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Abstract	
	
The	Caribbean	is	an	understudied	region	in	terms	of	gender	wage	gaps	
and	 this	 research	 adds	 new	 insights	 into	 the	 sparse	 economics	
literature	 on	 this	 topic	 for	 the	 region,	 and	 in	 particular,	 for	 the	 two-
island	 state	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 Economic	 inequality	 between	
men	 and	 women	 is	 a	 pertinent	 problem	 deserving	 of	 in-depth	 study	
because	 it	 has	 far-reaching	 inter-generational	 consequences.		
Furthermore,	gender	 inequalities	 in	 the	 labour	market	are	 considered	
as	indicators	that	considerably	restrain	economic	growth.		Trinidad	and	
Tobago’s	 economy	 has	 undergone	 tremendous	 strides	 in	 terms	 of	
economic	 growth	 over	 the	 past	 20	 years,	 and	 this	 study	 provides	 a	
deeper	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 gender	 pay	 gap	 evolved	 over	 that	
time	period.		The	present	analysis	of	the	gender	wage	gap	has	allowed	
us	to	ascertain	if	working	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	were	able	to	
benefit	from	the	country’s	improved	economic	prosperity.								
	
The	 present	 study	 employs	 2012	 Continuous	 Sample	 Survey	 of	 the	
Population	 (CSSP)	 data	 for	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 to	 investigate	 the	
causes	 of	 gender	 income	 differentials.	 The	 CSSP	 is	 used	 to	 generate	
labour	 force	 statistics	 for	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 and	 provides	 a	 wide	
range	of	 information,	 including	data	on	wages,	 gender,	 employment,	
unemployment,	 hours	 of	 work,	 industry,	 occupation,	 and	 level	 of	
education.	 	 The	 CSSP	 has	 two	main	 advantages	 that	make	 it	 a	 good	
source	 of	 data	 for	 analysing	 labour	 market	 issues	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago.		Firstly,	it	is	a	nationally	representative	population	survey,	and	
secondly,	it	is	the	most	detailed	population	survey	for	the	country.			
						
The	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 and	 Neumark	 methods	 of	 decomposition	 were	
used	 to	 portion	 the	 wage	 gap	 into	 “explained”	 and	 “unexplained”	
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components.	 	 The	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 differential	 is	 not	 well	
explained	 by	 differences	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 human	 capital	 (“explained”	
component)	and	 indeed	gender	bias	 in	 favour	of	male	workers	seems	
to	 be	 prevalent	 (“unexplained”	 component).	 	 The	 raw	 wage	 gap	 in	
2012	 measured	 11.4	 per	 cent,	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 gender	
discrimination	 women’s	 wages	 could	 increase	 by	 as	 much	 as	 26	 per	
cent.	
	
In	addition	 to	decomposing	 the	gender	wage	gap	at	 the	mean	 level	of	
wages,	 the	 research	 also	 investigated	 the	 causes	 of	 gender	 income	
differentials	along	the	entire	distribution	of	wages.	Two	recent	quantile	
decomposition	 techniques	 –	 developed	 by	 the	 Machado	 and	 Mata	
(2005)/Melly	(2006),	and	Firpo,	Fortin	and	Lemieux	(2009)	were	used	to	
portion	the	gap	into	“explained”	and	“unexplained”	components.		Similar	
to	the	findings	from	the	Blinder-Oaxaca	methodology,	the	results	for	this	
portion	of	the	research	suggest	that	the	differential	in	wages	is	not	well	
explained	by	differences	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 human	 capital	 and	 substantial	
gender	bias	in	favour	of	male	workers.			
	
Quantile	decompositions	allow	us	to	ascertain	if	there	is	a	“glass	ceiling”	
or	a	“sticky	floor”	 in	the	 labour	market.	 	Glass	ceilings	are	said	to	exist	
when	 there	 is	a	 larger	unexplained	gender	wage	gap	at	 the	 top	of	 the	
wage	 distribution,	 whereas	 sticky	 floors	 exist	 when	 there	 is	 a	 larger	
unexplained	wage	gap	at	 the	 lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution.	 	 The	
results	 suggest	 that	 female	workers	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 face	 sticky	
floors	rather	than	a	glass	ceiling.	
	
Lastly,	 the	 well-known	 Heckman	 two-step	 procedure	 (sometimes	
referred	 to	 as	 the	 limited	 information	 maximum	 likelihood	 (LIML)	
estimator)	was	employed	to	test	for	the	presence	of	sample	selection.		
The	 test	 for	 selectivity	 was	 carried	 out	 for	 both	 men	 and	 women	
separately.	The	results	indicated	no	evidence	of	sample	selection	in	any	
of	the	model	specifications,	including	Mincerian-type	wage	regressions	
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with	 additional	 controls	 for	 occupation,	 industry,	 and	 sector	 of	
employment	(public	vs.	private).		However,	the	sample	selection	model	
did	not	consider	any	exclusion	restrictions	due	to	data	limitations,	and	
consequently	 the	model	 proved	 to	 be	weakly	 identified.	 	 The	 chapter	
concluded	 that	 the	 “uncorrected”	 OLS	 subsample	 is	 the	 more	
appropriate	model	 to	be	used	 for	analysis	given	 that	 these	estimates	
are	 more	 robust	 compared	 to	 a	 sample	 selection	 model	 without	
exclusion	restrictions.		
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Chapter	1 Introduction	
	
1.1	 Context	and	Motivation	
	
“Throughout	most	 regions	and	many	occupations,	women	are	paid	
less	money	 than	men	 for	 the	 same	 job.	 In	 a	majority	 of	 countries,	
women's	 wages	 represent	 between	 70	 and	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 men's	
wages,	 with	 even	 lower	 ratios	 in	 some	 Asian	 and	 Latin	 American	
countries.”		
	 	 	 	 	 (International	Labour	Organisation,	2009)		
	
The	same	exists	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago.		Based	on	1993-data,	the	gender	wage	gap	
in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 measured	 19.2	 per	 cent	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001).	 	 The	
principle	of	equal	pay	 for	work	of	equal	 value	 has	gained	global	acceptance	and	 is	
reflected	 in	 several	 International	 Labour	 Organization	 conventions,	 including	 the	
organisation’s	Gender	Equality	Action	Plan	2010-2015.	The	importance	of	this	 issue	
is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 third	 goal	 of	 the	United	Nation’s	Millennium	Development	
Goals	–	promote	gender	equality	and	empower	women.		Furthermore,	as	part	of	the	
United	 Nation’s	 Post-2015	 Development	 Agenda,	 the	 Sustainable	 Development	
Goals	(SDGs)	–	the	successor	to	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	–	was	signed	in	
2015,	 with	 the	 fifth	 goal	 stated	 as	 gender	 equality.	 It	 was	 highlighted	 that,	 even	
though	goal	five	is	a	stand-alone	goal,	the	SDGs	would	only	be	successful	if	women	
are	completely	integrated	into	all	of	the	SDG	goals.	
	
Economic	 inequality	between	men	and	women	is	a	pertinent	problem	deserving	of	
in-depth	study	because	it	has	far-reaching	inter-generational	consequences.	Not	only	
do	 current	 gender	 wage	 gaps	 affect	 women,	 they	 also	 affect	 their	 children	 and	
future	 generations	 as	well.	 	 According	 to	 the	World	Bank	 (2011)	 there	 is	 evidence	
from	 several	 countries,	 both	 developed	 and	 developing,	 that	 when	 women	 have	
more	 control	 over	 household	 income	 (either	 their	 own	 income	 or	 cash	 transfers),	
children	tend	to	benefit	as	a	result	of	greater	spending	on	food	and	education.	
	
2	
	
In	 poverty	 research,	 gender	 inequalities	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 are	 considered	 as	
indicators	that	considerably	restrain	economic	growth	(United	Nations	Development	
Programme	 2008).	 	 The	 disparity	 in	 earnings	 among	men	 and	women	 has	 serious	
implications	 for	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 given	 that	 35	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 households	 are	
headed	by	women	(Household	Budgetary	Survey,	2008/2009).	 	Data	obtained	from	
the	Survey	of	Living	Conditions	 (2005)	has	shown	a	decline	 in	 the	national	poverty	
Headcount	 Index	 from	 18.4	 per	 cent	 in	 1998	 (Household	 Budgetary	 Survey	
1997/1998)	to	11.0	per	cent	in	2005.		Significantly,	some	38	per	cent	of	the	poorest	
households	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	in	2005,	were	headed	by	women.		
	
Globally,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 research	 conducted	 concerning	
labour	 markets.	 Many	 of	 these	 studies	 have	 focussed	 on	 gender	 disparities	 in	
developed	countries	(inter	alia	Anderson	et	al	2001;	Reiman	2001;	Chichilnisky	and	
Frederisksen	 2008).	 However,	 there	 are	 fewer	 studies	 based	 on	 developing	
economies	and	even	less	on	the	Caribbean.		Of	the	studies	based	on	the	Caribbean’s	
labour	markets,	 only	 a	 few	have	 concentrated	on	 the	 gender	 earnings	 gap.	 	 Reilly	
and	Bellony	(2009)	and	Bellony	and	Reilly	(2009)	looked	at	labour	market	earnings	in	
two	Eastern	Caribbean	islands	–	Dominica	and	St.	Lucia,	highlighting	gender,	ethnic,	
and	 inter-industry	 pay	 gaps.	 	 Sookram	 and	 Watson	 (2008)	 investigated	 wage	
discrimination	 between	males	 and	 females	 in	 the	 informal	 sector	 of	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago.		Coppin	(1998)	explored	women’s	earnings	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	based	on	
household	status	(that	is,	headship	versus	non-headship)	and	ethnicity,	while	Coppin	
and	Olsen	 (2007)	 investigated	gender	pay	gaps	 in	 the	public	and	private	 sectors	 in	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 More	 recently,	 Bellony	 et	 al	 (2010)	 investigated	 gender	
earnings	 gaps	 in	 two	 Caribbean	 countries	 –	 Barbados	 and	 Jamaica.	 This	 thesis	
contributes	 to	 the	 limited	 literature	on	 gender	wage	 gaps	 in	 the	Caribbean	 region	
and	in	particular	the	two-island	state	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
		
	
This	particular	type	of	study	is	also	timely	and	relevant	in	the	context	of	Trinidad	and	
Tobago.	 The	 government	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 has	 stated	 that	 one	 of	 their	
strategic	 objectives	 includes	 the	 incorporation	 of	 “a	 gender	 perspective	 in	 all	
development	planning	as	the	strategy	for	promoting	gender	equity	and	‘fairness’	so	
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that	development	planning	itself	becomes	fundamentally	gendered”	(National	Policy	
on	 Gender	 and	 Development,	 2009).	 	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 government’s	 overall	
framework	for	sustainable	development	both	female-headed	households	and	single-
parent	 households	 were	 identified	 as	 most	 vulnerable	 to	 poverty	 (Ministry	 of	
Planning	and	the	Economy,	Medium-Term	Policy	Framework	2012-2014).	In	Trinidad	
and	Tobago,	poverty	 is	higher	among	female-headed	households	because	women’s	
wages	tend	to	be	lower	and	fewer	women	in	this	group	are	in	paid	employment	(UN	
Women	Caribbean,	Advocacy	Brief:	 Strengthening	Women’s	 Economic	 Security	and	
Rights).		The	results	and	analysis	in	this	thesis	should	prove	useful	to	policymakers	in	
devising	 a	 more	 directed	 approach	 to	 tackle	 the	 issue	 of	 gender	 inequality	 and	
discrimination	in	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	labour	market.	
	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 economy	 has	 undergone	 tremendous	 strides	 in	 economic	
growth	over	 the	past	20	 years,	 and	 this	 study	provides	a	deeper	understanding	of	
how	 the	gender	pay	gap	evolved	over	 that	 time	period.	 	During	 the	years	1994	 to	
2008,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 experienced	 an	 economic	 boom;	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
gender	wage	gap	will	allow	us	to	ascertain	if	working	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
benefited	from	the	country’s	improved	economic	prosperity.		During	this	time,	new	
anti-discrimination	 legislation	 was	 passed	 –	 the	 Equal	 Opportunities	 Act	 of	 2000.		
The	 current	 analysis	 is	 only	 for	 one	 year	 (2012),	 therefore,	 the	 significance	of	 this	
new	 anti-discrimination	 legislation	 and	 its	 likely	 impact	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	
could	not	be	adequately	investigated.		The	analysis	was	however	able	to	answer	the	
question,	 which	 has	 been	 raised	 recently	 in	 both	 public	 and	 political	 fora:	 “Do	
women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	face	a	“glass	ceiling”1?”		At	the	time	of	writing,	there	
have	been	no	other	economic	research	papers	analysing	the	“glass	ceiling”	effect	for	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
The	main	 empirical	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 quantify	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	
gender	 pay	 gap	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 This	 analysis	 also	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	
gaining	 new	 insights	 into	 the	 nature	 and	 sources	 of	 gender	 wage	 inequality	 in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.	To	achieve	this	objective,	 the	gender	wage	gap	was	analysed	
																																								 																				
1	 The	 term	 “glass	 ceiling”	 refers	 to	 an	 informal	 barrier	 that	 limits	 the	 level	 to	 which	 a	 woman	 or	
another	member	of	a	demographic	minority	can	advance	within	the	hierarchy	in	an	organisation.		This	
barrier	disregards	factors	that	normally	influence	career	development,	such	as	education	and	earlier	
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using	 the	 well-known	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 and	 Neumark	 decomposition	 methodologies	
applied	to	nationally	representative	data	for	2012.	 	 In	addition,	 in	order	to	analyse	
the	 wage	 gap	 throughout	 the	 entire	 wage	 distribution,	 the	 Machado	 and	 Mata	
(2005)/Melly	 (2006)	 and	 RIF-regressions	 (re-centred	 influence	 function)	 quantile	
decomposition	techniques	were	employed.	
	
Following	many	years	of	research	analysing	the	magnitude	(and	source)	of	the	mean	
gender	wage	gap	(Blinder-Oaxaca	decomposition),	researchers	have	recently	begun	
to	consider	 the	way	 in	which	relative	wages	differ	 for	high-	and	 low-wage	workers	
(using	 quantile	 regressions).	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this	 shift	 in	 analysis.	
Firstly,	 the	magnitude	of	 the	gender	wage	gap	 is	generally	not	constant	across	 the	
entire	wage	 distribution	 and	 the	 gap	 in	mean	wages	 obscures	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 the	
variation	 in	the	data.	Secondly,	a	better	understanding	of	the	role	of	gender	 in	the	
labour	market	emerges	when	 there	 is	an	expanded	 focus	on	outcomes	apart	 from	
simply	the	“average”	man	and	woman,	in	particular,	the	presence	of	“glass	ceilings”	
where	 the	gender	wage	gap	 tends	 to	be	 larger	amongst	workers	earning	 relatively	
high	wages,	and	the	existence	of	“sticky	floors”	which	occurs	at	the	lower	end	of	the	
wage	distribution.		
	
In	the	latter	portion	of	the	research,	the	issue	of	sample	selection	was	tackled.		This	
was	 done	 by	 estimating	 the	 wage	 equation	 jointly	 with	 selection	 into	 the	 labour	
market	 using	 Heckman’s	 two-step	method,	which	 estimates	 selection	 first	 using	 a	
probit	model	 for	employment	determination	and	 then	 inserting	 the	selection	 term	
(or	 the	 inverse	 Mills	 ratio)	 into	 the	 OLS	 estimation	 of	 the	 wage	 equation.	 	 For	
identification	of	 the	 selection	parameter	 in	 the	earnings	 function,	Heckman’s	 two-
step	method	 requires	 variable(s)	 that	 influence	 the	probability	of	 employment	but	
not	 the	 level	 of	 earnings	 (that	 is,	 exclusion	 restrictions).	 	 Due	 to	 data	 limitations,	
appropriate	exclusion	restrictions	were	void	from	the	analysis,	and	consequently,	the	
functional	 form	 of	 the	 selection	 equation	 was	 used	 for	 identification.	 	 Maddala	
(1985)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 even	 when	 no	 exclusion	 restrictions	 are	 used,	 an	
important	 feature	 of	 the	 selection	 model	 is	 its	 ability	 to	 investigate	 potential	
outcomes	in	addition	to	observed	outcomes.						
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Finally,	the	results	from	the	first-stage	of	the	Heckman	model	(the	probit	model	for	
employment	 determination)	 were	 used	 to	 explore	 the	 labour	 supply	 decision	 of	
women.	 	 These	 results	 highlight	 some	 of	 the	 factors	 that	 are	 most	 influential	 in	
determining	the	supply	of	 labour	and	elucidate	some	of	the	reasons	 leading	to	the	
gender	gap	in	wage	employment	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
The	data	used	in	the	analysis	was	derived	from	the	2012	(third	quarter)	Continuous	
Sample	Survey	of	the	Population	(CSSP),	which	is	conducted	by	the	Central	Statistical	
Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(CSO).		The	CSSP	is	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	force	
survey	and	is	used	to	provide	up-to-date	data	on	labour	force	characteristics	of	the	
population	on	a	continuing	basis.		The	CSSP	has	two	main	advantages	that	make	it	a	
good	source	of	data	for	analysing	labour	market	issues	in	the	country.		Firstly,	it	is	a	
nationally	 representative	 population	 survey,	 and	 secondly,	 it	 is	 the	 most	 detailed	
population	survey	for	the	labour	market	available	for	the	country	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	
2001).	 	 Notwithstanding	 these	 advantages,	 the	 data	 set	 is	 limited2	 insofar	 that	
appropriate	 instrumental	 variables	 were	 not	 available	 to	 adequately	 address	
econometric	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 possible	 endogeneity	 of	 education,	 heterogeneity,	
and	sample	selection.		Although,	Card	(1999)	performed	a	survey	of	the	literature	on	
the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 education	 and	 earnings	 and	 concluded	 that	 the	
average	(or	average	marginal)	return	to	education	for	a	given	population	is	not	much	
less	 than	 the	 estimate	 derived	 from	 a	 standard	 human	 capital	 earnings	 function	
fitted	by	OLS.			Moreover,	Card	(1999)	also	concluded	that	IV	estimates	of	the	return	
to	 education	 based	 on	 family	 background	 are	 systematically	 higher	 than	
corresponding	OLS	estimates,	implying	that	IV	estimates	have	an	even	larger	upward	
“ability”	bias	than	OLS	estimates.									
	
																																								 																				
2	 No	major	 revisions	 have	 been	made	 to	 the	 CSSP	 questionnaire	 since	 the	 late-1980s	 save	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 a	 few	 additional	 questions	 relating	 to	 ethnicity,	 location	 of	 employment,	 and	 having	 a	
second	 job.	 	 The	 other	major	 nationally	 representative	 surveys	 conducted	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	
include	the	Household	Budget	Survey	(HBS)	and	the	Survey	of	Living	Conditions	(SLC).		Although	both	
the	 HBS	 and	 SLC	 questionnaires	 include	 a	 question	 relating	 to	 gross	monthly	 income,	 they	 do	 not	
enquire	about	the	number	of	hours	worked,	making	them	not	suitable	for	this	analysis	where	hourly	
wages	is	used	as	the	dependent	variable.	 	Additionally,	the	most	recent	HBS	was	conducted	in	2008	
while	the	most	recent	SLC	was	conducted	in	2005.		Consequently,	as	this	research	started	in	2013,	the	
(third	 quarter)	 2012	 CSSP	 was	 deemed	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 survey	 data	 to	 be	 used	 for	 our	
analysis.													
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1.2	 Research	Questions	
	
The	main	research	questions	this	thesis	sought	to	answer	include:	
1. What	is	the	overall	size	of	the	gender	wage	gap	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago?	
2. Does	the	magnitude	of	the	gender	wage	gap	differ	in	the	public	sector	versus	
the	private	sector?	
3. Do	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	face	a	“glass	ceiling”	or	“sticky	floor”?	
4. What	factors	account	for	the	gender	gap	in	wage	employment	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago?	
	
1.3	 Main	Contributions	
	
The	 main	 contributions	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 two-fold.	 	 Firstly,	 it	 provided	 the	 first	
measure	of	the	overall	size	of	the	gender	wage	gap	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	in	twenty	
years.	 	 The	 detailed	 decompositions	 of	 the	 wage	 gap	 provide	 a	 greater	
understanding	of	some	of	the	main	sources	of	“discrimination”	that	working	women	
in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 face,	 but	 not	 only	 for	 the	 overall	 working	 population,	 but	
within	the	public	and	private	sectors	as	well.		The	thesis	was	able	to	reveal	that	the	
wage	gap	narrowed	over	the	period	1993	to	2012.					
	
Secondly,	 the	 thesis	makes	original	 contributions	 to	 the	 literature	on	gender	wage	
gaps	specifically	for	the	economy	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	by	analysing	the	wage	gap	
not	only	at	the	mean,	but	also	at	various	points	along	the	wage	distribution.		To	date,	
there	have	been	no	other	studies	looking	at	gender	pay	differentials	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	between	high-income	and	low-income	earners.		This	portion	of	the	research	
makes	original	 contributions	 to	 the	existing	 literature	on	discrimination	 in	Trinidad	
and	 Tobago’s	 labour	 market	 in	 the	 context	 of	 any	 existing	 “glass	 ceiling”	 and/or	
“sticky	 floor”.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 research	 also	 adds	 to	 the	 literature	 insofar	 by	
analysing	the	gender	pay	gap	via	quantile	decomposition	for	the	public	and	private	
sectors.			
	
The	findings	of	this	research	prove	that	such	analyses	are	important	given	that	low-
income	earning	women	appear	to	face	far	more	discrimination	in	the	labour	market	
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compared	 to	 their	 higher-income	 earning	 counterparts,	 and	 this	 result	 can	 prove	
useful	for	policy	formulation	and	implementation.								
	
1.4	 Main	Findings	
	
The	main	findings	showed	that	the	gender	wage	gap	narrowed	over	the	past	twenty	
years,	moving	from	19.2	per	cent	in	1993	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001)	to	11.4	per	cent	
in	2012.	 	However,	 the	 size	of	 the	gap	differs	greatly	 in	 the	public	and	 the	private	
sector;	the	male-female	pay	gap	in	the	public	sector	is	negligible	(3.2	per	cent),	while	
the	 gap	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 far	 greater	 (23	 per	 cent).	 	 The	 decompositions	
compartmentalise	the	gap	into	two	portions	–	first,	a	part	due	to	differences	in	the	
productive	 characteristics	 between	 men	 and	 women	 and	 second,	 a	 part	 due	 to	
differences	in	returns	for	these	characteristics.		Given	the	fact	that	working	women	
in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	have	higher	levels	of	educational	attainment	than	men,	the	
results	 of	 the	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decompositions	 reveal	 that	 if	 women	 possessed	 the	
same	mean	characteristics	as	men,	their	wages	would	actually	decrease	by	11.6	per	
cent;	however,	if	their	productive	characteristics	were	rewarded	at	the	same	rates	as	
men,	their	wages	could	potentially	increase	by	as	much	as	26	per	cent.			
	
The	main	result	based	on	the	quantile	decompositions	is	that	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	
labour	market	does	not	have	a	glass	 ceiling,	but	 rather	 female	workers	 face	sticky	
floors	–	for	the	overall	working	population	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution,	
the	gender	wage	gap	is	much	larger	(25.1	per	cent)	compared	to	the	higher	end	of	
wages	where	no	gap	exists.		
		
The	main	focus	of	this	thesis	is	measuring	and	decomposing	the	gender	wage	gap	in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.	 	By	 the	very	design	of	wage	equations,	unemployed	persons	
and	 those	not	 in	 the	 labour	market	are	omitted	 from	the	analysis.	 	Given	 that	 the	
subsample	used	is	restricted	to	only	wage	earners	and	not	a	random	sample	of	the	
overall	population,	the	coefficient	estimates	in	the	wage	equations	could	be	biased.		
In	the	OLS	and	quantile	regressions	used,	the	issue	of	sample	selection	was	not	taken	
into	account.			
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The	 research	 concluded	 that	 the	 “uncorrected”	 OLS	 estimates	 used	 do	 not	 suffer	
from	sample	selection	bias	given	that	the	Heckman	two-step	method	was	unable	to	
reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 no	 sample	 selection.	 	 However,	 this	 conclusion	 is	 a	
tentative	one	and	some	interpretational	caution	should	perhaps	be	exercised	given	
that	 the	 sample	 selection	 model	 was	 weakly	 identified,	 as	 it	 did	 not	 include	 any	
exclusion	restrictions	due	to	data	limitations	in	the	survey	used.		Nonetheless,	some	
researchers	 (Stolzenberg	and	Relles,	1997)	have	noted	 that	only	 if	 selection	bias	 is	
very	severe	and	the	samples	are	large,	does	Heckman’s	two-step	correction	method	
improve	estimates	compared	to	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	estimates.						
	
Notwithstanding	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 self-selection	 in	 our	 sample,	 it	 should	 be	
noted	however,	that	in	the	absence	of	selectivity	correction,	the	coefficients	should	
be	 interpreted	 as	 being	 conditional	 on	 the	 selected	 sample.	 	 In	 other	 words,	
inferences	about	all	women	of	working	age	cannot	be	made.		The	coefficients	in	the	
“uncorrected”	OLS	and	quantile	 regressions	are	biased	estimates	of	 the	 returns	 to	
covariates	–	and	 it	 is	acknowledged	that	 these	 ‘returns	 to	endowments’	are	of	 the	
given	sample	and	cannot	be	applied	to	the	working	age	population	in	general.	
	
Finally,	 regarding	 employment	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 in	 2012,	 the	 percentage	 of	
men	 and	 women	 in	 wage	 employment	 was	 66.3	 per	 cent	 and	 53.5	 per	 cent,	
respectively.	 	As	expected,	 the	predicted	probability	of	women	participating	 in	 the	
labour	 market	 increases	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 education.	 	 Education	 has	 a	 larger	
(positive)	impact	on	a	woman’s	decision	to	engage	in	wage	employment	than	it	does	
for	 men.	 	 In	 keeping	 with	 societal	 norms,	 on	 average,	 having	 a	 partner	
(married/common	 law)	 decreases	 a	 woman’s	 probability	 of	 participating	 in	 the	
labour	market.		One	particularly	interesting	result	with	reference	to	ethnicity3	is	that	
ethnicity	 is	not	a	significant	determinant	of	wages	for	either	men	or	women,	but	 it	
does	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	women’s	 labour	 supply	 decision.	 	Women	 of	 Indian	
descent	are	the	least	likely	to	participate	in	the	labour	market,	and	this	may	be	due	
to	historical	and	cultural	norms	within	that	sub-ethnic	grouping.				
	
	
																																								 																				
3	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	ethnic	composition	in	2012	was:	38.6	per	cent	African,	41.6	per	cent	Indian,	
and	19.7	per	cent	Mixed/Other.	
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1.5	 Organisation	of	Thesis	
	
The	remainder	of	this	thesis	is	organised	as	follows:	Chapter	2	discusses	the	issue	of	
sample	 selection	and	explores	 the	gender	gap	 in	employment.	 	Chapter	3	gives	an	
overview	of	the	labour	market	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	and	decomposes	the	gender	
wage	gap	into	“explained”	and	“unexplained”	components	using	the	Blinder-Oaxaca	
methodology	based	on	OLS	 regressions.	 	 Chapter	 4	 explores	 the	 gender	wage	 gap	
throughout	the	entire	wage	distribution	using	quantile	regressions,	paying	particular	
attention	to	the	“glass	ceiling”	and	“sticky	floor”	phenomena.		Chapter	5	concludes	
the	thesis,	highlights	some	of	the	limitations	of	the	research,	and	gives	some	policy	
implications.			
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Chapter	2 Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	with	Sample	Selection	Adjustment	
	
2.1 Introduction	
	
The	main	focus	of	this	thesis	is	measuring	and	decomposing	the	gender	wage	gap	in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.	 	By	 the	very	design	of	wage	equations,	unemployed	persons	
and	 those	 not	 in	 the	 labour	 force	 are	 omitted	 from	 the	 analysis.	 	 Several	 studies	
(Badel	 and	 Peña	 2010,	 Beblo	 et	 al	 2003)	 have	 shown	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	
correlation	between	wages	and	the	propensity	 to	participate	 in	 the	 labour	market,	
and	the	estimated	wage	gap	understates	the	true	difference	in	earnings	when	self-
selection	is	 ignored.		The	wage	equations	used	throughout	the	analysis	were	based	
on	subsamples	from	a	nationally	representative	labour	force	survey,	the	CSSP,	based	
on	 specified	 criteria,	 such	 as,	 being	 of	 working	 age	 (15-65),	 employees	 only,	 and	
having	a	non-zero	value	for	wages.		The	issue	of	self-selection	is	particularly	relevant	
in	 the	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 context	 given	 that	 in	 the	 period	 spanning	 1990-2010,	
female	 labour	 force	 participation	 averaged	 less	 than	 50	 per	 cent.	 	 Consequently,	
without	correcting	for	the	likelihood	of	selectivity	bias,	the	results	from	the	OLS	and	
quantile	 regression	 estimations	 may	 have	 indeed	 underestimated	 the	 size	 of	 the	
gender	wage	gap	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.				
	
Given	that	the	subsample	used	is	restricted	to	only	wage	earners	and	not	a	random	
sample	 of	 the	 overall	 population,	 the	 coefficient	 estimates	 in	 the	wage	 equations	
could	be	biased.	 	 For	 instance,	women	with	 young	 children	may	not	participate	 in	
the	 labour	market	 since	 the	 wages	 they	 would	 earn	 would	 not	 offset	 the	 cost	 of	
childcare	and	the	disutility	from	not	being	able	to	raise	their	children	for	themselves.		
Such	 women	 tend	 to	 have	 high	 reservation	 wages	 compared	 to	 women	 without	
young	children.		Hence,	women	with	young	children	who	decide	to	participate	in	the	
labour	 market,	 tend	 to	 do	 so	 because	 their	 offered	 wages	 are	 higher	 than	 their	
reservation	 wages.	 	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 women	who	 possess	 characteristics	
(such	as	high	cognitive	abilities,	motivation,	etc.),	which	are	rewarded	highly	 in	the	
labour	market.							
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Usually	 in	 applied	 econometric	 work,	 the	 researcher	 does	 not	 observe	 these	
characteristics	 and	 when	 estimating	 wages	 by	 OLS,	 the	 estimation	may	 include	 a	
random	 sample	 of	 women	 without	 children	 alongside	 a	 non-random	 sample	 of	
women	 with	 children.	 	 If	 this	 is	 indeed	 the	 case,	 and	 we	 want	 the	 results	 of	 the	
estimation	to	apply	to	all	women	and	not	just	those	in	the	labour	market,	we	need	
to	 take	 into	 account	 selection	 into	 the	 labour	 market.	 	 This	 can	 be	 done	 by	
estimating	 the	wage	 equation	 jointly	 with	 selection	 into	 the	 labour	market	 either	
simultaneously	using	Heckman’s	maximum	likelihood	estimator	(efficient	estimator)	
or	 Heckman’s	 two-step	 method	 (consistent,	 but	 inefficient4),	 which	 estimates	
selection	first	using	a	probit	model	and	then	OLS	estimation	of	the	wage	equation.		
	
The	 survey	 used	 for	 this	 analysis,	 unfortunately,	 does	 not	 include	 any	 question(s)	
surrounding	 number	 of	 children	 and/or	 the	 ages	 of	 children	 in	 the	 household.		
Indeed,	 without	 such	 data	 we	 cannot	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 presence	 of	
(young)	 children	 in	 the	 household	 is	 a	 significant	 determining	 factor	 for	 female	
labour	force	participation	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.		Consequently,	the	functional	form	
of	 the	 selection	 equation	 was	 used	 for	 identification	 rather	 than	 exclusion	
restrictions:	broadly	speaking,	the	same	explanatory	variables	were	used	in	both	the	
wage	equation	and	the	selection	equation.5		This	was	due	to	the	paucity	of	relevant	
data	in	the	survey	but	one	should	also	note	that	it	is	conceptually	problematic	to	find	
suitable	 instrumental	 variables	 for	 the	 selection	 equation,	 as	 variables	 that	
determine	 labour	market	participation	also	determine	wages	 (for	example,	 level	of	
education).	 	 Identification	 of	 the	model	 by	 functional	 form	was	 possible	 since	 the	
Inverse	 Mill’s	 Ratio	 (IMR)	 is	 nonlinear	 (this	 is	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	
Methodology	 section).	 	 Notably,	 as	 the	 IMR	 may	 be	 linear	 for	 some	 ranges,	
																																								 																				
4	 An	efficient	 estimator	is	 one	 that	 has	 small	variances,	 that	 is,	the	 estimator	 deviates	 as	 little	 as	
possible	from	the	“true”	value	you	are	trying	to	estimate.		An	estimator	is	consistent	if,	as	the	sample	
size	 increases,	 the	 estimates	 produced	 by	 the	 estimator	 “converge”	 to	 the	 true	 value	 of	 the	
parameter	being	estimated.		In	other	words,	consistency	means	that,	as	the	sample	size	increases,	the	
sampling	 distribution	 of	 the	 estimator	 becomes	 increasingly	 concentrated	 at	 the	 true	 parameter	
value.					
5	 The	 wage	 equation	 included	 the	 following	 variables:	 potential	 experience,	 potential	 experience	
squared,	dummies	for	highest	level	of	education	attained,	dummies	for	marital	status,	and	dummies	
for	 ethnicity.	 	 The	 selection	 equation	 included	 the	 same	 variables	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 potential	
experience	and	its	square;	instead	dummies	for	age	categories	ranging	from	15	to	65	were	used.			
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identification	may	be	weak.	 	Notwithstanding	this,	Maddala	(1986)	notes	that	even	
in	 the	 scenario	 where	 the	 data	 is	 censored	 and	 there	 are	 no	 available	 exclusion	
restrictions,	 we	 can	 define	 the	 selection	 equation	 over	 the	 whole	 population	 and	
analyse	the	model	of	interest	from	the	censored	sample.								
						
Notwithstanding	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 self-selection	 bias,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	
however,	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 selectivity	 correction	 the	 coefficients	 should	 be	
interpreted	as	being	conditional	on	the	selected	sample.		In	other	words,	inferences	
about	 all	 women	 of	 working	 age	 cannot	 be	 made.	 	 The	 coefficients	 in	 the	
“uncorrected”	 regressions	 from	 the	next	 two	 chapters	 are	biased	estimates	of	 the	
returns	 to	covariates	–	and	 it	 is	acknowledged	that	 these	 ‘returns	 to	endowments’	
are	 of	 the	 given	 sample	 and	 cannot	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 working	 age	 population	 in	
general	(de	la	Rica	et	al,	2007).	
	
Briefly,	 the	 research	 concludes	 that	 the	 “uncorrected”	OLS	 estimates	 used	 do	 not	
suffer	 from	 sample	 selection	 bias	 given	 that	 the	 Heckman	 two-step	 method	 was	
unable	 to	 reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 no	 sample	 selection.	 	 However,	 this	
conclusion	 is	 a	 tentative	 one	 given	 that	 the	 sample	 selection	 model	 was	 weakly	
identified	as	it	did	not	include	any	exclusion	restrictions	due	to	data	limitations	in	the	
survey	used.						
	
The	rest	of	the	chapter	is	outlined	as	follows:	section	2.2	discusses	the	literature	and	
theoretical	 background	 of	 the	 neoclassical	 theory	 of	 time	 allocation;	 section	 2.3	
presents	 the	 methodology	 used	 for	 analysis	 –	 Heckman	 correction	 procedure;	
section	2.4	outlines	 the	data	 and	econometric	 specification	used	while	 section	2.5	
discusses	the	results.		Section	2.6	concludes	the	chapter.		
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2.2 Literature	Review	
	
To	 estimate	 a	 wage	 equation	 for	 people	 of	 working	 age,	 the	 ideal	 would	 be	 to	
include	all	individuals	whether	or	not	they	are	working.	However,	earnings	are	only	
observed	 for	 those	persons	who	are	 in	 the	 labour	 force,	 leading	 the	 researcher	 to	
use	a	selected	sample.		People	self-select	into	employment,	hence	whether	the	wage	
is	observed	or	not	will	depend	on	an	 individual’s	 labour	supply	decision.	 	Failing	to	
account	 for	 this	 sample	 selection,	 may	 lead	 to	 biased	 estimates	 of	 the	 wage	
equation.		Additionally,	given	that	women	are	less	likely	to	be	employed	than	men	in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago,	the	selectivity	bias	could	affect	the	comparisons	of	returns	to	
men’s	and	women’s	covariates	–	 for	example,	a	 small	proportion	of	women	 in	 the	
labour	 force	 may	 be	 relatively	 more	 able	 or	 more	 ambitious	 and	 therefore	 their	
unobservable	characteristics	could	be	positively	correlated	with	schooling	and	wages	
thus	leading	to	biased	estimates	on	the	returns	to	their	education.		To	deal	with	the	
issue	of	potential	 sample	 selection	bias,	 this	 chapter	employs	Heckman’s	 selection	
correction.			
	
The	 neoclassical	 theory	 of	 time	 allocation	 is	 one	 of	 the	 eminent	 theories	 used	 to	
explain	 labour	 supply	 decisions	 of	 individuals	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 decision	 whether	 to	
participate	 or	 not	 in	 the	 work	 force.	 	 The	main	 assumption	 of	 this	 theory	 is	 that	
individuals	 value	 their	 time	 according	 to	 his/her	preferences	 that	maximise	 utility,	
then	decide	whether	to	participate	 in	the	 labour	market.	 	The	decision	 is	based	on	
the	 value	 placed	 on	 market	 activities	 versus	 the	 value	 placed	 on	 non-market	
activities.		If	the	value	of	time	spent	on	market	activities	is	higher	than	the	value	of	
non-market	activities,	then	the	individual	decides	to	participate	and	vice	versa.			
	
The	 value	 of	market	 activities	 depends	 on	 the	 prevailing	wage	 rate	 in	 the	market	
while	 the	 value	 of	 non-market	 activities	 depends	 on	 the	 individual’s	 tastes	 and	
preferences	as	well	as	the	demands	placed	on	the	individual’s	non-market	time,	such	
as,	 the	 number	 of	 children	 and	 dependents	 in	 the	 household	 and	 non-market	
income.	 	 Traditionally,	 women	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 high	 reservation	 wage	 (the	
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minimum	wage	rate	 at	 which	 a	 worker	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 accept	 employment)	
given	that	they	tend	to	give	a	high	value	to	non-market	activities	at	home.			
	
Several	factors	contribute	to	the	difference	in	time	spent	on	market	and	non-market	
activities	 between	 men	 and	 women.	 	 In	 some	 societies,	 women	 are	 considered	
better	 suited	 to	 work	 in	 household	 activities	 (such	 as	 child	 care)	 and	 women	 are	
viewed	 differently	 from	 men,	 particularly	 regarding	 different	 expectations	 of	
academic	achievement.		In	such	patriarchal	societies,	men	tend	to	spend	more	time	
on	market	activities	while	women	are	more	likely	to	spend	time	on	home	activities	
(Mollet,	2011).		Given	this,	in	such	patriarchal	societies,	it	is	not	unusual	for	women	
to	have	lower	labour	force	participation	rates	compared	to	the	participation	rates	of	
men.	 	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 relatively	 lower	 female	 labour	 force	 participation	
rate	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	may	be	because	of	the	embedded	patriarchy	still	present	
in	 the	 society.	 Indeed,	 some	 Caribbean	 feminists	 have	 asserted	 that	 gender	 roles	
during	the	time	of	colonialism	have	filtered	down	to	subsequent	generations	(Bailey,	
2003;	Barriteau,	1995).		
	
The	 neoclassical	model	 of	 time	 allocation	 or	 the	model	 of	 labour-leisure	 choice	 is	
traditionally	 used	 to	 analyse	 labour	 supply	 decisions	 of	 individuals,	 and	 is	 an	
extension	 of	 the	 utility	 maximisation	 problem	 of	 consumer	 theory.	 	 The	 model	
analyses	 how	 individuals	 make	 choices	 in	 deciding	 how	 they	 will	 spend	 a	 fixed	
amount	of	time.		The	model	has	two	main	assumptions:	
1) There	are	only	two	possible	uses	of	time	–	labour	and	leisure;	and	
2) Each	 individual	 selects	 the	 combination	 of	 hours	 of	 work	 and	 leisure	 that	
maximises	his/her	level	of	satisfaction	(utility).	
	
In	the	basic	model,	individuals	maximise	their	utility	or	satisfaction	(U)	by	consuming	
goods	and	services	 (C)	and	by	consuming	time	 in	 leisure	activities	 (L).	 	For	working	
individuals,	the	opportunity	cost	of	an	additional	hour	of	leisure	time	is	his/her	wage	
rate.		Individuals	choose	not	to	work	if	the	value	of	leisure	time	exceeds	the	market	
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wage.	 	 The	 amount	 consumed	 in	 goods	 and	 services	 and	 leisure	 depends	 on	 the	
individual’s	market	wage	(W),	personal	preferences,	and	non-labour	income	(V).	
	
The	individual’s	utility	is	therefore	a	function	of	the	person’s	consumption	of	goods	
and	services	and	leisure:	𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(1)	
where	U	is	an	index	that	measures	the	individual’s	level	of	satisfaction	or	happiness,	
assuming	that	people	are	able	to	rank	all	possible	combinations	of	C	and	L	from	least	
desirable	 to	most	desirable.	 	Hence,	a	higher	 index	U	means	greater	amounts	of	C	
and/or	L	and	greater	satisfaction.		C	and	L	can	be	considered	as	economic	“goods”	–	
that	is,	the	more	of	either	is	preferred	to	less.	
	
A	person’s	consumption	of	goods	and	leisure	 is	constrained	by	his/her	time	and	by	
his/her	 income.	 	When	an	 individual	maximises	his/her	utility	with	 respect	 to	 time	
during	 the	 period	 under	 analysis,	 (s)he	 must	 first	 allocate	 the	 day’s	 discretionary	
time	(T)	towards	either	working	for	pay	(H)	or	towards	leisure	(L).		Income	is	derived	
from	 labour	 wages	 (W	 *	 H)	 and	 non-labour	 income	 (V).	 	 Non-labour	 income	 is	
independent	of	how	many	hours	a	person	works	and	may	include	property	income,	
dividends,	and	lottery	prizes.6			
These	two	constraints	can	be	written	as:	
𝑇 = 𝐿 + 𝐻	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(2)	
𝐶 = 𝑊 ∗ 𝐻 + 𝑉	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(3)	
Equation	 3	 is	 the	 individual’s	 budget	 constraint	 and	 shows	 that	 consumption	
expenditure	cannot	exceed	the	individual’s	total	income.7		The	budget	constraint	can	
re-written	as:	
																																								 																				
6	For	women,	non-labour	income	may	also	include	the	husband’s	earnings.			
7	 An	 additional	 assumption	 of	 the	 model	 is	 that	 the	 individual	 does	 not	 save	 or	 borrow.	 	 The	
specification	of	 the	budget	 constraint	 implies	 that	 the	 individual	 spends	all	 if	his/her	 income	 in	 the	
period	under	analysis.			
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𝐶 =𝑊 𝑇 − 𝐿 + 𝑉	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(4)	
Setting	 up	 the	 Lagrangian	 to	 derive	 the	 individual’s	 utility	 maximisation	 problem	
gives:	
ℓ = 𝑈 𝐶, 𝐿 +  𝜆 { 𝑊 𝑇 − 𝐿 + 𝑉 − 𝐶}		
The	first	order	conditions	are:	
!ℓ!" =  !"!" −  𝜆 = 0 ∴ 𝑀𝑈! =  𝜆	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(5)	
!ℓ!" =  !"!" −  𝜆𝑊 = 0 ∴ !"!! =  𝜆	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(6)	
Equating	equations	5	and	6,	we	get:	
!"!!"! =𝑊	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(7)	
	
Equation	7	represents	the	utility-maximising	 labour	supply	decision	principle	–	that	
is,	for	a	given	real	wage,	𝑊,	the	individual	chooses	to	work	for	the	number	of	hours	
for	which	the	marginal	rate	of	substitution	of	leisure	for	the	consumption	of	goods	is	
equal	to	𝑊.		This	type	of	solution	is	called	an	interior	solution	since	the	individual	is	
not	 at	 either	 corner	 of	 the	 opportunity	 set,	 meaning	 (s)he	 is	 not	 working	 for	 all	
available	hours,	or	working	for	no	hours	whatsoever.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 neoclassical	 theory	 of	 time	 allocation,	 other	 factors	 which	
determine	 women’s	 labour	 supply	 decisions	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 patriarchal	
structures	in	the	household	and	the	wider	society,	characteristics	of	male	and	female	
labour	 supply,	 and	 incentives	 and	 disincentives	 created	 by	 national	 employment	
systems	 (Lisaniler	 and	 Bhatti,	 2005).	 	 According	 to	 Walby	 (1994),	 a	 sociologist,	
patriarchy	 in	 the	 household,	 state	 and	 culture	 affect	 women’s	 labour	 supply	
negatively.	
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In	 the	 Caribbean	 context,	 Seguino	 (2003)	 notes	 several	 reasons	 why	 Caribbean	
women	 face	greater	challenges	 than	 their	male	counterpart	 in	 terms	of	 job	search	
and	 employment;	 in	 turn,	 these	 obstacles	 may	 lead	 to	 lower	 labour	 force	
participation	rates	 for	women.	 	Seguino	 (2003)	states	 that	since	Caribbean	women	
have	 primary	 responsibility	 for	 children,	 the	 elderly,	 and	 the	 ill,	 they	 tend	 to	 face	
more	difficulty	than	men	in	searching	for	a	job.		Segunio	(2003)	also	highlights	that	
job	searches	incur	costs,	and	caretakers	would	need	to	replace	unpaid	labour	while	
seeking	employment.	 	 This	 issue	may	also	 lead	 to	women	 limiting	 their	 job	 search	
geographically	to	ensure	their	availability	if	they	are	needed	at	home	on	short	notice	
to	care	for	children	and/or	family	members.		These	factors	are	likely	to	increase	the	
probability	of	women	being	unemployed	or	opting	to	drop	out	of	the	labour	market	
completely.					
	
Although	 not	 formally	 tested	 in	 this	 current	 research,	 other	 sources	 of	 potential	
sample	selectivity	bias	may	arise	in	addition	to	the	labour	force	participation	process	
–	namely,	choice	of	sector	of	employment,	for	example,	public	versus	private	and/or	
formal	 versus	 informal	 employment.	 	 Optimising	 behaviour	 on	 the	 part	 of	 agents,	
may	lead	individuals	to	enter	that	sector	which	provides	them	with	the	greatest	net	
advantage	(Hoffnar	and	Greene,	1996).		If	the	variables	that	affect	sectoral	choice	of	
employment	 and	 earnings	 are	 correlated,	 then	 the	 earnings	 determination	 and	
sectoral	 choice	 processes	will	 not	 be	 independent.	 	 This	 non-independence	would	
result	 in	 biased	 estimates	 of	 male-female	 earnings	 differentials	 by	 sector	 of	
employment	 (Greene	 and	Hoffnar,	 1994;	 Belman	and	Heywood,	 1989;	 Choudhury,	
1994).	 	 To	 control	 for	 self-selection,	 the	 sorting	 of	men	 and	women	 into	 different	
employment	 statuses	 can	be	 studied	either	using	 a	probit	model	 (if	 there	are	 two	
work	choices	as	per	Heckman,	1979)	or	a	multinomial	logit	model	(if	there	are	more	
than	 two	work	 choices).	 	 The	 literature	 has	 proposed	 different	methods	 (e.g.	 Lee,	
1983	 and	 Dubin	 and	McFadden,	 1984)	 for	 addressing	 the	 effect	 of	 selection	 into	
multinomial	outcomes	on	wage	estimations,	which	are	similar	to	the	Heckman	two-
stage	procedure.	
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Additionally,	 the	 issue	 of	 sample	 selection	 is	 also	 relevant	 when	 using	 a	 quantile	
regression	framework	for	analysing	gender	wage	gaps.	 	For	 instance,	 if	the	fraction	
of	 women	 participating	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 is	 higher	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution,	observed	data	will	tend	to	under	sample	the	low	potential	wage	earners	
and	oversample	the	high	potential	workers	(Badel	and	Peña,	2010).	 	At	the	time	of	
writing,	 there	 is	 little	 agreement	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	most	 appropriate	
treatment	for	selectivity	bias	in	quantile	regression	models.	 	However,	one	method	
that	 appears	 to	 be	 popular	 among	 economists	 (inter	 alia	 Chzhen	 and	 Mumford,	
2011;	 Badel	 and	 Peña,	 2010;	 and	 Nicodemo,	 2009)	 involves	 an	 extension	 of	 the	
Machado	 and	 Mata	 (2005)	 methodology,	 which	 utilises	 the	 Buchinsky	 (1998)	
selection	 correction	method	 for	quantile	 regression.	 	 This	method	of	decomposing	
gender	wage	gaps	within	a	quantile	regression	framework	and	controlling	for	sample	
selection	was	first	introduced	by	Albrecht,	van	Vuuren	and	Vroman	(2009).		Albrecht	
et	 al	 (2009)	 use	 a	 two-stage	 sample	 selection	 correction	 procedure	 that	 was	
introduced	by	Buchinsky	 (1998);	 the	procedure	combines	a	semi-parametric	binary	
model	for	the	participation	equation	with	a	linear	quantile	regression	model	for	the	
wage	 equation.	 	 Similar	 to	 the	 Heckman	 two-step	 selection	 correction	model,	 for	
identification	 to	 be	 possible,	 within	 the	 set	 of	 observables	 that	 influence	 the	
participation	decision,	at	least	one	variable	must	be	continuous	and	not	included	in	
the	wage	equation.	 	For	this	reason,	given	the	paucity	of	 the	data	set	used	for	the	
current	analysis	to	sufficiently	estimate	the	selection	equation,	selection	correction	
was	not	attempted	in	the	quantile	regression	decompositions.													
		
2.3 Methodology	
	
2.3.1 Heckman	Selection	Model	
	
Heckman	(1979)	proposed	two	estimation	techniques	to	overcome	the	self-selection	
problem.		One	method	consists	of	using	a	maximum	likelihood	(ML)	estimation	of	a	
selection	 model	 (referred	 to	 as	 the	 full-information	 maximum	 likelihood	 (FIML)	
estimator)	 assuming	 bivariate	 normality	 of	 the	 error	 terms	 in	 the	 wage	 and	
participation	 equations.	 The	 other	 method	 proceeds	 in	 two	 steps,	 ML	 probit	
estimation	of	 the	participation	equation,	and	OLS	estimation	of	 the	wage	equation	
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using	 participants	 only	 and	 the	 normal	 hazard	𝜆	which	 is	 estimated	 from	 the	 first	
step	 as	 an	 additional	 regressor	 (the	 two-step	method	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 limited	
information	maximum	likelihood	(LIML)	method).		
	
There	 are	 two	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 the	 LIML	 estimator	 to	 the	 direct	 FIML	 estimator.		
First,	 FIML	 relies	 on	 joint	 normality	 of	 the	 errors	 in	 the	 selection	 equation	 and	
equation	 of	 interest.	 The	 advantages	 and	 drawbacks	 are	 twofold	 –	 if	 neither	
equation	 is	 mis-specified,	 simultaneous	 estimation	 yields	 efficiency	 gains.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 misspecification	 of	 either	 (or	 both)	 the	 selection	 equation	 or	 the	
equation	of	 interest,	 results	 in	 inconsistency.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 LIML	 estimator	 only	
relies	on	conditional	moments,	which,	although	derived	under	 joint	normality,	may	
hold	for	a	wider	class	of	distributions.		Second,	using	OLS	in	the	second	stage	has	the	
advantage	that	the	average	of	the	residual	is	zero,	which	does	not	hold	for	the	FIML	
estimator.	 	However,	the	LIML	estimator	 is	consistent,	but	 inefficient,	whereas,	the	
FIML	estimator	is	efficient.		Summarily,	consistency	deals	with	the	amount	of	bias	in	
the	estimate	while	efficiency	concerns	the	size	of	the	standard	errors.		
	
2.3.2 Heckman’s	Two-Step	Selection	Model	
	
Heckman’s	(1976:	476,	1979:	154)	two-step	selection	model	is	as	follows.		Using	the	
case	of	only	one	independent	variable,	let	equation	8	be	the	regression	equation	of	
substantive	interest:	
	𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋 + 𝜎𝜀	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(8)	
	𝑋	is	the	independent	variable,	𝑌!	is	the	dependent	variable,	and	𝜎𝜀	is	the	error	term,	
where	𝜎	is	a	scalar	and	𝜀	is	normally	distributed	with	a	mean	of	0	and	a	variance	of	1	
(𝑁(!,!)).		𝛽!	and	𝛽!are	the	regression	coefficients.	
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For	the	same	data	for	which	equation	8	is	defined,	we	also	define	equation	9,	called	
the	selection	equation:	
	𝑃𝑟 𝑌! > 𝑇 𝑍 = 𝑃𝑟 𝛼𝑍 +  𝛿 > 𝑇 𝑍 		 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(9)	
	
In	 the	 selection	equation,	which	 is	 estimated	with	 a	probit,	𝑌!	 is	 the	dichotomous	
dependent	variable, 𝑍	is	the	independent	variable,	𝛼	is	the	coefficient	of	𝑍,	and	𝛿	is	
the	normally	distributed	𝑁(!,!)	error	term.	𝑍	may	be	identical	to	𝑋;	when	this	occurs	
estimation	 becomes	 problematic	 (discussed	 further	 in	 section	 3.4).	 	 𝑇	 is	 a	 scalar	
called	 the	 selection	 threshold.	 	 The	 value	 of	 𝑌!is	 observed	 when	 𝑌! > 𝑇,	 and	 is	
censored	(missing)	for	all	other	cases:	𝑌! ≤ 𝑇.					
	
Heckman	(1976)	noted	that	there	 is	a	potential	bias	 in	using	only	selected	cases	to	
estimate	 equation	 8.	 	 Heckman	 computed	 the	 conditional	 expectation	 of	𝑌!	given	
that	𝑌!	is	observed,	as:		
	𝐸 𝑌! 𝑌! > 𝑇 =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋 +  𝜎𝜌!"𝜆(𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍)						 	 	 	 Eq.	(10)	
	
where		𝜌!" 	is	the	correlation	between	𝜀	and	𝛿,	and	𝜆	is	the	inverse	Mills	ratio	(IMR),	
defined	as:	
𝜆 𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍 =  !(!!!")!!!(!!!")     	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(11)	
	
where	𝜙(𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍)	 is	 the	normal	density	 function	evaluated	at	𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍,	 and	Φ(𝑇 −𝛼𝑍)	is	the	normal	cumulative	distribution	function	evaluated	at	𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍.			
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In	the	presence	of	selection,	estimation	of	the	original	regression	equation	(equation	
8)	will	suffer	from	omitted	variable	problem	as	it	omits	the	IMR.		If	the	IMR	[𝜆 𝑇 −𝛼𝑍 ]	is	substantially	correlated	with	𝑋	and	𝑌!,	then	instead	of	estimating	equation	8,	
the	appropriate	estimation	regression	would	be	(outcome	equation):	
	𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋 +  𝜎𝜌!"𝜆 𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍 +  𝜎′𝜀′			 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(12)	
	𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍	 is	 estimated	 as	 the	 predicted	 values	 in	 a	 probit	 in	which	 the	 independent	
variable	is	𝑍	and	the	dependent	variable	is	a	dummy	coded	as	0	if	𝑌!	has	a	missing	
value	 and	 1	 if	 the	 value	 of	 𝑌!	 is	 not	 missing.	 	 Essentially,	 Heckman’s	 two-step	
correction	consists	of	estimating	the	value	of	𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍	for	each	data	case,	calculating	
the	inverse	Mills	ratio,	𝜆 𝑇 − 𝛼𝑍 ,	from	those	estimates,	and	then	using	the	IMR	as	
an	additional	regressor	in	equation	8.		A	test	for	selectivity	bias	can	be	performed	by	
examining	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 IMR,	with	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 being:	𝐻!:𝜌!" = 0	
versus	 the	 alternative 𝐻!:𝜌!" ≠ 0.	 	 Rejection	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 can	 be	
interpreted	as	evidence	in	favour	of	the	presence	of	selectivity	bias.		The	regression	
line	for	𝑌!	on	𝑋	will	be	biased	upward	when	𝜌	 is	positive	and	downward	when	𝜌	 is	
negative,	 as	 the	 IMR	 is	 always	 positive.	 	 The	 size	 of	 the	 bias	 depends	 on	 the	
magnitude	 of	 the	 correlation,	 the	 relative	 variance	 of	 the	 disturbance,	 and	 the	
severity	of	the	censoring.			
	
The	resultant	estimates	of	𝛽,	𝜌,	and	𝜎	are	consistent	but	not	asymptotically	efficient	
under	the	normality	assumption.		Heckman’s	two-step	correction	method	has	three	
(related)	drawbacks:	
1) The	 conventional	 standard	 error	 estimates	 are	 inconsistent	 because	 the	
outcome	 equation	 (eq.	 12)	 is	 intrinsically	 heteroskedastic	 due	 to	 the	
selection.	 	 One	 possible	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	 is	 to	 compute	 robust	
standard	error	estimates.	
2) The	two-step	method	does	not	impose	the	constraint	| 𝜌|	≤ 1	that	is	implied	
by	the	underlying	model.		Often	in	practice,	this	constraint	is	violated.	
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3) The	normality	assumption	is	necessary	for	consistency.	
	
2.3.3 Maximum	Likelihood	Estimator	
	
Given	 these	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 two-step	method,	 some	 researchers	 prefer	 using	
the	 full	 information	maximum	 likelihood	method	 instead.	 	Asymptotically,	 the	 two	
methods	 are	 equivalent,	 but	 in	 small	 samples	 the	 results	 can	 differ.	 	 The	 FIML	
estimator	is	more	efficient	than	the	two-stage	method	but	is	also	more	sensitive	to	
mis-specification	due	to	non-normal	disturbance	terms.		In	applied	work,	the	results	
of	both	estimators	should	be	considered.			
	
Similar	 to	 the	 LIML	 correction	 procedure,	 for	 the	 full	 information	 maximum	
likelihood	 method,	 there	 are	 two	 types	 of	 observations:	 1)	 where	 𝑌!is	 observed	
when	𝑌! > 𝑇;	 and	 2)	where	𝑌!	 is	 not	 observed	when	𝑌! ≤ 𝑇.	 	 Recall	 that	𝑇	 is	 the	
selection	threshold.		Thus,	if	we	set	T=0,	the	likelihood	function	is	the	probability	of	
the	joint	event	𝑌!	and	𝑌!	> 0:	
	
Pr 𝑌!,𝑌! > 0 𝑋,𝑍 =  !!𝜙 !!!!!!!!!!  .Φ !"! !!(!!!!!!!!!)!!!! 		 	 Eq.	(13)	
	
Hence,	the	probability	of	an	observation	is	seen	in	the	data	is	the	density	function	at	
the	 point	𝑌!	multiplied	 by	 the	 conditional	 probability	 distribution	 for	𝑌!	 given	 the	
value	of	𝑌!	that	is	observed.	
	
For	those	observations	where	𝑌!	is	not	observed,	the	likelihood	function	is	simply	the	
marginal	probability	that	𝑌! ≤ 0:	
	Pr 𝑌! ≤ 0 = Φ −𝛼𝑍 = 1−Φ(𝛼𝑍)			 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(14)	
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The	log	likelihood	for	the	entire	sample	of	observations	will	be	as	follows:	
	log 𝐿 𝛽,𝛼,𝜌,𝜎 = Π!𝑙𝑜𝑔 1−Φ 𝛼𝑍 	
+ Π! −𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝜎 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝜙 !!!!!!!!!! + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 Φ !"! !!(!!!!!!!!!)!!!! 			 Eq.	(15)	
	
The	parameter	estimates	for	the	sample	selection	model	are	obtained	by	maximizing	
this	 likelihood	 function	with	 respect	 to	 its	 arguments	 and	 subject	 to	−1 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1.		
These	estimates	will	be	consistent	and	asymptotically	efficient	under	the	assumption	
of	 normality	 and	 homoscedasticity	 of	 the	 uncensored	 disturbances.	 	 If	 these	
assumptions	fail,	the	FIML	will	no	longer	be	consistent.		A	test	for	selectivity	bias	can	
be	performed	by	testing	the	null	hypothesis:	𝐻!: 𝜌 = 0	versus	𝐻!: 𝜌 ≠ 0.		Rejection	
of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 would	 be	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 selectivity	
bias.		
	
2.3.4 Two-Step	Estimator	versus	Maximum	Likelihood	Estimator		
	
Several	Monte	Carlo	studies	have	been	conducted	to	test	the	predictive	power	of	the	
FIML,	 LIML,	 and	 the	 “uncorrected”	 subsample	OLS	 sample	 selection	models	 under	
various	 conditions,	 including	 with	 and	 without	 exclusion	 restrictions.8	 	 In	 many	
practical	 problems,	 the	 same	 set	 of	 variables	 in	 the	 outcome	 equation	 is	 usually	
present	in	the	selection	equation	as	well.		In	this	scenario,	the	selection	model	is	said	
to	have	no	exclusion	restrictions	and	is	weakly	identified.		In	these	cases,	the	model	
is	 only	 identified	 through	 the	 nonlinearity	 of	 the	 inverse	Mills	 ratio	𝜆!.	 	 However,	
collinearity	problems	are	likely	to	arise,	as	the	inverse	Mills	ratio	is	an	approximately	
linear	function	over	a	wide	range	of	its	argument.				
	
																																								 																				
8	 See	 Puhani	 (2000,	 p.59-63)	 for	 a	 compilation	 of	 such	 studies	 spanning	 the	 period	 1984	 to	 1996.		
Also,	Chiburis	and	Lokshin	(2007)	perform	Monte	Carlo	simulations	to	compare	the	performances	of	
the	 FIML	 and	 LIML	 estimators	 of	 an	 ordered-probit	 selection	 model	 with	 and	 without	 exclusion	
restrictions.		
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Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	Monte	 Carlo	 studies	 highlighted	 in	 Puhani	 (2000),	 the	
correlation	between	 the	 error	 terms,	𝜎𝜀! 	 and	𝛿!,	 corr(𝜎𝜀! , 𝛿!),	 seems	 to	 affect	 the	
performance	of	 the	LIML	estimator.	 	Nelson	 (1984),	Stolzenberg	and	Relles	 (1990),	
and	Nawata	(1993;	1994)	provide	evidence	that	the	higher	the	correlation	between	𝜎𝜀! 	and	𝛿!,	the	greater	the	superiority	of	the	FIML	(and	maybe	OLS)	estimator	over	
the	LIML	in	terms	of	efficiency	(Puhani,	2000).			
	
One	 criticism	 of	 the	 FIML	 estimator	 surrounds	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 estimated	
coefficients	of	the	outcome	equation	with	respect	to	the	distributional	assumptions	
placed	on	the	errors	terms	in	the	outcome	(wage)	equation	and	probit-type	selection	
(propensity	to	work)	equation	(Little	and	Rubin,	1987).		If	the	joint	distribution	of	the	
error	terms	is	mis-specified	(either	because	the	form	of	the	distribution	is	incorrect	
or	because	of	dependence	on	the	conditional	distribution	of	Z),	the	OLS	parameter	
estimates	𝛽′𝑠	will	be	inconsistent.	
	
Leung	and	Yu	(1996)	conclude	that	the	degree	of	collinearity	between	the	outcome	
equation’s	 independent	 regressors	 and	 the	 inverse	 Mills	 ratio	 𝜆! 	 is	 the	 decisive	
criterion	 to	 determine	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 FIML	 and	 LIML	 estimators	 in	
relation	to	the	“uncorrected”	subsample	OLS.			The	degree	of	collinearity	also	limits	
the	power	of	the	t-test	for	sample	selectivity	on	the	coefficient	of	the	inverse	Mills	
ratio.				
	
Little	 and	 Rubin	 (1987)	 noted	 that	 for	 the	 Heckman	 method	 to	 work	 in	 practice,	
exclusion	 restrictions	 are	 needed	 –	 that	 is,	 variables	 are	 needed	 in	 the	 outcome	
equation	that	are	good	predictors	of	the	dependent	variable	(in	our	case,	wages)	and	
do	not	appear	in	the	selection	equation	(that	is,	probability	of	being	employed).			In	
practice,	it	is	often	difficult	to	find	such	variables.		For	instance,	in	terms	of	modeling	
Mincerian-type	wage	 equations,	 theory	 suggests	 that	 household	 variables	 such	 as	
the	presence	of	children	(especially	when	estimating	female	wages),	 the	 income	of	
the	 spouse,	 household	 wealth,	 or	 non-labour	 household	 income	 are	 likely	 to	
influence	 reservation	 wage	 (and	 ultimately	 the	 decision	 to	 participate	 in	 wage	
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employment),	 but	 unlikely	 to	 influence	 the	 gross	 wage	 offered	 and	 hence	 should	
only	 be	 included	 in	 the	 selection	 equation	 (model	 of	 employment).	 	 However,	 in	
many	instances	these	types	of	household	data	are	not	available;	furthermore	it	is	not	
always	 guaranteed	 that	 these	 variables	 are	 good	 predictors	 of	 the	 propensity	 to	
work	(Puhani,	2000).			
	
According	 to	Puhani	 (2000),	 the	most	 important	difference	 for	 the	performance	of	
the	alternative	estimators	(FIML,	LIML,	“uncorrected”	subsample	OLS)	arise	from	the	
existence	 of	 exclusion	 restrictions.	 When	 there	 are	 no	 exclusion	 restrictions,	
collinearity	problems	are	 likely	 to	arise;	a	high	degree	of	censoring	may	also	cause	
collinearity.	 	 Puhani	 (2000)	 suggests	 that	 if	 the	 econometrician	 cannot	 solve	 the	
collinearity	problem,	based	on	the	evidence	from	Monte	Carlo	studies	surveyed,	the	
standard	OLS	should	be	used	to	estimate	wage	equations.				
	
In	 practice,	 when	 deciding	 which	 estimator	 to	 use	 (FIML,	 LIML,	 or	 “uncorrected”	
subsample	 OLS),	 Leung	 and	 Yu	 (1996)	 suggest	 that	 a	 test	 for	 collinearity	 be	
performed	 by	 regressing	 the	 inverse	Mills	 ratio	 on	 the	 regressors	 of	 the	 outcome	
equation	and	calculating	the	corresponding	condition	number.		As	a	rule	of	thumb,	if	
the	 condition	 number	 exceeds	 10	 (that	 is,	 collinearity	 is	 present),9	 the	 subsample	
OLS	is	the	more	robust	estimator.		If	there	are	no	collinearity	problems,	Heckman’s	
LIML	estimator	should	be	used.	 	However,	 if	 the	FIML	estimator	can	be	computed,	
this	 estimator	 is	 recommended	 over	 the	 LIML	 estimator,	 as	 it	 is	 usually	 more	
efficient	than	the	LIML	estimator.			
	
In	practical	cases,	to	solve	collinearity	problems,	researchers	try	to	find	appropriate	
exclusion	 restrictions.	 	 As	 was	 previously	 mentioned,	 sourcing	 such	 appropriate	
instruments	 may	 be	 problematic.	 	 Selection	 models	 that	 do	 not	 have	 exclusion	
restrictions	 are	 said	 to	 be	weakly	 identified,	 and	 in	 such	 cases,	 the	 t-tests	 for	 the	
presence	of	selectivity	bias	have	incorrect	size	and	often	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	
																																								 																				
9	This	is	an	informal	rule	of	thumb	as	researchers	sometimes	use	a	condition	number	threshold	of	15	
and	as	high	as	30	to	decide	whether	multicollinearity	is	of	concern.			
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the	null	hypothesis	of	no	sample	selection	 is	true.	 	Additionally,	 the	tests	have	 low	
power,	 such	 that	 making	 a	 type	 II	 error	 (incorrectly	 failing	 to	 reject	 the	 null	
hypothesis)	is	likely,	when	in	fact,	sample	selection	is	present.		In	this	current	study,	
the	researcher	was	unable	to	source	appropriate	exclusion	restrictions	(see	above	for	
suggestions	of	such	instruments)	due	to	data	limitations.		Rendtel	(1992)	concludes	
that	 a	 sample	 selection	 model	 without	 exclusion	 restrictions,	 OLS	 is	 slightly	
preferable	to	the	FIML	estimator,	and	clearly	preferable	to	LIML	estimator.		In	short,	
as	the	Monte	Carlo	studies	show,	 in	those	cases	where	Heckman’s	estimator(s)	are	
particularly	 inefficient,	 the	 “uncorrected”	 subsample	 OLS	 may	 be	 more	 robust	
(Puhani,	2000).						
		
2.3.5 Probit	Model	
	
Probit	 models	 are	 widely	 used	 for	 estimating	 the	 relationship	 between	 (binary)	
choices	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 attributes	 of	 alternatives	 and	 individual	 decision-
making	 on	 the	 other	 (Hausman	 and	 Wise,	 1978).	 	 Labour	 force	 participation	 is	
defined	 as	 the	 ratio	 of	 the	 economically	 active	 population	 (persons	 aged	 15-65,	
employed	and	unemployed)	to	the	working	age	population:	
	
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  !"#$%&!'!!"#$%&'(#)!"#$%&' !"# !"!#$%&'"(	 	 	 Eq.	(16)	
	
The	advantage	of	using	a	probit	model	is	that	the	predicted	values	are	bounded	by	0	
and	1.		Since	the	parameters	of	the	model	are	not	marginal	effects	and	are	difficult	
to	 interpret,	 it	 is	more	useful	 to	calculate	 these	marginal	effects	of	 the	 regressors.		
Subsequently,	the	average	marginal	effect	(AME)	of	each	covariate	on	the	probability	
of	choosing	to	participate	in	the	labour	market	can	be	estimated.	
			
The	 coefficients	 obtained	 after	 running	 the	 probit	 regression	 (i.e.	 the	 selection	
equation	-	equation	9	above)	do	not	have	any	direct	interpretation.		Instead,	we	are	
interested	 in	 the	ceteris	 paribus	effects	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 regressors	 affecting	 the	
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features	of	the	outcome	variable	(labour	force	participation)	–	that	is,	the	marginal	
effects.	
	
Given	 that	 all	 the	 covariates	 in	 the	 analysis	 are	 discrete	 regressors,	 the	 average	
marginal	effects	(AMEs)	can	be	calculated	as:		
	
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ∆!" !!!!! !!∆!! = !! ∆!" !!!!! !!!!∆!!!!!! 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(17)	
	
The	average	marginal	effects	(AMEs)	are	obtained	by	calculating	the	marginal	effects	
for	each	observation	in	the	data,	and	then	taking	the	average	of	these	effects.		Since	
all	the	covariates	are	discrete	(or	categorical)	variables,	the	analysis	will	be	the	effect	
of	changing	the	independent	variable	(in	relation	to	the	reference	category)	on	the	
predicted	probability	of	Y!! > 0,	stated	in	percentage	points.		The	marginal	effect	for	
categorical	variables	shows	how	the	probability	of	𝑌!! > 0	changes	as	the	categorical	
independent	 variables	 change	 from	 0	 to	 1,	 after	 holding	 all	 other	 variables	 in	 the	
model	constant.			
	
2.4 Data	and	Econometric	Specification	
	
2.4.1 Dependent	Variable	
	
Given	that	this	portion	of	the	research	seeks	to	explore	the	issue	of	selectivity	 into	
employment,	 the	 dependent	 variable	 included	 only	 those	 persons	 in	 wage	
employment	 (see	 Table	 2.1)	 rather	 than	 the	 strict	 definition	 of	 labour	 force	
participation,	 which	 includes	 both	 employed	 and	 unemployed	 persons.	 	 In	 recent	
years,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 has	 had	 low	 unemployment	 rates	 –	 the	 rate	 of	
unemployment	steadily	reduced	from	20	per	cent	 in	the	early	1990s	to	 less	than	5	
per	cent	 in	2008.	 	Based	on	the	current	data	set,	the	unemployment	rates	for	men	
and	women	were	3.6	per	cent	and	6.6	per	cent,	respectively	during	the	third	quarter	
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of	2012.		Labour	force	participation	rates	for	the	third	quarter	of	2012	were	72.5	per	
cent	 and	 51.5	 per	 cent	 for	 men	 and	 women,	 respectively.	 	 The	 corollary	 non-
participation	rates	are	27.5	per	cent	for	men	and	48.5	per	cent	for	women.			
	
The	 Central	 Statistical	Office	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 defines	 employed	 persons	 as	
persons	 fifteen	 (15)	 years	 old	 and	 above,	 who	 are	 engaged	 in	 the	 production	 of	
goods	and	services	for	pay,	profit	or	family	gain	for	at	least	one	(1)	hour	during	the	
survey	 week,	 including	 persons	 who	 had	 jobs	 but	 did	 not	 actually	 work	 due	 to	
reasons	such	as	illness,	vacation,	study	leave,	suspension,	maternity	leave,	etc.		More	
specifically,	employed	persons	are	classified	as:	
a) All	persons	who	worked	for	pay	(in	cash	or	kind)	for	any	length	of	time	during	
the	survey	week;	
b) Persons	who	were	temporarily	absent	from	work	because	of	vacation,	illness,	
industrial	 dispute	 or	 similar	 cause,	 but	 who	 had	 jobs	 to	 which	 they	 would	
return	 at	 the	 end	of	 that	 period	of	 absence	 (seasonal	workers	 out	 of	work	
were	not	included);	and	
c) Persons	who	worked	without	pay	on	a	family	farm	or	business	or	as	a	learner.			
	
A	 summary	 of	 individual	 characteristics	 for	 men	 and	 women	 who	 are	 in	 waged	
employment	is	presented	in	Table	2.1.10		A	greater	proportion	of	men	than	women	in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	are	engaged	in	waged	employment	–	66.3	per	cent	of	all	men	
are	 employed	 versus	 53.5	 per	 cent	 of	 women.	 	 Not	 surprisingly,	 highly	 educated	
women	(those	with	tertiary	education)	have	the	highest	employment	rate	(81.1	per	
cent)	compared	to	women	with	less	education	–	31.9	per	cent	and	46.8	per	cent	for	
women	with	primary	and	 lower	secondary	school	education,	respectively.	 	Married	
women	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 employed	 (44.0	 per	 cent)	 compared	 to	married	men	
(64.9	per	cent).		Among	all	women,	women	of	Indian	descent	are	the	least	likely	to	
be	employed,	with	only	40.3	per	cent	of	 Indian	women	being	 in	the	 labour	market	
compared	 with	 65.6	 per	 cent	 among	 African	 women	 and	 58.4	 per	 cent	 among	
women	who	are	of	mixed/other	origin.		The	highest	employment	rates	for	both	men	
																																								 																				
10	The	sample	includes	persons	aged	15	to	65,	but	excludes	full-time	students	and	retired	persons.		
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and	women	are	for	the	age	category	25-34	years	at	71.9	per	cent	for	men	and	58.8	
per	cent	for	women.	
	
Table	2.1:	Individual	Characteristics	of	Persons	in	Wage	Employment	
	(percent	of	total	sample1)	
	 Men	 Women	
Per	cent	in	wage	employment	 66.3	 53.5	
Age	Group	 	 	
			15-24	 71.9	 58.8	
			25-34	 74.4	 64.8	
			35-44	 66.1	 58.1	
			45-54	 59.1	 46.4	
			55-65	 54.0	 33.2	
Marital	Status	 	 	
			Single/	Separated	 67.4	 63.3	
			Married/	Common	Law	 64.9	 44.0	
Highest	Level	of	Education	 	 	
			Primary	 53.1	 31.9	
			Lower	Secondary	 67.0	 46.8	
			Upper	Secondary	 75.8	 67.9	
			Tertiary	 78.4	 81.1	
Ethnicity	 	 	
			African	 68.9	 65.6	
			Indian	 63.5	 40.3	
			Mixed/	Other	 67.2	 58.4	
										1	Sample	excludes	students	and	retired	persons.	
	
2.4.2 Econometric	Specification	
	
To	test	and	correct	 for	the	presence	of	selectivity	bias,	 the	wage	equation	remains	
the	same	as	 in	 the	OLS	and	quantile	 regression	estimations	 in	 the	 two	subsequent	
chapters:	      log 𝑤! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑿𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑺𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝜇! 			 	 	 Eq.	(18)	
where	 log	𝑤!,	 is	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 hourly	 wages,	 𝑺𝒊	 is	 a	 series	 of	 dummy	
variables	for	the	highest	level	of	education	attained,	𝑥! 	is	potential	experience,	𝑿𝒊	is	
a	 vector	 of	 other	 variables	 assumed	 to	 affect	 wages	 (including	marital	 status	 and	
ethnicity),	𝛼! 	is	a	constant	term,	and	𝜇! 	is	the	error	term.	
	
The	 Heckman	 sample	 selection	 correction	 model	 assumes	 that	 there	 exists	 an	
underlying	 regression	relationship,	 in	our	case,	between	participating	 in	 the	 labour	
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market	and	the	Mincerian-type	earnings	equation	above.		Under	some	conditions	we	
do	not	observe	wages	(equation	18);	observation	of	wages	is	related	to	the	selection	
equation	(equation	19),	which	relates	a	latent	variable	𝑠! 	to	observed	characteristics	𝒁! .		Wages	is	observed	only	if:		
					𝑠! = 𝛾!𝒁! + 𝜀! 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(19)	
where	𝑠! 	is	the	latent	dependent	variable	that	captures	the	propensity	to	participate	
in	the	labour	market	and	takes	the	value	of	1	if	earnings	are	observed	and	is	positive	
and	 0	 otherwise.	 𝒁! 	 includes	 all	 variables	 in	 equation	 18	 except	 for	 potential	
experience	and	potential	experience	squared;	these	are	replaced	with	dummies	for	
different	age	categories	spanning	the	ages	15-65.	 	Equation	19	is	estimated	using	a	
probit	model.					
	
Generally,	an	exclusion	restriction,	that	is,	at	least	one	variable	that	is	included	with	a	
non-zero	coefficient	in	the	selection	equation	(equation	19)	but	does	not	appear	in	
the	 equation	 of	 interest	 (equation	 18)	 is	 required	 to	 generate	 credible	 estimates.	
Usually	in	applied	work	on	the	topic	of	gender	wage	gaps,	the	inclusion	of	variables	
affecting	 women’s	 propensity	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	 market,	 such	 as	 the	
number	 and/or	 ages	 of	 children	 present	 in	 the	 household	 or	 non-own	 labour	
household	income	(e.g.	spouse’s	income	or	government	assistance),	are	used	as	the	
exclusion	restriction(s).		No	such	variables	are	available	in	the	current	data	set	being	
used	 for	 this	 analysis,	 and	 the	 author	 acknowledges	 that	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	
adequately	test	and/or	correct	for	the	presence	of	sample	selection	bias.	
	
The	Heckman	procedure	assumes	that	𝜇! 	 (the	error	 term	from	the	wage	equation)	
and	 𝜀! 	 (the	 error	 term	 from	 the	 selection	 equation)	 follow	 a	 bivariate	 normal	
distribution	with	 correlation	ρ.	 	 Selection	bias	 occurs	when	 the	 error	 terms	of	 the	
selection	and	 linear	equations	are	 correlated.	 	Conditional	on	 selection	 (i.e.	𝑠! 	 =1),	
the	expected	value	of	log	w	is:	
	𝐸 log𝑤!  	𝑠! = 1) =  𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑿𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑺𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝛽!𝜆! 			 	 Eq.	(20)	
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where	𝜆! 	 is	 the	 Inverse	Mills	Ratio	 (IMR),	which	depends	on	the	𝛾′𝑠	 from	equation	
19.		A	test	for	selectivity	bias	can	be	performed	by	examining	the	coefficient	on	the	
IMR,	 with	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 being:	𝐻!:𝛽! = 0	 versus	 the	 alternative 𝐻!:𝛽! ≠ 0.		
Rejection	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
presence	of	selectivity	bias.			
	
2.5 Results	and	Discussion	
	
2.5.1 Heckman	Model:	Probit	Results	and	Average	Marginal	Effects		
	
Whether	or	not	sample	selection	bias	is	present,	the	results	of	the	probit	model	are	
informative	 in	 understanding	 the	 characteristics	 of	 individuals	 engaged	 in	 wage	
employment	 (Table	 2.2).	 	 Also,	 the	 Heckman	 probit	 results	 show	 that	 individual	
characteristics	affect	men	and	women	differently	when	deciding	 to	engage	 in	paid	
employment	or	not.									
	
Based	 on	 the	 human	 capital	 model,	 not	 surprisingly	 given	 societal	 norms,	 a	 key	
variable	 in	 determining	 the	 probability	 of	 a	woman	 being	 in	wage	 employment	 is	
marital	 status.	 	 Being	 married	 or	 in	 a	 common-law	 relationship	 decreases	 the	
probability	 that	 a	 woman	 is	 employed	 by	 11.6	 percentage	 points	 while	 for	 men,	
marital	status	is	not	a	significant	factor	in	their	decision	to	work	or	not.						
	
Education,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	key	variable	in	explaining	the	probability	of	both	
men	 and	 women	 being	 in	 wage	 employment,	 although	 higher	 education	 plays	 a	
more	 important	 role	 for	women	 than	 it	 does	 for	men.	 	 For	men,	upper	 secondary	
schooling	 and	 tertiary	 education	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 employed	 by	 a	
similar	 amount	–	15.7	 and	17.1	percentage	points,	 respectively,	 compared	 to	men	
with	 only	 primary	 school	 education.	 	 Meanwhile,	 for	 women,	 upper	 secondary	
education	 and	 tertiary	 education	 increase	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 employed	 by	 a	
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much	 larger	amount	–	24.8	and	38.4	percentage	points,	 respectively.	 	This	may	be	
indicative	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 more	 educated	 women	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 seek	
employment	 opportunities.	 	 Alternatively,	 it	 may	 also	 be	 indicative	 of	 employers’	
hiring	practices	or	bias	where	employers	seem	to	be	keener	on	women’s	education	
than	on	men’s	when	making	hiring	decisions	(Khitarishvili,	2009).			
	
Ethnicity	 plays	 a	 greater	 role	 in	 explaining	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 in	 wage	
employment	 for	women	 than	 it	 does	 for	men.	 	Generally,	 ethnicity	 is	 not	 a	 highly	
significant	 factor	 in	 determining	 a	 man’s	 decision	 to	 enter	 into	 employment.		
Meanwhile,	 Indian	women	and	 those	of	mixed/other	 heritage	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
employed	compared	to	African	women	ceteris	paribus.		The	predicted	probability	of	
an	 Indian	woman	entering	 into	 formal	employment	 falls	by	14.7	percentage	points	
(compared	to	African	women)	and	for	women	of	mixed/other	origin,	 the	predicted	
probability	of	being	employed	falls	by	11.1	percentage	points.			
	
The	 fact	 that	 Indian	 women	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	 market	
(compared	with	African	women)	may	be	due	 to	 cultural	 and	historical	 norms,	 and	
the	 legacy	 of	 indentureship.	 	 A	 1913	 Commissioners	 report	 for	 Trinidad	 analysing	
women’s	labour	during	the	indentureship	period	(which	occurred	during	1845-1917)	
stated	 that	 some	men	were	withdrawing	 their	wives	 from	wage	 labour	 to	 ‘devote	
themselves	solely	to	domestic	work	including	the	care	of	children’.	 	Early	in	the	20th	
century,	 this	 practice	 became	more	 frequent	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 	 First,	 the	
colonial	 state	 was	 supporting	 Indian	 men	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 reconstruct	 the	
patriarchal	Indian	family.		Second,	the	redefinition	of	women	as	wives	and	mothers	
facilitated	the	local	reproduction	of	the	labour	force,	and	most	importantly,	provided	
free	 labour	 for	 the	 peasant	 production	 of	 cane	 and	 food	 crops.	 	 Women	 were	
withdrawn	 into	 the	 domestic	 economy,	 but	 engaged	 in	 cane	 farming,	 rice	
production,	 and	 animal	 husbandry,	 but	 received	 no	 wages.	 	 These	 women	 were	
officially	defined	as	non-earning	“housewives”	(Reddock,	1994).		On	the	other	hand,	
persons	 of	 mixed/other	 origins	 (Chinese,	 Caucasian,	 Syrian/Lebanese,	 etc.)	 were	
historically	 of	 a	 higher	 class	 than	 Africans	 and	 Indians	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 context	
(Coppin	and	Olsen,	1998).	 	Belonging	to	a	higher	social	class	may	explain	the	lower	
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probability	 of	 women	 of	 mixed/other	 origin	 being	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 formal	
employment	 compared	 to	 African	 women	 as	 they	 may	 be	 from	 relatively	 more	
affluent	 households	 and	 the	 need	 to	 work	 is	 not	 as	 imperative.	 Indeed,	 poverty	
statistics	 for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	reveal	 that	 there	was	no	significant	difference	 in	
the	level	of	poverty	between	the	two	major	ethnic	groups	–	Africans	and	Indians	–	in	
1998,	while	poverty	was	almost	non-existent	in	the	residual	“Other”	category	which	
included	Whites,	Chinese,	Syrian-Lebanese,	etc.	(Kairi	Consultants	Ltd,	2004).		
	
Compared	 to	 the	default	age	category	15-24,	women	 in	 their	most	probable	child-
bearing	years	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	the	labour	market:	by	7.3	percentage	
points	for	those	aged	25	to	34	and	by	9.1	for	those	aged	35-44.		In	contrast,	slightly	
older	women	(aged	45-54)	are	just	as	likely	to	be	employed	as	young	females	aged	
15-24.	Not	surprisingly,	both	male	and	female	seniors	(55-65	years	old)	are	less	likely	
to	be	in	wage	employment	(14.1	and	9.8	percentage	points,	respectively)	compared	
to	men	and	women	in	the	age	group	15-24.					
	
In	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	context,	among	women	who	choose	to	participate	in	the	
labour	market,	their	labour	market	attachment	is	fairly	strong.		A	2008	International	
Labour	 Organisation	 (ILO)	 study	 on	 work	 and	 family	 life	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	
revealed	 that	many	married	women	 and	women	with	 children	made	 “a	 conscious	
decision	to	remain	in	the	labour	force”	(Center	for	Gender	and	Development	Studies,	
2004,	p.54).		Furthermore,	the	gradual	increase	in	female	labour	force	participation	
over	 the	 past	 few	 decades11	 has	 challenged	 the	 traditional	 roles	 that	 society	 has	
placed	on	women	 (International	 Labour	Organisation,	 2008).	 	 The	 ILO	 study	noted	
that	 in	many	 cases	women	 have	 shown	 a	 capability	 of	 functioning	 equally	well	 at	
family	tasks	and	at	productive	employment.		
	
																																								 																				
11	During	the	period	1985	to	2012,	the	female	labour	force	participation	rate	increased	from	41.8	per	
cent	to	51.7	per	cent.	
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Moreover,	 during	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 human	 resources	 business	 consultant	
operating	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago12,	she	stated	that	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
are	not	in	a	position	to	(permanently)	leave	the	workforce	to	raise	a	family	especially	
with	 the	 high	 number	 of	 single	mothers	 prevalent	 in	 the	 country.	 	 For	 blue-collar	
couples,	 the	 consultant	 stated	 that	 these	women	 also	 do	 not	 leave	 the	workforce	
because	they	tend	to	be	the	more	responsible	and	stable	parent.						
	
Another	factor	 impacting	female	labour	market	attachment	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
is	the	Maternity	Protection	Act	No.	4,	which	was	enacted	in	1998.		The	Act	is	binding	
for	both	private	sector	employers	and	the	State.		Under	the	Act,	female	employees	
are	 entitled	 to	 13	 weeks’	 paid	 maternity	 leave	 and	 one	month’s	 pay	 during	 such	
leave.		Also,	an	employee	on	maternity	leave	has	the	right	to	return	to	work.			
	 	
																																								 																				
12	See	Appendix	III:	 Interview	with	Business	Consultant	Operating	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	for	further	
details.	
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Table	2.2:	Heckman	(Two-Step)	Selection	Model	–	Probit	Results	
Dependent	variable	=	wage	employment	
Average	Marginal	Effect	
Men	 Women	
Age	group	(ref:	15-24)	 		 		
25-34	 	0.028	 0.073*		
		 (0.035)	 (0.037)	
35-44	 -0.062	 	0.091*		
		 (0.038)	 (0.038)	
45-54	 -0.088*	 	0.000	
		 (0.041)	 (0.039)	
55-65	 -0.141**	 -0.098*		
		 (0.047)	 (0.043)	
Highest	Level	of	Education	Attained	(ref:	primary)	 		 		
Lower	Secondary	 0.088**	 	0.083**		
		 (0.029)	 (0.028)	
Upper	Secondary	 	0.157***	 	0.248***	
		 (0.032)	 (0.033)	
Tertiary	 	0.171***	 	0.384***	
		 (0.044)	 (0.036)	
Marital	Status	(ref:	unmarried)	 		 		
Married/Common	Law	 	0.033	 -0.116***	
		 (0.024)	 (0.022)	
Ethnicity	(ref:	African)	 		 		
Indian	 -0.008	 -0.147***	
		 (0.024)	 (0.024)	
Mixed/Other	 -0.078*	 -0.111***	
		 (0.032)	 (0.030)	
Number	of	observations	 	2021	 	2011	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
	
Note:	 The	 probit	 results	 from	 the	 Heckman	 full	 model,	 which	 includes	 controls	 for	 occupation,	
industry	 and	 type	 of	 employee	 (public	 sector	 vs.	 private	 sector)	 in	 the	 wage	 equation,	 are	
qualitatively	similar	to	those	obtained	from	the	human	capital	model.			 	
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2.5.2 Heckman	Two-Step	Model:	Evidence	of	Sample	Selection		
	
Given	 the	 drawbacks	 of	 the	 FIML	 estimator	 (as	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.3.4),	 in	
particular,	 its	 sensitivity	 to	 mis-specification	 of	 either	 (or	 both)	 the	 outcome	
equation	or	the	selection	equation	(which	leads	to	inconsistent	estimates),	the	LIML	
estimator	was	used	for	analysis.13	 	By	contrast,	the	LIML	estimator,	although	it	also	
relies	 on	 joint	 normality	 of	 the	 disturbance	 terms,	 only	 relies	 on	 conditional	
moments	and	may	hold	for	a	wider	class	of	distributions.		
	
Following	 Leung	 and	 Yu’s	 (1996)	 recommendation,	 a	 test	 for	 collinearity	 was	
performed.		This	test	was	done	by	regressing	the	inverse	Mills	ratio	on	the	regressors	
of	the	wage	equation,	and	then	calculating	the	corresponding	condition	number.		A	
complementary	 collinearity	 test	 was	 also	 performed	 using	 the	 variance	 inflation	
factor	(VIF).14		Table	2.3	shows	the	results	of	both	collinearity	tests.		Across	all	model	
specifications	(except	for	the	public	sector	full	model	for	men),	collinearity	was	not	
found	based	on	the	condition	numbers	being	below	10.	 	On	the	other	hand,	based	
on	the	mean	VIF,	multicollinearity	was	found	across	all	specifications	of	the	human	
capital	models	for	both	men	and	women.		The	average	mean	VIF	was	“substantially	
higher”	 than	 1,	 indicating	 there	 is	 multicollinearity	 across	 all	 the	 predictors	
(Montgomery,	 2001).	 However,	Montgomery	 (2001)	 has	 noted	 that	 the	 VIF	 score	
may	be	grossly	inflated	if	you	use	categorical	variables	(as	we	have),	interactions,	or	
exponents.			
	
Leung	and	Yu	(1996)	suggest	 that	 if	 there	are	no	collinearity	problems	(based	on	a	
condition	 number	 of	 less	 than	 10),	 the	 LIML	 estimator	 should	 be	 used.	 	 Table	 2.4	
presents	 the	 results	 for	 the	 tests	 for	 sample	 selection,	 which	 was	 performed	 by	
																																								 																				
13	Asymptotically,	the	LIML	and	FIML	are	equivalent,	but	in	small	samples	the	results	can	differ.	 	For	
completeness,	 the	 results	 from	 the	 FIML	 estimation	 are	 also	 presented	 later	 in	 the	 chapter.	
Summarily,	 selection	 was	 found	 to	 be	 present	 for	 women	 (full	 model),	 and	 private	 sector	 male	
employees	(in	both	the	human	capital	and	full	models).	
14	 The	Variance	 Inflation	Factor	 (VIF)	quantifies	 the	 severity	of	multicollinearity	 in	 an	ordinary	 least	
squares	regression	analysis.	 	The	VIF	 is	an	 index	that	measures	how	much	variance	of	an	estimated	
regression	coefficient	is	increased	because	of	multicollinearity.			As	a	rule	of	thumb,	if	any	of	the	VIF	
values	 exceeds	 5	 or	 10,	 it	 implies	 that	 the	 associated	 regression	 coefficients	 are	 poorly	 estimated	
because	of	multicollinearity	(Montgomery,	2001).		
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examining	the	coefficient	on	the	 IMR:	𝐻!:𝛽! = 0	versus	the	alternative  𝐻!:𝛽! ≠ 0	
(see	equation	20).			
	
Table	2.3:	Collinearity	Tests	between	IMRs	and	Regressors	of	Outcome	Equation	
						Model	
Men	
Mean	VIF	
Condition	
Number	
All	Men/All	Women	 		 		
			Human	Capital	Model	 5.30	 8.73	
			Full	Model	 2.87	 9.24	
Public	Sector	
	 				Human	Capital	Model	 6.07	 9.34	
			Full	Model	 3.27	 10.37	
Private	Sector	
	 				Human	Capital	Model	 5.08	 8.54	
			Full	Model	 2.93	 9.19	
		 Women	
		 Mean	VIF	
Condition	
Number	
All	Men/All	Women	 		 		
			Human	Capital	Model	 5.42	 8.60	
			Full	Model	 2.91	 9.00	
Public	Sector	
	 				Human	Capital	Model	 5.57	 8.66	
			Full	Model	 3.28	 9.96	
Private	Sector	
	 				Human	Capital	Model	 5.23	 8.21	
			Full	Model	 2.88	 8.72	
	
Rejection	of	the	null	hypothesis	is	interpreted	as	evidence	in	favour	of	the	presence	
of	sample	selection.		None	of	the	coefficients	on	the	IMR	are	statistically	significantly	
different	 from	zero,	 leading	us	 to	conclude	 that	 selectivity	 is	not	present	 in	any	of	
our	model	specifications.		A	word	of	caution	is	needed	since	selection	models	that	do	
not	have	exclusion	restrictions,	such	as	the	one	we	are	analysing,	are	usually	weakly	
identified.	 	Weakly	 identified	 selection	models	 suffer	 from	 the	 t-tests	 for	 selection	
being	incorrectly	sized,	often	leading	the	researcher	to	make	a	type	II	error,	that	is,	
erroneously	failing	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	sample	selection.			
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Table	2.4:	Evidence	of	Sample	Selection	using	the	LIML	estimator	
		 Estimated	coefficient	of	lambda	
		 Men	 Women	
All	Men/All	Women	 	 	
			Human	Capital	Model	 -0.163	 0.146	
	 (0.346)	 (0.259)	
			Full	Model	 0.184	 -0.174	
		 (0.317)	 (0.222)	
	 	 	
Public	Sector	 	 	
			Human	Capital	Model	 -0.636	 0.086	
	 (0.470)	 (0.373)	
			Full	Model	 -0.158	 -0.057	
	 (0.271)	 (0.297)	
		 	 	
Private	Sector	 	 	
			Human	Capital	Model	 0.133	 1.103	
	 (0.300)	 (1.029)	
			Full	Model	 0.108	 0.581	
	 (0.272)	 (0.523)	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
	
	
The	 identification	of	 a	 selection	model	by	 functional	 form	 is	only	possible	 through	
the	 nonlinearity	 of	 the	 IMR.	 	 However,	 as	 the	 IMR	may	 be	 linear	 for	much	 of	 its	
argument,	 identification	 may	 be	 weak.	 	 This	 is	 indeed	 the	 case	 for	 our	 selection	
model,	as	plots	of	the	IMRs	for	both	the	human	capital	and	full	models	(Figure	2.5.1)	
reveal	that	a	large	portion	of	the	IMR	from	these	models	is	linear.			
	
As	much	 as	 we	 can	 tentatively	 conclude	 that	 selection	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 an	
issue	 in	 our	 model(s),	 several	 Monte	 Carlo	 simulations	 show,	 including	 Rendtel	
(2000),	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	subsample	estimates	are	more	robust	than	the	LIML	
estimator	when	the	sample	selection	model	does	not	have	any	exclusion	restrictions.		
In	short,	we	conclude	that	the	estimates	from	the	previous	chapters	using	OLS	and	
quantile	 regression	may	 not	 suffer	 from	 selectivity	 bias	 and	 should	 be	 used	 for	
analysis	instead	of	the	sample	selection	model.						
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Figure	2.5.1:	Plots	of	the	Inverse	Mills	Ratio	
	 	
	 	
	
	
2.5.3 Heckman	FIML	Model:	Evidence	of	Sample	Selection		
	
This	 section	 discusses	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Heckman	 full	 information	 maximum	
likelihood	(FIML)	selection	model.		If	we	were	to	accept	these	results	that	selectivity	
is	present,	then	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	subsample	estimation	regression	would	have	
to	 be	 adjusted	 to	 include	 the	 presence	 of	 sample	 selection,	 which	 would	 have	
implications	 for	 the	 decomposition	 of	 the	 wage	 gap.	 	 The	 gender	 wage	 gap	 was	
decomposed	 following	 the	adjustment	 to	 the	OLS	estimation	and	 these	 results	are	
also	presented	here.						
	
Heckman	FIML	Model:	Test	for	Sample	Selection	
	
Heckman’s	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimator	 was	 also	 used	 to	 test	 for	 selectivity	
separately	for	men	and	for	women.		The	test	for	selectivity	is	carried	out	by	testing	
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the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 𝜌=0	 versus	 the	 alternative	 that	 𝜌≠0	 (see	 Equation	 15).		
Rejection	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 would	 be	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 existence	 of	
sample	selection.		In	terms	of	the	full	sample,	the	results	do	not	reject	the	null	of	no	
selectivity	for	either	men	or	women	in	the	human	capital	model,	but	does	reject	the	
null	 for	women	only	 in	 the	 full	model	 (Table	2.5).	 	 In	 the	private	sector,	selectivity	
was	found	for	men	only	in	both	the	human	capital	and	full	models,	while	selectivity	
was	not	found	in	the	public	sector	models.			
	
	
Table	2.5:	Evidence	of	Sample	Selection	using	the	FIML	estimator		
	
	 Estimated	coefficient	of	rho	
		 Men	 Women	
All	Men/All	Women	 		 		
Human	Capital	Model	 -0.219	 		0.170	
Full	Model	 	0.622	 	-0.861***		
		 		 		
Public	Sector	 		 		
Human	Capital	Model	 -0.551	 	0.033	
Full	Model	 -0.701	 -0.033	
		 		 		
Private	Sector	 		 		
Human	Capital	Model	 	0.755**	 	0.251	
Full	Model	 	0.750**	 	0.173	
*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	
		
In	 the	 full	 model	 (using	 the	 full	 sample),	 the	 coefficient	 of	 rho	 in	 the	 selection	
equation	for	women	was	statistically	significant;	this	implies	that	sample	selection	is	
present	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 ‘correct’	 the	 female	 earnings	 function.	 	 The	
negative	value	of	 rho	 indicates	 that	 those	unobserved	characteristics	 that	 increase	
an	 individual’s	 salary	 also	 lower	 the	 probability	 of	 this	 person	 being	 employed	
(Khitarishvili,	2009).	 	A	negative	estimate	of	 rho	 seems	counterintuitive,	and	 is	not	
often	discussed	 in	 the	 literature	with	many	 researchers	either	not	addressing	 it	or	
simply	attributing	it	to	model	misspecification	(Khitarishvili,	2009).	The	negative	sign	
also	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 –	 a	
negative	 rho	 implies	 that	 mean	 wages	 of	 those	 in	 employment	 are	 lower	 than	
hypothetical	mean	wages	for	the	full	population	(Khitarishvili,	2009).		Accounting	for	
selectivity	 would	 result	 in	 an	 increase	 in	 an	 unconditional	 estimate	 of	 women’s	
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wages	without	a	corresponding	 increase	 for	men.	 	Consequently,	 the	gender	wage	
gap	with	correction	for	sample	selection	bias	should	be	lower	than	that	without	it.						
	
Literature	 on	 sample	 selection	 bias	 usually	 involves	 discussion	 on	 the	 reservation	
wage	 hypothesis.	 	 This	 hypothesis	 postulates	 that	 if	 the	 wage	 offer	 is	 below	 the	
reservation	wage,	individuals	will	refuse	the	offer,	and	the	offer	will	be	unobserved.		
If	the	wage	offer	is	above	the	reservation	wage,	persons	will	accept	it	and	this	wage	
offer	will	be	observed.		A	negative	correlation	between	the	error	terms	of	the	wage	
equation	and	the	selection	equation,	as	 in	our	 (full)	model	 for	women,	means	that	
women	are	more	likely	to	accept	lower	rather	than	higher	wage	offers	(Khitarishvili,	
2009).	 	 This	 result	 is	 counterintuitive;	 however,	 Ermisch	 and	 Wright	 (1994)	 have	
shown	 that	 negative	 rho	 can	 be	 consistent	with	 the	 reservation	wage	 hypothesis.		
The	authors	show	that	rho	will	be	negative	if	the	variance	of	wage	offers	is	smaller	
than	the	covariance	of	 the	wage	offers	and	reservation	wages.	 	For	 instance,	 if	we	
assume	that	the	means	of	wage	offers	and	reservation	wages	are	the	same,	then	for	
individuals	whose	wage	 offer	 deviates	 positively	 from	 the	mean,	 their	 reservation	
wage	deviation	from	the	mean	would	be	even	higher.		Thus,	individuals	with	higher	
wage	 offers	 will	 also	 be	 those	 persons	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 out	 of	 the	 sample	 with	
observed	wages	because	they	are	the	ones	rejecting	the	offers.					
	
Nicaise	 (2001)	has	 an	 alternative	explanation	 to	 account	 for	 a	negative	 rho,	which	
stems	 from	 the	 involuntary	 nature	 of	 unemployment,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	
developing	 countries.	 	 In	 this	 argument,	 market	 wages	 are	 above	 individuals’	
reservation	wages,	but	these	individuals	are	not	hired.		Nicaise	(2001)	proposes	that,	
holding	 all	 individual	 characteristics	 constant,	 employers	 offer	 jobs	 to	 individuals	
who	 are	 willing	 to	 work	 for	 less	 money,	 that	 is,	 offer	 jobs	 to	 those	 with	 lower	
reservation	 wages.	 	 In	 essence,	 individuals	 who	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 work	 are	 also	
those	individuals	who	are	paid	 less	than	would	otherwise	be	observed	for	 identical	
individuals	 in	 the	 population.	 	 Hence,	 individuals	 with	 higher	 reservation	 wages	
would	be	rejected	by	employers	in	favour	of	workers	with	lower	reservation	wages.			
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The	fact	that	selection	bias	was	found	among	women	only	in	the	full	model	and	not	
in	 the	 human	 capital	model	 (using	 the	 full	 sample)	 reveals	 that	women	 self-select	
into	 particular	 occupations	 and	 industries.	 	Women	 in	 employment	 appear	 to	 get	
lower	 wages	 controlling	 for	 job	 characteristics	 than	 would	 a	 random	 sample	 of	
women.		However,	it	appears	that	this	is	offset	by	employed	women	tending	to	be	in	
better	 paying	 industries/occupations	 than	 one	 would	 expect	 a	 random	 sample	 of	
women	to	be.			
	
In	the	private	sector	however,	sample	selection	bias	was	found	for	men	only	in	both	
the	human	capital	and	full	models.		The	coefficient	on	rho	was	statistically	significant	
and	positive.		The	positive	coefficient	of	rho	for	men	shows	that	men	are	less	likely	
to	accept	jobs	in	the	lower	segment	of	the	male	wage	offer	distribution.		This	finding	
is	consistent	with	the	kernel	density	function	of	the	log	of	hourly	wages	for	men	in	
the	 private	 sector	 (see	 Figure	 4.2).	 	 In	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 distribution	 of	male	
wages	 is	 further	right	 indicating	that	there	are	 fewer	men	 in	the	 lower	segment	of	
the	wage	distribution	 (see	also	Table	4.2).	 	 The	positive	 rho	 implies	 that	 the	mean	
wages	 for	men	are	overestimated,	 and	would	 result	 in	 a	decrease	 in	men’s	wages	
without	 a	 corresponding	 increase	 in	 mean	 wages	 for	 women.	 	 Consequently,	 the	
gender	 wage	 gap	 with	 correction	 for	 sample	 selection	 bias	 should	 be	 lower	 than	
without	it.				
	
In	 many	 studies	 on	 gender	 wage	 gaps	 with	 sample	 selection	 adjustment,	 sample	
selection	 bias	 correction	 is	 usually	 performed	only	 for	women,	 implicitly	 assuming	
that	sample	selection	bias	is	an	issue	only	for	the	female	population.		The	results	of	
this	current	study	show	that	the	issue	of	sample	selection	bias	is	not	one	that	affects	
only	the	female	population,	and	more	attention	needs	to	be	placed	in	analysing	the	
causes	of	sample	selection	bias	among	women	as	well	as	men.			
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Heckman	FIML	Model:	Wage	Regression	Results	
	
In	 this	 section,	 comparisons	 will	 be	 made	 to	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 of	 the	
“uncorrected”	 OLS	 earnings	 regressions	 from	 Chapter	 3	 with	 the	 Heckman	
“corrected”	earnings	regressions.		
	
Just	as	in	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	results	for	the	full	model	(full	sample),	the	returns	
to	education	for	both	men	and	women	are	much	lower	compared	to	the	estimated	
returns	 to	 education	 in	 the	 human	 capital	 model.	 	 However,	 for	 women	 in	 the	
Heckman	 full	 model,	 only	 tertiary	 education	 brings	 statistically	 significant	 (higher)	
returns	to	education	–	32.8	per	cent	higher	returns	compared	to	women	who	only	
attained	primary	school	level	education	(Table	2.6).			
	
In	terms	of	marital	status,	in	the	Heckman	full	model	married	men	are	estimated	to	
receive	a	wage	premium	of	14.1	per	cent	over	 their	unmarried	counterparts.	 	This	
wage	premium	for	married	men	is	estimated	to	be	the	same	as	in	the	human	capital	
model	 (14.5	 per	 cent).	 	 For	married	women	 however,	 in	 the	Heckman	 full	model,	
these	women	receive	a	wage	premium	of	10.2	per	cent	over	unmarried	women.		This	
is	in	contrast	with	the	human	capital	model,	in	which,	the	estimated	return	to	being	
married	was	negative	 and	 statistically	 insignificant.	 	Marital	 status	 for	women	was	
also	statistically	insignificant	in	the	OLS	earnings	regressions.		
	
Also	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 human	 capital	 model	 for	 women,	 Indian	 women	 in	 the	
Heckman	full	model	receive,	on	average,	wages	that	are	7.7	per	cent	higher	than	the	
wages	 received	 by	 African	 women,	 ceteris	 paribus.	 	 In	 the	 OLS	 results,	 by	
comparison,	ethnicity	was	statistically	insignificant	for	both	men	and	women.	
	
For	both	sexes,	all	occupation	and	most	industry	dummy	variables	are	characterised	
by	 positive	 wage	 premia	 relative	 to	 the	 reference	 occupational	 and	 industry	
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groupings	 (that	 is,	 elementary	 occupations	 and	 Social/Personal	 Services).	 	 These	
wage	premia	are	similar	in	both	the	OLS	and	Heckman	regressions.	 	
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Table	2.6:	Heckman	FIML	Earnings	Regression:	All	Men	&	All	Women	
	
		 Human	Capital	Model	 Full	Model	
Dependent	variable	=	log	hourly	wage	 Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Potential	Experience	 0.0105*	 0.0217***	 0.004	 0.0132**		
		 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Potential	Experience2	 0.00167	 -0.0272**	 0.001	 -0.008	
		 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.008)	 (0.009)	
Highest	Level	of	Education	Attained	(ref:	primary)	 		 		 		 		
Lower	Secondary	 0.201***	 0.232***	 0.136***	 0.053	
		 (0.042)	 (0.050)	 (0.037)	 (0.053)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.499***	 0.636***	 0.356***	 0.080	
		 (0.060)	 (0.059)	 (0.044)	 (0.064)	
Tertiary	 1.159***	 1.290***	 0.756***	 0.251**		
		 (0.073)	 (0.062)	 (0.075)	 (0.077)	
Marital	Status	(ref:	unmarried)	 		 		 		 		
Married/Common	Law	 0.145***	 -0.0184	 0.139***	 0.0988**		
		 (0.031)	 (0.035)	 (0.028)	 (0.035)	
Ethnicity	(ref:	African)	 		 		 		 		
Indian	 -0.026	 -0.033	 -0.022	 0.0931*		
		 (0.028)	 (0.036)	 (0.027)	 (0.038)	
Mixed/Other	 -0.031	 0.007	 -0.056	 0.081	
		 (0.046)	 (0.047)	 (0.038)	 (0.046)	
Occupation	(ref:	Elementary	Worker)	 		 		 		 		
Machine	Operator	 		 		 0.249***	 0.294	
		 		 		 (0.040)	 (0.203)	
Craft	Worker	 		 		 0.220***	 0.480***	
		 		 		 (0.032)	 (0.115)	
Sales	Worker	 		 		 0.264***	 0.134**		
		 		 		 (0.044)	 (0.043)	
Clerical	 		 		 0.212***	 0.286***	
		 		 		 (0.060)	 (0.042)	
Technician	 		 		 0.397***	 0.585***	
		 		 		 (0.044)	 (0.051)	
Professional	 		 		 0.504***	 0.837***	
		 		 		 (0.100)	 (0.066)	
Manager	 		 		 0.619***	 0.768***	
		 		 		 (0.081)	 (0.089)	
Industry		(ref:	Social/Personal	Services)	 		 		 		 		
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 -0.113	 -0.051	
		 		 		 (0.094)	 (0.147)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 0.478***	 0.225	
		 		 		 (0.063)	 (0.123)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 0.191***	 0.120	
		 		 		 (0.044)	 (0.067)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 0.278***	 0.461**		
		 		 		 (0.071)	 (0.161)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 0.035	 -0.032	
		 		 		 (0.043)	 (0.042)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 0.188***	 0.190*			
		 		 		 (0.053)	 (0.094)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 0.213***	 0.208***	
		 		 		 (0.062)	 (0.044)	
Construction	 		 		 0.106***	 -0.207**		
		 		 		 (0.032)	 (0.067)	
Type	of	worker	(ref:	private	sector	employee)	 		 		 		 		
Public	Sector	 		 		 0.236***	 0.299***	
		 		 		 (0.030)	 (0.038)	
Constant	 2.725***	 2.269***	 2.341***	 2.629***	
		 (0.146)	 (0.087)	 (0.068)	 (0.088)	
rho	 -0.219	 0.170	 0.622	 -0.861***	
Number	of	observations	 2021	 2011	 2021	 2007	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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In	 the	private	 sector,	 the	 results	of	 the	Heckman	 full	model	 reveal	 similar	 rates	of	
return	 to	 education	 for	men	 and	women	 as	was	 estimated	 in	 the	OLS	 regressions	
(Table	2.7).		The	wage	premia	for	occupations	and	industries	for	men	and	women	in	
the	 Heckman	 full	 model	 were	 qualitatively	 similar	 to	 the	 OLS	 results	 with	 the	
exception	of	male	professionals.	 	Male	professionals	in	the	Heckman	full	model	are	
estimated	 to	 earn	 a	 lower	 wage	 premium	 (relative	 to	 elementary	 workers,	 the	
reference	occupational	category)	compared	to	the	estimated	wage	premium	found	
in	 the	OLS	 earnings	 regression	 –	 that	 is,	 39.0	 per	 cent	 in	 the	Heckman	 full	model	
versus	54.9	per	cent	in	the	OLS	regression.			 	
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Table	2.7:	Heckman	FIML	Earnings	Regressions	–	Private	Sector	
	
		 Human	Capital	Model	 Full	Model	
Dependent	variable=	hourly	log	wage	 Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Potential	Experience	 0.008	 0.0164**	 0.00463	 0.0166***	
		 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
Potential	Experience2	 0.00144	 -0.0193	 0.00277	 -0.0229*			
		 (0.011)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	
Highest	Level	of	Education	Attained	 		 		 		 		
Lower	Secondary	 0.219***	 0.167**	 0.106*	 0.0578	
		 (0.052)	 (0.057)	 (0.047)	 (0.054)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.455***	 0.477***	 0.257***	 0.175**		
		 (0.059)	 (0.065)	 (0.054)	 (0.062)	
Tertiary	 1.280***	 1.171***	 0.785***	 0.560***	
		 (0.102)	 (0.081)	 (0.115)	 (0.096)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		
Married/Common	Law	 0.234***	 0.0285	 0.170***	 -0.000981	
		 (0.039)	 (0.043)	 (0.034)	 (0.036)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		
Indian	 0.00819	 0.0257	 -0.0318	 0.0121	
		 (0.039)	 (0.042)	 (0.034)	 (0.039)	
Mixed/Other	 -0.0517	 0.0639	 -0.0448	 0.0139	
		 (0.052)	 (0.059)	 (0.044)	 (0.050)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		
Machine	Operator	 		 		 0.222***	 0.051	
		 		 		 (0.048)	 (0.191)	
Craft	Worker	 		 		 0.179***	 0.318**		
		 		 		 (0.038)	 (0.113)	
Sales	Worker	 		 		 0.117*	 0.0213	
		 		 		 (0.057)	 (0.054)	
Clerical	 		 		 0.201*	 0.286***	
		 		 		 (0.101)	 (0.057)	
Technician	 		 		 0.449***	 0.475***	
		 		 		 (0.054)	 (0.074)	
Professional	 		 		 0.390*	 0.634***	
		 		 		 (0.156)	 (0.114)	
Manager	 		 		 0.743***	 0.704***	
		 		 		 (0.113)	 (0.100)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 -0.151	 -0.269***	
		 		 		 (0.137)	 (0.055)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 0.633***	 0.482***	
		 		 		 (0.076)	 (0.113)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 0.257***	 0.168*			
		 		 		 (0.052)	 (0.068)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 0.432*	 -0.574**		
		 		 		 (0.174)	 (0.206)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 0.141**	 0.0345	
		 		 		 (0.050)	 (0.054)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 0.177*	 0.247	
		 		 		 (0.085)	 (0.128)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 0.400***	 0.359***	
		 		 		 (0.072)	 (0.063)	
Construction	 		 		 0.279***	 0.252**		
		 		 		 (0.042)	 (0.097)	
Constant		 2.529***	 2.290***	 2.365***	 2.254***	
		 (0.075)	 (0.089)	 (0.068)	 (0.086)	
rho	 0.755**	 0.251	 0.750**	 0.173	
Number	of	observations	 927	 811	 927	 807	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Heckman	FIML	Model:	Blinder-Oaxaca	Decomposition	Results	with	
Sample	Selection	Correction		
	
As	 it	 was	 previously	 discussed,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 negative	 rho,	 the	 uncorrected	
wage	 distribution	 underestimates	 the	 true	wage	 distribution,	 and	 vice	 versa	 for	 a	
positive	rho.	 	Given	this,	we	expect	that	once	we	correct	for	sample	selection	bias,	
the	mean	wages	for	women	in	the	full	model	(full	sample)	would	increase,	while	the	
mean	wages	for	men	in	the	private	sector	will	decrease	(Table	2.8).			
	
Using	 the	 full	 sample,	 the	 uncorrected	 results	 of	 the	 full	 model	 suggest	 that	 the	
wage	gap	was	13.3	per	cent.	Once	the	Heckman	correction	is	implemented,	women’s	
mean	wages	increase	from	$22.26	to	$33.88,	closing	the	wage	gap	entirely.		In	fact,	
following	 the	 Heckman	 correction	 the	mean	wages	 for	 women	 is	 higher	 than	 the	
mean	wages	for	men,	which	is	estimated	to	be	$25.23.		
	
The	 uncorrected	 results	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 of	 the	 private	 sector	mean	wages	 for	
men	and	women	are	$23.57	and	$19.25	(in	the	full	model),	respectively,	resulting	in	
a	wage	gap	of	22.5	per	cent.		Correcting	for	the	Heckman	selection	lowers	the	wage	
gap	as	men’s	mean	wages	decreases	to	$21.86	while	women’s	mean	wages	remain	
unchanged.		The	resulting	wage	gap	is	now	lower	and	is	estimated	at	13.6	per	cent.		
In	 this	 scenario,	 the	 unexplained	 component	 of	 the	 wage	 gap	 (that	 portion	
attributable	to	differences	in	returns	to	characteristics)	suggests	that	if	women	were	
to	receive	the	same	rates	of	return	to	their	personal	and	job	characteristics	as	men	
do,	 their	 wages	 are	 estimated	 to	 increase	 by	 16.3	 per	 cent.	 	 In	 the	 uncorrected	
results,	the	unexplained	component	suggests	that	women’s	wages	would	increase	by	
22.5	per	cent	if	they	were	to	receive	similar	rates	of	return	to	their	characteristics	as	
men	receive.		
	
In	both	cases	when	selection	bias	was	found	and	corrected	for,	there	was	a	sizeable	
decrease	in	the	estimated	gender	wage	gap.	 	However	opposing	forces	 lead	to	this	
decrease	 –	 in	 the	 full	 sample,	 women’s	 estimated	 wages	 increased	 while	 in	 the	
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private	sector,	men’s	estimated	earnings	decreased.		These	results	for	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	 based	 on	 the	 full	 sample	 are	 contradictory	 to	 several	 studies	 where	 a	
positive	correlation	between	wages	and	the	propensity	to	participate	 in	the	 labour	
market	was	 found	 (Badel	 and	 Peña	 2010,	 Beblo	 et	 al	 2003).	 	 In	 these	 studies	 the	
estimated	wage	gap	understates	the	true	difference	in	earnings	when	self-selection	
is	ignored.				
											
Table	2.8:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	correcting	for	Sample	Selection	
(FIML)	
	
		
Human	Capital	
Model	
Full	
Model	
Full	Sample:	All	Men/All	Women	 		 		
No	selection	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $25.23	 $25.23	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $22.27	 $22.26	
Wage	Gap:	 1.133	 1.133	
Using	a	pooled	waged	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
Characteristics	 0.859	 0.861	
Returns	to	characteristics	 1.320	 1.317	
Selection	applied	to	women	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 		 $25.23	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 		 $33.88	
Wage	Gap:	 		 0.745	
Using	a	pooled	waged	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
Characteristics	 		 0.864	
Returns	to	characteristics	 		 0.862	
Public	Sector:	 		 		
No	selection	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $32.71	 $32.71	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $31.30	 $31.30	
Wage	Gap:	 1.045	 1.045	
Using	a	pooled	waged	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
Characteristics	 0.835	 0.898	
Returns	to	characteristics	 1.252	 1.164	
Private	Sector:	 		 		
No	selection	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $23.57	 $23.57	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $19.28	 $19.25	
Wage	Gap:	 1.223	 1.225	
Using	a	pooled	waged	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
Characteristics	 0.914	 0.975	
Returns	to	characteristics	 1.338	 1.256	
Selection	applied	to	men	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $21.62	 $21.86	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $19.28	 $19.25	
Wage	Gap:	 1.122	 1.136	
Using	a	pooled	waged	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
Characteristics	 0.914	 0.977	
Returns	to	characteristics	 1.227	 1.163	
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Heckman	FIML	Model:	Summary	
	
Positive	sample	selection	bias	was	found	to	be	present	for	women	in	the	full	model	
(using	the	full	sample),	which	includes	controls	for	occupations,	industries,	and	type	
of	worker	(public	sector	vs.	private	sector)	but	not	in	the	human	capital	model.		This	
suggests	 that	 women	 in	 employment	 self-select	 into	 particular	 occupations	 and	
industries.		Conditional	on	being	in	those	occupations	and	industries,	the	sample	of	
employed	 women	 appears	 to	 have	 favourable	 unobservables	 compared	 to	 the	
population	 of	 women	 as	 a	 whole.	 When	 the	 Heckman	 selection	 correction	 is	
implemented	for	women	in	the	full	model,	the	gender	wage	gap	is	eliminated	as	the	
mean	wage	for	women	is	estimated	to	be	higher	than	the	mean	wage	for	men.	 	 In	
other	words,	 if	all	women	engaged	themselves	 in	wage	employment,	 the	observed	
gender	pay	gap	would	disappear.			
	
Sample	 selection	bias	was	 also	 found	 to	be	present	 for	men	 in	 the	private	 sector.		
Correcting	 for	 this	 bias	 among	 men,	 their	 mean	 wage	 is	 estimated	 to	 decrease,	
hence	 lowering	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 compared	 to	 the	 uncorrected	 wage	 gap.		
However,	these	Heckman	selection	results	need	to	be	interpreted	with	some	care	as	
appropriate	exclusion	restriction(s)	were	not	available	in	the	dataset	used.		Although	
the	 inclusion	 of	 exclusion	 restrictions	 is	 not	 necessary	 in	 parametric	 models,	 in	
practice,	 identification	without	 the	 use	 of	 an	 instrument	 is	weak.	 	 Nonetheless,	 it	
appears	that	the	estimated	gender	wage	gap	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	overstates	the	
true	differences	in	wages	between	the	genders	when	self-selection	is	ignored.								
	
2.6 Conclusions	
	
This	chapter,	in	part,	explores	the	labour	supply	decision	of	women	to	highlight	some	
of	the	factors	that	are	most	influential	and	may	account	for	the	gender	gap	in	wage	
employment.	 	 In	 the	 sample	 used,	 the	 percentage	 of	 men	 and	 women	 in	 wage	
employment	 was	 66.3	 per	 cent	 and	 53.5	 per	 cent,	 respectively	 –	 Table	 2.1.	 	 As	
51	
	
expected,	 the	 predicted	 probability	 of	 women	 participating	 in	 the	 labour	 market	
increases	with	higher	levels	of	education.		Education	has	a	larger	(positive)	impact	on	
a	woman’s	decision	to	engage	in	wage	employment	than	it	does	for	men.		In	keeping	
with	societal	norms,	on	average,	having	a	partner	(married/common	law)	decreases	
a	 woman’s	 probability	 of	 participating	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 by	 11.6	 percentage	
points.	 	Meanwhile,	 women	 of	 Indian	 descent	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
labour	market,	and	this	may	be	due	to	historical	and	cultural	norms	within	that	sub-
ethnic	grouping.				
	
However,	 demand	 factors	 can	 also	 account	 for	 this	 disparity	 in	wage	 employment	
between	 men	 and	 women.	 	 According	 to	 Seguino	 (2003),	 in	 the	 Caribbean15,	
employers	appear	to	favour	hiring	male	workers	by	giving	them	preferential	access	
to	 jobs.	 	 “Unobserved”	 productivity	 differentials	 (such	 as	 commitment	 to	 work,	
potential	for	absenteeism,	etc.)	may	account	for	this	gender	gap	in	employment	and	
may	 lead	 to	 employers	 favouring	 one	 gender	 over	 the	 other.	 	 However,	 Seguino	
(2003)	 states	 that	 no	 research	 on	 the	 Caribbean	 (at	 least	 to	 her	 knowledge)	 have	
shown	or	even	suggest	that	Caribbean	women	and	men	differ	substantially	 in	their	
attitudes	 towards	work.	 	Nonetheless,	 the	absence	of	 such	differences	 in	attitudes	
does	 not	 prevent	 employers	 from	 having	 prejudicial	 gender	 stereotypes	 that	
influence	their	hiring	decisions	(Seguino,	2003).			
	
The	main	aim	of	 this	 chapter	was	 to	analyse	 the	gender	wage	gap	 in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 possible	 presence	 of	 sample	 selection	 bias.		
Heckman’s	two-step	procedure	tentatively	concluded	the	absence	of	selection	in	our	
models.	 	However,	 given	 the	weak	 identification	of	 the	 LIML	estimator	because	of	
the	lack	of	exclusion	restrictions	due	to	data	limitations,	and	assuming	that	selection	
bias	is	only	moderate,	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	estimates	would	be	more	robust	and	is	
considered	to	be	the	more	appropriate	model	for	analysis.			
	
																																								 																				
15	 This	 study	 included	 the	 three	 largest	 economies	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 region	 –	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	
Jamaica,	and	Barbados.		
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Furthermore,	Stolzenberg	and	Relles	(1997)	have	noted	that	only	if	selection	bias	is	
very	 severe	 and	 the	 samples	 are	 large	 does	 the	 two-step	 correction	 improve	
estimates	 compared	 to	 the	 “uncorrected”	 OLS	 estimates.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	
selection	bias	is	moderate,	or	if	samples	are	relatively	small	with	only	a	few	hundred	
cases,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	two-step	estimator	will	make	estimates	worse,	even	
when	sample	selection	is	known	to	be	present	and	the	assumptions	of	the	two-step	
correction	method	are	satisfied.					 	
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Chapter	3 Gender	Wage	Gap	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
	
3.1 Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 provides	 new	 insight	 into	 the	 nature	 and	 sources	 of	 gender	 wage	
inequality	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 To	 achieve	 this,	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 was	
analysed	 using	 the	 well-known	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 and	 Neumark	 decomposition	
methodologies	applied	to	nationally	representative	data	for	2012.		This	chapter	also	
contributes	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 Caribbean	 region,	 which	 is	 generally	 an	
understudied	geographical	region	in	terms	of	wage	gaps.	
	
Globally,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 research	 conducted	 concerning	
labour	 markets.	 Many	 of	 these	 studies	 have	 focussed	 on	 gender	 disparities	 in	
developed	countries	 (see	 inter	alia	Anderson	et	al	2001;	Reiman	2001;	Chichilnisky	
and	 Frederisksen	 2008).	 However,	 there	 are	 fewer	 studies	 based	 on	 developing	
economies	 and	 even	 less	 on	 the	 Caribbean.	 A	World	 Bank	 report	 comprising	 case	
studies	on	women’s	employment	and	pay	(edited	by	Psacharopoulos	and	Tzannatos,	
1992)	contains	21	case	studies	of	15	Latin	American	countries,	but	only	1	Caribbean	
nation	 (Jamaica)	 is	 featured	 in	 the	 report.	 	 A	 more	 recent	 co-publication	 by	 the	
World	Bank	and	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank,	issued	in	2012,	again	looking	
at	 the	 Latin	 American	 and	 Caribbean	 region,	 contained	 2	 case	 studies	 on	 the	
Caribbean	–	Jamaica	and	Barbados	(edited	by	Ñopo,	2012).		
	
Of	 the	 studies	 based	 on	 the	 Caribbean’s	 labour	 markets,	 only	 a	 few	 have	
concentrated	on	the	gender	earnings	gap.	Reilly	and	Bellony	(2009)	and	Bellony	and	
Reilly	 (2009)	 looked	 at	 labour	market	 earnings	 in	 two	 Eastern	 Caribbean	 islands	 –	
Dominica	 and	 St.	 Lucia,	 highlighting	 gender,	 ethnic,	 and	 inter-industry	 pay	 gaps.		
Sookram	 and	Watson	 (2008)	 investigated	wage	 discrimination	 between	males	 and	
females	 in	 the	 informal	 sector	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 In	 1997,	 Coppin	 explored	
women’s	 earnings	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 based	 on	 household	 status	 (that	 is,	
headship	versus	non-headship)	and	ethnicity.	More	 recently,	 in	2010,	Bellony	et	al	
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investigated	 gender	 earnings	 gaps	 in	 two	 Caribbean	 countries	 (Barbados	 and	
Jamaica).		
	
This	 research	 is	 timely	 and	 relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago;	 the	
disparity	 in	 earnings	 among	men	and	women	has	 serious	 implications	 for	 Trinidad	
and	 Tobago,	 given	 that,	 35	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 households	 are	 headed	 by	 women	
(Household	Budgetary	Survey,	2008/2009).		In	poverty	research,	gender	inequalities	
in	 the	 labour	 market	 are	 considered	 as	 indicators	 that	 considerably	 restrain	
economic	 growth	 (United	Nations	Development	Programme	2008).	 	Data	obtained	
from	 the	 Survey	 of	 Living	 Conditions	 (2005)	 has	 shown	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 national	
poverty	Headcount	 Index	from	18.4	per	cent	 in	1998	(Household	Budgetary	Survey	
1997/1998)	to	11.0	per	cent	in	2005.	Significantly,	some	38	per	cent	of	the	poorest	
households	in	2005	were	headed	by	women.			
	
In	 2003,	 an	 assessment	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 progress	 towards	 achieving	 the	
United	 Nation’s	 Millennium	 Development	 Goals	 (in	 particular	 Goal	 3:	 promote	
gender	 equality	 and	 empower	women)	 revealed	 the	 estimated	 income	 of	 women	
was	 far	 less	 than	 men	 in	 comparable	 positions	 despite	 their	 higher	 educational	
achievements	 at	 all	 levels	 (United	 Nations	 Development	 Programme,	 Human	
Development	 Report,	 2003).	 In	 spite	 of	 being	 categorised	 by	 the	World	 Bank	 as	 a	
high-income	 country,	 alongside	 fourteen	 years	 of	 consecutive	 positive	 economic	
growth	 (prior	 to	 the	 global	 recession),	 the	 national	 poverty	 rate	 still	 stands	 in	
double-digits.	 A	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 and	 wage	
discrimination	will	assist	in	improving	gender	equity	and	social	wellbeing	in	Trinidad	
and	Tobago.		
	
The	Government	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	has	already	recognised	the	 importance	of	
gender	 equity	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 National	 Policy	 on	 Gender	 and	
Development	(later	revised	in	2009).	In	the	draft	Gender	Policy	document,	one	of	the	
strategic	 objectives	 includes	 the	 incorporation	 of	 “a	 gender	 perspective	 in	 all	
development	planning	as	the	strategy	for	promoting	gender	equity	and	‘fairness’	so	
that	 development	 planning	 itself	 becomes	 fundamentally	 gendered”.	 In	 the	
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Government’s	 overall	 framework	 for	 sustainable	 development	 –	 the	 “Seven	
Interconnected	 Pillars	 for	 Sustainable	 Development”,	 the	 second	 Pillar	 refers	 to	
Poverty	 Eradication	 and	 Social	 Justice.	 To	 address	 this	 Pillar,	 the	 government	 has	
identified	 both	 female-headed	 households	 and	 single-parent	 households	 as	 most	
vulnerable	 to	poverty	 (Ministry	of	Planning	and	the	Economy,	Medium-Term	Policy	
Framework	 2012-2014).	 In	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 poverty	 is	 higher	 among	 female-
headed	households	because	women’s	wages	tend	to	be	lower	and	fewer	women	in	
this	 group	 are	 in	 paid	 employment	 (UN	 Women	 Caribbean,	 Advocacy	 Brief:	
Strengthening	Women’s	Economic	Security	and	Rights).	 	The	 results	and	analysis	 in	
this	thesis	should	prove	useful	to	policymakers	in	devising	a	more	directed	approach	
to	 tackle	 the	 issue	 of	 gender	 inequality	 and	 discrimination	 in	 the	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago	labour	market.	
	
The	main	finding	of	this	chapter	is	that	the	gender	wage	gap	has	narrowed	over	the	
past	twenty	years,	moving	from	19.2	per	cent	 in	1993	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001)	to	
11.4	per	cent	in	2012.		However,	the	size	of	the	gap	differs	greatly	in	the	public	and	
the	private	sector;	the	male-female	pay	gap	in	the	public	sector	is	negligible	(3.2	per	
cent),	 while	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 far	 greater	 (23	 per	 cent).	 	 The	
decompositions	 seek	 to	 compartmentalise	 the	gap	 into	 two	portions	–	 first,	 a	part	
due	 to	differences	 in	 the	productive	 characteristics	between	men	and	women	and	
second,	a	part	due	to	differences	in	returns	for	these	characteristics.		The	results	of	
the	 decompositions	 (Neumark	method)	 reveal	 that	 if	 women	 possessed	 the	 same	
mean	characteristics	as	men	their	wages	would	actually	decrease	by	11.6	per	cent,	
but	 if	 their	productive	characteristics	were	rewarded	the	same	as	men	their	wages	
could	potentially	increase	by	as	much	as	26	per	cent.		
	
The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	organised	as	follows.		The	next	section	presents	an	
overview	of	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	labour	market,	while	section	3.3	discusses	the	
theoretical	underpinnings	seeking	to	explain	the	existence	of	the	gender	wage	gap,	
outlines	 how	 the	 gap	 can	 be	 measured,	 and	 includes	 some	 discussion	 on	 the	
shortcomings	of	these	techniques.		Section	3.4	briefly	looks	at	some	previous	studies	
on	 gender	 wage	 gaps	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 Section	 3.5	 follows	 with	 the	
59	
	
description	 of	 the	 data	 and	 the	model	 used	 to	measure	 the	 gap,	 and	 section	 3.6	
entails	the	discussion	of	the	results.		Section	3.7	concludes	the	chapter.		
		
3.2 Overview	of	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	Labour	Market	
	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	is	a	two-island	republic	(officially	called	the	Republic	of	Trinidad	
and	 Tobago)	 situated	 between	 the	 Caribbean	 Sea	 and	 the	 North	 Atlantic	 Ocean,	
northeast	 of	 Venezuela.	 	 The	 republic	 has	 a	 land	 area	 of	 5,128	 square	 kilometres	
(1,980	square	miles),	 with	 a	 population	 of	 approximately	 1.3	 million	 people	
according	to	the	latest	Population	and	Housing	Census	conducted	in	2011.			
	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	is	an	energy-based	economy	(mostly	crude	oil	and	natural	gas),	
with	the	energy	sector	accounting	for	on	average	40	per	cent	of	the	country’s	Gross	
Domestic	Product	(GDP)	over	the	five-year	period	2009-201316,	and	an	estimated	per	
capita	GDP	of	US$10,727	in	2013.		The	energy	sector	however,	dominates	output	but	
not	employment.		Tourism	and	manufacturing	are	also	important	sources	of	national	
revenue.	 	 The	World	 Bank	 ranks	 the	 country	 as	 a	 high-income	non-OECD	 country,	
and	it	is	the	most	industrialised	country	in	the	English-speaking	Caribbean.		
	
Oil	was	first	discovered	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	in	1857	and	soon	grew	to	be	a	major	
contributor	to	the	country’s	GDP.		By	1970	the	petroleum	sector	accounted	for	over	
20	per	cent	of	national	output,	and	as	oil	prices	increased	so	too	did	the	importance	
of	this	sector	grow	in	relation	to	economic	growth.		Given	the	country’s	dependence	
on	 the	 energy	 sector,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 economic	 cycle	 has	 mirrored	
movements	in	the	international	price	of	oil.		For	instance,	the	country’s	boom	period	
of	1974	to	1982	was	accompanied	by	high	and	rising	oil	prices,	and	was	followed	by	
a	bust	period	(1983-1989),	when	oil	prices	were	low	and	falling.17			
	
During	 the	 1980s	 to	 the	 mid-1990s,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 economy	 underwent	
several	periods	of	bust	and	boom,	before	experiencing	sustained	economic	growth	
																																								 																				
16	Review	of	the	Economy,	2013.		Ministry	of	Finance	and	the	Economy,	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
17	The	average	price	of	West	Texas	Intermediate	(WTI)	was	US$17.26	per	barrel	in	1979,	and	jumped	
to	US$28.67	per	barrel	in	the	following	year	and	averaged	US$31.55	over	the	three-year	period	1980-
1982.		During	the	bust	years	of	1983-1989,	WTI	averaged	US$22.08	per	barrel.			
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for	over	a	decade.		The	economy	slowed	in	1981	and	1982	(growing	at	4.6	per	cent	
per	annum),	then	contracted	over	the	years	1983-1989	with	output	declining	by	4.8	
per	cent	per	annum.		The	economy	recovered	for	a	short	period	(1990-1991)	before	
going	 into	a	slump	again	 (1992-1993),	and	 then	had	steady	growth	of	3.7	per	cent	
per	annum	in	1994	and	1995	(Downes,	1998).	 	Post-1995,	the	country	experienced	
thirteen	 consecutive	 years	 of	 positive	 economic	 growth	 (growing	 at	 an	 annual	
average	 of	 7.6	 per	 cent)	 before	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 when	 the	
economy	contracted	by	0.9	per	cent	and	0.1	per	cent	in	2009	and	2010,	respectively	
(Figure	3.2.1).	
	
Figure	3.2.1:	Unemployment	Rate,	Real	GDP	Growth	Rate	and	Crude	Oil	Prices,	
1980-2010	
	
							Source:	Central	Statistical	Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
Given	 the	 country’s	 recessionary	 period	 in	 the	 1980s,	 the	 national	 unemployment	
rate	more	 than	doubled	 from	9.9	 per	 cent	 in	 1980	 to	 22.0	 per	 cent	 in	 1989.	 	 The	
economic	recession	also	saw	a	decline	in	real	wage	rates,	which	fell	by	more	than	9	
per	 cent	 from	 1983	 to	 1995	 (Strobl	 and	 Walsh,	 2003).	 	 By	 2004,	 the	 national	
unemployment	 rate	 was	 in	 single	 digits	 and	 continued	 to	 progress	 downwards,	
measuring	5.9	per	cent	in	2010.		With	an	unemployment	rate	at	below	6.0	per	cent,	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 had	 the	 lowest	 unemployment	 rate	 among	 Caribbean	
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countries,	with	other	 countries	 experiencing	double-digit	 unemployment	 rates	 (for	
example,	 in	2010	Jamaica’s	and	Barbados’	unemployment	rates	measured	12.4	per	
cent	and	10.8	per	cent,	respectively).	 	Real	wages	also	 improved,	with	the	 index	of	
(real)	 average	weekly	 earnings	 increasing	 by	 36	 per	 cent	 over	 the	 period	 1995	 to	
2004.				
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 over	 the	 last	 five	 decades	 or	 so,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	
economy,	 including	 the	 labour	market,	 has	 undergone	 significant	 changes.	 	 At	 the	
beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	like	several	other	Caribbean	countries,	Trinidad	
and	Tobago’s	economy	depended	heavily	on	the	agriculture	sector	(mainly	sugar	and	
cocoa)	to	propel	economic	activity,	and	generate	employment	and	foreign	exchange.		
Following	 the	 discovery	 of	 oil,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 agriculture	 sector,	 and	 in	
particular,	employment	in	the	sector,	began	to	wane	(Table	3.1).			
	
Table	3.1:	Distribution	of	Employment	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	by	Sector,	1970-2011	
/per	cent/	
Sector	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990*	 1995*	
2004-
2011*	
Agriculture	and	Forestry	 23.0	 14.0	 10.0	 11.0	 12.1	 10.7	 2.6	
Manufacturing,	Mining,	
Quarrying	 21.0	 21.0	 16.0	 15.0	 14.4	 14.1	 6.0	
Construction,	Electricity,	
Water,	Gas	 14.0	 14.0	 21.0	 19.0	 12.6	 11.5	 11.3	
Distribution,	Restaurants,	
Hotels	 15.0	 19.0	 20.0	 24.0	 16.7	 18.7	 11.5	
Transportation	and	
Communication	 6.0	 8.0	 8.0	 7.0	 7.3	 7.1	 4.5	
Services	 21.0	 24.0	 24.0	 25.0	 36.2	 38.0	 62.0	
Source:	Central	Statistical	Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
*	 The	 classification	 in	 1990	 onwards	 is	 more	 disaggregated	 than	 in	 previous	 years.	 In	 1990	 the	 petroleum	
industry	 accounted	 for	 4.4	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 employment,	 while	 in	 1995	 it	 accounted	 for	 3.7	 per	 cent,	 and	
averaged	2.1	per	cent	over	the	period	2004-2011.	
Services	category	includes	the	following	sub-categories:	Finance,	Insurance	and	Real	Estate;	Community,	Social	
and	Personal	Services;	and	Other	Services.	
	
Employment	 in	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 moved	 from	 over	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 total	
employment	 in	 the	 1970s	 to	 less	 than	 5.0	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 new	millennium.	 	 The	
government	 and	 services	 sectors	 became	 the	 main	 employers	 in	 the	 economy	
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(Mahabir	et	al,	2013).		During	the	period	2004	to	2011,	the	services	sector	accounted	
for,	on	average,	36.5	per	cent	of	 total	employment;	 followed	by	community,	social	
and	 personal	 services,	 which	 include	 the	 government	 (19.9	 per	 cent);	 the	
construction	sector	(11.3	per	cent);	and	wholesale	and	retail	sectors	(11.5	per	cent)	–	
Figure	 3.2	 	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 has	 often	 been	 argued,	 to	 suffer	 from	 Dutch	
Disease18	following	the	oil	boom	of	the	1970s	–	see	inter	alia	Gelb	(1988),	Auguste	et	
al	 (2011)	 and	 Hosein	 (2007).	 	 According	 to	 Hosein	 (2007),	 within	 the	 Caribbean	
region,	 the	 decline	 in	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 has	 been	 the	 most	 pronounced	 in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago;	most	notably,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 is	 the	only	country	 in	 the	
region	that	possesses	significant	oil	and	natural	gas	reserves.			
	
Figure	3.2:	Average	Employment	by	Industrial	Group,	2004-2011	
/per	cent/	
	
	
					Source:	Central	Statistical	Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
Following	the	recession	of	the	1980s,	when	the	 labour	force	participation	rate	(the	
labour	force	divided	by	the	non-institutional	population19)	dipped	to	55.6	per	cent,	
the	rate	has	hovered	around	62	per	cent	over	the	last	decade	(Figure	3.22).	The	size	
																																								 																				
18	Dutch	disease	refers	to	the	relationship	between	the	increase	in	economic	growth	propelled	by	the	
exploitation	of	natural	resources	and	a	decline	in	the	manufacturing	and/or	agricultural	sectors.	
19	The	labour	force	consists	of	persons	with	a	job,	and	those	who	are	unemployed	and	seeking	work.	
Persons	 who	 are	 not	 seeking	 work,	 for	 example	 a	 discouraged	 worker	 or	 a	 student,	 are	 not	
considered	to	be	in	the	labour	force.		The	non-institutional	population	consists	of	those	persons	who	
are	15	years	old	and	over	and	who	are	not	institutionalized.		
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of	 the	 labour	 force	has	 increased	over	 the	 years,	moving	 from	480,000	persons	 in	
1987	 to	619,000	persons	 in	2010	–	an	annual	average	growth	 rate	of	1.1	per	 cent	
(Figure	3.22).		Even	though	males	continue	to	be	predominant,	the	share	of	females	
in	the	labour	force	has	steadily	increased	moving	from	31.8	per	cent	in	1980	to	41.4	
per	cent	in	2010.	
	
Figure	3.22:	Trinidad	and	Tobago	Labour	Force	and	Participation	Rates	(Both	
Sexes),	1987-2010	
	
											Source:	Central	Statistical	Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
	
As	 in	 most	 countries,	 female	 labour	 force	 participation	 rates20	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago	are	markedly	lower	than	male	participation	rates.		Despite	this,	the	disparity	
between	these	rates	has	been	decreasing	–	over	the	two	decades	spanning	1990	to	
2010,	 male	 participation	 rates	 hovered	 around	 75	 per	 cent,	 while	 female	
participation	increased	from	38	per	cent	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	to	just	over	
50	 per	 cent	 in	 2010.21	 	 Noteworthy	 however,	 in	 comparison	 to	 neighbouring	
Caribbean	countries	(namely,	Jamaica	and	Barbados),	Trinidad	and	Tobago	has	lower	
female	participation	rates.		Between	2000	and	2009,	Barbados	and	Jamaica’s	female	
																																								 																				
20	The	female	labour	force	participation	rate	is	the	percentage	of	working	age	women	who	are	either	
working	or	looking	for	work.	
21	 Coppin	 (1997)	 attributes	 this	 increasing	 trend	 in	 female	 labour	 force	 participation	 (across	 the	
Caribbean)	 in	 large	measure	 to	 higher	 levels	 of	 educational	 attainment	 and	 a	 changing	 social	 and	
economic	structure,	which	affords	women	better	labour	market	options.			
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labour	 force	 participation	 rates	 averaged	 65.1	 and	 57.4	 per	 cent,	 respectively22	
(Roopnarine	and	Ramrattan,	2012).	
	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 institutional	 infrastructure,	 Rambarran	 (1998)	 has	 noted	 that	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 formal	 labour	 market	 institutions	 have	 “traditionally	 been	
characterized	 by	 politically	 strong,	 oligopolistic	 firms	 producing	 for	 the	 domestic	
market	and	an	equally	powerful	and	aggressive	trade	union	movement	concentrated	
in	the	energy-related,	capital-intensive	manufacturing	and	public	sectors.”	 	 In	2011,	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	had	123	registered	trade	unions,	representing	94,621	persons;	
this	 translates	 into	 a	 trade	 union	 intensity	 of	 16.4	 per	 cent	 (Mahabir	et	 al,	 2013).		
The	 presence	 of	 trade	 unions	 within	 specific	 industrial	 sectors	 can	 aid	 in	 the	
narrowing	of	the	gender	wage	differential	within	that	sector.		Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	
trade	union	 intensity	 ratio	of	16.4	per	cent	 is	 considerably	 lower	 than	 the	average	
trade	union	 intensity	of	26	per	 cent	among	 industrialised	 countries.23	 	Meanwhile,	
the	country’s	trade	union	intensity	ratio	is	on	par	with	countries	like	Chile	(14.3	per	
cent	in	2009)	and	Mexico	(14.4	per	cent	in	2010)	(Mahabir	et	al,	2013).				
	
The	 government	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 has	 ratified	 several	 International	 Labour	
Organisation	 (ILO)	 Conventions	 including	 the	 Tripartite	 Consultation	 (International	
Labour	Standards)	Convention,	1976	(No.	144).		Some	of	the	more	important	pieces	
of	 legislation	passed	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	concerning	the	 labour	market	 include:	
the	 Industrial	Relations	Act	 (1972),	 the	Retrenchment	and	Severance	Payments	Act	
(1985),	the	Minimum	Wage	Act	(1976),	and	the	Equal	Opportunity	Act	(2000).		
	
The	 Industrial	 Relations	 Act	 (IRA)	 was	 enacted	 to	 make	 better	 provision	 for	 the	
stabilisation,	 improvement	 and	 promotion	 of	 industrial	 relations	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago.		The	IRA	made	provisions	for	the	establishment	of	an	Industrial	Court	with	
jurisdiction	 inter	 alia	 to	 hear	 and	 determine	 trade	 disputes	 as	 well	 as	 to	 register	
collective	agreements.			
	
																																								 																				
22	Data	were	sourced	from	the	International	Labour	Organisation	(ILO).	
23	Data	on	industrialised	countries	refer	to	2010,	while	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	trade	union	intensity	
ratio	refers	to	2011	data.		
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The	 Retrenchment	 and	 Severance	 Payments	 Act	 prescribes	 the	 procedure	 to	 be	
followed	 in	 the	event	of	 redundancy	and	 the	provision	 for	 severance	payments	 to	
retrenched	workers.		In	the	case	of	dismissal	due	to	redundancy,	the	Act	outlines	the	
minimum	 severance	 payments	 to	 be	 a	 function	 of	 the	 length	 of	 uninterrupted	
service,	generally	2–3	weeks	for	each	year	of	service.	 	Following	the	passing	of	the	
Retrenchment	 and	 Severance	 Payments	 Act,	 Rambarran	 (1998)	 highlighted	 that	
many	 employers	 consequently	 substituted	 full-time	 labour	 with	 part-time	 and	
temporary	workers	who	are	not	covered	by	the	legislation.	
	
Even	 though	 the	 legislative	 framework	 allowing	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 minimum	
wages	was	 first	passed	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 in	1976,	 a	national	minimum	wage	
was	 only	 declared	 several	 years	 later	 in	 1998.	 	 Since	 then,	 the	 national	minimum	
wage	 has	 been	 revised	 twice	 and	 currently	 stands	 at	 TT$12.5024	 per	 hour	 (as	 of	
January	01,	2011)	from	TT$9.00	per	hour	(which	was	set	in	2005),	and	up	from	the	
initial	 minimum	 wage	 of	 TT$7.00	 per	 hour.	 	 The	 most	 recent	 amendment	 to	 the	
legislation	raising	the	minimum	wage	to	TT$12.50	per	hour	explicitly	stated	that	this	
increase	in	the	minimum	wage	was	not	intended	to	reduce	the	wages	of	employees	
who	were	already	earning	in	excess	of	TT$12.50	an	hour:		
“This	order	shall	not	be	construed	as	authorising	–		
	a)	 the	 reduction	 of	 wages	 paid	 to	 those	 employees	 who	 already	
receive	wages	in	excess	of	the	national	minimum	wage;	and		
b)	changes	in	the	existing	terms	and	conditions	of	any	worker	to	effect	
a	lowering	of	such	terms	and	conditions.”	
		(Minimum	Wages	Order	2010,	Part	II:	9)	
	
In	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	the	Equal	Opportunity	Act	 (EOA)	was	passed	 in	2000.	 	The	
(EOA)	prohibits	an	employer	or	prospective	employer	from	discriminating	against	an	
employee	 or	 a	 prospective	 employee	 because	 of	 their	 status	 (race,	 disability,	
ethnicity,	 marital	 status,	 religion,	 sex,	 or	 geographical	 origin)	 and	 also	 from	
discrimination	 by	 victimisation	 whereby	 the	 person	 victimised	 is	 less	 favourably	
treated	than	other	persons.	 	The	Act	states	that	an	employer	shall	not	discriminate	
against	an	employee	in	the	terms	and	conditions	of	employment	as	well	as	access	to	
																																								 																				
24	TT$	refers	to	Trinidad	and	Tobago	dollars.		TT$1.00	=	US$0.16	(as	at	March	24,	2014).	
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opportunities	 for	 promotion,	 transfer,	 training,	 or	 any	 other	 benefit,	 facility	 or	
service	related	to	the	employment.		The	Act	also	allows	for	the	establishment	of	an	
Equal	 Opportunity	 Commission	 and	 an	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Tribunal.	 	 Currently,	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	does	not	have	any	legislation	pertaining	to	equal	pay	for	work	
of	equal	value.			
	
3.3 Conceptual	Framework	
	
3.3.1 Theory	of	Discrimination	
	
The	 gender	wage	 gap	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 ratio	 of	 female	 to	male	 earnings.	 	 Several	
theories	 have	 been	 put	 forward	 to	 explain	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 gender	wage	 gap,	
where	the	gap	is	usually	viewed	as	comprising	of	two	parts:	an	“explained”	portion	
and	an	“unexplained”	portion.		Some	of	these	theories	can	be	categorized	as	either	
neoclassical	or	 institutional	 (sometimes	 referred	 to	as	 labour	market	segmentation	
theories).	 	 However,	 no	 singular	 theory	 sufficiently	 explains	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
gender	 wage	 gap.	 	 Those	 theories	 used	 to	 account	 for	 the	 “explained”	 wage	
differential	 relate	to	human	capital,	social	constructions	of	skill,	“crowding”	of	 jobs	
traditionally	 labelled	 as	 male	 and	 female	 jobs,	 labour	 market	 segmentation	 and	
other	 imperfections	 in	 the	 labour	 market.	 	 The	 “unexplained”	 component	 of	 the	
wage	gap	is	usually	considered	to	be	due	to	discriminatory	practices	by	employers.	
	
Arrow	(1971)	describes	labour	market	discrimination	as	follows,	
	 “The	 fact	 that	 different	 groups	 of	 workers,	 be	 they	 skilled	 or	
unskilled,	 black	 and	 white,	 or	 male	 and	 female,	 receive	 different	
wages,	 invites	 the	 explanation	 that	 different	 groups	 must	 differ	
according	to	some	characteristic	valued	on	the	market.		In	standard	
economic	theory,	we	think	first	of	all	of	differences	in	productivity.		
The	 notion	 of	 discrimination	 involves	 the	 additional	 concept	 that	
personal	 characteristics	 of	 the	 worker	 that	 are	 unrelated	 to	
productivity	 are	 also	 valued	 on	 the	 market.	 	 Such	 personal	
characteristics	 as	 race,	 ethnic	 background,	 and	 sex	 have	 been	
frequently	adduced	in	this	context.”	
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Neoclassical	 theorists	 typically	 explain	 the	 male-female	 earnings	 gap	 within	 the	
tenets	of	human	capital	theory.		Human	capital	theory	relates	the	differences	in	pay	
for	men	and	women	to	differences	in	the	relative	levels	of	human	capital	(experience	
and	educational	attainment),	which	is	usually	reflected	in	differences	in	productivity.		
Human	capital	is	more	profitable	the	longer	the	payoff	period	over	which	returns	on	
investment	 can	 be	 realised	 (Altonji	 and	 Blank,	 1999).	 	 The	 argument	 follows	 that	
most	men	expect	to	participate	in	the	labour	market	throughout	their	lives,	whereas	
some	 women	 expect	 to	 devote	 time	 to	 the	 household	 (either	 caring	 for	 their	
children	or	elderly	parents),	thereby	shortening	the	payoff	period	and	reducing	the	
returns	on	the	investment.		In	the	latter	case,	it	has	been	argued	that	for	this	reason	
women	 have	 acquired	 less	 human	 capital.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 human	 capital	 that	 a	
woman	acquires	will	 depreciate	during	her	 years	out	of	 the	 labour	market	 (Altonji	
and	Blank,	1999).		In	short,	the	value	of	the	woman’s	human	capital	stock	is	reduced	
by	her	intermittent	labour	market	attachment.					
	
In	 the	 neoclassical	 literature,	 theoretical	 models	 have	 been	 used	 for	 both	
competitive	and	non-competitive	market	structures.	The	neoclassical	models	which	
assume	 competitive	 markets	 are	 based	 on	 Becker’s	 concept	 of	 “tastes	 for	
discrimination”,	which	assumes	that	employers	or	consumers	have	different	“tastes”	
for	the	service	of	certain	groups	of	workers	(for	example,	women),	or	for	the	goods	
produced	 by	 these	 workers	 (Becker,	 1971).	 	 These	 different	 tastes	 give	 rise	 to	
different	wages,	despite	workers	being	equally	skilled	or	productive.		For	instance,	if	
employers	prefer	to	hire	males	over	females	(prejudice	in	favour	of	male	workers),	a	
concept	referred	to	in	the	literature	as	nepotism,	employers	will	act	as	if	hiring	men	
is	cheaper	than	it	actually	is	(Becker,	1971).		For	instance,	female	workers	may	have	
to	 ‘compensate’	 employers	 by	 being	 more	 productive	 at	 a	 given	 wage	 or,	
equivalently,	by	accepting	a	lower	wage	for	identical	productivity.			
	
Neoclassical	economists	have	also	argued	that	discrimination	may	arise	even	in	the	
absence	 of	 prejudice.	 	 The	 argument	 here	 stems	 from	 asymmetric	 information	
concerning	 the	 true	 productivity	 of	 potential	male	 and	 female	 employees	 (Arrow,	
1973).	 	 Given	 this	 uncertainty,	 employers	 use	 statistics	 about	 the	 average	
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performance	 of	 the	 group	 (here,	 male	 versus	 female)	 to	 predict	 the	 potential	
employee’s	 productivity.	 	 This	 type	 of	 discrimination	 is	 termed	 statistical	
discrimination.		Consequently,	women	may	earn	less	than	men	simply	because	they	
have	a	higher	probability	of	 leaving	 the	organisation	 (for	 instance,	 in	order	 to	 rear	
children).		By	applying	probabilities	for	the	whole	population	to	specific	individuals,	
discrimination	may	arise.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 institutional	 theories	 of	 labour	 market	 discrimination,	 the	 labelling	 of	
jobs	 as	 “male”	 and	 “female”	 can	 also	 influence	 gender	 pay	 differentials.	 	 When	
women	 are	 discouraged	 from	 applying	 to	 jobs	 seen	 as	 “men’s	 jobs”,	 (e.g.	 jobs	 in	
STEM	 industries	 –	 science,	 technology,	 mathematics	 and	 engineering),	 which	 are	
usually	 better	 paid	 jobs,	 women	 tend	 to	 “crowd”	 lower	 level	 occupations	 (e.g.	
teaching,	nursing).		This	excess	supply	of	female	labour	in	these	occupations	tends	to	
depress	wages	for	such	jobs.		This	phenomenon	is	known	as	occupational	crowding.	
	
The	theory	of	segmented	labour	markets	argues	that	the	labour	market	consists	of	a	
primary	market	and	a	secondary	market.		The	primary	market	offers	workers	higher	
wages	 and	 is	 usually	 characterized	 by	 higher	 levels	 of	 productivity,	 whereas,	 the	
secondary	market	 is	usually	 typified	by	 low	paying	 jobs,	 insecure	employment	and	
lower	levels	of	productivity.		Persons	employed	in	the	secondary	market	are	usually	
limited	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 transfer	 to	 the	primary	market	 given	 their	 history	 of	 low	
productivity	working	in	the	secondary	sector	and	by	the	labour	market	which	favours	
those	employees	employed	 in	 the	primary	sector.	Women	may	be	concentrated	 in	
jobs	 within	 the	 secondary	 market	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 as	 discussed	 above,	
including	 the	 effects	 of	 discrimination,	 and/or	 restrictions	 on	 their	 labour	 market	
options	(Anderson	et	al,	2001).					
	
In	 summary,	wage	 differences	 among	men	 and	women	 can	 be	 partly	 explained	 in	
terms	 of	 their	 human	 capital	 endowments	 and	 access	 to	 the	 primary	 market	 for	
employment.	 	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 overwhelming	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 gender	
bias	 also	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 determining	 the	differences	 in	wages	 for	men	
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and	women	(Madheswaran	and	Khasnobis,	2007).25		This	discrimination	of	women’s	
wages,	 sometimes	measured	 by	 the	 “discrimination	 coefficient”,	 is	 used	 to	 define	
employers	“taste	for	discrimination”	(Becker,	1971);	this	 is	discussed	in	more	detail	
in	the	next	section.	
3.3.2 Decomposition	Analysis	
	
In	 the	 literature	 it	 is	 standard	 to	 investigate	 gender	 wage	 gaps	 using	 the	 Blinder	
(1973)-Oaxaca	 (1973)	 BO	 decomposition	 methodology.	 	 This	 decomposition	
approach	 is	 commonly	 used	 to	 measure	 labour	 market	 discrimination	 against	
women.		The	standard	Oaxaca	decomposition	method	enables	the	wage	differential	
to	 be	 separated	 into	 differences	 that	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 differences	 in	
characteristics	 (sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 endowments	 component)	 and	 those	
that	cannot	be	explained	by	differences	in	characteristics	(usually	referred	to	as	the	
discrimination	component).		The	Oaxaca	methodology	gives	an	estimate	of	the	wage	
discrimination	using	averages,	 thus	giving	an	 indication	of	the	overall	extent	of	the	
gender	wage	gap.	
	
In	 terms	of	 the	Oaxaca	decomposition	method,	 the	 gross	wage	differential	 can	be	
defined	as:	𝐺 =  !!!!!!! =  !!!! − 1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(1)	
where	𝑌!	and	𝑌!	represent	the	wages	of	male	and	female	individuals,	respectively.		
In	 the	 absence	 of	 labour	 market	 discrimination,	 the	 male-female	 earnings	
differential	would	reflect	pure	productivity	differences	(𝑄):	𝑄 =  !!!!!! − 1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(2)	
where	 the	 superscript	 denotes	 the	 absence	of	market	 discrimination.	 	 The	market	
discrimination	 coefficient	 (𝐷)	 can	 then	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 proportionate	 difference	
between	𝐺	+1	and	𝑄	+1:	
																																								 																				
25	 The	 authors	 reference	 previous	 studies	 such	 as	 the	 volume	 edited	 by	 G.	 Psacharopoulos	 and	 Z.	
Tzannatos	(1992)	which	contains	twenty-one	studies	of	fifteen	different	Latin	American	countries,	and	
Horton	 (1996)	 which	 analyses	 seven	 countries	 in	 East	 Asia.	 	 In	 the	 1992	 volume,	 on	 average,	
discrimination	accounted	for	88	per	cent	of	the	male	pay	advantage,	while	Horton	(1996)	concluded	
that	differences	in	returns	to	male	and	female	characteristics	accounted	for	at	least	half	of	the	gender	
pay	gap	(although	this	differential	appears	to	be	narrowing).	
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𝐷 =  !! !! ! !!! !!!!!! !!! 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(3)	
Equations	 (1)	 to	 (3)	 imply	 the	 following	 logarithmic	 decomposition	 of	 the	 gross	
earnings	differential:	𝑙𝑛 𝐺 + 1 = 𝑙𝑛 𝐷 + 1 + 𝑙𝑛 (𝑄 + 1)	 	 	 	 Eq.	(4)	
	
This	decomposition	can	be	used	to	estimate	male	and	female	wage	functions,	using	
the	 semi-logarithmic	earnings	equations	 (Mincer,	 1974)	 and	ordinary	 least	 squares	
(OLS):	 𝑙𝑛 𝑌! =  𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑋! 	 (Male	Earnings	Function)	
Eq.	(5)	 	𝑙𝑛 𝑌!  =  𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑋!	 										(Female	Earnings	Function)	
Eq.	(6)	 	
ln𝑌	denotes	the	geometric	mean	of	earnings,	𝑋the	vector	of	the	mean	values	of	the	
regressors,	𝛽	the	vector	of	coefficients,	α the	intercept	term,	and	𝜀	is	the	error	term.		
The	gross	wage	differential	in	logarithmic	terms	is	given	by:	𝑙𝑛(𝐺 + 1)  =  𝑙𝑛 𝑌! 𝑌! =   𝛽! 𝑋!-	 𝛽! 𝑋!	 	 	 Eq.	(7)	
	
The	Oaxaca	decomposition	 involves	expanding	equation	 (7).	 	 The	difference	of	 the	
coefficients	 of	 the	 two	 earnings	 functions	 is	 taken	 as	 a	 priori	 evidence	 of	
discrimination.	 	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 discrimination,	 for	 a	 given	 level	 of	 endowment,	
females	 would	 be	 paid	 according	 to	 the	 male	 wage	 structure.	 	 Hence,	 the	
hypothetical	female	earnings	function	without	discrimination	would	be	given	as:	𝑙𝑛𝑌! =  𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑋!	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(8)	
Subtracting	equation	(8)	from	equation	(7),	we	get:		𝑙𝑛 𝑌! −  𝑙𝑛 𝑌! = 𝛼! − 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑋! −  𝑋! + 𝑋! (𝛽! −  𝛽!)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(9)	
Alternatively,	the	decomposition	can	be	represented	as:	
	 𝑙𝑛 𝑌! −  𝑙𝑛 𝑌! =  𝛼! − 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑋! −  𝑋! + 𝑋! (𝛽! −  𝛽!)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(10)	
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In	equations	(9)	and	(10),	the	first	term	on	the	right	hand	side	gives	the	difference	in	
the	 intercepts	 for	 the	 two	 groups,	 while	 the	 second	 term	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	
differences	in	skills	and	characteristics,	and	the	third	term	in	both	equations	can	be	
interpreted	 as	 the	 “discrimination	 component”	 or	 the	 difference	 in	 returns	 to	
characteristics.			
	
By	way	of	exposition	based	on	equation	(9),	if	𝑋	represented	years	of	schooling,	the	
coefficient	on	𝛽!	gives	an	indication	of	how	much	a	man’s	wage	will	 increase	if	he	
gets	 one	more	 year	 of	 schooling,	 while	 the	 coefficient	 on	𝛽!	 gives	 the	 analogous	
statistic	 for	women.	 	Hence,	 if	 employers	 valued	 the	 characteristics	 (endowments)	
acquired	by	women	as	much	as	they	value	the	endowments	acquired	by	men,	then	𝛽! = 𝛽!.	 	 Similarly,	 the	 intercepts	 give	 the	 earnings	 profile	 for	 each	 of	 the	 two	
groups.	 	 If	employers	valued	 the	skills	of	men	and	women	who	have	zero	years	of	
schooling	 equally,	 the	 two	 intercepts	 would	 be	 the	 same,	 that	 is,	 𝛼! = 𝛼!.	
Therefore,	the	unexplained	portion	of	the	wage	gap	is	captured	by	the	difference	in	
the	 intercepts	 and	 the	 third	 term.	 	 The	 wage	 gap	 that	 arises	 because	 of	 this	
differential	treatment	of	men	and	women	is	typically	defined	as	discrimination.		The	
second	 term	 would	 be	 zero	 if	 men	 and	 women	 have	 the	 same	 average	 years	 of	
schooling	 (𝑋! =  𝑋!);	 hence,	 part	 of	 the	 raw	wage	 differential	 between	men	 and	
women	arises	due	 to	differences	 in	 skills	between	 the	 two	groups	–	 the	explained	
portion.			
	
Either	 forms	 of	 the	 decomposition	 (equation	 9	 or	 10)	 can	 be	 used	 based	 on	 the	
researcher’s	assumption	of	which	wage	structure	(male	or	female)	would	exist	in	the	
absence	of	discrimination.		However,	decomposition	can	be	sensitive	to	which	wage	
structure	 is	 used,	 and	 in	 general,	 there	 is	 no	 a	 priori	 preference	 (Nordman	 and	
Rouband,	 2005).	 	 In	 essence,	 the	 well-known	 “index	 number”	 problem	 arises.		
Researchers	sometimes	choose	the	wage	structure	for	the	more	dominant	group	of	
workers;	 in	 this	 case,	 usually	 the	 male	 wage	 structure	 would	 be	 chosen	 as	 non-
discriminatory.			
	
Neumark	 (1988)	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 appropriate	 decomposition	 depends	 on	 the	
type	 of	 discrimination	 hypothesised	 –	 nepotism	 and/or	 discrimination.	 	 Under	
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nepotism,	women	are	paid	the	competitive	wage,	but	men	are	overpaid.		Here,	the	
coefficients	 from	 the	women’s	 earnings	 functions	provide	 an	estimate	of	 the	non-
discriminatory	 wage	 structure.	 	 Under	 discrimination,	 employers	 pay	 men	
competitive	wages	but	underpay	women.	 In	this	case,	 the	male	coefficients	should	
be	 taken	 as	 the	 non-discriminatory	 wage	 structure.	 In	 reality,	 employers	 may	
practice	both	nepotism	and	discrimination.				
	
A	 possible	 solution	 to	 this	 dilemma	 is	 to	 assume	 that	 employer	 preferences	 are	
homogeneous	of	degree	zero	with	each	type	of	labour	–	that	is,	assume	employers	
are	only	concerned	about	the	proportion	of	each	type	of	labour	employed.		With	this	
restriction,	 Neumark	 proposed	 that	 the	 non-discriminatory	 wage	 structure	 can	 be	
estimated	from	an	earnings	function	estimated	over	the	pooled	sample	(that	is,	both	
men	and	women).		This	“pooled”	wage	structure	is	a	weighted	average	of	the	male	
and	female	wage	structures.	
	
The	Neumark	(1988)	general	decomposition	approach	can	be	written	as:	𝑙𝑛 𝑌! −  𝑙𝑛 𝑌! =  𝛼! − 𝛼! + 𝛽∗ 𝑋! −  𝑋! + 𝑋! 𝛽! −  𝛽∗ +  𝑋! 𝛽∗ −  𝛽! 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(11)	
where	 𝛽∗	 is	 the	 vector	 of	 returns	 that	 would	 exist	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 gender	
discrimination.		This	decomposition	form	can	be	reduced	to	the	Oaxaca’s	two	cases	
above	if	the	male	wage	structure	is	assumed	to	be	non-discriminatory	(𝛽∗ =  𝛽!), 	
or	the	female	wage	structure	as	non-discriminatory	(𝛽∗ =  𝛽!).  𝛽∗ can	be	estimated	
using	the	weighted	average	of	the	wage	structures	of	males	and	females	via	a	pooled	
sample.	 The	 second	 term	 in	 equation	 (11)	 measures	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 total	 log	
earnings	 differential	 “explained”	 by	 gender	 differences	 in	 the	 measured	
characteristics.	 	The	first	and	the	last	two	terms	on	the	right	hand	side	capture	the	
“unexplained”	 portion	 of	 the	 log	 wage	 differential.	 	 Together,	 these	 three	 terms	
provide	a	possible	measure	of	gender	discrimination.		The	third	and	fourth	terms	of	
equation	(11)	capture	the	differences	between	the	actual	and	pooled	wages	for	men	
and	women,	respectively.		More	specifically,	the	third	term	reflects	the	overpayment	
of	men	 (the	 advantaged	group),	while	 the	 fourth	 term	gives	 the	underpayment	of	
women	(the	disadvantaged	group).	
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Appleton	 et	 al	 (1999)	 has	 cautioned	 on	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Neumark	 decomposition	
technique	 since	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 zero-homogeneity	 restriction	 on	
employer	preferences	is	valid.	 	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	not	certain	whether	the	pooled	
coefficients	 will	 be	 a	 good	 estimator	 of	 the	 non-discriminatory	 wage	 structure.		
Additionally,	conventional	wage	structures	may	be	mis-specified	where	key	variables	
that	may	influence	productivity	(like	motivation)	are	omitted	(Appleton	et	al,	1999).					
	
With	 reference	 to	 the	 data	 used	 to	 describe	worker’s	 characteristics	most	 studies	
use	micro-data	 from	national	 surveys	 and	 include	 variables	 (subject	 to	 availability)	
such	 as	 hourly	 or	 gross	 wages;	 education;	 experience	 (or	 “potential	 experience”,	
usually	measured	as	age	minus	years	of	education	minus	age	of	school	enrolment);	
age;	 ethnicity;	 marital	 status;	 on-the-job-training;	 tenure;	 occupation;	 industry;	
public	 versus	 private	 employment;	 union	 status;	 share	 of	 females	 in	 specific	
occupation;	and	location	of	job	(that	is,	urban	versus	rural).			
	
A	 meta-analysis	 of	 the	 international	 wage	 gap	 was	 conducted	 in	 2005	 by	
Weichselbaumer	 and	 Winter-Ebmer26	 in	 which	 the	 authors	 concluded	 that	 data	
restrictions	had	the	biggest	impact	on	the	resulting	gender	wage	gap.		According	to	
the	 authors,	 misspecification	 of	 the	 underlying	 wage	 equations	 due	 to	 data	
restrictions	 could	 result	 in	 serious	 bias	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 discrimination	
component.	 	 For	 instance,	 most	 researchers	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 variables	 like	
hourly	wages	or	actual	experience,	and	other	human	capital	characteristics	 like	on-
the-job-training	 or	 job	 tenure.	 	 Also,	 Weichselbaumer	 and	 Winter-Ebmer	 (2005)	
found	that	using	potential	experience	instead	of	actual	experience	overestimates	the	
unexplained	gender	wage	gap	on	average	by	1.8	log	points	since	this	measure	does	
not	take	into	account	women’s	more	frequent	labour	market	interruptions.				
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
26	This	 study	 included	263	 research	papers	which	covered	63	countries	over	 the	 time	period	of	 the	
1960s	to	1990s.	
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3.3.3 Methodological	Issues	
	
In	any	analysis	of	the	gender	wage	gap	two	major	methodological	issues	arise	(Beblo	
et	 al,	 2003).	 	 Firstly,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 male	 and	 female	 earnings	 equations	 are	
estimated	consistently,	paying	particular	attention	to	 the	methodological	problems	
of	 self-selection,	 heterogeneity,	 and	 endogeneity.	 	 Secondly,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	
decomposition	technique	of	the	wage	gap	is	critical	for	meaningful	interpretation	of	
its	components.		
	
The	Mincerian	wage	equations	discussed	above	(equations	5	and	6)	explain	the	male	
and	 female	 wage	 structures,	 respectively,	 following	 human	 capital	 theory	 where	
variables	 such	 as	 education	 and	 work	 experience	 are	 included	 in	 the	𝑿	 vector	 of	
explanatory	 variables.	 	 Most	 empirical	 studies	 also	 include	 job	 attributes	 (for	
example,	 public	 sector	 employment	 versus	 private	 sector),	 labour	market	 features	
and	 demographic	 characteristics	 as	 well	 (Beblo	 et	 al,	 2003).	 	 The	 endogenous	
variable	 is	 the	 logarithmic	 wage,	 ln 𝑌. 	 These	 equations	 are	 usually	 estimated	 by	
ordinary	least	squares	(OLS).		Heckman	et	al	(2003)	have	shown	that	the	underlying	
assumptions	 of	 the	 Mincer	 wage	 equation	 may	 no	 longer	 hold	 and	 may	 in	 fact	
underestimate	the	returns	to	education.	
	
Estimating	 these	equations	by	OLS	will	provide	consistent	 coefficient	estimates27	 if	
the	following	orthogonality	conditions	are	fulfilled:	
E	[𝜀! 	|		𝑋! 	,	𝐼!∗>	0]	=	0				 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(12)	
	
where	 𝐼!∗	 denotes	 a	 latent	 index	 variable	 which	 is	 positive	 if	 an	 individual	 𝑖 	 is	
employed	 and	 non-positive	 otherwise.	 	 For	 the	 orthogonality	 condition	 to	 be	
satisfied,	 the	 wage	 equation	 cannot	 be	 mis-specified	 (either	 through	 omitted	
variables,	 endogeneity	 or	 sample	 selection).	 	 Sample	 selection	 violates	 the	
orthogonality	condition	since	by	definition,	 the	sample	of	working	people	excludes	
those	 who	 do	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 and	 may	 not	 be	 a	 random	
selection	 of	 the	 overall	 population	 (Beblo	 et	 al,	 2003).	 	 In	 addition,	 if	 the	
participation	decision	is	correlated	with	the	earnings	function,	the	expected	value	of	
																																								 																				
27	The	property	of	consistency	in	an	estimator	ensures	that	the	estimated	coefficient	will	be	close	to	
the	true	parameter	value	with	a	high	probability	as	the	sample	size	“grows	to	infinity”.	
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the	error	term	in	the	earnings	function	may	not	be	zero.		To	deal	with	this	selectivity	
bias,	 a	 sample	 selection	 model	 of	 earnings	 can	 be	 applied	 which	 takes	 the	
participation	decision	into	account	(Beblo	et	al,	2003).			
	
Earnings	may	also	be	 influenced	by	a	host	of	unobservable	 factors	 like	 intelligence	
and	 motivation;	 but	 these	 are	 difficult	 to	 measure.	 	 Heterogeneity	 arises	 if	
unobserved	 individual	 characteristics	 that	 affect	 wages	 are	 correlated	 with	 the	
explanatory	 variables.	 	 In	 effect,	 the	 presence	 of	 unobserved	 individual	
heterogeneity	may	yield	biased	coefficient	estimates	of	the	observed	variables	that	
are	generated	from	OLS.		This	issue	of	heterogeneity	may	be	circumvented	by	using	
panel	data	techniques	or	by	using	random	parameter	estimation	(Beblo	et	al,	2003).		
The	Trinidad	and	Tobago	data	set	does	not	lend	itself	to	panel	data	estimation.	
	
The	underlying	wage	equations	can	also	be	mis-specified	due	to	the	endogeneity	of	
the	 explanatory	 variables.	 	 For	 example,	 education	may	 be	 a	 function	 of	 previous	
earnings	 as	well	 as	 present	 earnings;	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	whether	 the	higher	
earnings	observed	for	better-educated	workers	are	caused	by	their	higher	education,	
or	whether	 individuals	with	 greater	 earning	 capacity	have	 chosen	 to	 acquire	more	
schooling	 –	 this	 implies	 a	 simultaneity	 bias	 in	 the	wage	equation.	 	 To	 remove	 this	
bias,	 the	 endogenous	 variables	 should	 be	 instrumented	 (Beblo	 et	 al,	 2003).	 	 The	
instrumented	variable	cannot	be	correlated	with	the	error	term,	but	should	have	a	
high	correlation	with	the	endogenous	variable.			
	
The	 second	 major	 methodological	 issue	 surrounding	 the	 analysis	 of	 gender	 wage	
gaps	involves	the	choice	of	the	decomposition	technique	used.		For	instance,	as	was	
previously	mentioned	 the	classic	 index	number	problem	arises	with	 the	use	of	 the	
BO	 decomposition	 methodology	 concerning	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 non-discriminatory	
wage	 structure	 used	 in	 the	 decomposition.	 	 With	 reference	 to	 the	 Neumark	
decomposition	 methodology,	 it	 was	 been	 found	 that	 this	 technique	 tends	 to	
overstate	the	effects	of	variables	with	large	gender	differences,	and	inaptly	transfers	
some	of	the	unexplained	parts	of	the	wage	differential	to	the	explained	component	
(Fortin,	2006).	
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There	 is	 also	 a	 potential	 identification	 problem	 for	 dummy	 variable	 effects	 in	 BO	
decompositions,	 particularly	 for	 the	 unexplained	 component	 (Oaxaca	 and	 Ransom	
(1999);	Fortin	et	al.	(2010))	given	that	the	sub-component	estimates	are	sensitive	to	
the	choice	of	the	reference	category	used	in	estimation.		Oaxaca	and	Ransom	(1999)	
showed	 that	 for	 the	 “unexplained”	 part	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 differential,	 the	
subdivision	 into	 separate	contributions	 is	 sensitive	 to	 locational	 transformations	of	
the	 regressors.	 	 Thus,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 detailed	 “unexplained”	 component	 are	
arbitrary	unless	the	regressors	have	natural	zero	points.		Fortin	et	al.	(2010)	highlight	
that	 in	 BO	 decompositions,	 categorical	 variables	 generate	 two	 problems.	 First,	
categorical	 variables	 do	 not	 have	 a	 natural	 zero,	 therefore	 the	 reference	 point	 is	
usually	 chosen	 arbitrarily.	 	 Second,	 the	 conventional	 practice	 of	 omitting	 one	
category	 to	 identify	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 remaining	 categories	 makes	 the	
interpretation	 of	 the	 “unexplained”	 portion	 of	 the	 decomposition	 difficult	 –	 one	
cannot	distinguish	 the	portion	 attributable	 to	 group	membership	 (that	 is,	 the	 true	
“unexplained”	 portion	 captured	 by	 the	 difference	 in	 intercepts)	 from	 the	 portion	
attributable	 to	differences	 in	 the	coefficient	of	 the	base	 (omitted)	category.	 	 Jones	
(1983)	 initially	highlighted	 these	 issues	associated	with	 the	detailed	decomposition	
of	 the	 “unexplained”	 component.	 	 Jones	 (1983)	 demonstrated	 that	 separating	 out	
the	magnitude	of	the	contribution	of	the	constant	term	in	the	presence	of	a	set	of	
dummy	 variables	 depended	on	 the	 omitted	 reference	 group.	 	 Fortunately,	Oaxaca	
and	 Ransom	 (1999)	 also	 show	 that	 the	 estimated	 overall	 “unexplained”	 and	 the	
separately	 estimated	 endowment	 effects	 (“explained”	 component)	 are	 invariant	
with	respect	to	the	choice	of	left-out	reference	categories.				
	
	
3.4 Previous	Studies	on	Gender	Wage	Gaps	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
	
There	has	been	a	wide	range	of	empirical	research	on	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	
market	analysing	disparities	in	wages	not	just	based	on	gender,	but	ethnicity,	marital	
status,	employment	in	the	public	versus	the	private	sector,	and	differences	in	wages	
in	 the	 formal	and	 informal	sectors	of	 the	economy.	 	 In	 this	section,	we	attempt	 to	
summarise	the	results	of	these	studies	within	the	context	of	the	gender	wage	gap	for	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.		We	will	focus	the	discussion	on	a	few	select	issues	known	to	
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affect	 gender	 pay	 gaps,	 namely,	 returns	 to	 education,	 work	 experience,	 marital	
status,	occupational	segregation,	ethnicity,	and	labour	market	participation.			
	
Olsen	 and	 Coppin	 (2001)	 employed	 cross-sectional	 1993	 labour	 force	 (the	
Continuous	Sample	Survey	of	the	Population,	CSSP)	data	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	to	
investigate	 the	 causes	 of	 gender	 income	 differentials.	 	 The	 authors	 found	 the	
unadjusted	male-female	 income	differential	 in	1993	 to	be	19	per	 cent,	noting	 that	
this	differential	was	relatively	small	when	compared	to	the	differentials	observed	in	
developed	countries,	which	at	the	time	ranged	between	20	and	50	per	cent	(Blau	et	
al,	 1998).	 	 The	 male-female	 income	 differential	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 was	 also	
small	when	compared	with	other	developing	countries.		For	instance,	the	results	of	a	
World	Bank	study	of	15	Latin	American	countries	found	that	gender	pay	differentials	
averaged	 30	 per	 cent	 for	 the	 region	 (Psacharopoulos	 and	 Tzannatos,	 1992).		
Comparisons	to	other	Caribbean	countries	were	relatively	similar	–	based	on	2004-
data	for	Barbados	and	2003-data	for	Jamaica,	it	was	found	that	men	earned	between	
14	and	27	per	cent	more	than	women	in	Barbados,	and	between	8	and	17	per	cent	
more	than	women	in	Jamaica	(Bellony,	Hoyos,	and	Ñopo,	2010).		
	
In	 1993,	 working	women	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 had	 higher	 levels	 of	 educational	
attainment	than	working	men.		This	is	also	true	for	the	overall	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
population	 (that	 is,	 working	 and	 non-working	 persons).	 	 Olsen	 and	 Coppin	 (2001)	
noted	 that	 women	 enjoyed	 slightly	 higher	 returns	 to	 education	 than	 men	 and	
hypothesised	that	this	may	reflect	women’s	poorer	labour	market	options	with	low	
levels	of	education.		Olsen	and	Coppin	(2001)	concluded	that	women	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	would	have	been	worse	off	if	they	had	men’s	level	of	education,	as	well	as	if	
they	had	received	the	male	rate	of	return	to	education.	 	These	results	suggest	that	
women	 have	 a	 greater	 financial	 incentive	 than	 men	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 higher	
levels	of	educational	attainment	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).							
	
With	respect	to	the	income-experience	nexus,	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	women	were	
seen	 to	 have	 lower	 returns	 to	 experience	 than	 men	 and	 women’s	 returns	 to	
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experience	 declined	 at	 a	 slightly	 faster	 rate	 than	men’s	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001).		
For	example,	20	years	of	experience	was	estimated	to	augment	the	average	male’s	
earnings	by	62	per	cent,	but	the	same	number	of	years	of	experience	was	estimated	
to	increase	the	average	female’s	wage	by	42	per	cent.			
	
Being	legally	married	had	a	statistically	significant	positive	impact	on	both	men’s	and	
women’s	 wages	 (Coppin,	 2000).	 	 However,	 the	 favourable,	 but	 smaller,	 marriage	
premium	 found	 for	men	 in	 common	 law	unions	was	not	 found	 for	women	 in	 such	
unions	(Coppin,	2000).		For	women,	the	premium	for	legal	marriage	is	much	smaller	
than	that	was	observed	for	men.		In	1993,	men	in	common-law	unions	earned	72	per	
cent	 of	 what	 their	 legally	 married	 counterparts	 earned,	 while	 among	 women	 the	
corresponding	 ratio	 was	 65	 per	 cent	 (Coppin,	 2000).	 	 	 Olsen	 and	 Coppin	 (2001)	
suggest	 that	 the	observed	difference	 in	wage	premia	by	 type	of	marriage	could	be	
because,	 generally	 speaking,	 there	may	be	 a	weaker	marital	 bond	 in	 common	 law	
relationships	where	spouses	in	such	unions	are	less	likely	to	have	the	same	level	of	
career	support	as	persons	in	legal	marital	unions.				
	
Coppin	 (2000)	 estimated	 that	 just	 over	 half	 of	 the	 earnings	 differential	 between	
legally	 married	 men	 and	 those	 in	 common-law	 relationships	 was	 “explained”	 by	
differences	in	characteristics	(age,	education,	work	experience,	etc.)	that	are	valued	
by	 the	 labour	market.	 	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	wage	differential	 between	married	
women	 and	 those	 in	 common-law	 unions	 was	 due	 to	 the	 endowments	 of	
characteristics	they	brought	to	their	respective	jobs.			
	
Notwithstanding	 the	 above	 discussion,	 the	 effect	 of	 marriage	 yielding	 a	 wage	
premium,	 especially	 for	 men,	 might	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 self-selection.	 	 Human	
capital	 theory	 postulates	 that	 the	 existence	 of	marriage	 premiums	 arises	 because	
marriage	itself	increases	the	productivity	of	workers	separate	from	the	acquisition	of	
additional	 human	 capital.	 	 Becker’s	 (1981)	 theory	 of	 the	 family	 suggests	 that	
economies	 of	 scale	 within	 the	 family	 may	 allow	 both	married	 partners	 to	 devote	
time	 and	 effort	 to	 labour	market	 productivity.	 	 However,	 Ribar	 (2004)	 notes	 that	
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comparative	advantage	may	 lead	 to	gender	 specialisation.	 	 The	assumption	 is	 that	
married	males	will	tend	to	specialise	more	in	labour	market	activities,	while	married	
females	will	specialise	 in	household	production	(Ribar,	2004).	 	While	 labour	market	
discrimination	can	account,	in	part,	for	the	marriage	wage	premium	that	men	enjoy,	
self-selection	is	also	another	underlying	mechanism	that	should	be	considered:	men	
who	have	characteristics	that	the	labour	market	values	may	be	in	a	better	position	to	
marry.	 	 In	other	words,	marriage	 itself	may	not	 increase	worker’s	productivity	but,	
rather,	 more	 productive	 workers	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 get	 married	 (see	 inter	 alia	
Blackburn	and	Korenman,	1994;	Hersch	and	Stratton,	2000;	and	Ribar,	2004).	
	
Coppin	 (2000)	 estimated	earnings	 functions	 correcting	 for	 self-selection	and	 found	
that	 the	marriage	 premium	 for	men	was	 reduced,	 but	 not	 eliminated.	 	 Even	 after	
controlling	for	self-selection	a	substantial	marriage	premium	remained,	implying	that	
for	 married	 males	 working	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 marriage	 does	 increase	 their	
productivity.	 	 The	 same	was	not	 true	 for	 those	men	 in	 common-law	unions	where	
selectivity	 correction	 made	 the	 premium	 negative	 (Coppin,	 2000).	 	 In	 contrast,	
correcting	for	selectivity	in	the	female	earnings	functions	substantially	increased	the	
marriage	 premium.	 	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 selectivity	 bias	 for	women	works	 in	 the	
opposite	direction	 than	 for	men.	 	Unlike	men,	 the	 less	productive	 is	a	woman,	 the	
more	 likely	 she	 is	 to	 be	married.	 	 This	 result	 is	 consistent	with	 the	marital	 choice	
literature	which	suggests	that	household	gender	specialisation	results	in	men	being	
valued	more	 for	 their	 economic	 contributions	 and	 women	 being	 valued	more	 for	
their	household	contributions	(Becker,	1981;	Manning	and	Smock,	1998;	Sanchez	et	
al,	1998).								
	
Olsen	and	Coppin	 (2001)	calculated	the	well-known	Duncan	 Index	of	Dissimilarity28	
(Duncan	 and	 Duncan,	 1955)	 values	 for	 gender	 segregation	 by	 occupation	 and	 for	
																																								 																				
28	 The	Duncan	 Index	of	 Dissimilarity	 (Duncan	 and	 Duncan,	 1955)	 is	 a	 measure	 of	occupational	
segregation	and	is	often	used	to	gauge	whether	there	is	a	larger	presence	of	one	gender	over	another	
in	a	given	occupation	by	identifying	the	percentage	of	employed	women	(or	men)	who	would	have	to	
change	occupations	for	the	occupational	distribution	of	men	and	women	to	be	equal.	A	Duncan	Index	
value	 of	 0	 implies	 the	 share	 of	 women	 in	 every	 occupation	 is	 the	 same	 as	 women's	 share	 of	
employment	as	a	whole.	In	other	words,	0	indicates	perfect	gender	integration	within	the	workforce,	
while	a	value	of	1	indicates	complete	gender	segregation	within	the	workforce.				
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gender	segregation	by	industry.		In	order	to	eliminate	occupational	segregation,	33.1	
per	 cent	 of	 working	 women	 would	 have	 to	 change	 their	 occupations,	 while	 the	
concomitant	value	for	 industry	was	35.8	per	cent	of	women	would	have	to	change	
the	 industry	 in	 which	 they	 work	 in	 order	 for	 there	 to	 be	 a	 similar	 male-female	
distribution	across	 industry	 categories.	 	Moreover,	Olsen	and	Coppin	 (2001)	noted	
that	women	would	have	substantially	higher	incomes	if	their	distribution	of	jobs	by	
industry	 were	 the	 same	 as	men’s	 distribution	 of	 jobs,	 but	 by	 occupation,	 women	
would	have	 significantly	 lower	 incomes	with	men’s	occupational	 distribution.	 	 This	
seemingly	 contrary	 outcome	 for	 industry	 and	 occupational	 distributions	 may	 be	
because	of	the	structure	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	market.		It	is	not	likely	that	
most	women	 in	 “female”	occupations	would	be	able	 to	 find	 similar	 jobs	 in	 “male”	
industries,	 where	 the	 rates	 of	 remuneration	 are	 higher	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001).		
The	authors	do	conclude	however,	that	 if	all	 industry	and	occupational	segregation	
were	 eliminated,	 overall,	women	would	 be	 better	 off	 in	 terms	 of	 receiving	 higher	
wages.				
	
Sookram	and	Strobl	(2009)	utilized	1991-2004	waves	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	
force	 survey	 to	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 educational	 choice	 in	 occupational	 gender	
segregation.	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	 gender	 wage	 gaps,	 it	 is	 widely	 recognised	 that	
occupational	 segregation	 can	 have	 substantial	 consequences	 in	 terms	 of	 gender	
discrimination	 as	 “female-type”	 jobs	 tend	 to	 be	 characterised	 by	 lower	 pay	 and	
worse	working	 conditions.	 	 However,	 pre-	 and	 post-labour	market	 entry	 decisions	
and	 opportunities	 regarding	 the	 level	 and	 type	 of	 education	 individuals	
pursue/receive	 can	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 future	 employment	 opportunities.	 	 These	
education	choices	can	also	be	a	consequence	of	discrimination	with	respect	to	family	
and	societal	gender	preferences	(Sookram	and	Strobl,	2009).						
	
In	 terms	 of	 gender	 education	 policy	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 the	 Education	 Act	 of	
1966,	 the	 law	that	guides	the	course	of	education	 in	the	country,	did	not	explicitly	
refer	 to	 gender-based	 discrimination	 in	 the	 education	 system.	 	 However,	 the	
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Education	 Policy	 Paper	 (1993-2003)29	 explicitly	 outlined	 guidelines	 to	 enhance	
gender	equality	in	the	education	system.		For	example,	one	initiative	emanating	from	
this	policy	 involved	 the	development	of	 a	 gender-neutral	 curriculum.	 	 Prior	 to	 this	
policy	initiative,	 in	co-educational	schools	there	would	be	timetabled	classes	where	
the	 class	would	 be	 divided	 between	males	 and	 females,	 where	 the	 former	would	
attend	Industrial	Arts	classes	(e.g.	woodworking,	metal	work,	technical	drawing,	etc.)	
while	 the	 latter	would	 do	Home	 Economics	 (cooking,	 sewing,	 home	management,	
etc.).		Under	the	new	policy,	the	curriculum	and	timetable	were	reorganised	in	such	
a	way	that	all	 students	would	partake	 in	both	 Industrial	Arts	and	Home	Economics	
classes	(Sookram	and	Strobl,	2009).					
	
The	investigation	undertook	by	Sookram	and	Strobl	(2009)	covered	the	time	period	
relevant	to	the	implementation	of	the	new	educational	policy	that,	in	part,	aimed	at	
eliminating	 gender-based	 discrimination	 in	 education.	 	 In	 brief,	 the	 authors	
concluded	that	while	educational	segregation	fell	substantially	over	the	period	under	
review,	 this	 did	 not	 translate	 into	 less	 occupational	 segregation.	 	 At	 a	 more	
disaggregated	 level,	 there	 was	 considerable	 heterogeneity	 in	 terms	 of	 both	
education	 and	 occupation	 segregation.	 	 The	 authors	 discovered	 that	 at	 the	
disaggregated	 level,	 the	 link	 between	 educational	 choice	 and	 sorting	 by	 gender	 in	
employment	 is,	 on	 average,	 strongest	 and	 most	 consistent	 in	 lower	 level	
occupations.		From	a	policy	perspective,	it	seems	that,	at	least	in	the	case	of	Trinidad	
and	 Tobago,	 ensuring	 gender	 equality	 within	 the	 educational	 system	 was	 not	
sufficient	 to	 lead	 to	 less	 occupational	 segregation.	 	 Summarily,	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago,	 greater	 equality	 in	 human	 capital	 has	 not	 ensured	 greater	 equality	 in	
employment	opportunities	(Sookram	and	Strobl,	2009).																					
	
Olsen	and	Coppin	(2001),	again	using	1993	labour	force	data	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
investigated	the	determinants	of	earnings	by	ethnicity	and	gender.		The	authors	ran	
separate	 earnings	 functions	 for	 men	 and	 women	 across	 the	 major	 ethnicities	
prevalent	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 (African,	 Indian,	Mixed/Other).	 	 They	 found	 the	
																																								 																				
29	 See	 National	 Report	 on	 the	 Development	 of	 Education	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 2004	 for	 more	
details.		Available	at:	http://www.ibe.unesco.org/National_Reports/ICE_2004/ttobago_scan.pdf.		
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largest	 male-female	 income	 differential	 (28	 per	 cent)	 among	 Africans	 and	 the	
smallest	differential	(12	per	cent)	among	the	“Mixed/Other”	ethnicity	category.		The	
researchers	 stated	 that	 one	 possible	 explanation	 for	 Africans	 having	 the	 largest	
male-female	income	differential	might	be	due	to	this	sub-ethnic	grouping	having	the	
highest	female	labour	force	participation	rate	among	the	three	ethnic	groups.			
	
Coppin	 and	 Olsen	 (2007)	 used	 1993	 data	 from	 the	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 CSSP	 to	
investigate	patterns	of	remuneration	across	the	public	and	private	sectors.		The	ratio	
of	government	to	non-government	wages	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	in	1993	was	1.63	
for	men	and	2.14	for	women.		Government	workers	were	found	to	have	higher	levels	
of	education	 than	 their	private	 sector	counterparts,	especially	at	 the	 tertiary	 level.		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 gender	 pay	 gap,	 the	 authors	 found	 a	 much	 larger	 male-female	
income	differential	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 compared	 to	 the	 pay	 gap	 found	 in	 public	
sector.	 	 In	 the	 public	 sector,	 men	 earned	 a	 wage	 premium	 of	 6.3	 per	 cent	 over	
women,	while	the	male	earnings	premium	in	the	private	sector	was	estimated	to	be	
31.6	per	cent.			
	
The	authors	suggest	the	smaller	gender	wage	gap	in	public	sector	may	be	indicative	
of	 lower	 levels	 of	 gender	 discrimination	 within	 the	 public	 sector.	 	 Moreover,	 the	
researchers	 assert	 that	 the	 government	may	 be	 using	 its	market	 power	 to	 reduce	
gender	 discrimination.	 	 Notably,	 in	 1993,	 the	 government’s	 share	 of	 total	
employment	 was	 33	 per	 cent.	 	 This	 assertion	 was	 based	 on	 their	 findings	 where	
several	 personal	 characteristics	 (namely,	 education,	 experience,	 and	 marriage)	
received	higher	rates	of	return	in	the	private	sector	compared	to	the	public	sector.		
However,	 in	 those	 cases	where	 the	 rates	of	 return	 to	 variables	were	higher	 in	 the	
government	sector,	the	higher	returns	favoured	women.		In	addition,	in	contrast	to	
the	 general	 finding	 in	 empirical	 studies,	 women	 employed	 in	 the	 public	 sector	
enjoyed	a	larger	marital	premium	compared	to	men.		The	authors	postulate	that	this	
is	evidence	that	the	government	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	is	attempting	to	use	public	
policy	to	reduce	levels	of	gender	discrimination.											
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Sookram	 and	Watson	 (2008)	 used	 the	 CSSP	 for	 2006	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 informal	 sector	 and	 gender.	 	 Caribbean	 economies	 have	 sizeable	
informal	sectors	–	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	the	size	of	the	informal	sector	has	been	
estimated	to	be	between	14	per	cent	and	36	per	cent	during	the	period	1970-1999	
(Llyod-Evans	and	Potter,	2002;	Maurin	et	al,	2005;	Sookram	et	al,	2006;	Sookram	and	
Watson,	2007).		Men	employed	in	the	informal	sector	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	tend	to	
dominate	in	the	“business”	informal	sector,	whereas	women	tend	to	dominate	in	the	
“household”	informal	sector	(Sookram	et	al,	2006;	Sookram	and	Watson,	2007).					
	
Based	on	the	data	from	the	2006	CSSP,	of	the	total	number	of	individuals	who	work	
in	 the	 informal	 sector,	 43.4	 per	 cent	 of	 them	were	 female.	 	 Sookram	and	Watson	
(2008)	found	that	women	were	more	likely	than	men	to	work	only	in	one	sector	of	
the	 economy	 (informal	 versus	 formal),	 while	 men	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 work	
simultaneously	 in	 both	 sectors.	 	 There	 was	 evidence	 of	 a	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 in	
favour	 of	 men	 of	 1.33	 log	 points	 in	 the	 informal	 sector.	 	 Most	 of	 the	 observed	
income	differential	was	attributed	to	wage	discrimination	rather	than	to	differences	
in	 human	 capital	 between	 the	 two	 sexes.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 results	 show	 that	
experience	 is	 the	main	 contributing	 factor	 in	 the	male-female	wage	 differential	 in	
the	informal	sector.			
	
With	respect	to	labour	market	participation,	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	women	are	less	
likely	 to	participate	 in	 the	 labour	market.	 	Based	on	1993	 labour	 force	data,	while	
women	 accounted	 for	 slightly	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 working	 and	 non-working	
sample,	 they	 comprised	 only	 one-third	 of	 the	 working	 sample	 (Coppin,	 2000).				
Roopnarine	 and	Ramrattan	 (2012)	 used	2008/2009	Household	Budget	 Survey	data	
for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	to	investigate	what	are	the	main	factors	which	influence	the	
ability	and/or	desire	of	women	 to	participate	 in	 the	 labour	market.	 	The	 results	of	
the	 study	were	 broadly	 in	 line	with	a	 priori	 expectations.	 	 Summarily,	 the	 level	 of	
schooling,	 household	 headship,	 and	 being	 unmarried/single	 all	 had	 positive	
influences	on	women’s	probability	to	participate	in	the	labour	market.		On	the	other	
hand,	the	presence	of	children	in	the	household,	non-labour	income	(e.g.	accessing	
social	 security	 programmes)	 and	 chronic	 illness	 had	 negative	 effects	 on	 female	
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participation.		Country-specific	variables	like	ethnicity	and	religion	were	also	tested.		
Women	 of	 East	 Indian	 descent	 and	 Hindus	 were	 10	 per	 cent	 and	 4	 per	 cent,	
respectively,	less	likely	to	participate	in	the	labour	market.		A	feature	of	Trinidad	and	
Tobago’s	 labour	 market	 that	 may	 also	 account	 for	 the	 lower	 level	 of	 female	
participation	is	the	low	prevalence	of	part-time	work	among	women.		This	feature	of	
the	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 labour	 market	 is	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 several	 developed	
countries’	labour	markets.		In	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	among	those	women	who	work,	
they	have	similar	lengths	of	the	workweek,	on	average,	36.4	hours	per	week	(Coppin,	
1997).			
	
3.5 Data	and	Econometric	Specification	
3.5.1 Data	
	
Survey	 data	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 Continuous	 Sample	 Survey	 of	 the	 Population	
(CSSP)	for	the	third	quarter	of	2012.		The	CSSP	is	conducted	by	the	national	statistical	
office	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 (called	 the	 Central	 Statistical	 Office	 of	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago)	and	 is	the	country’s	official	 labour	force	survey.30	 	The	CSSP	has	two	main	
advantages	that	make	it	a	good	source	of	data	for	analysing	labour	market	issues	in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.		Firstly,	it	is	a	nationally	representative	population	survey,	and	
secondly,	 it	has	the	most	detailed	labour	market	characterisation	of	the	population	
(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).	The	CSSP	 includes	data	on	 income,	employment,	 sector,	
industry,	education,	and	demographic	characteristics.		Consequently,	using	the	CSSP	
should	 yield	 reliable	 results	 for	 the	 current	 type	 of	 labour	 market	 analysis	 being	
undertaken.			
	
Notwithstanding	 these	 advantages,	 the	data	 set	 is	 limited	 insofar	 that	 appropriate	
instrumental	 variables	 were	 not	 available	 to	 adequately	 address	 the	 econometric	
issues	 such	 as	 the	 possible	 endogeneity	 of	 education,	 heterogeneity,	 and	 sample	
																																								 																				
30	 The	 CSSP	was	 designed	 as	 a	multi-purpose	 household	 survey	 in	 1963	with	 its	 primary	 objective	
being	to	provide	up-to-date	data	on	the	labour	force	characteristics	of	the	population	of	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	 on	 a	 continuing	 basis.	 	 The	 survey	 used	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 on	 a	 semi-annual	 basis	 but	was	
changed	to	a	quarterly	survey	beginning	from	the	first	quarter	of	1987.		The	duration	of	the	quarterly	
survey	is	fixed	to	last	exactly	three	months	with	each	month	consisting	of	two	periods	of	a	fortnight’s	
duration.	
85	
	
selection.	 	No	major	revisions	have	been	made	to	the	CSSP	questionnaire	since	the	
late-1980s	save	for	the	inclusion	of	a	few	additional	questions	relating	to	ethnicity,	
location	 of	 employment,	 and	 having	 a	 second	 job.	 	 The	 other	 major	 nationally	
representative	 surveys	 conducted	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 include	 the	 Household	
Budget	Survey	 (HBS)	and	 the	Survey	of	 Living	Conditions	 (SLC).	 	Although	both	 the	
HBS	 and	 SLC	 questionnaires	 include	 a	 question	 relating	 to	 gross	monthly	 income,	
they	do	not	enquire	about	the	number	of	hours	worked,	making	them	not	suitable	
for	this	analysis	where	hourly	wages	is	used	as	the	dependent	variable.		Additionally,	
at	the	time	of	conducting	this	research,	both	the	HBS	and	the	SLC	were	dated	–	the	
most	recent	HBS	was	conducted	in	2008	while	the	most	recent	SLC	was	conducted	in	
2005.		Consequently,	as	this	research	started	in	2013,	the	(third	quarter)	2012	CSSP	
was	deemed	as	the	most	appropriate	survey	data	to	be	used	for	our	analysis.														
	
	
During	 the	 third	 quarter	 of	 2012,	 8,070	 persons	 were	 interviewed	 comprising	 of	
4,002	men	and	4,068	women.		The	sample	that	was	drawn	from	these	observations	
included	 only	 those	 persons	 aged	 16-65	 (that	 is,	 the	 working	 age	 population),	
employees	 (in	 the	private	and	public	sectors),	 those	 in	 full-time	employment31	and	
do	 not	 have	 a	 second	 job.	 	 All	 observations	 with	 a	 missing	 value	 for	 one	 of	 the	
variables	were	excluded.		The	number	of	observations	in	the	sample	was	2,022	with	
1,168	males	and	854	females.	 	As	the	sample	includes	only	wage	earners	(and	only	
those	observations	of	employed	persons	who	reported	non-zero	wages),	the	results	
must	be	interpreted	with	some	caution	conditional	on	the	selected	sample.			
	
The	problems	of	sample	selectivity,	which	tends	to	be	more	of	an	issue	for	women	
than	 for	men	 due	 to	 their	 lower	 participation	 rates,	 and	 the	 potential	 problem	of	
portion	of	the	research	given	the	lack	of	variables	in	the	CSSP	to	form	an	appropriate	
selection	 equation	 (Heckman	 procedure)	 and/or	 instrumental	 variables.	 	 Labour	
force	participation	is	often	affected	by	family	size,	marital	status,	alternative	sources	
of	income	besides	wage-income,	among	other	variables.		The	issue	of	selectivity	and	
labour	market	participation	is	explored	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2.	
	
																																								 																				
31	Full-time	employment	refers	to	persons	who	work	at	least	33	hours	per	week.	
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In	 terms	 of	 the	 returns	 to	 education	 obtained	 from	 OLS	 estimation,	 it	 is	 well	
established	that	 if	“ability”	 is	positively	correlated	with	both	the	 level	of	education	
and	 earnings,	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 estimates	 based	 on	 OLS	 display	 an	 upward	 bias.		
Panel	data	techniques,	such	as	instrumental	variables,	could	be	used	to	circumvent	
this	 issue	 of	 heterogeneity.	 	 However,	 even	 though	 there	 is	 consensus	 about	 the	
direction	of	 the	bias	when	heterogeneity	 is	 ignored,	 there	 is	 less	agreement	on	 its	
magnitude.	 	Card	 (1999)	has	presented	evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	extent	of	 the	
bias	may	be	modest.	 	Card	(1999)	concluded,	based	on	the	results	emanating	from	
studies	of	identical	twins,	that	there	is	a	small	upward	bias	(of	about	10	per	cent)	in	
the	return	to	education	based	on	OLS	estimation.								
	
A	summary	of	some	descriptive	statistics	is	presented	in	Table	3.3.		The	percentages	
of	women	and	men	employed	in	the	public	and	private	sectors	appear	to	be	similar	
with	 roughly	 37	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 women	 and	 all	men	 being	 employed	 in	 the	 public	
sector	and	the	remaining	63	per	cent	in	the	private	sector.			
	
Based	 on	 average	 gross	 monthly	 income,	 men	 out-earn	 women	 across	 all	
occupational	groupings	(Figure	3.5.1).		However,	on	an	hourly	basis,	(average)	wages	
in	the	public	sector	for	both	men	and	women	are	fairly	similar,	while	there	is	a	much	
larger	 disparity	 between	 hourly	 wages	 for	 men	 and	 women	 in	 the	 private	 sector	
(Table	3.3).		Average	male	(hourly)	wages	in	the	private	sector	is	approximately	7	per	
cent	higher	than	female	private	sector	average	wages.		At	the	lower	end	of	the	pay	
scale	men’s	average	hourly	wages	are	4	times	higher	than	women’s	average	hourly	
wages.	Meanwhile,	at	the	middle	of	the	wage	distribution,	hourly	wages	are	similar	
for	 both	 genders,	 but	 at	 the	 higher	 end	 of	 the	 pay	 scale	men’s	 hourly	 wages	 are	
again	 higher	 than	 those	 of	 women	 –	 1.8	 times	 higher	 (Table	 3.4).	 At	 first	 glance,	
Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	market	shows	signs	of	the	“sticky	floors”	phenomena	–	
that	is,	where	the	gender	wage	gap	is	wider	at	the	bottom	of	the	wage	distribution.32			
	
The	average	age	of	both	working	men	and	women	is	37	years,	but	the	average	age	of	
men	employed	in	the	public	sector	is	slightly	higher	than	women	–	41	versus	38.		The	
																																								 																				
32	These	striking	differences	in	hourly	wages	for	men	and	women	at	the	lower	and	upper	ends	of	the	
wage	distribution	will	be	explored	in	more	detail	using	quantile	regressions	in	the	foregoing	chapter.			
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reverse	 is	 true	 in	 the	private	sector,	with	 the	average	age	of	women	being	slightly	
higher	–	37	versus	35.	The	differences	in	ages	between	men	and	women	working	in	
the	public	and	private	sectors	are	significantly	different	from	each	other.		Given	that	
the	 CSSP	 does	 not	 capture	 actual	 experience,	 it	 is	 common	 in	 the	 literature	 to	
employ	 a	 measure	 of	 potential	 experience	 as	 a	 proxy.	 	 Potential	 experience	 is	
calculated	 as	 age	 minus	 years	 of	 education	 minus	 age	 at	 which	 formal	 schooling	
begins,	which	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 is	 five	years	old.	 	The	 largest	disparity	 in	 the	
mean	 level	 of	 (potential)	 experience	 is	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 with	 men	 having,	 on	
average,	26	years	of	experience	compared	with	women	having	on	average	only	20	
years	 of	 experience.	 	 Generally,	 a	 lower	 mean	 level	 of	 experience	 for	 working	
women	is	usually	the	mathematical	consequence	of	their	lower	mean	age	and	higher	
mean	 level	of	education	than	their	male	counterparts	 (Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).	 In	
the	 public	 sector,	 women	 have,	 on	 average,	 12.7	 years	 of	 schooling	 compared	 to	
10.3	years	for	men.	
	
There	 is	 a	 higher	 percentage	 of	 female	 workers	 with	 tertiary	 (diplomas	 and	
university	degrees)	level	education	than	there	are	male	workers	with	post-secondary	
education	(Table	3.3);	this	is	contrary	to	human	capital	theory	which	postulates	that,	
in	general,	given	that	women	tend	to	have	shorter	payback	periods	to	recoup	their	
investment	 in	 human	 capital	 because	 they	 intermittently	 leave	 the	 labour	market,	
women	tend	to	accumulate	lower	levels	of	human	capital	compared	to	men	(Altonji	
and	 Blank,	 1999).	 	 This	 observation	 that	 working	 women	 have	 higher	 levels	 of	
educational	 attainment	 than	men	 also	 applies	 to	 the	 overall	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	
population	 (that	 is,	 both	working	 and	 non-working	 individuals).	 	 Indeed,	 a	 cursory	
look	at	the	number	of	graduates	from	one	of	the	country’s	leading	tertiary	learning	
institutions,	 the	University	of	the	West	 Indies,	St.	Augustine	Campus,	revealed	that	
there	 was	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 female	 graduates33	 across	 all	 faculties	 except	
Engineering	 in	 the	 academic	 year	 2010/2011.	 	 Furthermore,	 according	 to	 Reddock	
(2009),	there	is	more	incentive	for	young	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	than	there	
is	 for	 school-leaving	 males	 to	 stay	 in	 school	 longer,	 since	 there	 are	 fewer	
employment	and	financial	opportunities	(legal	or	otherwise)	available	to	the	former.	
																																								 																				
33	 Persons	 graduated	 from	 the	 following	 programmes:	 Advanced	 Diplomas,	 Certificates,	 Diplomas,	
Higher	Degrees,	and	Undergraduate	degrees.	
88	
	
	
In	the	overall	working	population,	persons	of	African	and	Indian	descent	account	for	
84	per	cent	of	the	sample	(with	both	ethnicities	representing	42	per	cent	each),	and	
all	 other	 ethnicities	 were	 grouped	 into	 a	 third	 category,	 referred	 to	 as	
“Mixed/Other”;	 this	 category	 includes	 minority	 ethnicities	 classified	 as	 White,	
Syrian/Lebanese,	Chinese,	Mixed	and	Other.			
	
There	is	evidence	of	occupational	segregation	–	for	instance,	a	higher	proportion	of	
women	are	employed	as	clerical	staff	whereas	there	 is	a	higher	proportion	of	men	
working	 as	 machine	 operators	 (Table	 3.3).	 	 On	 a	 more	 disaggregated	 level	 (not	
shown	 in	 Table	 3.3),	 there	 is	 some	 level	 of	 occupational	 crowding	 for	 jobs	
traditionally	 labelled	 as	 “male”	 and	 “female”.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 occupational	
category	 “Professional”,	 74	per	 cent	of	 the	engineers	were	male,	whereas,	 for	 the	
professions	of	nurses	and	primary	school	teachers	88	per	cent	were	women	in	both	
professions.	
	
The	average	(log)	hourly	earnings	are	higher	 in	the	public	sector	 for	both	men	and	
women	 than	 in	 the	private	 sector.	 	 The	 sample	used	also	 shows	 that	public	 sector	
employees	 are,	 on	 average,	 more	 educated	 than	 private	 sector	 employees.	 	 For	
instance,	13.7	per	cent	of	the	male	employees	in	the	public	sector	have	achieved	a	
university	degree	and	40	per	cent	of	female	public	sector	workers	have	a	university	
degree.	 	This	compares	to	 just	5.1	per	cent	and	11.3	per	cent	 for	male	and	female	
private	 sector	 employees	 with	 university	 degrees.	 	 Male	 public	 sector	 employees	
have	more	 (potential)	 labour	market	 experience	 (25.5	 years)	 compared	 to	 female	
public	sector	employees	(20.3	years)	and	both	men	and	women	(20.7	and	21.2	years)	
working	in	the	private	sector.	 	This	disparity	in	(potential)	job	experience	may	even	
be	 wider	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 women	 are	more	 likely	 to	 exit	 and	 re-enter	 the	
labour	 market	 to	 have	 a	 family,	 the	 potential	 experience	 calculation	 is	 likely	 to	
overestimate	women’s	actual	job	experience.		These	differences	in	work	experience	
and	 education	 may	 explain	 the	 higher	 average	 wage	 of	 public	 sector	 employees.		
Another	 probable	 cause	 for	 the	 disparity	 in	 average	 wages	 between	 public	 and	
private	 sector	 employees	 may	 be	 the	 greater	 concentration	 of	 professionals	 and	
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technicians	in	the	public	sector.		Of	all	male	public	sector	employees,	14.5	per	cent	
are	 technicians	while	 in	 the	private	sector	only	9.2	per	cent	of	all	male	employees	
are	technicians.		This	disparity	is	even	greater	among	women,	with	27.7	per	cent	of	
all	female	public	sector	employees	being	technicians	versus	only	15.9	per	cent	of	the	
female	workforce	being	technicians	in	the	private	sector.				
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Table	3.2:	Variable	Definitions	
Variable	 Definition	
Total	Earnings	 Gross	Monthly	Job	Related	Earnings	–	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	dollars	
Log	Earnings	 Natural	Logarithm	of	Total	Earnings	
Education	 Years	of	Education	
Primary	 1	if	worker’s	highest	level	of	education	is	primary	schooling;	
0	otherwise		
Lower	Secondary	 1	if	worker’s	highest	level	of	education	is	CSEC	(Caribbean	
Secondary	Education	Certificate)1;	0	otherwise	
Upper	Secondary	 1	if	worker’s	highest	level	of	education	is	CAPE	(Caribbean	
Advanced	Proficiency	Examinations)2;	0	otherwise	
Tertiary	 1	if	worker’s	highest	level	of	education	is	some	university	
education;	0	otherwise	
Public	Sector	 1	if	the	worker	works	for	either	a	statutory	board,	
government	state	enterprise,	central	government,	or	local	
government;	0	otherwise	
Private	Sector	 1	if	the	worker	works	for	a	private	enterprise;	0	otherwise	
Potential	Experience	 Years	of	potential	job	experience	=	Age	–	(Years	of)	
Education	-	5	
Potential	Experience	
Squared	
Years	of	potential	job	experience	squared	
Hours	Worked	 Number	of	hours	worked	in	the	previous	week	
Married	 1	if	the	worker	is	married	and	currently	living	with	spouse,	or	
living	with	a	common-law	spouse;	0	otherwise	
Unmarried	 1	if	the	worker	is	not	married/never	had	a	partner,	married	
but	now	living	alone,	or	had	a	partner	but	now	living	alone;	0	
otherwise		
African	 1	if	the	worker	is	of	African	descent;	0	otherwise	
Indian	 1	if	the	worker	is	of	East	Indian	descent;	0	otherwise	
Other	 1	if	the	worker	is	of	Mixed/Other	ethnicity;	0	otherwise	
Industry	 Industries	were	classified	based	on	the	revised	Standard	
Industrial	Classification	2000	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(TTSIC)	
Occupation	 Occupations	were	classified	based	on	the	National	
Occupational	Classification	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(NOCTT)3	
1	Caribbean	Secondary	Education	Certificate	(CSEC)	examinations	are	usually	taken	by	students	after	five	years	of	secondary	
school,	and	are	equivalent	to	the	GCE	Ordinary	Level	(O-Levels)	examinations.	
2	Caribbean	Advanced	Proficiency	Examinations	(CAPE)	are	equivalent	to	the	British	Advanced	Levels	(A-levels),	and	are	
voluntary	qualifications	that	are	intended	for	university	entrance.	
3	See	Appendix	I:	National	Occupational	Classification	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(2013)	for	further	details.	
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Table	3.3:	Sample	Characteristics	
1	Potential	experience	is	defined	as	age	minus	years	of	education	minus	five.	
	 	
	 All	 Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
	 Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Sample	size	 1,168	 854	 392	 350	 776	 504	
Percentage	of	employed	 	 	 33.4	 41.0	 66.6	 59.0	
Mean	of	log	of	hourly	wages	 3.28	 3.17	 3.50	 3.46	 3.17	 2.96	
Mean	Age	 37.2	 37.2	 40.8	 37.9	 35.4	 36.8	
Mean	Potential	Experience1	 22.3	 20.8	 25.5	 20.3	 20.7	 21.2	
Mean	Potential	Experience	Squared	 662.4	 586.4	 807.0	 564.0	 589.4	 602.0	
Mean	Years	of	Education	 9.9	 11.4	 10.3	 12.7	 9.7	 10.5	
Education	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		Employees	with	at	most:	 	 	 	 	 	 	
					Primary	schooling	 24.3	 15.6	 21.7	 11.1	 25.6	 18.7	
					Lower	secondary	schooling	 39.6	 31.3	 28.8	 18.6	 45.0	 40.1	
					Upper	secondary	schooling	 28.1	 30.1	 35.7	 30.3	 24.2	 30.0	
					Tertiary	 8.1	 23.0	 13.7	 40.0	 5.1	 11.3	
Marital	Status	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
					Unmarried	 54.9	 56.6	 48.7	 56.0	 58.1	 57.1	
					Married	 45.1	 43.4	 51.3	 44.0	 41.9	 42.9	
Ethnicity	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
					African	 38.4	 45.7	 48.1	 52.0	 33.5	 41.4	
					Indian	 47.0	 36.1	 39.4	 30.6	 50.8	 40.0	
					Mixed/Other	 14.6	 18.2	 12.5	 17.4	 15.7	 18.7	
Occupation	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
					Elementary	Worker	 26.4	 17.8	 30.0	 18.9	 24.6	 17.1	
					Machine	Operator	 13.5	 1.5	 10.2	 0.3	 15.2	 2.4	
					Craft	Worker	 25.6	 2.2	 14.0	 0.6	 31.4	 3.4	
					Sales	Worker	 12.5	 23.7	 14.8	 9.1	 11.4	 33.7	
					Clerical	 4.8	 23.8	 6.6	 28.9	 3.8	 20.2	
					Technician	 11.0	 20.7	 14.5	 27.7	 9.2	 15.9	
					Professional	 3.5	 6.7	 5.9	 12.0	 2.3	 3.0	
					Manager	 2.8	 3.6	 4.1	 2.6	 2.2	 4.4	
Industry	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
					Construction	 27.6	 6.1	 19.6	 9.7	 31.6	 3.6	
					Agriculture/Fishing	 2.4	 1.2	 3.6	 2.6	 1.8	 0.2	
					Mining/Quarrying	 4.8	 0.9	 2.8	 0.9	 5.9	 1.0	
					Manufacturing	 11.6	 7.2	 5.1	 1.1	 14.8	 11.4	
					Electricity/Gas/Water	 3.1	 1.2	 7.6	 2.6	 0.9	 0.2	
					Wholesale/Retail	 12.3	 23.9	 1.3	 0.9	 17.9	 40.0	
					Transport/Communication	 6.4	 2.9	 9.7	 3.1	 4.7	 2.8	
					Finance/Insurance	 6.8	 12.1	 2.0	 3.4	 9.2	 18.1	
					Social/Personal	Services/	 25.0	 44.5	 48.3	 75.7	 13.3	 22.7	
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Figure	3.5.1:	Average	Monthly	Income	by	Gender	
	
	*Figures	above	the	bars	refer	to	the	female-to-male	earnings	ratio.	
	
Table	3.4:	Hourly	Wages	
		
		
		
Quantiles		
Hourly	Wages*	 Mean	 S.D.	 Min.	 0.25	 Mdn.	 0.75	 Max.	
Male	 30.88	 20.31	 5.00	 18.75	 25.00	 37.50	 225.00	
Female	 28.51	 17.87	 1.25	 15.63	 25.00	 37.50	 125.00	
*Figures	quoted	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	dollars.	
	
3.5.2 Econometric	Specification	
	
Conventional	 Mincer-type	 wage	 equations	 were	 estimated	 for	 both	 men	 and	
women:	
	 log 𝑤! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑿𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑺𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝜇! 	 	 	 Eq.	(13)	
where	log 𝑤!,	is	an	earnings	measure	(the	natural	logarithm	of	hourly	wages.		Hourly	
wages	 was	 obtained	 by	 dividing	 gross	 monthly	 wages	 by	 the	 number	 of	 worked	
hours.	 	Working	 hours	 equal	 the	 number	 of	 hours	 worked	 on	 average	 during	 the	
week	 times	 four)	 for	 individual𝑖, 𝑺𝒊	 represents	 a	 measure	 of	 schooling	 (more	
specifically,	 is	 a	 series	 of	 dummy	 variables	 for	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 education	
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attained),	𝑥! 	is	an	experience	measure	(namely,	potential	experience),	𝑿𝒊	is	a	vector	
of	other	variables	assumed	to	affect	wages	 (including	marital	status	and	ethnicity),	𝛼! 	 is	a	constant	 term,	and	𝜇! 	 is	a	disturbance	term	representing	 those	 factors	 that	
affect	earnings	but	are	not	directly	observed	and	is	assumed	to	be	independent	of	𝑿𝒊	
and	 the	 other	 covariates.	 	 Given	 that	 this	 is	 a	 log-linear	model,	 the	 coefficient	βk 
measures	 (approximately)	 the	 proportionate	 change	 in	 the	 expected	 value	 of	 log	
hourly	 wages	 given	 the	 covariates,	 E(y|x) as	 𝑥!	 changes,	 as	 semi-elasticities.34		
Hence,	 𝛼! 	 represents	 the	 logarithm	 of	 the	 wage	 due	 to	 zero	 schooling	 and	
experience;	β3	 is	the	return	to	an	additional	 level	of	schooling;	and	the	coefficients	β3	 and	β4	 capture	 the	positive	but	diminishing	 return	 to	years	of	experience.	 	 The	
reference	 education	 category	 is	 primary	 school,	 unmarried	 for	 marital	 status,	
mixed/other	 for	ethnicity,	elementary	 for	occupations,	and	social/personal	services	
for	industry.		TablesTable	3.6	and	Table	3.7	report	the	results	for	the	human	capital	
and	expanded	models,	with	 separate	 log	earnings	 functions	 for	 those	employed	 in	
the	public	and	private	sectors.			
	
Potential	experience	is	used	as	a	proxy	for	actual	experience	as	this	is	not	captured	
in	the	CSSP.		Potential	experience	is	included	as	a	quadratic	term,	as	is	customary	in	
this	 literature,	 to	 capture	 the	 concavity	 of	 the	 experience-earnings	 profile.	 	 The	
coefficients	 on	 potential	 experience	 and	 potential	 experience	 squared	 (𝛽!	 and	𝛽!)	
estimate	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 in	 earnings	 resulting	 in	 an	 additional	 year	 of	 labour	
market	experience;	 in	 lieu	of	 actual	data	 for	on-the-job	 training,	 these	 coefficients	
can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 measuring	 the	 impact	 of	 on-the-job	 training	 on	 earnings.		
However,	 one	 must	 note	 that	 potential	 experience	 is	 usually	 a	 good	 measure	 of	
actual	 experience	 for	men	 (since	men	 tend	 to	 have	 continuous	 employment	 since	
leaving	school),	but	less	so	for	women	(since	women	typically	spend	some	time	out	
of	the	labour	force,	for	example,	to	care	for	young	children,	etc.).		Consequently,	the	
potential	 experience	measure	 in	 reference	 to	 women	 tends	 to	 overestimate	 their	
actual	 years	 of	 experience	 and	 underestimate	 the	 impact	 of	 work	 experience	 on	
earnings	(Tzannatos	and	Sapsford,	1993).		
																																								 																				
34	 The	 approximation	 is	 more	 accurate	 if	 βk	 is	 small.	 The	 exact	 definition	 is	 that	 the	 proportional	
change	in	y is	equal	to	eβk – 1.	
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Schooling	 is	 a	 series	 of	 dummy	 variables	 for	 whether	 individuals’	 highest	 level	 of	
education	 is	 primary,	 lower	 secondary,	 upper	 secondary	 (‘A’	 levels),	 or	 tertiary	
(diplomas	 and	 university	 degrees).	 The	 coefficients	 on	 the	 schooling	 dummies	
estimate	 the	 per	 cent	 increase	 in	 earnings	 (relative	 to	 the	 base	 dummy	–	 primary	
school)	resulting	from	obtaining	an	additional	level	of	education.	
	
Marital	 status	 is	 also	 a	 dummy	 variable	 for	 whether	 the	 employee	 is	 unmarried	
(single	 or	 separated)	 or	 married	 (including	 common-law).	 	 Dummies	 for	 ethnicity	
were	 also	 included	 (African,	 Indian,	Mixed/Other).	 For	 the	 regression	 analysis,	 the	
“Mixed/Other”	grouping	was	used	as	the	base	group	since	historically	all	the	ethnic	
groups	 in	 this	 category	 have	 had	 higher	 social	 status	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	
compared	 with	 Africans	 and	 Indians	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001).	 	 Additionally,	 this	
avoids	 the	 issue	 of	 small	 sample	 size,	 which	may	 yield	 unreliable	 estimates.	 	 In	 a	
second	specification,	additional	controls	 for	occupation	and	 industry	were	 included	
and	 the	 results	 of	 those	 estimates	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 3.7.	 The	 dependent	
variable	was	 the	 log	 of	 hourly	wages	 and	was	 calculated	 as	 gross	monthly-earned	
income	divided	by	hours	worked.	
	
Pooled	Regression	with	Gender	Dummy		
	
Some	 analyses	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 begin	 with	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 Mincer	
(1974)	 wage	 equation	 with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 gender	 dummy	 to	 describe	 the	
relationship	between	wages	and	the	relevant	labour	market	characteristics:		
	log 𝑤! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑿𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑺𝒊 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!! +  𝛽!𝐹! + 𝜇! 	 	 	 Eq.	(14)	
	𝐹! 	 is	a	gender	dummy	variable	where	1	 indicates	a	 female	 individual	and	0	a	male	
individual.		All	other	covariates	are	the	same	as	in	equation	13	above.		
	
Pooled	 regression	 imposes	 the	 restriction	 that	 the	 returns	 to	 labour	 market	
characteristics	are	the	same	for	men	and	women.	Consequently,	 the	coefficient	on	
the	gender	dummy	variable	shows	the	extent	to	which	the	gender	wage	gap	remains	
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unexplained	 after	 controlling	 for	 individuals’	 characteristics	 (see	 Appendix	 II:	
Measuring	the	Mean	Gender	Wage	Gap	using	Pooled	OLS	Regressions	Table	AII.1	for	
the	pooled	regression	results35).	 	Given	that	a	major	 limitation	of	using	this	pooled	
log	 wage	 equation	 is	 that	 the	 model	 assumes	 that	 the	 returns	 to	 labour	 market	
characteristics	are	the	same	across	industries,	occupations,	sectors	of	employment,	
etc.,	Wald	tests	were	conducted	by	interacting	all	the	explanatory	variables	with	the	
gender	dummy	variable	to	test	whether	or	not	the	pooled	estimation	is	appropriate.	
Previous	 studies	 have	 showed	 that	men	 and	women	have	different	 labour	market	
characteristics	and	are	rewarded	differently	 for	 those	characteristics.	 	As	such,	 this	
imposing	restriction	of	the	pooled	earnings	function	may	not	be	appropriate	for	the	
analysis	at	hand.	Given	the	statistical	significance	of	some	of	these	tests36	estimation	
of	 the	 separate	 earnings	 functions	 for	 men	 and	 women	 was	 deemed	 more	
appropriate.		
	
3.6 Results	
3.6.1 Wage	Equations	
	
In	 general,	 the	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 views	 of	 human	 capital	 and	 its	
influence	 on	 labour	 market	 income.	 	 For	 example,	 education	 and	 experience	 are	
statistically	significant	and	both	impact	positively	on	income;	experience,	at	least	in	
the	case	of	women,	has	a	diminishing	impact	over	time	as	is	hypothesised	by	human	
capital	theory.		Similarly,	demographic	factors	like	marital	status,	in	the	case	of	men,	
influence	earnings	as	expected;	that	is	to	say,	those	in	marital	unions	tend	to	earn	a	
premium	over	their	unmarried	counterparts.		
	
The	model	based	on	human	capital	 theory	 (Table	3.6),	 reveals	 that	 for	both	sexes,	
education	 is	a	highly	 significant	determining	 factor,	as	expected,	 for	wages.	 	Given	
that	schooling	enters	the	regression	as	a	series	of	dummies	pertaining	to	the	highest	
																																								 																				
35	Summarily,	the	unexplained	gender	wage	gap	for	the	human	capital	model	was	26.7	per	cent	and	
23.2	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 full	model,	which	 includes	 controls	 for	 sector	 of	 employment,	 occupation	 and	
industry.			
36	 Wald	 tests	 on	 marital	 status,	 sector	 of	 employment,	 occupation,	 and	 industry	 were	 statistically	
significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level	(see	Appendix	III	Table	AII.2).		
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level	of	education	achieved	(denoted	below	as	P,	LS,	US,	and,	T for	primary,	 lower	
secondary,	 upper	 secondary	 and	 tertiary),	 the	 private	 rate	 of	 return	 to	 different	
levels	of	schooling	can	be	derived	from	the	following	formulae:	𝑟!" = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽!")− 1 𝑆!" − 𝑆! 	𝑟!" = (𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛽!" − 𝛽!" − 1) 𝑆!" − 𝑆!" 	𝑟! = (𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛽! − 𝛽!" − 1) 𝑆! − 𝑆!" 	
where	𝑆!,𝑆!",	𝑆!",	and	𝑆! 	stand	for	the	total	number	of	years	of	schooling	for	each	
successive	 level.	 	As	expected,	earnings	 increase	with	each	 incremental	 increase	 in	
educational	attainment	(Table	3.5).			
	
In	the	overall	sample,	the	estimated	differentials	to	schooling	for	women	at	all	levels	
of	 education	 are	 not	 statistically	 different	 (at	 the	 95%	 confidence	 interval)	 from	
those	 for	 men.	 	 In	 the	 public	 sector	 however	 women’s	 private	 returns	 to	 lower	
secondary	 schooling	 is	more	 than	double	 the	 returns	 for	men	 (9.2	per	cent	vs.	3.4	
per	cent),	while	the	returns	to	upper	secondary	schooling	is	slightly	higher	for	men	
than	 for	women	 (12.6	per	cent	vs.	11.6	per	cent);	 for	 tertiary	education,	male	and	
female	 rates	 of	 return	 are	 15.4	 per	 cent	 and	 15.0	 per	 cent,	 respectively,	 but	 this	
difference	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 In	 the	 private	 sector,	 there	 exists	 greater	
differences	in	the	returns	to	schooling	by	gender,	but	none	of	these	differences	are	
statistically	 significant.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 this	 baseline	 model,	 workers	 in	
Trinidad	 and	Tobago	enjoy	 slightly	 higher	 returns	 to	 schooling	 at	 the	 tertiary	 level	
compared	with	the	regional	average	(based	on	2011	data)	–	on	average,	in	Trinidad	
and	Tobago	men	and	women	have	returns	to	tertiary	education	upwards	of	20	per	
cent	compared	to	the	regional	(Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean)	average	of	17.6	per	
cent	(Montenegro	and	Patrinos,	2013).	
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Table	3.5:	Returns	to	Schooling	by	Educational	Level	and	Gender	–	Human	Capital	
Model	
Highest	
level	of	
Education	
All	Men	 All	Women	
Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Lower	
Secondary	 5.1%	 4.6%	 3.4%	 9.2%	 5.4%	 2.8%	
Upper	
Secondary	 9.1%	 11.9%	 12.6%	 11.6%	 6.0%	 9.4%	
	
Tertiary	 23.4%	 21.8%	 15.4%	 15.0%	 28.9%	 24.2%	
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Figure	3.6.1:	Wage-Experience	Curves	(Parsimonious	Model)	
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Table	3.6:	Earnings	Functions	for	Men	and	Women	–	Human	Capital	Theory	
		
All	Men	 All	Women	
Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Potential	Experience	 0.011***	 0.020***	 0.019***	 0.027***	 0.005	 0.013**	
		 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
Potential	Experience	Squared	 1.21E-05	 -2.22E-04	 -1.87E-04	 -3.38E-04**	 1.23E-04	 -1.20E-04	
		 (8.40E-05)	 (9.82E-05)	 (1.37E-04)	 (1.66E-04)	 (1.07E-04)	 (1.19E-04)	
Education	 		 		
	
		 		 		
Lower	Secondary	 0.226***	 0.205***	 0.159***	 0.378***	 0.240***	 0.133**	
		 (0.037)	 (0.051)	 (0.057)	 (0.103)	 (0.049)	 (0.058)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.536***	 0.595***	 0.567***	 0.758***	 0.455***	 0.451***	
		 (0.041)	 (0.054)	 (0.055)	 (0.09)	 (0.057)	 (0.065)	
Tertiary	 1.197***	 1.221***	 1.047***	 1.229***	 1.223***	 1.128***	
		 (0.062)	 (0.052)	 (0.075)	 (0.086)	 (0.108)	 (0.082)	
Marital	Status	 		 		
	
		 		 		
Married	 0.146***	 -0.004	 0.080*	 -0.085*	 0.178***	 0.045	
		 (0.029)	 (0.033)	 (0.043)	 (0.047)	 (0.036)	 (0.042)	
Ethnicity	 		 		
	
		 		 		
Indian	 0.01	 -0.037	 -0.022	 -0.050	 0.027	 -0.038	
		 (0.039)	 (0.046)	 (0.061)	 (0.072)	 (0.048)	 (0.059)	
African	 0.034	 -0.029	 -0.041	 -0.018	 0.033	 -0.079	
		 (0.039)	 (0.045)	 (0.06)	 (0.068)	 (0.049)	 (0.06)	
	
Constant	 2.603***	 2.394***	 2.764***	 2.384***	 2.607***	 2.477***	
		 (0.061)	 (0.072)	 (0.108)	 (0.116)	 (0.074)	 (0.091)	
		 		 		
	
		 		 		
No.	of		Observations	 1,157	 849	 388	 350	 769	 499	
R-squared	 0.365	 0.443	 0.446	 0.444	 0.286	 0.342	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	 	 	 	 	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	hourly	wages.		Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	Status	-	
unmarried;	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other.	
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Table	3.7:	Earnings	Functions	for	Men	and	Women	–	Full	Model	
	(Human	Capital	Theory	&	Controls	for	Industry	and	Occupation)	
		
All	Men	 All	Women	
Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Potential	Experience	 0.008**	 0.019***	 0.018***	 0.021***	 0.003	 0.015***	
		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
Potential	Experience	Squared	 3.16E-05	 -2-39E-04***	 -2.14E-04*	 -2.57E-04*	 1.09E-04	 -1.87E-04*	
		 (7.78E-05)	 (8.51E-04)	 (1.26E-04)	 (1.42E-04)	 (9.50E-05)	 (9.99E-05)	
Education	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Lower	Secondary	 0.156***	 0.102**	 0.025	 0.170*	 0.133***	 0.034	
		 (0.036)	 (0.049)	 (0.049)	 (0.093)	 (0.045)	 (0.056)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.368***	 0.284***	 0.247***	 0.265***	 0.272***	 0.163**	
		 (0.043)	 (0.056)	 (0.058)	 (0.095)	 (0.053)	 (0.065)	
Tertiary	 0.794***	 0.607***	 0.561***	 0.488***	 0.649***	 0.550***	
		 (0.075)	 (0.066)	 (0.088)	 (0.099)	 (0.13)	 (0.102)	
Occupation	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Machine	Operator	 0.211***	 0.110	 0.270***	 1.040***	 0.215***	 0.072	
		 (0.043)	 (0.213)	 (0.064)	 (0.129)	 (0.051)	 (0.194)	
Craft	Worker	 0.153***	 0.362***	 0.212***	 0.326	 0.171***	 0.328***	
		 (0.033)	 (0.115)	 (0.054)	 (0.215)	 (0.04)	 (0.116)	
Sales	Worker	 0.252***	 0.120**	 0.372***	 0.375***	 0.101*	 0.037	
		 (0.046)	 (0.05)	 (0.063)	 (0.102)	 (0.059)	 (0.054)	
Clerical	 0.195***	 0.348***	 0.155**	 0.237***	 0.202**	 0.311***	
		 (0.059)	 (0.045)	 (0.072)	 (0.074)	 (0.095)	 (0.057)	
Technician	 0.360***	 0.594***	 0.332***	 0.606***	 0.425***	 0.487***	
		 (0.046)	 (0.06)	 (0.07)	 (0.084)	 (0.058)	 (0.073)	
Professional	 0.516***	 0.858***	 0.478***	 0.881***	 0.549***	 0.641***	
		 (0.102)	 (0.07)	 (0.108)	 (0.095)	 (0.167)	 (0.116)	
Manager	 0.604***	 0.746***	 0.360***	 0.679***	 0.784***	 0.714***	
		 (0.08)	 (0.086)	 (0.112)	 (0.139)	 (0.123)	 (0.106)	
Industry	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Agriculture/Fishing	 -0.109	 0.016	 -0.018	 -0.126	 -0.112	 -0.211***	
		 (0.1)	 (0.163)	 (0.104)	 (0.18)	 (0.153)	 (0.058)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.387***	 0.040	 0.192**	 -0.187	 0.627***	 0.455***	
		 (0.063)	 (0.113)	 (0.09)	 (0.212)	 (0.081)	 (0.122)	
Manufacturing	 0.093**	 -0.018	 0.355***	 0.557***	 0.257***	 0.198***	
		 (0.044)	 (0.065)	 (0.085)	 (0.164)	 (0.055)	 (0.071)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.331***	 0.475***	 0.224***	 0.438***	 0.436**	 -0.540**	
		 (0.074)	 (0.181)	 (0.075)	 (0.104)	 (0.19)	 (0.211)	
Wholesale/Retail	 -0.096**	 -0.176***	 0.223	 0.356***	 0.136***	 0.073	
		 (0.041)	 (0.042)	 (0.228)	 (0.097)	 (0.051)	 (0.056)	
Transport/Communication	 0.161***	 0.053	 0.244***	 0.150*	 0.188**	 0.189*	
		 (0.057)	 (0.082)	 (0.06)	 (0.08)	 (0.089)	 (0.105)	
Finance/Insurance	 0.088	 0.082**	 -0.188	 0.020	 0.395***	 0.385***	
		 (0.061)	 (0.042)	 (0.171)	 (0.120)	 (0.078)	 (0.065)	
Construction	 0.046	 -0.178***	 -0.172***	 -0.474***	 0.276***	 0.287***	
		 (0.033)	 (0.068)	 (0.048)	 (0.1)	 (0.045)	 (0.099)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Constant	 2.529***	 2.370***	 2.743***	 2.478***	 2.413***	 2.289***	
		 (0.061)	 (0.077)	 (0.096)	 (0.117)	 (0.069)	 (0.092)	
No.	of	Observations	 1,157	 847	 388	 350	 769	 497	
R-squared	 0.463	 0.572	 0.608	 0.677	 0.439	 0.520	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	hourly	wages.		Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	Status	-	
unmarried	(not	reported);	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other	(not	reported);	Occupation	-	Elementary	Occupations;	Industry	-	
Social/Personal	Services.	
Ethnicity	and	marital	status	are	included	in	the	regressions,	but	not	shown.	
	
In	terms	of	potential	experience,	this	variable	is	statistically	significant	for	both	men	
and	women,	with	the	exception	of	men	working	 in	the	private	sector.	 	Figure	3.6.1	
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depicts	 the	 wage-experience	 nexus	 based	 on	 the	 “average”	 man	 and	 “average”	
women37	 and	 shows	 the	 effect	 of	 increasing	 potential	 experience	 on	 log	 wages	
(holding	 education,	 ethnicity,	 and	 marital	 status	 constant).	 	 Men	 appear	 to	 be	
rewarded	much	more	 than	women	 for	 their	work	 experience,	 and	appear	 to	have	
increasing	returns	over	time.		On	the	other	hand,	over	time	the	rewards	to	women’s	
work	experience	declined.		For	instance,	after	40	years	of	experience,	the	log	wages	
of	women	working	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 begin	 to	wane,	whilst	 the	wages	 of	 their	
male	counterpart	remain	on	an	upward	trajectory.							
	
Marital	 status	 is	only	 significant	 for	male	employees	 in	 the	private	 sector.	 	Human	
capital	 theory	 postulates	 that	 being	 in	 a	 marital	 union	 tends	 to	 positively	 impact	
men’s	wages.	 	 In	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	married	men	working	 in	 the	private	 sector	
enjoy	 wages	 that	 are	 on	 average	 17.8	 per	 cent	 higher	 than	 their	 unmarried	
colleagues.	 	 Ethnicity	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 significant	 determining	 factor	 for	
wages	for	both	men	and	women.		The	statistically	significant	higher	intercept	terms	
for	men	employed	 in	both	the	private	and	public	sectors	show	that	men	enter	 the	
labour	market	at	an	advantage	compared	to	women.			
	
The	 models	 improve	 in	 explaining	 the	 variation	 in	 (log)	 wages	 when	 controls	 for	
occupation	 and	 industry	 are	 included	 given	 the	 higher	 R2	 value	 (Table	 3.7).	 	Most	
striking	 is	 the	 returns	 to	 schooling	 across	 all	 levels	 (lower	 secondary,	 upper	
secondary	and	tertiary)	of	academic	achievement;	these	estimated	returns	are	much	
lower	 in	the	full	model	than	 in	the	parsimonious	one.	 	For	example,	 the	returns	to	
schooling	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 (for	 both	 men	 and	 women)	 more	 than	 halved	
compared	 to	 the	 estimated	 returns	 in	 the	 parsimonious	 model	 (Table	 3.8).	 	 It	
appears,	 as	 one	would	 expect,	 that	 higher	 levels	 of	 education	 help	 both	men	 and	
women	to	get	into	higher	paying	occupations	(and	industries).	
	
																																								 																				
37	 Here	 the	 “average”	 man/woman	 was	 characterised	 using	 the	 coefficients	 on	 the	 independent	
variables	 based	 on	 the	 OLS	 estimates	 presented	 in	 Table	 3.6	 to	 determine	 the	 intercepts,	 that	 is,	
holding	all	other	characteristics	constant,	the	corresponding	level	of	log	wages	with	no	experience.		
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After	controlling	 for	occupation	and	 industry,	 the	effect	of	potential	experience	on	
(log)	wages	for	men	and	women	show	similar	rates	of	diminishing	returns	although,	
in	absolute	 terms	men	enjoy	higher	wage	premiums	 for	 their	work	experience.	 	 In	
the	private	sector	both	men	and	women	get	higher	wage	premiums	for	 their	work	
experience	compared	to	their	respective	counterparts	working	 in	the	public	sector.		
Similar	 to	 the	 parsimonious	 model,	 post-35	 years	 of	 work	 experience,	 the	 wage	
premium	 private-sector	 female	 employees	 receive	 begin	 to	 diminish,	 whilst	 male	
employees	continue	to	receive	increasing	returns	for	their	work	experience.	
	
In	 general,	 tests	 for	 the	 equality	 of	 the	 coefficients	 on	 the	 categorical	 variables	
occupation	 and	 industry	 for	men	 and	women	 in	 the	 overall	 sample	 revealed	 that	
these	respective	coefficients	are	not	significantly	different	from	each	other;	the	only	
male	versus	female	coefficients	that	were	significantly	different	from	each	other	(at	
a	 5%	 level)	 included	 Technicians	 and	 Professionals	 and	 those	 working	 in	 the	
Mining/Quarrying,	and	Construction	 industries.	 	Notably,	 these	occupations	have	a	
higher	percentage	of	female	workers	(around	58	per	cent	of	all	employees	for	both	
occupational	 groups	 are	 female),	 whereas	 the	 two	 industries	 are	 predominately	
male	 (around	 87	 per	 cent).	 In	 the	 public	 sector	 the	 only	 coefficients	 that	 were	
statistically	 different	 between	 the	 genders	 were	 those	 for	 Machine	 Operators,	
Professionals,	 and	 Construction	 workers.	 	 In	 the	 private	 sector	 none	 of	 the	
occupation	 and	 industry	 coefficients	were	 statistically	 different	 between	male	 and	
female	employees,	except	for	the	Electricity/Gas/Water	industry.	
	
The	 lack	of	 significant	differences	 in	 the	coefficients	 for	education,	occupation	and	
industry	 indicate	 that	 one	 should	 be	 careful	 not	 to	 read	 too	 much	 into	 the	
contribution	of	the	coefficient	differences	in	the	decompositions.		
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Table	3.8:	Returns	to	Schooling	by	Educational	Level	and	Gender	-	Full	Model	
	
Highest	
level	of	
Education	
All	Men	 All	Women	
Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
Men	 Women	 Men	 Women	
Lower	
Secondary	 3.4%	 2.1%	 0.5%	 3.7%	 2.8%	 0.7%	
Upper	
Secondary	
5.9%	 5.0%	 6.2%	 2.5%	 3.7%	 3.4%	
Tertiary	 13.3%	 9.5%	 9.2%	 6.2%	 11.4%	 11.8%	
	
3.6.2 Decompositions	of	the	Wage	Equations	
	
This	 section	 evaluates	 the	 gender	 differences	 in	 log	 wages	 via	 the	 standard	
decomposition	 methodologies	 discussed	 above,	 namely	 the	 Oaxaca	 and	 Neumark	
methods	 outlined	 in	 equations	 (9),	 (10)	 and	 (11).	 	 The	 gender	 wage	 gap	
decompositions	based	on	these	methods	are	shown	in	Table	3.9	using	two	different	
models,	 firstly	 using	 human	 capital	 characteristics	 only	 (parsimonious	 model)	 and	
secondly	 expanding	 the	 list	 of	 explanatory	 variables	 to	 include	 controls	 for	
occupation	and	industry	(full	model).		For	ease	of	interpretation,	the	decomposition	
results	 were	 retransformed	 from	 the	 logarithmic	 scale	 (recall	 that	 log	 of	 hourly	
wages	was	used	as	the	dependent	variable)	to	the	original	scale	of	hourly	wages	(in	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	dollars,	TT$).	
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 decompositions,	 using	 the	 Oaxaca	methodology,	 the	 classic	 index	
number	 problem	 arises	 based	 on	 the	 chosen	 wage	 structure	 used	 as	 the	 “non-
discriminatory”	wage	structure,	or	 in	other	words,	 the	wage	structure	used	for	the	
reference	coefficients.		There	is	no	a	priori	preference	for	the	use	of	either	the	male	
or	 female	 wage	 structure,	 even	 though	 some	 researchers	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 wage	
structure	 for	 the	 more	 dominant	 group	 as	 the	 reference	 wage	 structure.	 	 To	
circumvent	 the	 index	number	problem,	 the	non-discriminatory	wage	structure	was	
estimated	over	a	pooled	sample	of	both	 the	male	and	 female	earnings	 functions	–	
i.e.	 the	Neumark	method.	 	The	discussion	of	 the	results	 in	 the	proceeding	sections	
will	be	based	on	the	Neumark	method.			
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Considering	 the	 individual	 characteristics	 in	 the	 “explained”	 and	 “unexplained”	
components	 (Table	3.10	 and	Table	3.11),	 coefficients	 greater	 than	unity	 indicate	 a	
widening	of	the	gap,	while	coefficients	less	than	unity,	indicate	a	closing	of	the	gap.		
Recall	that	the	explained	component	 is	that	portion	of	the	wage	differential	that	 is	
explained	 by	 differences	 in	 characteristics	 between	 men	 and	 women,	 while	 the	
unexplained	component	corresponds	to	the	differences	in	the	coefficients	as	well	as	
the	 difference	 between	 the	 constants.	 	 The	 unexplained	 component	 is	 usually	
attributed	 to	 discrimination	 in	 the	 labour	 market,	 but	 also	 captures	 all	 potential	
effects	of	differences	in	unobserved	variables	(e.g.	ability	and	motivation).						
	
In	 the	 parsimonious	 model,	 the	 (geometric)	 mean	 level	 of	 wages	 for	 men	 and	
women	are	TT$26.48	and	TT$23.79,	 respectively;	 this	 translates	 into	a	gap	of	11.3	
per	cent.		Adjusting	women’s	mean	level	of	characteristics	to	the	mean	levels	of	men	
would	decrease	women’s	wages	by	14.8	per	cent,	while	equalising	the	differences	in	
rates	of	return	would	increase	women’s	wages	by	30.6	per	cent.	
	
The	 major	 differences	 in	 mean	 characteristics	 between	 men	 and	 women	
(“explained”	component)	relate	to	potential	experience	and	education.		On	average,	
men	have	more	years	of	work	experience	than	women	–	22.3	years	versus	20.8	years	
(this	difference	is	statistically	significant),	while	women	have	more	years	of	schooling	
–	11.4	 versus	9.9	 (this	difference	 is	 also	 statistically	 significant).	 	 If	women’s	mean	
level	 of	 tertiary	 education	 was	 adjusted	 to	 the	 mean	 level	 of	 men’s	 tertiary	
education,	their	wages	would	be	10.2	per	cent	lower,	whereas,	if	they	had	the	same	
years	of	experience	as	men,	their	wages	would	increase	by	2.1	per	cent.			
	
The	“unexplained”	component	of	the	gap	appears	to	be	driven	in	 large	part	due	to	
differences	 in	 the	 intercepts,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	marital	 status.	 	Married	men	
receive	higher	wage	premiums	 than	do	married	women	–	 if	married	women	were	
rewarded	at	the	equivalent	rate	as	married	men,	their	wages	would	increase	by	3.4	
per	cent.		The	male	advantage	in	the	labour	market	is	captured	by	the	difference	in	
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the	constant	terms	–	if	employers	valued	female	employees	to	the	same	extent	that	
they	valued	male	employees,	female	wages	would	increase	by	35.7	per	cent.			
	
Table	3.9:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	using	the	Oaxaca	and	Neumark	
Methods	
		 Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $26.48	 $26.48	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $23.79	 $23.76	
Wage	Gap:	 1.113	 1.114	
			Using	the	male	wage	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
						Characteristics	 0.858	 0.901	
						Returns	to	characteristics1	 1.298	 1.237	
		 		 		
			Using	the	female	wage	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
						Characteristics	 0.845	 0.846	
						Returns	to	characteristics	 1.317	 1.317	
		 		 		
			Using	a	pooled	wage	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
						Characteristics	 0.852	 0.884	
						Returns	to	characteristics	 1.306	 1.261	
	
1	 The	 estimation	 of	 the	 pooled	 OLS	 wage	 regressions	 with	 a	 gender	 dummy	 yield	 similar	 results	 for	 the	
unexplained	gender	wage	gap:	26.7	per	cent	for	the	human	capital	model	and	23.2	per	cent	for	the	full	model.	
	
Based	on	 the	 full	model	 (which	 includes	controls	 for	occupation	and	 industry),	 the	
gender	wage	gap	in	2012	was	11.4	per	cent.		In	a	previous	study	based	on	1993	data	
for	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001),	 the	male/female	 (log)	 income	
differential	was	19.2	per	cent.		Thus,	in	the	twenty	years	between	the	earlier	study	
and	 this	 present	 analysis,	 the	 male/female	 income	 differential	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago	has	narrowed,	possibly	 reflecting	 the	positive	 impact	of	 the	passing	of	 the	
Equal	 Opportunity	 Act	 (EOA)	 in	 2000.	 	 In	 the	 current	 study,	 the	 mean	 level	 of	
women’s	 wages	 is	 estimated	 to	 decrease	 by	 11.6	 per	 cent	 if	 they	 had	 the	 same	
(mean)	characteristics	as	men	given	that	a	higher	proportion	of	women	have	higher	
levels	of	 education	 than	men	 (“explained”	 component).	 	However,	women’s	mean	
level	 of	wages	would	 increase	 by	 26.1	per	 cent	 if	 they	 received	 the	 same	 rates	 of	
return	for	relevant	characteristics	as	men	(“unexplained”	component).			
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In	terms	of	the	“explained”	component,	most	of	the	wage	differential	between	men	
and	women	again	 relate	 to	potential	 experience	 and	education.	 	Work	 experience	
leads	 to	 a	widening	 of	 the	 gap;	 the	 potential	 experience	 and	potential	 experience	
squared	 variables	 highlight	 that	 as	 work	 experience	 increases,	 the	 wage	 gap	
increases	 at	 a	 decreasing	 rate.	 	With	 the	 inclusion	 of	 controls	 for	 occupation	 and	
industry,	adjusting	women’s	mean	level	of	tertiary	education	to	that	of	men’s	would	
decrease	 women’s	 wages	 by	 5.5	 per	 cent.	 Other	 variables	 that	 account	 for	 a	
widening	of	the	gap	include	the	occupations	of	Sales	and	Clerical	workers	(which	are	
female-dominated	 occupations	 –	 see	 Table	 3.3),	 and	 a	 few	 industries,	 namely	
Social/Personal	Services,	Mining/Quarrying	and	Wholesale/Retail.				
	
	
By	far,	the	biggest	contributor	to	the	“unexplained”	component	of	the	male/female	
earnings	gap	is	the	difference	in	the	constants.		This	suggests	that	male	employees	in	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 enter	 the	 labour	market	 at	 an	 advantage;	 regardless	 of	 their	
socioeconomic	 attributes	 (level	 of	 schooling,	work	 experience,	marital	 status,	 etc.)	
employers	simply	pay	men	more	than	they	pay	women.		Other	factors	contributing	
to	the	widening	of	the	unexplained	part	of	the	gap	include	education,	marital	status,	
and	 private	 sector	 employment.	 	 If	women	were	 rewarded	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	
men	 for	 their	 higher	 education	 degrees	 (that	 is,	 tertiary	 education),	 their	 wages	
would	increase	by	2.3	per	cent.	 	Similarly,	 if	married	women	were	rewarded	at	the	
same	 rate	 as	 married	 men	 their	 wages	 would	 increase	 by	 2.6	 per	 cent.	 	 Male	
employees	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 also	 appear	 to	 be	 more	 valued	 by	 employers;	 if	
female	 employees	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 received	 the	 same	 rate	 of	 return	 as	 their	
male	counterparts,	 their	wages	would	 increase	by	3.5	per	cent.	 	Differences	 in	 the	
coefficients	for	Sales	and	Elementary	workers	and	those	working	in	the	Construction	
industry	 also	 account	 for	 a	 widening	 of	 the	 gap.	 	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 gender	
differences	 in	coefficients	for	several	other	characteristics	help	to	close	the	gap,	as	
indicated	by	the	value	of	the	coefficients	being	less	than	unity.			
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Table	3.10:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	–	“Explained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Characteristics)	
	
Differences	due	to	
Characteristics	
Reference	Wage	Structure	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Male	 Female	 Pooled	 Male	 Female	 Pooled	
Potential	Experience	 1.017	 1.030*	 1.021*			 1.010	 1.029*	 1.016*			
		 (0.009)	 (0.014)	 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.013)	 (0.007)	
Potential	Experience	Squared	 1.001	 0.983	 0.995	 1.002	 0.981	 0.996	
		 (0.006)	 (0.010)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.010)	 (0.005)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Primary	 0.957***	 0.956***	 0.956***	 0.975***	 0.982***	 0.977***	
		 (0.009)	 (0.009)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.978***	 0.975***	 0.977***	 0.987***	 0.990**	 0.988***	
		 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.999	 0.998	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Tertiary	 0.900***	 0.898***	 0.898***	 0.940***	 0.957***	 0.945***	
		 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Unmarried	 1.001	 1.000	 1.001	 1.001	 1.000	 1.001	
		 (0.002)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	
Married	 1.001	 1.000	 1.001	 1.001	 1.000	 1.001	
		 (0.002)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Mixed/Other	 1.001	 0.999	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	
		 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Indian	 0.999	 0.998	 0.999	 1.000	 1.000	 0.999	
		 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	
African	 0.999	 1.000	 1.000	 0.999	 1.000	 0.999	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Sector	Employed	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Public	Sector	 		 		 		 0.991**	 0.987***	 0.990***	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	
Private	Sector	 		 		 		 0.991**	 0.987***	 0.990***	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Table	3.10:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	–	“Explained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Characteristics)	–	cont’d	
Differences	due	to	
Characteristics	
Reference	Wage	Structure	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Male	 Female	 Pooled	 Male	 Female	 Pooled	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Elementary	Occupations	 		 		 		 0.975***	 0.967***	 0.971***	
		 		 		 		 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	
Machine	Operators	 		 		 		 0.993	 0.970*	 0.990*			
		 		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.012)	 (0.004)	
Craft	Workers	 		 		 		 0.978**	 1.008	 0.979**		
		 		 		 		 (0.007)	 (0.020)	 (0.007)	
Sales	Workers	 		 		 		 1.005	 1.031***	 1.020***	
		 		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	
Clerical	Workers	 		 		 		 1.022*	 1.018**	 1.017***	
		 		 		 		 (0.010)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	
Technicians	 		 		 		 0.992*	 0.982***	 0.987***	
		 		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.003)	
Professionals	 		 		 		 0.993*	 0.986**	 0.990**		
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
Managers	 		 		 		 0.998	 0.997	 0.998	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Social/Personal	Services	 		 		 		 1.032***	 1.019**	 1.026***	
		 		 		 		 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 		 0.997	 0.998	 0.997	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 		 1.013***	 1.003	 1.012***	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.003)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 		 1.001	 1.003	 1.001	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.001)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 		 1.003	 1.007*	 1.003	
		 		 		 		 (0.001)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 		 1.015**	 1.010	 1.015***	
		 		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 		 1.001	 1.002	 1.001	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.001)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 		 0.997	 0.991**	 0.994*			
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Construction	 		 		 		 0.989	 0.937***	 0.981***	
		 		 		 		 (0.006)	 (0.013)	 (0.006)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Table	3.11:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	–	“Unexplained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Coefficients)	
Differences	due	to	
Coefficients	
Reference	Wage	Structure	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Male	 Female	 Pooled	 Male	 Female	 Pooled	
Potential	Experience	 0.835	 0.825	 0.832	 0.774*	 0.759*	 0.769*			
		 (0.111)	 (0.118)	 (0.112)	 (0.091)	 (0.096)	 (0.091)	
Potential	Experience	
Squared	 1.147	 1.168	 1.154	 1.167*	 1.192*	 1.174*			
		 (0.088)	 (0.102)	 (0.092)	 (0.079)	 (0.092)	 (0.081)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Primary	 1.002	 1.004	 1.003	 0.988	 0.981	 0.986	
		 (0.007)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	
Lower	Secondary	 1.011	 1.014	 1.013	 0.987	 0.984	 0.986	
		 (0.011)	 (0.014)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	 (0.013)	 (0.012)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.987	 0.988	 0.987	 0.998	 0.998	 0.999	
		 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	
Tertiary	 0.998	 0.999	 1.000	 1.029*	 1.010*	 1.023**		
		 (0.011)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	 (0.014)	 (0.005)	 (0.009)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Unmarried	 0.958***	 0.960***	 0.959***	 0.968**	 0.969**	 0.968**		
		 -0.012	 -0.0116	 -0.0117	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	
Married	 1.033***	 1.034***	 1.034***	 1.025**	 1.027**	 1.026**		
		 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.009)	 (0.009)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Mixed/Other	 0.993	 0.995	 0.994	 0.997	 0.998	 0.998	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
Indian	 1.004	 1.005	 1.004	 1.000	 1.001	 1.001	
		 (0.011)	 (0.014)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	
African	 1.012	 1.010	 1.011	 1.006	 1.005	 1.005	
		 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	 (0.011)	
Sector	Employed	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Public	Sector	 		 		 		 0.977*	 0.981*	 0.979*			
		 		 		 		 (0.010)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	
Private	Sector	 		 		 		 1.034*	 1.038*	 1.035*			
		 		 		 		 (0.015)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Table	3.11:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	–	“Unexplained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Coefficients)	–	cont’d	
	
Differences	due	to	
Coefficients	
Reference	Wage	Structure	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Male	 Female	 Pooled	 Male	 Female	 Pooled	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Elementary	Occupations	 		 		 		 1.019*	 1.028*	 1.023*			
		 		 		 		 (0.009)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	
Machine	Operators	 		 		 		 1.003	 1.027	 1.005	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.015)	 (0.005)	
Craft	Workers	 		 		 		 0.997	 0.967	 0.996	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.022)	 (0.006)	
Sales	Workers	 		 		 		 1.054***	 1.028***	 1.040***	
		 		 		 		 (0.013)	 (0.007)	 (0.012)	
Clerical	Workers	 		 		 		 0.996	 0.999	 1.001	
		 		 		 		 (0.014)	 (0.003)	 (0.009)	
Technicians	 		 		 		 0.978*	 0.988*	 0.983	
		 		 		 		 (0.011)	 (0.006)	 (0.010)	
Professionals	 		 		 		 0.985*	 0.992*	 0.988*			
		 		 		 		 (0.006)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	
Managers	 		 		 		 0.998	 0.999	 0.998	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Social/Personal	Services	 		 		 		 0.972	 0.984	 0.978	
		 		 		 		 (0.019)	 (0.011)	 (0.017)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 		 0.999	 0.999	 1.000	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 		 1.002	 1.013	 1.004	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.007)	 (0.002)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 		 0.998	 0.996	 0.998	
		 		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 		 0.998	 0.994	 0.998	
		 		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 		 0.989	 0.994	 0.989	
		 		 		 		 (0.013)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 		 1.000	 0.999	 1.000	
		 		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.006)	 (0.003)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 		 0.986	 0.992	 0.989	
		 		 		 		 (0.008)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	
Construction	 		 		 		 1.015***	 1.071***	 1.024**		
		 		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	
Constant	Term	 1.357***	 1.357***	 1.357***	 1.375***	 1.375***	 1.375***	
		 (0.095)	 (0.095)	 (0.091)	 (0.099)	 (0.099)	 (0.103)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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3.6.3 Decompositions	by	Sector	
	
Table	3.12	presents	the	wage	decompositions	separately	 for	the	public	and	private	
sectors	based	on	 the	Neumark	method.	 	 There	 is	 a	much	wider	gap	 in	 the	private	
sector	 than	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 is	 negligible	
amounting	 to	3.2	per	cent	compared	to	a	gap	of	almost	23	per	cent	 in	 the	private	
sector.			
	
In	the	private	sector,	based	on	the	full	model,	which	includes	controls	for	occupation	
and	 industry,	 the	mean	 level	of	women’s	wages	would	decrease	 by	3.1	per	 cent	 if	
they	had	the	same	mean	characteristics	as	men,	but	the	mean	level	of	their	wages	
would	 increase	 by	 26.8	 per	 cent	 if	 they	 were	 paid	 the	 same	 rates	 of	 return	 to	
characteristics	as	men.	
	
Table	3.12:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	(Neumark	Method)	by	Sector	
		
Parsimonious	
Model	
Full		
Model	
In	the	public	sector:	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $32.97	 $32.97	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $31.94	 $31.94	
Wage	Gap:	 1.032	 1.032	
Using	a	pooled	wage	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
						Characteristics	 0.836	 0.904	
						Returns	to	characteristics	 1.235	 1.144	
In	the	private	sector:	 		 		
(Geometric)	Mean	of	male	hourly	wages	 $23.71	 $23.71	
(Geometric)	Mean	of	female	hourly	wages	 $19.34	 $19.30	
Wage	Gap:	 1.226	 1.229	
Using	a	pooled	wage	structure,	difference	due	to:	 		 		
						Characteristics	 0.911	 0.969	
						Returns	to	characteristics	 1.346	 1.268	
	
Looking	 at	 the	 “unexplained’	 component	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 in	 the	 private	
sector	in	greater	detail	(Table	3.14),	the	gender	differences	in	coefficients	that	widen	
the	gap	 include	marriage	and	being	of	African	descent;	however,	the	biggest	single	
contributor	 to	 the	 unexplained	 component	 of	 the	 gap	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 the	
constant	 terms.	 	 Male	 private	 sector	 employees	 are	 rewarded	 twice	 as	 much	 as	
female	 private	 sector	 employees.	 	 Essentially	 upon	 entry	 into	 the	 labour	 market,	
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private	 sector	 employers	 favour	men	 over	women	 and	 pay	 the	men	much	 higher	
wages.		Notably,	in	the	private	sector,	both	men	and	women	receive	similar	rates	of	
return	for	tertiary	education.	
	
One	 should	 note	 though	 that	 these	 results	 may	 reflect	 an	 overestimation	 of	 the	
“unexplained”	component	of	the	gender	wage	gap	since	the	issues	of	heterogeneity,	
endogeneity,	 and	 selectivity	 have	not	been	addressed.	 	 Additionally,	 as	was	noted	
previously,	 the	 Neumark	 method	 tends	 to	 overstate	 the	 effects	 of	 variables	 with	
large	 gender	 differences	 and	 transfers	 some	 of	 the	 “unexplained”	 portion	 to	 the	
“explained”	component	(Fortin,	20006).	
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Table	3.13:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	(Neumark	Method)	by	Sector	–	
“Explained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Characteristics)	
	
Differences	due	to	
Characteristics	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Potential	Experience	 1.121***	 0.996	 1.106***	 0.997	
		 (0.037)	 (0.006)	 (0.032)	 (0.005)	
Potential	Experience	Squared	 0.944*	 1.000	 0.946*	 1.000	
		 (0.026)	 (0.002)	 (0.023)	 (0.001)	
Education	 		 		 		 		
Primary	 0.948***	 0.967**		 0.977***	 0.983**		
		 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.974**	 0.988	 0.986**	 0.993	
		 (0.008)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
Upper	Secondary	 1.007	 1.000	 1.002	 1.000	
		 (0.005)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	
Tertiary	 0.850***	 0.957***	 0.922***	 0.977**		
		 (0.018)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.007)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		
Unmarried	 1.000	 0.999	 1.001	 1.000	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Married	 1.000	 0.999	 1.001	 1.000	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		
Mixed/Other	 0.999	 1.000	 1.001	 1.000	
		 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Indian	 0.999	 1.000	 0.999	 0.998	
		 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
African	 1.000	 1.001	 0.999	 0.999	
		 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
						Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
	
	 	
114	
	
Table	3.13:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	(Neumark	Method)	by	Sector	–	
“Explained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Characteristics)	–	cont’d	
	
Differences	due	to	
Characteristics	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		
Elementary	Occupations	 		 		 0.962***	 0.978**		
		 		 		 (0.011)	 (0.007)	
Machine	Operators	 		 		 1.000	 0.986*			
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
Craft	Workers	 		 		 0.990	 0.963***	
		 		 		 (0.006)	 (0.010)	
Sales	Workers	 		 		 1.001	 1.057***	
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.010)	
Clerical	Workers	 		 		 1.038***	 1.004	
		 		 		 (0.009)	 (0.006)	
Technicians	 		 		 0.984**	 0.990**		
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
Professionals	 		 		 0.979**	 0.999	
		 		 		 (0.008)	 (0.002)	
Managers	 		 		 1.002	 0.991*			
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.004)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		
Social/Personal	Services	 		 		 1.022*	 1.021***	
		 		 		 (0.009)	 (0.006)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 0.999	 0.994*			
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.003)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 1.000	 1.020***	
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.005)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 1.010*	 1.001	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.001)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 1.009*	 1.001	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.001)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 1.001	 1.024**		
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.009)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 1.007*	 0.999	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.001)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 1.002	 0.985**		
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.005)	
Construction	 		 		 0.965***	 1.014	
		 		 		 (0.010)	 (0.011)	
													Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Table	3.14:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	(Neumark	Method)	by	Sector	–	
“Unexplained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Coefficients)	
	
Differences	due	to	
Coefficients	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Potential	Experience	 0.838	 0.850	 0.920	 0.777	
		 (0.197)	 (0.139)	 (0.187)	 (0.110)	
Potential	Experience	Squared	 1.101	 1.158	 1.028	 1.194*			
		 (0.159)	 (0.110)	 (0.127)	 (0.097)	
Education	 		 		 		 		
Primary	 1.023*	 0.989	 1.003	 0.985	
		 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.012)	 (0.014)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.984	 1.023	 0.973*	 1.010	
		 (0.014)	 (0.019)	 (0.011)	 (0.020)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.987	 0.987	 1.001	 1.009	
		 (0.017)	 (0.014)	 (0.016)	 (0.014)	
Tertiary	 0.991	 1.004	 1.027	 1.003	
		 (0.014)	 (0.007)	 (0.017)	 (0.008)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		
Unmarried	 0.958**	 0.963*			 0.986	 0.967*			
		 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	
Married	 1.040**	 1.029*			 1.014	 1.025*			
		 (0.016)	 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		
Mixed/Other	 1.000	 0.990	 0.999	 0.996	
		 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	
Indian	 1.009	 1.002	 0.998	 0.992	
		 (0.016)	 (0.016)	 (0.012)	 (0.014)	
African	 0.987	 1.020	 1.008	 1.016	
		 (0.021)	 (0.015)	 (0.018)	 (0.013)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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Table	3.14:	Decomposing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	(Neumark	Method)	by	Sector	–	
“Unexplained”	Component	
	(Differences	due	to	Coefficients)	–	cont’d	
	
Differences	due	to	
Coefficients	
Parsimonious	Model	 Full	Model	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Public	
Sector	
Private	
Sector	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		
Elementary	Occupations	 1.371**	 1.359***	 1.057**	 1.004	
		 (0.152)	 (0.113)	 (0.019)	 (0.013)	
Machine	Operators	 		 		 0.999	 1.006	
		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.008)	
Craft	Workers	 		 		 1.003	 0.995	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.010)	
Sales	Workers	 		 		 1.027**	 1.019	
		 		 		 (0.010)	 (0.016)	
Clerical	Workers	 		 		 1.037**	 0.995	
		 		 		 (0.013)	 (0.009)	
Technicians	 		 		 1.000	 0.995	
		 		 		 (0.015)	 (0.010)	
Professionals	 		 		 0.990	 0.998	
		 		 		 (0.009)	 (0.004)	
Managers	 		 		 0.998	 1.002	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		
Social/Personal	Services	 		 		 0.993	 0.969*			
		 		 		 (0.040)	 (0.013)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 		 		 1.003	 1.000	
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.001)	
Mining/Quarrying	 		 		 1.005	 0.999	
		 		 		 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Manufacturing	 		 		 0.998	 0.989	
		 		 		 (0.004)	 (0.009)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 		 0.992	 1.002	
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.002)	
Wholesale/Retail	 		 		 0.998	 0.966	
		 		 		 (0.002)	 (0.019)	
Transport/Communication	 		 		 1.005	 0.995	
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
Finance/Insurance	 		 		 0.995	 0.977*			
		 		 		 (0.005)	 (0.011)	
Construction	 		 		 1.037**	 0.989	
		 		 		 (0.015)	 (0.008)	
Constant	term	 1.371**	 1.359***	 1.047	 1.512***	
		 (0.152)	 (0.113)	 (0.120)	 (0.128)	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
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3.7 Conclusions	
	
Men	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	out	earn	women	 in	all	occupational	groupings	despite	
women	 generally	 being	more	 educated.	 	 The	 largest	 disparity	 in	 the	male-female	
earnings	(average	gross	monthly	income)	is	among	sale	workers;	female	sale	workers	
earn	on	average	63	per	cent	of	what	their	male	counterpart	earns.		At	the	higher	end	
of	 the	 pay	 scale,	 professional	women	only	 earn	 81	 per	 cent	 of	men’s	 income	 and	
female	managers	 earn	 78	 per	 cent	 of	 what	 male	 managers	 earn.	 	 This	 is	 cursory	
evidence	that	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	labour	market	has	a	“sticky	floor”	instead	of	a	
“glass	 ceiling”	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 wage	 gap	 is	 higher	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution.	 	 Quantile	 regression	 analysis,	which	 is	 not	 performed	 in	 this	 chapter,	
would	confirm	if	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	working	women	face	“sticky	floors”	instead	
of	a	“glass	ceiling”.	
	
The	raw	wage	gap	in	2012	was	11.4	per	cent.		The	gender	wage	gap	narrowed	over	
the	past	twenty	years	given	that	the	gap	was	estimated	to	be	19.2	per	cent	in	1993	
(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).		It	is	still	unclear	what	were	the	main	drivers	contributing	
to	 the	 narrowing	 of	 the	 gap;	 one	 can	 speculate	 that	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 Equal	
Opportunity	Act	in	2000	may	be	one	such	factor,	but	the	law	in	its	current	form	does	
not	address	the	issue	of	equal	pay	for	work	of	equal	value.				
	
Based	on	the	Neumark	decomposition	technique,	women’s	earnings	would	actually	
decrease	(by	11.6	per	cent)	if	they	possessed	the	same	mean	characteristics	as	men,	
but	 if	 they	received	the	same	rates	of	return	as	men	for	these	characteristics	 their	
earnings	are	estimated	to	increase	by	26.1	per	cent.			
	
A	closer	look	at	the	pay	gaps	in	the	public	and	private	sectors	reveal	that	the	pay	gap	
in	the	public	sector	is	relatively	small,	only	3.2	per	cent	compared	to	a	pay	gap	of	23	
per	 cent	 in	 the	 private	 sector.	 	 If	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 rates	 of	 return	 to	
characteristics	were	equalised,	women’s	wages	in	the	private	sector	are	estimated	to	
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increase	 by	 almost	 27	 per	 cent.	 	 The	 largest	 contributor	 to	 the	 “unexplained”	
(differences	in	coefficients)	component	of	the	gender	pay	gap	is	the	difference	in	the	
intercepts	–	if	female	private	sector	employees	were	rewarded	to	the	same	extent	as	
male	private	sector	employees,	women’s	wages	would	increase	by	over	50	per	cent.	
This	means	that	men	employed	in	the	private	sector	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	appear	
to	 have	 a	 clear	 advantage	 over	 women	 when	 they	 enter	 the	 labour	 market	
regardless	 of	 their	 level	 of	 productivity.	 	 The	wider	 pay	 differential	 in	 the	 private	
sector	 compared	 to	 that	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 might	 be	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 labour	
regulations	and/or	enforcement	in	the	private	sector	compared	to	the	public	sector.				
	
	
	
	 	
119	
	
3.8 References	
	
Altonji,	 Joseph	and	Rebecca	Blank	 (1999).	Race	and	Gender	 in	 the	Labor	Market	 in		
O.	Ashenfelter	and	D.	Card	(ed.),	1999.	“Handbook	of	Labor	Economics”,	Edition	
1,	volume	3,	number	3.		Amsterdam:	Elsevier.	
	
Anderson,	Tracy,	J.	Forth,	H.	Metcalf	and	S.	Kirby	(2001).		The	Gender	Pay	Gap.	Final	
Report	to	DfEE,	July.	
	
Appleton,	 Simon,	 John	Hoddinott	 and	Pramila	 Krishnan	 (1999).	 	 The	Gender	Wage	
Gap	 in	 Three	 African	 Countries.	 Economic	 Development	 and	 Cultural	 Change,	
47(2):289-312,	(January).	
	
Appleton,	 Simon,	 Lina	 Song	 and	 Qingjie	 Xia	 (2012).	 	 Understanding	 Urban	 Wage	
Inequality	in	China	1988-2008:	Evidence	from	Quantile	Analysis.		IZA	Discussion	
Paper,	No.	7101,	Institute	for	the	Study	of	Labour	Economics	(IZA).	
	
Arrow,	 Kenneth	 (1973).	 “The	 Theory	 of	 Discrimination.”	 In	 Orley	 Ashenfelter	 and	
Albert	 Rees,	 eds.,	 Discrimination	 in	 Labor	 Markets.	 Princeton:	 Princeton	
University	Press	
	
Auguste,	 Sebastián,	 Ramiro	Moya	 and	 Sandra	 Sookram	 (2011).	 	 “Housing	 Finance	
Policy	 under	 Dutch	 Disease	 Pressure:	 The	 Mortgage	 Market	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago”.		Research	Department	Publications	4745,	Inter-American	Development	
Bank,	Research	Department.	
	
Beblo,	Miriam,	D.	Beninger,	A.	Heinze	and	F.	Laisney	(2003).	Methodological	 Issues	
Related	 to	 the	 Analysis	 of	 Gender	 Gaps	 in	 Employment,	 Earnings	 and	 Career	
Progression.		Final	Report	for	the	European	Commission	Employment	and	Social	
Affairs	DG,	October.	
	
Becker,	 Gary	 S.	 (1971).	 The	 Economics	 of	 Discrimination.	Chicago:	 University	 of	
Chicago	Press,.	
	
Bellony,	 Annelle,	 Hoyos,	 A.	 and	 Ñopo,	 H.	 (2010).	 	 Gender	 Earnings	 Gaps	 in	 the	
Caribbean:	 Evidence	 from	 Barbados	 and	 Jamaica.	 IDB	 Working	 Paper	 Series	
No.IDB-WP-210	(August).	
	
Bellony,	Annelle	and	Reilly,	Barry	(2009).	An	analysis	of	labour	market	earnings	in	St.	
Lucia.	Social	and	Economic	Studies,	58	(3	&	4).	pp.	111-147.	
	
Binder,	 Alan	 S.	 (1973).	 	 Wage	 Discrimination:	 Reduced	 Form	 and	 Structural	
Estimates.		Journal	of	Human	Resources,	8:436-455.			
	
Borjas,	George	J.	(2013).	Labor	Economics	(Sixth	Edition).	New	York:	McGraw-Hill.	
	
Card,	 David	 (1999).	 "The	 Causal	 Effect	 of	 Education	 on	 Earnings,"	 in	Handbook	 of	
Labor	 Economics,	 Volume	 3A,	 ed,	 by	 Orley	 Ashenfelter	 and	 David	 Card.	
Amsterdam	and	New	York:	North	Holland.	
120	
	
	
Chichilnisky,	G.	and	E.	H.	Frederisksen	(2008).	An	Equilibrium	Analysis	of	the	Gender	
Wage	Gap.	International	Labour	Review,	Vol.	147,	No.	2.	
	
Coppin,	Addington	(1997).	Women’s	Earnings	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago:	An	Analysis	by	
Household	Status	and	Ethnicity.	Social	and	Economic	Studies,	Vol.	46:4,	pp.	61-
82.	
	
Coppin,	A.	(2000).	Does	type	of	conjugal	union	matter	in	the	labor	market?	Evidence	
from	a	Caribbean	economy.	Review	of	Black	Political	Economy,	28(2),	7-27.	
Coppin,	A.	(2001,	June).	Would	Cohabitors	benefit	more	from	the	pay	structures	of	
their	 Single	 or	 Married	 counterparts?	 Evidence	 from	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	
Social	and	Economic	Studies,	50(2),	139-165.	
Coppin,	A.,	&	Olsen,	R.	N.	(1998).	Earnings	and	ethnicity	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	The	
Journal	of	Development	Studies,	34(3),	116-134.	
Coppin,	A.,	&	Olsen,	R.	N.	(2007).	Public	vs.	Private	sector	earnings	differentials	in	the	
Caribbean	 region:	Evidence	 from	 the	economy	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	The	
Journal	of	Developing	Areas,	40(2),	51-54,58-61,64-65,69-74.	
Costa,	Joana	and	Elydia	Silva	(2008).	The	Burden	of	Gender	Inequalities	for	Society	in	
Poverty	in	Focus.	International	Poverty	Centre,	No.	13,	January.	
	
Dolton,	Peter,	Donal	O’Neil	and	Olive	Sweetman	(1996).		“Gender	Differences	in	the	
Changing	 Labour	 Market.”	 	 The	 Journal	 of	 Human	 Resources,	 Vol.	 31(3),	
Summer.	
	
Downes,	Andrew	S.	(1998).		An	Economic	Analysis	of	Unemployment	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago.	Working	Paper	No.	389,	Washington	D.C.:	Inter-American	Development	
Bank.	
	
Fontana,	 Marzia	 and	 Cristina	 Paciello	 (2007).	 	 Labour	 regulations	 and	 anti-
discrimination	legislation:	how	do	they	influence	gender	equality	in	employment	
and	pay?	Institute	of	Development	Studies	at	Sussex,	April.	
	
Freeman,	R.B.	(1993).		“Labour	market	institutions	and	policies:	help	or	hindrance	to	
economic	development?”		Proceedings	of	the	World	Bank	Annual	Conference	on	
Development	Economics	1992,	Washington	D.C.:	The	World	Bank.	
	
____	 (1975).	 	 “Male-Female	 Wage	 Differentials	 and	 the	 Impact	 of	 Equal	 Pay	
Legislation”.		The	Review	of	Economics	and	Statistics,	Vol.	57	(4):	462-469.	
	
Fortin,	Nicole	(2006).	Greed,	Altruism,	and	the	Gender	Wage	Gap.		Available	at:	
http://www.econ.ubc.ca/nfortin/Fortinat8.pdf.	
	
Gelb,	A.	and	Associates	(1988).	Oil	Windfalls:	Blessing	or	Curse?		World	Bank:	Oxford	
University	Press.	
	
121	
	
Gunderson,	 Morley	 (1989).	 	 “Make-Female	 Wage	 Differentials	 and	 Policy	
Responses”.		Journal	of	Economic	Literature,	Vol.	27	(1):	46-72.	
	
Heckman,	 J.J.,	 Tobias,	 J.L.,	 Vytlacil,	 E.J.	 (2003).	 “Simple	 estimators	 for	 treatment	
parameters	in	a	latent	variable	framework”.	Review	of	Economics	and	Statistics,	
85	(3),	748–754.	August.	
	
Horton,	 S.	 (1996).	Women	 and	 Industrialization	 in	 Asia	 (edited).	 London	 and	 New	
York:	Routledge.	
	
Hosein,	 Roger	 (2007).	 “Booming	 Hydrocarbon	 Exports,	 De-agriculturalization	 and	
Food	 Security	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.”	 	 Farm	 &	 Business:	 The	 Journal	 of	 the	
Caribbean	Agro-Economic	Society	(CAES),	Vol.	7	(1):	51-79.	
	
Koenker,	Roger	and	Gilbert	Bassett	Jr.	(1978).	“Qunatile	Regressions.”	Econometrica,	
46(1):	33-50.	
	
Kunze,	 Astrid	 (2008).	 Gender	Wage	 Gap	 Studies:	 Consistency	 and	 Decomposition.		
Empirical	Economics,	35:63-76.	
	
Machado,	 J.A.F.	 and	 J.	 Mata	 (2005).	 Counterfactual	 Decomposition	 of	 Changes	 in	
Wage	Distributions	Using	Qunatile	Regression.	Journal	of	Applied	Econometrics,	
20(3):	445-465.	
	
Madheswaran	S.	and	Khasnobis,	B.G.		(2007).	Decomposition	of	Gender	Wage	Gap	in	
India:	An	Econometric	Analysis.		Presented	at	the	43rd	Annual	Conference	of	the	
Indian	Econometric	Society,	Mumbai,	January	5-7.	
	
Mahabir,	 Reshma,	 Vishana	 Jagessar,	 Crystal	 Neptune	 and	 Delvin	 Cox	 (2013).		
Understanding	 Wages	 in	 a	 Small	 Open	 Economy:	 The	 Case	 of	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago.	 	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	Working	 Papers,	WP	 11/2013,	
February.	
	
Manning,	A.	(2003).		Monopsony	in	motion:	imperfect	competition	in	labour	markets.		
Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	
	
Ministry	 of	 Community	 Development,	 Culture	 and	 Gender,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	
(2009).	Draft	National	Policy	on	Gender	and	Development,	June.		
	
Ministry	of	Planning	and	 the	Economy,	 Trinidad	and	Tobago	 (2011).	Medium-Term	
Policy	Framework	2012-2014,	Innovation	for	Lasting	Prosperity,	October.		
	
Ministry	of	Social	Development,	Poverty	Reduction	Programme,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
(2007).	Analysis	of	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	Survey	of	Living	Conditions	-	2005.	
	
Montenegro,	Claudio	E.	and	Harry	Patrinos	(2013).	Returns	to	Schooling	around	the	
World.	Background	Paper	for	the	World	Development	Report	2013.	
	
Neumark,	D.	(1988).	Employers’	Discrimatory	Behaviour	and	the	Estimation	of	Wage	
Discrimination.		Journal	of	Human	Resources,	23:	279-95.		
122	
	
	
Nordman	C.	and	Rouband	F.	(2005).	Reassessing	the	Gender	Wage	Gap:	Does	Labour	
Force	 attachment	 Really	 Matter?	 Evidence	 for	 Matched	 Labour	 force	 and	
Biographical	Survey	in	Madagascar.	ECINEQ	Working	Paper-16.	
	
Oaxaca,	R.	(1973).		Male-female	Differentials	in	Urban	Labour	Markets.	International	
Economic	Review,	14	(3):693-709.			
	
Olsen,	 R.N.	 and	 A.	 Coppin	 (2001).	 The	 Determinants	 of	 Gender	 Differentials	 in	
Income	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	Journal	of	Development	Studies,	37(5):	31-	56.	
	
Olsen,	 R.	 N.	 (2010,	 March).	 The	 impact	 of	 more	 complex	 family	 structure	 upon	
marital	 earnings	 premiums.	 International	 Review	 of	 Applied	 Economics,	 24,	
pp.	148-178.	
Olsen,	R.	N.,	&	Copin,	A.	 (2010).	Marital	 earnings	premiums	 in	 Trinidad	&	Tobago:	
Ethnicity	and	Socioeconomic	 status.	The	 Journal	of	Developing	Areas,	44(1),	
pp.	201-227.	
Psacharopoulas,	 G.	 and	 Z.	 Tzannatos	 (1992).	 Edited	 Case	 Studies	 on	 Women’s	
Employment	and	Pay	in	Latin	America,	World	Bank,	Washington	D.C.	
	
Psacharopoulos,	 George	 and	 Harry	 Patrinos	 (2004).	 	 Returns	 to	 Investment	 in	
Education:	A	Further	Update.		Education	Economics,	Vol.	12,	No.	2,	pp.	111-134,	
August.	
	
Rambarran,	Aniston	(1998).		Labor	Market	Adjustment	in	an	Oil-Based	Economy:	The	
Experience	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 in	 P.	 Dabir-Alai	 and	 M.	 Odekon	 (ed.)	
Economic	Liberalization	and	Labor	Markets,	(Westport,	Conn.:	Greenwood),	pp.	
217–37.	
	
Reddock,	 Rhoda	 and	 Yvonne	 Bobb-Smith	 (2008).	 “Reconciling	 work	 and	 family:	
Issues	 and	 policies	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.”	 ILO	 Conditions	 of	 Work	 and	
Employment	Series	No.	18.	
	
Reilly,	Barry	and	Bellony,	Annelle	(2009).	The	Determinants	of	Labor	Market	Earnings	
in	a	Small	Caribbean	Island:	The	Case	of	Dominica.	Journal	of	Developing	Areas,	
43	(1).	pp.	65-85.		
	
Reiman,	 Cornelis	 (2001).	 The	 Gender	 Wage	 Gap	 in	 Australia.	 National	 Centre	 for	
Social	and	Economic	Modelling,	University	of	Canberra.	Discussion	Paper	No.	54.	
	
Rodgers,	 Y.	 and	 Berik,	 G.	 (2006).	 “Asia’s	 race	 to	 capture	 post-MFA	 markets:	 a	
snapshot	 of	 labour	 standards	 compliance	 and	 impacts	 on	 competitiveness.”		
Asian	Development	Review.	
	
Roopnarine,	Karen,	and	Dindial	Ramrattan	(2012).	Female	labour	force	participation:	
the	 case	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 World	 Journal	 of	 Entrepreneurship,	
Management	and	Sustainable	Development	8,	no.	2/3:183-193.		
	
123	
	
Shapiro,	D.M.	and	M.	Stelcner	(1987).		The	Persistence	of	the	Male-Female	Earnings	
Gap	in	Canada,	1970-1980:	The	Impact	of	Equal	Pay	Laws	and	Language	Policies.		
Canadian	 Public	 Policy/	 Analyse	 de	 Politiques,	 Vol.	 13,	 No.	 4,	 pp.	 462-476,	
December.	
	
Sookram,	 S.	 &	 Strobl,	 E.	 (2009).	 The	 role	 of	 educational	 choice	 in	 occupational	
gender	 segregation:	 Evidence	 from	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 Economics	 of	
Education	Review,	Vol.	28,	pp.	1-10.				
	
Sookram,	Sandra	and	Watson,	Patrick	K.	(2008).	The	Informal	Sector	and	Gender	in	
the	Caribbean:	The	Case	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	 	 Journal	of	Eastern	Caribbean	
Studies,	33(4):	42-66.	
	
Strobl,	Eric	and	Frank	Walsh	(2003).		Minimum	Wages	and	Compliance:	The	Case	of	
Trinidad	and	Tobago.	 	Economic	Development	and	Cultural	 Change,	 51(2):427-
450.	
	
Tzannatos,	Z.	 (1999).	 	 “Women	and	 labour	market	changes	 in	 the	global	economy:	
growth	helps,	inequalities	hurt	and	public	policy	matters.”		World	Development,	
27	(3):	551-569.	
	
Tzannatos,	Z.	and	D.	Sapsford	(1993).	The	Economics	of	the	Labour	Market.	London:	
Macmillan	Press	Limited.	
	
United	Nations	Development	Programme	 (2003).Human	Development	Report.	New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
United	Nations	Development	Programme	(2008).	Annual	Report.	
	
Weichselbaumer,	 D.	 and	 Winter-Ebmer,	 R.	 (2005).	 A	 Meta-Analysis	 of	 the	
International	Gender	Wage	Gap.	Journal	of	Economic	Surveys,	19(3):	479–511.			
	
	 	
124	
	
Appendix	I:	National	Occupational	Classification	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
(2013)	
	The	 Major	 Groups	 of	 occupations	 as	 described	 in	 the	 National	 Occupational	Classification	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 (2013)	 produced	 by	 the	 Government	 of	Trinidad	and	Tobago38	are	more	fully	described	as	follows:	
	
Major	Group	1:	Managers	This	 Major	 Group	 includes	 occupations	 whose	main	 tasks	 consist	 of	 planning,	directing,	 coordinating	 and	 evaluating	 the	 overall	 activities	 of	 government,	enterprises	and	other	organizations,	or	of	organizational	units	within	them,	and	formulating	 and	 reviewing	 their	 policies,	 laws,	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 Formal	preparation	 for	 these	 occupations	may	 be	 supplemented	 or	 replaced	 partly	 or	wholly	by	on-the-job	training	and/or	experience.	
	
Major	Group	2:	Professionals	This	Major	Group	includes	occupations	whose	main	tasks	require	a	high	level	of	professional	knowledge	and	experience.	The	main	tasks	consist	of	increasing	the	existing	 stock	 of	 knowledge,	 applying	 scientific	 and	 artistic	 concepts	 and	theories,	teaching	about	the	foregoing	in	a	systematic	manner	or	engaging	in	any	combination	of	 these	activities.	Competent	performance	 in	most	occupations	 in	this	Major	 Group	 requires	 skills	 at	 the	 fourth	 ISCO39	 skill	 level	 that	 have	 been	acquired	 from	 tertiary-level	 education	 leading	 to	 a	university	 or	post-graduate	university	 degree.	 On-the-job	 training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	formal	preparation	or	replace	it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
	
																																								 																				
38	 Document	 was	 prepared	 by	 the	 Occupational	 Research	 Unit	 -	 Curriculum	 Planning	 and	
Development	Division,	Ministry	of	Education	Government	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
39	 ISCO	 refers	 to	 the	 International	 Labour	 Organisation’s	 International	 Standard	 Classification	 of	
Occupations.	 	 ISCO	 serves	 as	 a	 model	 for	 the	 development	 or	 revision	 of	 corresponding	 national	
classifications	and	facilitates	 international	communication	on	occupational	 information,	 in	particular	
the	production	and	presentation	of	reasonably	comparable	statistics	for	different	countries.	
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Major	Group	3:	Technicians	and	Associate	Professionals	This	 Major	 Group	 includes	 occupations	 involving	 the	 performance	 of	 mostly	technical	 and	 related	 tasks	 connected	 with	 research	 and	 the	 application	 of	scientific	or	artistic	concepts,	operational	methods,	and	government	or	business	regulations.	Most	occupations	in	this	Major	Group	require	skills	at	the	third	ISCO	skill	level	that	have	been	acquired	from	post-secondary	education	leading	to	an	award	 not	 equivalent	 to	 a	 first	 university	 degree.	 On-the-job	 training	 and/or	experience	may	supplement	formal	preparation	or	replace	it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
Major	Group	4:	Clerical	Support	Workers	This	Major	Group	includes	occupations	which	involve	the	recording,	organising,	storing,	 computing	 and	 retrieving	 of	 information	 and	 performing	 a	 number	 of	clerical	 duties	 in	 connection	 with	 money-handling	 operations,	 travel	arrangements,	requests	 for	 information	and	appointments.	Most	occupations	 in	this	 Major	 Group	 require	 skills	 at	 the	 second	 ISCO	 skill	 level	 that	 have	 been	acquired	 from	 secondary-level	 education	 lasting	 about	 five	 years.	 On-the-job	training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	 formal	 preparation	 or	 replace	 it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
Major	Group	5:	Service	and	Sales	Workers	This	 Major	 Group	 includes	 occupations	 involving	 personal	 and	 protective	services	 related	 to	 travel,	 housekeeping,	 catering,	 personal	 care,	 or	 protection	against	 fire	and	unlawful	acts,	or	demonstrating	and	selling	goods	 in	wholesale	or	 retail	 shops	 and	 similar	 establishments,	 as	well	 as	 at	 stalls	 and	 in	markets.	Most	occupations	in	this	Major	Group	require	skills	at	the	second	ISCO	skill	level	that	have	been	acquired	from	secondary-level	education	lasting	about	five	years.	On-the-job	 training	 and/or	 experience	may	 supplement	 formal	 preparation	 or	replace	it	partly	or	wholly.	
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Major	Group	6:	Skilled	Agricultural,	Forestry	and	Fishery	Workers	Workers	 in	 this	Major	 Group	 grow	 and	 harvest	 field	 or	 tree	 and	 shrub	 crops,	gather	wild	 fruits	and	plants,	breed,	 tend	or	hunt	animals,	produce	a	variety	of	animal	 husbandry	 products,	 cultivate,	 conserve	 and	 exploit	 forests,	 breed	 or	catch	fish	and	cultivate	or	gather	other	forms	of	aquatic	life	in	order	to	provide	food,	shelter	and	income	for	themselves	and	their	households.	Most	occupations	in	 this	Major	Group	require	 skills	 at	 the	 second	 ISCO	skill	 level	 that	have	been	acquired	 from	 secondary-level	 education	 lasting	 about	 five	 years.	 On-the-job	training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	 formal	 preparation	 or	 replace	 it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
Major	Group	7:	Craft	and	Related	Trades	Workers	Workers	in	this	Major	Group	apply	specific	knowledge	and	skills	to	construct	and	maintain	buildings,	form	metal,	erect	metal	structures	or	set	machine	tools.	They	make,	fit,	maintain	and	repair	machinery,	equipment	or	tools,	carry	out	printing	work,	 and	 produce	 or	 process	 foodstuffs,	 textiles,	 or	wooden,	metal	 and	 other	articles,	 including	 handicraft	 goods.	 The	 work	 is	 carried	 out	 by	 hand	 and	 by	hand-powered	 and	 other	 tools	 that	 are	 used	 to	 reduce	 the	 amount	 of	 physical	effort	and	time	required	for	specific	tasks,	as	well	as	to	improve	the	quality	of	the	products.	 The	 tasks	 call	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 production	process,	 the	materials	 and	 tools	 used	 and	 the	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 final	product.	Most	occupations	in	this	Major	Group	require	skills	at	the	second	ISCO	skill	level	that	have	been	acquired	from	secondary-level	education	lasting	about	five	 years.	 On-the-job	 training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	 formal	preparation	or	replace	it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
Major	Group	8:	Plant	and	Machine	Operators	and	Assemblers	Workers	 in	 this	 Major	 Group	 operate	 and	 monitor	 industrial	 and	 agricultural	machinery	and	equipment	on	 the	spot	or	by	remote	control,	drive	and	operate	trains,	 motor	 vehicles	 and	 mobile	 machinery	 and	 equipment,	 or	 assemble	products	 from	 component	 parts	 according	 to	 strict	 specifications	 and	procedures.	The	work	mainly	calls	for	experience	with	and	an	understanding	of	
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industrial	and	agricultural	machinery	and	equipment	as	well	as	an	ability	to	cope	with	machine-paced	operations	and	to	adapt	to	technological	 innovations.	Most	occupations	in	this	Major	Group	require	skills	at	the	second	ISCO	skill	level	that	have	been	acquired	from	secondary-level	education	lasting	about	five	years.	On-the-job	 training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	 formal	 preparation	 or	replace	it	partly	or	wholly.	
	
Major	Group	9:	Elementary	Occupations	This	Major	Group	covers	occupations	that	involve	the	performance	of	simple	and	routine	 tasks	 that	 may	 require	 the	 use	 of	 hand-held	 tools	 and	 considerable	physical	 effort.	Most	 occupations	 in	 this	Major	Group	 require	 skills	 at	 the	 first	ISCO	 skill	 level	 that	 have	 been	 acquired	 from	 primary	 education.	 On-the-job	training	 and/or	 experience	 may	 supplement	 formal	 preparation	 or	 replace	 it	partly	or	wholly.	
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Appendix	II:	Measuring	the	Mean	Gender	Wage	Gap	using	Pooled	
OLS	Regressions	
	
Table	AII.1	Pooled	OLS	Earnings	Functions	
		 Human	Capital	Model	 Full	Model	
			Potential	Experience	 0.0139***	 0.0102***	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.000	 0.000	
		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.220***	 0.117***	
		 (0.031)	 (0.029)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.564***	 0.307***	
		 (0.033)	 (0.033)	
			Tertiary	 1.219***	 0.644***	
		 (0.038)	 (0.046)	
Marital	Status	 		 		
			Married	 0.0850***	 0.0748***	
		 (0.022)	 (0.019)	
Ethnicity	 		 		
			Indian	 -0.011	 -0.003	
		 (0.030)	 (0.027)	
			African	 0.003	 0.010	
		 (0.030)	 (0.027)	
Female	(1=female;0=male)	 -0.267***	 -0.232***	
		 (0.021)	 (0.023)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		
			Public	Sector	 		 -0.266***	
		 		 (0.026)	
Occupation	 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 		 0.266***	
		 		 (0.041)	
			Craft	Worker	 		 0.255***	
		 		 (0.031)	
			Sales	Worker	 		 0.175***	
		 		 (0.031)	
			Clerical	 		 0.259***	
		 		 (0.034)	
			Technician	 		 0.479***	
		 		 (0.035)	
			Professional	 		 0.672***	
		 		 (0.057)	
			Manager	 		 0.668***	
		 		 (0.060)	
Industry	 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 		 -0.148*			
		 		 (0.086)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 		 0.386***	
		 		 (0.062)	
			Manufacturing	 		 0.112***	
		 		 (0.039)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 0.226***	
		 		 (0.070)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 		 -0.035	
		 		 (0.035)	
			Transport/Communication	 		 0.111**		
		 		 (0.047)	
			Finance/Insurance	 		 0.195***	
		 		 (0.044)	
			Construction	 		 -0.040	
		 		 (0.031)	
Constant	 2.627***	 2.767***	
		 (0.048)	 (0.054)	
Number	of	Observations	 2006	 2004	
R-squared	 0.401	 0.533	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.	
Dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	hourly	wages.	Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	Status	–	
unmarried;	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other;	Occupation	-	Elementary	Occupations;	Industry	-	Social/Personal	Services.		
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Table	AII.2:	Wald	Tests	of	Interaction	Terms	from	Pooled	OLS	Regressions	
	
Wald	Test	–	Human	Capital	Model	
		 df	 F	 P>F	
		 		 		 		
female#education	 3	 1.48	 0.2194	
		 		 		 		
female#status	 1	 13.51	 0.0002	
		 		 		 		
female#ethnicity	 2	 0.60	 0.5474	
		 		 		 		
Overall	 6	 3.25	 0.0035	
		 		 		 		
Denominator	 1990	 		 		
Wald	Test	-	Full	Model	
		 df	 F	 P>F	
		 		 		 		
female#education	 3	 1.72	 0.1604	
		 		 		 		
female#status	 1	 7.19	 0.0074	
		 		 		 		
female#ethnicity	 2	 0.12	 0.8861	
		 		 		 		
female#sector	 1	 4.49	 0.0342	
		 		 		 		
female#occupation	 7	 4.15	 0.0002	
		 		 		 		
female#industry	 8	 2.32	 0.0176	
	 	 	 	
	Overall	 22	 3.23	 	0.0000	
	 	 	 	
Denominator	 1956	 		 		
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Chapter	4 Glass	 Ceilings	 or	 Sticky	 Floors?	 Beyond	 the	 Mean	
Gender	Wage	Gap	-	Decomposition	of	Gender	Wage	Differentials	
in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	using	Quantile	Regressions	
	
4.1 Introduction	
	
Following	many	years	of	research	analysing	the	magnitude	(and	source)	of	the	mean	
gender	 wage	 gap	 (OLS	 analysis),	 researchers	 have	 recently	 begun	 to	 consider	 the	
way	 in	which	 relative	wages	differ	 for	high-	 and	 low-wage	workers	 (using	quantile	
regressions).	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this	 shift	 in	 analysis.	 Firstly,	 the	
magnitude	of	the	gender	wage	gap	is	generally	not	constant	across	the	entire	wage	
distribution	and	the	gap	in	mean	wages	obscures	a	great	deal	of	the	variation	in	the	
data.	 Secondly,	 a	 better	 understanding	of	 the	 role	of	 gender	 in	 the	 labour	market	
emerges	 when	 there	 is	 an	 expanded	 focus	 on	 outcomes	 apart	 from	 simply	 the	
“average”	man	and	woman,	in	particular,	the	presence	of	“glass	ceilings”	where	the	
gender	wage	gap	tends	to	be	larger	amongst	workers	earning	relatively	high	wages,	
and	 the	 existence	 of	 “sticky	 floors”	 which	 occurs	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution	(see	Booth	et	al,	2003;	Arulampalam	et	al,	2007;	and	Kee,	2006).	Finally,	
the	 extent	 to	 which	 disparity	 in	 men’s	 and	 women’s	 productivity-related	
characteristics	 accounts	 for	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 also	 appears	 to	 differ	 between	
high-and	 low-wage	workers.	 This	 implies	 that	 theoretical	models	 of	 labour	market	
discrimination—and	 the	 public	 policies	 adopted	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 phenomenon—
need	 to	 be	 flexible	 enough	 to	 account	 for	 the	 full	 range	 of	 women’s	 experiences	
both	at	the	top	and	at	the	bottom	of	the	wage	distribution.	
	
Additionally,	 there	 are	 several	 attractive	 features	 of	 quantile	 regression	 (QR).			
Firstly,	unlike	OLS	regression	that	tends	to	be	sensitive	when	outliers	are	present	in	
the	data	and	estimates	may	be	inefficient	when	the	dependent	variable	has	a	non-
normal	distribution,	QR	estimates	are	more	 robust.	 	 Second,	QR	allows	 for	a	 fuller	
characterisation	of	the	data,	that	is	to	say,	QR	facilitates	the	analysis	of	the	impact	of	
covariates	on	the	full	distribution	or	any	particular	percentile	of	the	distribution,	and	
not	 just	 the	 conditional	 mean	 (like	 in	 OLS	 regression).	 	 Third,	 unlike	 in	 OLS	
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regression,	QR	estimates	do	not	 require	 the	existence	of	 the	 conditional	mean	 for	
consistency.	
	
The	 main	 contribution	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 explore	 beyond	 the	 mean	 analysis	 of	
gender	wage	gaps	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 (which	has	been	done	by	 researchers	 in	
the	past	–	Coppin	 (1997),	Coppin	and	Olsen	 (1998),	and	Olsen	and	Coppin	 (2001)).		
This	chapter	makes	original	contributions	to	the	existing	literature	on	discrimination	
in	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	market	in	the	context	of	any	existing	“glass	ceiling”	
and/or	“sticky	floor”	–	there	have	been	no	papers	employing	quantile	decomposition	
techniques	 using	 data	 based	 on	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago.	 	 In	 using	 the	 conditional	
quantile	decomposition	technique	developed	by	Melly	 (2006)	 this	paper	also	seeks	
to	answer	the	following	counterfactual	question:	“How	much	would	female	workers	
in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	earn	if	they	were	paid	based	on	the	wage	structure	of	male	
workers?”	
	
This	paper	also	adds	 to	 the	existing	 literature	by	analysing	 the	gender	pay	gap	via	
quantile	 decomposition	 for	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors.	 	 The	 results	 of	 the	
previous	 chapter	 showed	 that	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 is	much	 larger	 in	 the	 private	
sector	than	in	the	public	sector,	and	this	chapter	also	decomposes	the	wage	gap	via	
quantiles	between	the	two	sectors	of	employment.	
	
Exploration	 into	 public	 sector	 pay	 is	 important	 since	 the	 size	 of	 the	 public	 sector	
wage	 bill	 has	 implications	 for	 both	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 (Melly,	 2005).	 	 In	
Trinidad	and	Tobago,	wages	and	salaries	averaged	14	per	cent	of	total	government	
expenditure	during	the	fiscal	years	2007	to	2012	(Review	of	the	Economy,	2012).		In	
terms	of	employment,	 the	government	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 is	 the	single	 largest	
employer	 in	 the	country.	 	 In	 the	 sample	used	 for	 this	analysis,	36.7	per	 cent	of	all	
employees	were	employed	in	the	public	sector.		In	1993	the	government’s	share	of	
total	 employment	was	 about	 33	 per	 cent	 (Coppin	 and	Olsen,	 2007).	 	 Additionally,	
wage	 settlements	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 could	 have	 rippled	 effects	 on	 wage	
settlements	 in	 the	private	sector	as	well	 (Melly,	2005).	Higher	wage	settlements	 in	
132	
	
the	public	sector	could	induce	private	sector	employers	to	pay	higher	wages	and	this	
may	have	a	negative	effect	on	competitiveness	 in	 the	 international	 arena	and	 fuel	
domestic	 inflation	 (Melly,	 2005).	 	 In	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 following	 the	hike	 in	 oil	
prices	 in	 the	 1970s,	 the	 government	 was	 able	 to	 nationalise	 several	 industries	
(water,	 transportation,	 and	 telecommunications)	 and	 offered	 improved	 salary	
packages.		High	wages	in	the	government	sector	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	spilled	over	
into	other	sectors	as	well	(Hilaire,	1992),	for	instance,	other	sectors	started	to	follow	
the	government’s	initiative	and	included	cost-of-living	allowances	(COLAs)	to	wages.			
	
The	data	 for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 show	 that	wages	 in	 the	public	 sector	are	higher	
than	 those	 in	 the	private	 sector.	 	 Several	 reasons	may	account	 for	 this	disparity	 in	
wages	 between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors.	 	 The	 public	 sector	 operates	 under	
political	 constraints	 rather	 than	 profit	 constraints.	 	 Becker	 (1957)	 states	 that	 in	 a	
perfectly	 competitive	 market,	 employers	 who	 pursue	 goals	 other	 than	
competitiveness	 (for	 example,	 discriminating	 employers),	 will,	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 be	
driven	 out	 of	 the	 market.	 	 Governments,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 may	 be	 driven	 by	
political	pressures	to	be	exemplary	employers	and	not	pay	very	low	wages	to	its	less	
skilled	 workforce	 (Melly,	 2005).	 	 One	 explanation	 put	 forward	 to	 explain	 the	
existence	of	the	public	sector	wage	premium	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	may	be	that	the	
government	uses	public	 sector	employment	and	wages	 to	achieve	particular	policy	
goals,	 such	 as	 decreasing	 unemployment	 and	 decreasing	 gender	 and	 ethnic	
discrimination	(Coppin	and	Olsen,	2007).	
	
Generally,	 the	presence	of	 gender	wage	gaps	and	 its	heterogeneity	over	 the	wage	
distribution	 is,	 in	part,	a	 reflection	of	gender	differences	 in	work	 force	attachment	
and	as	such,	also	reflects	gender	differences	 in	the	propensity	to	participate	 in	the	
labour	market	 (Picchio	and	Mussida,	2010).	 	 In	many	countries	 there	exist	 sizeable	
gender	 wage	 gaps	 in	 employment	 rates,	 which	 make	 sample	 selection	 into	 the	
workforce	 an	 important	 issue	 when	 assessing	 gender	 wage	 gaps	 (Picchio	 and	
Mussida,	 2010).	 	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 is	 no	 different	 as	 female	 labour	 force	
participation	 rates	 are	 markedly	 lower	 than	 male	 participation	 rates.	 	 In	 the	 two	
decades	 spanning	 1990	 to	 2010,	male	 participation	 rates	 averaged	 around	 75	 per	
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cent,	 while	 female	 participation	 rates	 averaged	 47	 per	 cent.	 	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 the	
results	of	this	research	may	have	underestimated	the	true	size	of	the	gender	wage	
gap.			
	
Several	reasons	have	been	put	forward	to	explain	the	existence	of	gender	wage	gaps	
and	why	they	widen	at	the	bottom	and/or	top	of	the	wage	distribution,	even	after	
controlling	for	observed	characteristics	across	both	genders.		Booth	and	Francesconi	
(2003)	have	argued	 that	women	may	be	perceived	as	having	 a	 smaller	work	 force	
attachment,	especially	at	 the	bottom	of	 the	wage	distribution,	and	 this	may	affect	
how	 trade	 unions	 chose	 to	 represent	 them.	 	 Trade	 unions	 may	 be	 less	 likely	 to	
represent	 or	 may	 differentially	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 female	 workers	 (Booth,	
2009).	 	Additionally,	women	at	the	bottom	of	the	wage	distribution	are	more	likely	
to	 have	 less	 bargaining	 power	 or	 be	 more	 subject	 to	 firms’	 market	 power	 than	
comparable	men;	in	this	context,	social	norms	and	family	commitments	usually	lead	
to	 men’s	 careers	 taking	 precedence	 (Arulampalam	 et	 al,	 2007).	 	 Empirically,	 the	
sticky	floor	phenomenon	was	found	in	Cyprus	and	Luxembourgh,	and	was	attributed	
to	 the	 high	 segregation	 of	 women	 in	 low-paying	 industries	 and	 occupations	
(Christofides	and	Vrachims,	2010).	
	
In	terms	of	glass	ceilings,	Bjerk	(2008)	asserts	that	gender	inequality	 in	opportunity	
with	respect	to	hiring	and	promotion	to	top	paying	 jobs	may	be	the	reason	behind	
the	existence	of	glass	ceilings.		If	women	have	a	more	intermittent	career,	they	will	
have	fewer	opportunities	to	signal	to	employers	their	skills,	and	may	need	more	time	
to	 accumulate	 these	 positive	 signals	 to	 be	 considered	 for	 promotions.	 	 Others	
support	 institutional	 arrangements	 as	 a	 probable	 reason	 for	 the	 existence	of	 glass	
ceilings.	 	Albrecht	et	al	 (2003),	 in	 the	context	of	Sweden,	 states	 that	 the	country’s	
glass	ceiling	phenomenon	is	 likely	 linked	to	parental	 leave	and	the	day-care	system	
which	 incentivise	women	to	be	 in	 the	workforce	but	may	discourage	strong	career	
commitment.		Sociological	and	psychological	factors	may	also	play	a	role	in	favouring	
men	over	women,	particularly	at	the	top	of	the	wage	distribution.		Women	may	be	
less	 willing	 than	 men	 to	 negotiate	 over	 offered	 pay	 packages,	 and	 due	 to	
stereotypes,	women	may	not	be	seen	as	potential	leaders	–	and	when	they	become	
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leaders,	they	might	be	evaluated	less	favourably.		Also,	women	tend	to	be	more	risk	
averse	 and	 sometimes	 give	 priority	 to	 other	 perks	 of	 the	 job	 rather	 than	 wages	
(Picchio	and	Mussida,	2010	and	Booth,	2009).	
	
The	main	 result	 of	 the	 paper	 concludes	 that	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 labour	market	
does	not	have	a	glass	ceiling,	but	rather	female	workers	face	sticky	floors.		However,	
it	is	likely	that	the	glass	ceiling	is	“hidden”	given	that	at	the	higher	end	of	the	wage	
distribution,	women	have	a	greater	number	of	years	of	education	than	men.	
	
The	rest	of	the	chapter	is	as	follows:	section	4.2	outlines	the	conceptual	framework	
and	section	4.3	explains	the	methodology	used	for	the	regression	and	decomposition	
analyses;	 section	 4.4	 presents	 the	 data	 and	 econometric	 specification;	 section	 4.5	
discusses	the	estimation	results;	and	section	4.6	concludes	the	chapter.	
	
4.2 Estimation	Approach	–	Quantile	Regression	
	
More	 recent	 publications	 have	 gone	 beyond	 the	 BO	 decomposition	 approach	 and	
applied	quantile	regression	(QR)	techniques	as	well	(see	for	example,	Arjulampalam	
et	al,	2007,	Albercht	et	al,	2001,	and	de	 la	Rica	and	Dolado,	2008).	 	QR	techniques	
also	decompose	the	difference	between	the	male	and	female	wage	distributions	into	
“explained”	 and	 “unexplained”	 components.	 	 However,	 instead	 of	 identifying	
differences	at	the	mean,	QR	explains	these	differences	quantile	by	quantile,	that	is,	
over	the	entire	wage	distribution.		The	conventional	BO	and	Neumark	decomposition	
techniques	are	based	on	mean	regression	analysis,	but	these	approaches	are	limited	
since	inequality	depends	on	the	entire	distribution	of	wages,	and	not	merely	at	the	
mean	of	the	wage	distribution;	furthermore	the	parameters	of	the	regression	model	
may	vary	across	the	distribution	(Appleton	et	al,	2014).				
	
The	aim	of	this	part	of	the	research	is	to	analyse	pay	differentials	across	the	entire	
distribution	of	wages.		 	The	quantile	regression	methodology	(Koenker	and	Bassett,	
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1978)	allows	the	characteristics	of	 individuals	to	have	different	impacts	at	different	
points	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution,	 which	 consequently	 affects	 the	 implied	
decompositions	 at	 each	 point.	 This	 approach	 allows	 for	 the	 examination	 of	 the	
effects	of	either	 the	“glass	ceiling”	or	“sticky	 floor”	phenomena.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	
former,	 a	 larger	unexplained	gender	wage	gap	 is	 observed	at	 the	 top	of	 the	wage	
distribution,	suggesting	that,	as	women	advance	to	top	positions,	their	pay	may	not	
increase	pari	pasu.	In	the	latter	case,	a	larger	unexplained	earnings	gap	at	the	lower	
end	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution	 may	 suggest	 that	 females	 enter	 occupations	 and	
industries	 with	 low	 pay	 and	 few	 advancement	 opportunities	 (Christofides	 et	 al,	
2010).	At	the	time	of	writing,	there	is	sparse	research	on	either	the	“sticky	floor”	or	
the	“glass	ceiling”	phenomena	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago.			
	
The	 Oaxaca	 decomposition	 regressions	 are	 performed	 under	 the	 assumption	 that	
men	and	women	have	the	same	returns	to	characteristics.	 	This	assumption	will	be	
relaxed	to	run	separate	quantile	regressions	 for	men	and	women	to	see	 if	 the	two	
groups	have	differing	returns	to	the	same	labour	market	characteristics.			
	
The	QR	method	 estimates	 the	θth	 quantile	 variable,	 in	 this	 case	 logarithmic	wage,	
conditional	on	a	number	of	variables,	under	the	assumption	that𝑞!,	the	conditional	
quantile	of	𝑌,	is	linear	in𝑿	(that	is,	𝑞! =  𝑿𝛽(𝜃).		The	model	can	be	written	as:	
	 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! =  𝑿!𝛽!  +  µ 𝜃!𝜃 ∈ (0,1)	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(1)	
and	
	 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡! 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! 𝑿! =  𝑿!𝛽!	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(2)	
	
Xi	 represents	 the	 vector	 of	 exogenous	 variables	 for	 each	 individual	 i	 and	 𝛽!,	
represents	 the	 coefficient	 vector	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 estimated.		𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡!  (𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!│𝑿!  )	represents	the	conditional	quantile	of	ln	wage	given	𝑿.	
	
The	coefficient	vector	is	found	through	the	following	equation:	
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𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝛽(𝜃) 𝜃 𝑦! − 𝑥!𝛽(𝜃)!:!!!!!!(!)  + (1− 𝜃) 𝑦! − 𝑥!𝛽(𝜃)!:!!!!!!(!) 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(3)	
	
The	coefficient	vector,	𝛽!,	can	be	interpreted	as	the	estimated	returns	to	individual	
characteristics	 at	 the	θth	 quantile	 of	 the	wage	 distribution.	 	 The	 advantage	 of	 this	
technique	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 characteristics	 have	 different	
returns	at	different	parts	along	the	wage	distribution,	which	is	not	possible	using	the	
Ordinary	 Least	 Squares	 (OLS)	 analysis	 as	 employed	 by	 the	 Oaxaca	 decomposition	
methodology.	
	
To	 make	 the	 results	 of	 the	 QR	 analysis	 comparable	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 BO	 and	
Neumark	 decompositions	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 same	 explanatory	 variables	
will	 be	 used	 –	 potential	 experience,	 potential	 experience	 squared,	 dummies	 for	
highest	level	of	education	achieved,	marital	status,	ethnicity,	and	additional	controls	
for	 occupation	 and	 industry.	 	 The	 focus	of	 the	quantile	 regression	decompositions	
would	be	based	on	 five	quantiles	 -10%	25%,	50%,	75%,	and	90%.	 	 Following	other	
researchers	 (e.g.	 Christofides	et	 al,	 2012),	we	 can	define	 a	 sticky	 floor	 and	 a	glass	
ceiling	 as	 existing	 if	 the	 10th	 percentile	 and	 the	90th	 percentile	 respectively	 exceed	
other	reference	points	of	the	wage	distribution	by	at	least	two	percentage	points.			
	
Appleton	 et	 al	 (2014)	 has	 noted	 however	 that	 some	 prudence	 needs	 to	 be	 taken	
when	 interpreting	 the	 results	 of	 quantile	 regressions	 since	 they	 pertain	 to	
conditional	 quantiles,	 not	 unconditional	 ones.	 	 According	 to	 Appleton	 et	 al,	 since	
unobserved	 determinants	 of	 wages	 are	 unobserved,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 to	 the	
econometrician	 what	 these	 are.	 	 These	 unobserved	 determinants	 could	 possibly	
include	measurement	error	or	random	factors	like	a	worker’s	 luck	in	landing	a	high	
paying	job.		Furthermore,	the	authors	note	that	unobserved	characteristics	of	a	job	
may	also	be	noteworthy	–	for	example,	the	researcher	may	not	observe	firm	size	or	
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profitability,	but	rent-sharing	theories	(or	gift	exchange	theory,	Akerlof,	1982)	imply	
these	may	have	a	significant	effect	on	earnings.40	
	
4.3 Decomposition	Techniques		
4.3.1 Conditional	Quantile	Decomposition	
	
Machado	and	Mata	(2005)	and	Melly	(2006)	
The	simplest	method	to	estimate	the	difference	in	wages	between	genders	is	to	use	
a	Mincer	equation	for	wages	with	the	inclusion	of	a	gender	dummy.		However,	this	
approach	 has	 several	 shortcomings,	 such	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 unobservable	 factors	
(variables)	 that	may	be	 correlated	with	 the	 error	 term,	 sample	 selection	 bias,	 and	
the	 possibility	 that	 men	 and	 women	may	 receive	 different	 rewards	 for	 the	 same	
characteristics	(van	der	Velde	et	al,	2013).			These	shortcomings	can	be	addressed	by	
interacting	the	gender	dummy	with	some	of	the	other	variables.		In	practice,	this	is	
equivalent	 to	 estimating	 two	 separate	 wage	 equations	 for	 men	 and	 women,	 and	
then	decomposing	the	absolute	differences	in	wages	into	a	component	attributable	
to	 differences	 in	 characteristics	 and	 a	 component	 that	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	
differences	 in	 characteristics.	 	 The	most	widely	used	decomposition	 technique	has	
been	the	Blinder-Oaxaca	technique.		The	“unexplained”	component	is	often	seen	as	
evidence	 of	 discrimination,	 but	 also	 captures	 the	 effects	 of	 unobserved	
characteristics	(see	section	3.3.2	for	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	technique).				
	
However,	 Kuhn	 (1987)	was	 the	 first	 to	put	 forward	 some	of	 the	 limitations	of	 this	
traditional	approach	of	analysing	gender	wage	gaps	and	discrimination.		Conditional	
mean	models	do	not	allow	for	analyses	based	on	non-central	locations	which	can	be	
useful	for	social	research	in	studies	like	economic	inequality	and	mobility.		Secondly,	
conditional	mean	methods	may	fail	to	capture	trends	in	the	distribution	and	may	be	
an	 inappropriate	 measure	 of	 central	 tendency	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 outliers.	 	 The	
quantile	 approach	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 test	 whether	 determinants	 of	 wages	
																																								 																				
40	 Rent-sharing	 theory	 suggests	 that	 higher	 wages	 may	 induce	 loyalty	 from	 workers	 who	 in	 turn	
increase	 their	 productivity.	 	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 loyalty	 exists	 or	 even	 increases	 may	 be	
influenced	by	the	extent	to	which	the	firm	shares	its	profits	with	workers.		
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have	 different	 effects	 higher	 up	 the	 conditional	 wage	 distribution	 compared	 to	
workers	 at	 the	 lower	 end.	 	 Quantile	 regression	 analysis	 that	 was	 introduced	 by	
Koenker	and	Bassett	(1978)	can	be	more	useful	and	informative	even	in	the	presence	
of	 highly	 skewed	 data,	 and	 has	 better	 properties	 in	 the	 presence	 of	
heteroscedasticity	(Deaton,	1992).		
	
As	was	previously	mentioned,	Appleton	et	al	(2014)	has	cautioned	that	interpreting	
the	results	of	quantile	regressions	should	be	done	with	some	amount	of	care	given	
that	 they	 relate	 to	conditional	quantiles.	 	 In	other	words,	a	worker	at	a	high	wage	
quantile	 is	a	worker	with	high	wages	given	the	values	of	observed	determinants	of	
wages,	rather	than	simply	a	high	wage	worker	per	se.		Additionally,	workers	at	high	
wage	 quantiles	 tend	 to	 also	 have	 favourable	 unobserved	 determinants	 of	 wages.		
Given	that	unobserved	determinants	of	wages	are	unobserved,	it	is	not	clear	to	the	
researcher	what	they	are	–	these	unobservables	could	 include	measurement	error,	
random	 factors	 (for	 example,	 luck	 in	 landing	 a	 high	 paying	 job),	 and	 unobserved	
personal	 characteristics	 that	 affect	 earnings	 (in	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 this	 is	
usually	labelled	“ability”	but	may	also	include	determination,	ambition,	and	personal	
appearance).	 	There	may	also	be	unobserved	characteristics	of	 the	 job	as	well	–	 in	
the	case	that	firm	size	and	profitability	are	unobserved,	rent	sharing	theories	suggest	
that	these	may	have	a	significant	impact	on	earnings.	
	
Machado	and	Mata	(2004)	proposed	a	quantile-based	decomposition	technique	that	
combines	quantile	regression	with	bootstrapping.41		First,	in	the	quantile	regression	
model	the	conditional	quantiles	of	 ln	wage	are	given	by	equation	(2)	and	these	can	
be	estimated	by	quantile	 regression.	 	 Second,	underlying	 the	MM	technique	 is	 the	
probability	 integral	 transformation	 theorem	 from	 statistics:	 If	 U	 is	 uniformly	
distributed	on	[0,1],	then	F-1(U)	has	distribution	F.		Then,	for	a	given	Xi	and	a	random	
θ~U[0,1],	 Xiβθ	 has	 the	 same	 distribution	 as	 ln	 wagei|Xi.	 	 In	 the	 MM	 technique,	
																																								 																				
41	In	statistics,	bootstrapping	falls	into	the	broader	class	of	resampling	methods;	bootstrapping	refers	
to	 any	 test	 or	metric	 that	 relies	 on	 random	 sampling	with	 replacement.	 	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	
where	 a	 set	 of	 observations	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 from	 an	 independent	 and	 identically	 distributed	
population,	 the	 proprieties	 of	 an	 estimator	 (for	 example,	 its	 variance)	 can	 be	 estimated	 by	
constructing	a	number	of	resamples	with	replacement	of	the	observed	data	set.			
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instead	of	keeping	Xi	 fixed,	a	 random	X	 is	drawn	 from	the	population,	and	Xβθ	will	
have	the	same	distribution	as	ln	wage	(the	dependent	variable).	
	
Firstly,	 quantile	 regressions	 are	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 effects	 of	 covariates	 on	 the	
location	 and	 shape	 of	 the	 conditional	 wage	 distribution.	 	 Quantile	 regressions	
(equation	 2)	 are	 run	 separately	 for	 men	 and	 women	 to	 predict	 wages	 at	 various	
points	of	 the	wage	distributions	by	gender.	 	 The	MM	methodology	 focuses	on	 the	
impact	 of	 differences	 in	 the	 returns	 to	 characteristics	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap.		
Hence,	the	authors	estimate	a	counterfactual	female	wage	distribution	that	women	
would	 have	 if	 their	 labour	 market	 characteristics	 were	 rewarded	 equivalently	 as	
men.		Bootstrapping	is	used	to	estimate	the	counterfactual	female	wage	distribution	
instead	of	using	the	average	characteristics	of	the	female	sample.	
	
Formally,	the	MM	(2005)	approach	can	be	described	as	follows:	
Step	1:	generate	a	random	sample,	u,	of	size	n	from	an	uniform	distribution	U[0,1]:	θ1,	…,	θn.		
Step	 2:	 for	 each	 θ	 of	 u,	 the	 QR	 coefficients	 βF(θ)	 and	 βM(θ)	 in	 equation	 (2)	 are	
estimated	using	the	female	and	male	data	set,	respectively.	
Step	3:	draw	a	random	female	sample	with	replacement	and	use	their	characteristics	
to	predict	wages	using	the	estimated	coefficients	obtained	in	step	2.		This	prediction	
enables	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 marginal	 distribution	 of	 female	 wages	 and	 the	
marginal	distribution	of	male	wages	that	would	prevail	if	men’s	characteristics	were	
distributed	the	same	as	women’s.	
Step	 4:	 calculate	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 at	 each	 quantile	 using	 the	 new	 estimated	
female	wage	distribution	and	the	estimated	counterfactual	male	wage	distribution.		
	
One	major	disadvantage	of	 the	MM	decomposition	approach	 is	 that	 the	 individual	
contribution	 of	 each	 covariate	 (individual	 and	 firm-level	 characteristics)	 on	 the	
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gender	 wage	 gap	 cannot	 be	 disaggregated,	 which	 makes	 it	 less	 useful	 for	 policy	
recommendations.	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 method	 proposed	 by	 Melly	 (2006)	 was	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	
parameters	 of	 the	 Machado	 and	 Mata	 (MM)	 decomposition.42	 The	 Melly	 (2006)	
estimator	based	on	the	conditional	quantile	regression	methodology	 is	very	similar	
to	 the	MM	 decomposition	 technique.	 	 The	MM	 technique	 is	 based	 on	 simulation	
methods	 and	 can	 be	 very	 computationally	 tedious;	 however,	 Melly	 (2006)	 shows	
that	 if	 the	 number	 of	 simulations	 used	 in	 the	MM	procedure	 goes	 to	 infinity,	 the	
Melly	(2006)	decomposition	technique	is	numerically	similar	to	the	MM	procedure.		
One	should	note	that	the	Melly	 (2006)	decomposition	method	assumes	exogeneity	
for	 all	 covariates	 –	 as	 such,	 the	 use	 of	 instrumental	 variables	 or	 sample	 selection	
procedures	could	be	used	 to	address	 this	 issue.	 	Similar	 to	 the	MM	technique,	 the	
Melly	 (2006)	 decomposition	 technique	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 computing	 detailed	
decompositions.			
	
In	brief,	in	step	1,	instead	of	drawing	a	random	sample	from	a	uniform	distribution,	
Melly	estimates	conditional	(linear)	regressions	for	a	large	number	of	quantiles	and	
then	integrates	the	conditional	wage	distribution	over	the	covariates	to	estimate	the	
unconditional	 distribution.	 This	 allows	 for	 a	 more	 precise	 estimation	 of	 the	
unconditional	 distribution	 of	 wages	 using	 the	 information	 contained	 in	 the	
covariates.	 	 Also,	 the	 procedure	 allows	 for	 the	 estimation	 of	 counterfactual	
unconditional	 distributions	 –	 that	 is,	 by	 using	 the	 characteristics	 distribution	 of	
female	workers	and	the	coefficients	estimated	using	the	data	for	male	workers,	the	
counterfactual	distribution	of	wages	 can	be	estimated,	which	 is	 the	distribution	of	
wages	female	workers	would	receive	 if	they	had	the	same	output	function	as	male	
workers.		This	counterfactual	distribution	is	then	used	to	decompose	the	differences	
in	distribution.		For	each	quantile	considered,	the	wage	gap	can	be	decomposed	into	
a	part	explained	by	differences	in	characteristics	and	a	part	explained	by	differences	
																																								 																				
42	 The	 estimates	were	 computed	with	Melly’s	 (2006)	 implementation	 of	 the	 “rqdeco”	 command	 in	
Stata.	
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in	 coefficients.	 	 This	 essentially	 is	 a	 generalisation	 of	 the	 Oaxaca-Blinder	
decomposition	for	the	mean.	
	
For	 the	 Melly	 (2006)	 estimator,	 as	 was	 stated	 in	 equation	 (2),	 the	 conditional	
quantile	function	for	men	would	be:	𝑄!,! 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! 𝑿! =  𝑿!,!𝛽!,!	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(4)	
and	for	women:	𝑄!,! 𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! 𝑿! =  𝑿!,!𝛽!,!		 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(5)	
	
The	Melly	(2006)	approach	can	be	described	in	the	following	steps:	
Step	1:	estimate	the	entire	conditional	distribution	by	quantile	regression.	
Step	2:	obtain	the	unconditional	distribution	function	by	integrating	the	conditional	
distribution	function	over	a	range	of	covariates.	
Step	3:	invert	the	unconditional	distribution	function	(counterfactual	distribution)	to	
obtain	the	unconditional	quantiles	of	interest.		
	
Since	 the	 conditional	 quantile	 function	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 monotonic	 and	
impossible	 to	 invert,	 Melly	 (2006)	 proposed	 integrating	 the	 entire	 conditional	
distribution	 function	 by	 integrating	 over	 the	 full	 set	 of	 covariates.	 	 Note	 that	 the	
conditional	 cumulative	 distribution	 of	 wages	 is  𝐹! 𝑄! 	 in	 equation	 (6),	 and	 the	
inverse	of	the	distribution	function,	𝐹!!! 𝜃 ,	is	in	fact,	the	quantile	function:	𝜃 = 𝐹! 𝑄! = 𝐸[𝐹!|! 𝑄! 𝑊 𝑋 = 𝐹!|! 𝑄! 𝑊 𝑋 𝑑𝐹!(𝑋)	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(6)	 	
Hence,	in	order	to	obtain	our	counterfactual	quantile	of	interest,	we	need	to	invert	
the	 counterfactual	 distribution	 of	 interest,	 𝑄!,!! = 𝐹!!!!! 𝜃 .	 	 The	 counterfactual	
distribution	uses	 the	distribution	of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 female	workers	with	 the	
wage	structure	of	male	workers	as	follows:	
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𝐹!!,!! 𝑊 =  𝐹!,!|!! 𝑊 𝑋 𝑑𝐹!!(𝑋)	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(7)	
The	standard	errors	can	be	obtained	by	bootstrapping	the	results,	but	this	technique	
is	computationally	demanding	and	time	consuming.		To	deal	with	this,	Melly	(2005)	
constructed	an	analytical	estimator	of	the	asymptotic	variance	using	the	asymptotic	
results	for	the	parametric	estimator.	
Once	 the	 key	 counterfactual, 𝑄!! = 𝑋!,!𝛽!,!  is	 estimated,	 the	 wage	 gap	 of	 the	
unconditional	quantile	function	can	be	decomposed	between	the	two	genders:	  Δ! = 𝑄!,! − 𝑄!,!! + 𝑄!,!! − 𝑄!,! 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(8)	
The	first	term	on	the	right-hand	side	represents	the	effect	of	characteristics	(or	the	
quantile	 endowment	 effects)	 and	 the	 second	 term	 represents	 the	 effect	 of	
coefficients.	
	
4.3.2 Unconditional	Quantile	Decomposition	(using	RIF-regressions)		
	
Firpo,	Lemieux	and	Fortin	(2009)	
A	major	drawback	of	the	Machado	and	Mata	(2005)	and	Melly	(2006)	decomposition	
techniques	 is	 that	 they	both	 fail	 to	 provide	detailed	decompositions	 such	 that	 the	
effect	 of	 individual	 covariates	 on	 the	 unconditional	 quantile	 wage	 distribution	
cannot	 be	 estimated.	 	 Firpo,	 Lemieux	 and	 Fortin	 (2009)	 provide	 an	 alternative	
decomposition	 technique	 that	 allows	 for	 the	 computation	 of	 detailed	
decompositions.	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 quantiles,	 RIF-regressions	 (re-centred	 influence	 function)	 can	 be	
viewed	 as	 unconditional	 quantile	 regressions	 –	 it	 estimates	 the	 changes	 in	 the	
distribution	 of	 covariates	 on	 the	 quantiles	 of	 the	 unconditional	 distribution	 of	 an	
outcome	variable.	The	influence	function	is	a	widely	used	tool	in	robust	estimation;	
it	is	re-centred	so	the	mean	of	the	re-centred	influence	function	corresponds	to	the	
statistic	of	 interest.	 	RIF-regressions	are	similar	 to	standard	regressions	except	that	
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the	 dependant	 variable	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 corresponding	 RIF	 of	 the	 statistic	 of	
interest	–	in	our	case,	the	log	of	hourly	wages.	
	
According	 to	 Firpo	 et	 al	 (2010),	 RIF-regression	 methods	 enable	 detailed	
decompositions	 to	 be	 performed	 for	 any	 distributional	 statistic	 for	 which	 an	
influence	 function	 can	 be	 computed.	 	 In	 this	 study,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 difference	
between	 quantiles,	 𝑄!,	 of	 the	 marginal	 unconditional	 distribution	 𝐹!.	 	 RIF-
regression	methods	are	especially	useful	 to	analyse	glass	 ceilings	 in	 the	context	of	
gender	wage	 gaps	 as	 these	methods	 can	 be	 used	 to	 perform	Oaxaca-Blinder-type	
detailed	decompositions.	
	
Given	that	this	research	seeks	to	explore	the	phenomena	of	glass	ceilings	and	sticky	
floors,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 quantiles.	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 influence	 function	𝐼𝐹 (𝑊,𝑄!),	is	defined	as	follows	(Firpo	et	al,	2009):	𝐼𝐹(𝑊,𝑄!  ) = (𝜃 − 𝕀 𝑊 ≤  𝑄! )/𝑓!(𝑄!)	 	 	 	 Eq.	(9)	
where	𝕀 ∙ 	is	an	indicator	function,	and 𝑓!(∙)	is	the	density	function	of	the	marginal	
distribution	 of	 𝑊	 evaluated	 at	 𝑄!.	 	 The	 RIF	 function	 is	 equal	 to	 𝑄! +𝐼𝐹(𝑊,𝑄!  ),  and	can	be	written	as:	
	 𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑊;𝑄! =  𝑄! + !!𝕀 !! !!!!(!!) 	 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(10)	
	
The	 RIF	 for	 a	 quantile	 is	 simply	 an	 indicator	 (dummy)	 variable	 𝕀 𝑊 ≤  𝑄! 	 for	
whether	the	dependent	variable	(in	our	case,	the	log	of	hourly	wages,	𝑊)	is	less	than	
or	equal	to	the	quantile	𝑄!	of	interest.		Firpo,	Fortin	and	Lemieux	(2009)	explain	how	
to	compute	the	RIF,	and	then	run	regressions	of	the	RIF	on	the	vector	of	covariates.		
For	quantiles,	the	RIF	is	first	estimated	by	computing	the	sample	𝑄!,	and	estimating	
the	density	at	that	point,	usually	using	a	kernel	density.		Then,	an	estimate	of	the	RIF	
for	each	observation,	𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑊!;𝑄!),	is	generated	by	plugging	in	the	estimates	of	the	
sample	 quantile	𝑄!  and	 the	 density	 function	 evaluated	 at	𝑄! , that	 is,	 𝑓(𝑄!)	 into	
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equation	 (10).	 	 The	expected	 values	of	 the	RIF-regression	when	used	 for	quantiles	
can	be	thought	of	as	unconditional	quantile	regression.	
	
The	 coefficients	 of	 the	 unconditional	 quantile	 regression	 are	 estimated	 for	 each	
group	 (in	 our	 case,	 for	 men	 and	 women),	 and	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	 perform	 the	
equivalent	of	the	Oaxaca-Blinder	decomposition	for	each	quantile	as	follows:	
	 ∆!= 𝑋! − 𝑋! 𝛾!,! +  𝑋! 𝛾!,! − 𝛾!,! 	 	 	 	 Eq.	(11)	
	
The	 first	 term	 on	 the	 right	 hand	 side	 represents	 the	 differences	 in	 characteristics	
(endowments)	 and	 the	 second	 term	 represents	 the	 differences	 in	 returns	 to	
characteristics,	 that	 is,	 the	 wage	 structure	 effect.	 	 As	 was	 previously	 stated,	 this	
methodology	 allows	 for	 detailed	 decompositions	 so	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 each	
covariate	 to	 both	 the	 endowments	 and	 returns	 effects	 can	 be	 estimated.	 	 This	 is	
done	using	linear	approximation.		The	first	and	second	terms	in	equation	(11)		can	be	
rewritten	as	the	sum	of	the	contribution	of	each	covariate	as	follows:	
	 𝑋! − 𝑋! 𝛾!,!      = (𝑋!" − 𝑋!")𝛾!",!!!!! 		 	 	 Eq.	(12)	𝑋! 𝛾!,! − 𝛾!,! = 𝑋!" 𝛾!",! − 𝛾!",!!!!! 	 	 	 Eq.	(13)	
	
Firpo	et	al	(2010)	show	that	the	aggregate	decomposition	results	obtained	from	the	
RIF	 regressions	 should	 not	 be	 statistically	 significantly	 different	 from	 the	
decomposition	results	obtained	from	the	Machado	and	Mata	(2005)	methodology.	
	
Firpo	 et	 al	 (2010)	 highlighted	 that	 the	 RIF-regression	 technique	 is	 advantageous	
given	its	use	of	linearization.		Linearization	makes	it	easy	to	invert	the	proportion	of	
interest	by	dividing	by	the	density.	 	Further,	since	we	perform	the	inversion	locally,	
another	advantage	of	using	 this	 technique	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	need	 to	evaluate	 the	
global	 impact	 at	 all	 points	 of	 the	 distribution,	 and	 hence	 circumvent	 having	 to	
address	 the	 problem	of	monotonicity.	 	 Lastly,	 the	 use	 of	 linearization	 generates	 a	
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simple	regression,	which	is	easy	to	interpret,	and	the	resultant	decomposition	is	path	
independent.43	
	
Despite	these	advantages,	the	RIF-regression	technique	does	have	a	few	limitations	
as	well.		RIF-regression	assumes	the	invariance	of	the	conditional	distribution,	that	is,	
it	 assumes	 there	 are	 no	 general	 equilibrium	 effects	 (Fortin	 et	 al,	 2010).	 	 Also,	 in	
practical	 terms,	 there	 is	 a	question	of	how	good	 is	 this	 linear	 approximation.	 	 The	
RIF-technique	 transforms	 a	 non-linear	 distributional	 function	 into	 a	 linear	
approximation,	 which	 can	 potentially	 lead	 to	 approximation	 errors	 and	
consequently,	 the	estimation	of	 inconsistent	 results.	 	Firpo	et	al	 (2010)	highlighted	
that	 for	 relatively	 smooth	 dependent	 variables,	 the	 RIF	 technique	 should	 yield	
reliable	results.		However,	if	there	is	considerable	heaping	in	the	distribution	of	the	
dependent	variable	(as	is	usually	the	case	for	wage	distributions),	Firpo	et	al	(2010)	
advises	to	over-smooth	the	density	estimates	and	compare	these	values	around	the	
quantile	of	interest.	
	
4.4 Data	and	Econometric	Specification	of	Wage	Function	
	
The	same	data	set	(Continuous	Sample	Survey	of	the	Population,	CSSP)	used	in	the	
previous	 chapter	 was	 also	 used	 in	 this	 analysis,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 same	 covariates	 –	
potential	 experience,	 potential	 experience	 squared,	 dummies	 for	 highest	 level	 of	
education	 obtained,	 marital	 status	 and	 ethnicity.	 	 In	 an	 expanded	 version	 of	 the	
model	 controls	 for	 public	 versus	 private	 sector	 employment,	 occupation44,	 and	
industry	 were	 included.	 	 The	 reference	 categories	 include:	 primary	 school	
(education),	 unmarried	 (marital	 status),	 mixed/other	 (ethnicity),	 private	 sector	
employee	 (type	 of	 worker),	 elementary	 occupations,	 and	 social/personal	 services	
(industry).	 	 Like	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 problem	 of	 sample	 selectivity	 is	 not	
addressed	due	to	the	paucity	of	appropriate	variables	in	the	CSSP.			
																																								 																				
43	The	independence	of	path	refers	to	a	property	of	a	function	for	which	the	line	integral	has	the	same	
value	along	the	curve	between	two	specified	points.	
44	See	Appendix	I:	National	Occupational	Classification	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(2013)	for	more	details	
on	the	classification	of	occupations.		
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Table	 4.1	 presents	 the	 sample	 characteristics	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 (log	 of	
hourly	wages)	and	some	of	the	covariates	over	both	high	and	low	quantiles.		At	the	
lower	 end	 of	 the	wage	 distribution	 there	 is	 a	 greater	 disparity	 between	male	 and	
female	 wages	 compared	 to	 the	median	 and	 higher	 end	 of	 the	 distribution	 where	
both	 genders	 have	 similar	 (log)	 hourly	 wages.	 	 At	 the	 10th	 percentile	 men’s	 (log)	
hourly	 wages	 are	 2.36	 versus	 women’s	 wages	 of	 2.29.	 	 However	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile,	 both	 genders	 earn	 equivalent	 wages.	 	 This	 is	 cursory	 evidence	 that	
women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	labour	market	may	face	“sticky	floors”	instead	of	a	
“glass	ceiling”.		Even	though	men	and	women	earn	the	same	hourly	wage	at	the	top	
of	the	wage	distribution	and	there	appears	to	be	no	glass	ceiling,	this	may	be	hidden	
given	that	at	the	higher	end	of	the	wage	distribution	women	have	a	greater	number	
of	 years	 of	 education	 than	men.	 	 At	 the	 90th	 percentile	 women	 have	 three	more	
years	of	education	than	men.	
	
Table	4.1:	Sample	Characteristics	
	
Mean	 p10	 p50	 p90	
	
Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	
Log	of	hourly	wages	 3.28	 3.17	 2.36	 2.29	 3.19	 3.20	 3.90	 3.90	
Age	 37	 37	 32	 37	 37	 37	 40	 38	
Potential	Experience	 22	 21	 18	 22	 22	 22	 24	 18	
Years	of	Education	 10	 11	 9	 10	 9	 10	 11	 14	
Number	of	observations	 1,167	 844	 59	 80	 160	 83	 35	 32	
	
Graph	 1	 displays	 the	 unadjusted	 raw	 gender	 wage	 gap	 by	 quantile	 (that	 is,	 the	
gender	 differences	 in	 log	 hourly	wages	 by	 quantile).	 	 Sticky	 floor	 and	 glass	 ceiling	
effects	 can	be	defined	 to	exist	 if	 the	10th	percentile	 and	 the	90th	percentile	of	 the	
total	wage	gap,	respectively,	exceed	other	reference	points	of	the	wage	distribution	
by	at	least	two	percentage	points.	At	the	10th	percentile	the	unadjusted	total	gender	
wage	gap	is	0.26	log	points	and	-0.06	log	points	at	the	90th	percentile.		Using	the	50th	
percentile	(median)	as	the	reference	point,	at	the	10th	percentile	the	total	wage	gap	
is	 almost	30	percentage	points	higher,	while	 at	 the	90th	percentile,	 the	 total	wage	
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gap	is	6	percentage	points	 lower	than	the	median.	 	This	shows	evidence	of	a	sticky	
floor	in	the	labour	market	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	and	is	the	impetus	for	the	use	of	
quantile	decompositions	in	our	econometric	analysis.	
	
Graph	1:	Unadjusted	(Raw)	Gender	Wage	Gap	
	
	
Figure	4.1	shows	the	percentages	of	workers	(densities)	at	every	point	of	the	income	
distribution	for	the	log	of	hourly	wages.		At	lower	levels	of	wages,	there	is	a	higher	
concentration	 of	 women	 than	 men.	 	 The	 male	 curve	 is	 taller	 and	 thinner,	 which	
indicates	that	the	male	wage	distribution	is	more	condensed	than	the	corresponding	
function	for	females.		Further,	the	distribution	of	male	wages	is	farther	to	the	right,	
which	 is	 consistent	 with	 men	 receiving	 higher	 average	 wages	 than	 women.	 	 The	
Kolmogorov-Smirnov	 test	 for	 equality	 of	 distribution	 functions	 indicate	 that	 (log)	
hourly	wages	for	the	both	genders	do	not	have	the	same	distribution	function.	
	
	
	
	
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Lo
g W
ag
e D
iffe
ren
tia
l
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
148	
	
Figure	4.1:	Kernel	Density	Estimate	of	the	Wage	Distribution	
	
	
	
Figure	4.2:	Kernel	Density	Estimate	of	the	Wage	Distribution	by	Sector	of	
Employment	 	
	 	
Public	Sector		 	 	 	 	 	 Private	Sector	
	
The	mean	of	log	hourly	wages	in	the	public	sector	is	higher	for	both	men	and	women	
compared	to	the	mean	of	log	hourly	wages	in	the	private	sector	(see	Table	3.3).			
Figure	4.2	depicts	the	kernel	density	functions	of	log	hourly	wages	in	the	public	and	
private	sectors.		In	the	private	sector,	the	distribution	of	male	wages	is	farther	right	
indicating	that	they	receive	higher	wages	than	women.		The	distribution	of	wages	for	
both	men	and	women	 in	 the	private	sector	 is	more	compressed	 than	 in	 the	public	
sector.		This	finding	is	contrary	to	other	countries,	such	as	Germany	where	wages	in	
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the	public	sector	are	more	compressed	(Melly,	2005).		For	both	genders,	the	private	
sector	earnings	distribution	is	characterised	by	a	higher	density	function	around	the	
mode.			
	
Figure	4.3:	Deviation	of	Monthly	Earnings	from	National	Average	by	Occupation	
	 	
	
Figure	 4.3	 and	 Figure	 4.4	 depict	 the	 deviation	 of	 (gross)	monthly	wages	 from	 the	
national	average	for	men	and	women	by	occupational	classifications	and	industry	of	
employment.	 	 For	 lower	 level	 occupations45,	 such	 as,	 elementary	 workers,	 sales	
workers,	and	clerical	staff,	for	women,	their	wages	are	much	lower	than	the	national	
average	 and	 considerably	 lower	 than	 their	 male	 counterparts.	 	 For	 higher-end	
occupations,	 such	as	professionals	and	managers,	 the	 (positive)	deviation	 from	the	
monthly	national	average	of	wages	 is	 less	 for	women	compared	to	men’s	wages	 in	
such	occupations.	
	
The	proportion	of	men	working	 in	 those	 industries	 classified	 in	 Figure	4.4	 is	 larger	
than	 the	 proportion	 of	 women	 except	 for	 the	 Social	 and	 Personal	 Services,	
Wholesale	 and	 Retail,	 and	 Finance	 and	 Insurance	 industries.46	 	 In	 all	 of	 the	male-
dominated	 industries	 that	 have	 a	 positive	 deviation	 from	 the	 monthly	 national	
average	 of	wages,	 this	 positive	 deviation	 is	 greater	 for	men	 compared	 to	women.		
																																								 																				
45	See	Appendix	I:	National	Occupational	Classification	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(2013)	for	details	of	the	
skill	level	required	for	each	occupational	classification.			
46	 The	 proportion	 of	 men	 dominates	 the	 following	 industries:	 Agriculture/Fishing	 (73.7	 per	 cent);	
Mining/Quarrying	 (87.7	 per	 cent);	 Manufacturing	 (69.2	 per	 cent);	 Electricity/Gas/Water	 (78.7	 per	
cent);	Transport	(75.0	per	cent);	and	Construction	(86.2	per	cent).	 	Meanwhile,	women	dominate	 in	
the	 following	 industries:	 Social/Personal	 Services	 (56.0	 per	 cent);	Wholesale/Retail	 (58.5	 per	 cent);	
and	Finance/Insurance	(56.6	per	cent).			
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Among	 those	 industries	 that	 have	 a	 negative	 deviation	 from	 the	monthly	 national	
average	 of	 wages	 (namely,	 Agriculture	 and	 Fishing,	 Wholesale	 and	 Retail	 and	
Construction),	 women’s	 wages	 are	 much	 lower	 than	 the	 national	 average	 and	
considerably	lower	than	their	male	counterparts.												
	
	
Figure	4.4:	Deviation	of	Monthly	Earnings	from	National	Average	by	Industry	
	 	
	
Table	3.3	(Sample	Characteristics)	in	the	previous	chapter	revealed	that	average	(log)	
hourly	earnings	are	higher	in	the	public	sector	for	both	men	and	women	than	in	the	
private	 sector.	 	 The	 sample	 used	 also	 shows	 that	 public	 sector	 employees	 are,	 on	
average,	more	educated	than	private	sector	employees.		For	instance,	13.7	per	cent	
of	the	male	employees	in	the	public	sector	have	achieved	a	university	degree	and	40	
per	cent	of	female	public	sector	workers	have	a	university	degree.		This	compares	to	
just	 5.1	per	 cent	 and	11.3	per	 cent	 for	male	 and	 female	private	 sector	 employees	
with	university	degrees.		Male	public	sector	employees	have	more	(potential)	labour	
market	experience	 (25.5	years)	 compared	 to	 female	public	 sector	employees	 (20.3	
years)	and	both	men	and	women	(20.7	and	21.2	years)	working	in	the	private	sector.		
These	differences	in	work	experience	and	education	may	explain	the	higher	average	
wage	 of	 public	 sector	 employees.	 	 Another	 probable	 cause	 for	 the	 disparity	 in	
average	 wages	 between	 public	 and	 private	 sector	 employees	 may	 be	 the	 greater	
concentration	 of	 professionals	 and	 technicians	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 	 Of	 all	 male	
public	 sector	 employees,	 14.5	 per	 cent	 are	 technicians	while	 in	 the	 private	 sector	
only	 9.2	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 male	 employees	 are	 technicians.	 	 This	 disparity	 is	 even	
greater	 among	 women,	 with	 27.7	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 female	 public	 sector	 employees	
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being	 technicians	 versus	 only	 15.9	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 female	 workforce	 being	
technicians	in	the	private	sector.									
	
Table	4.2:	Sample	Characteristics	by	Sector	of	Employment	
Public	Sector	
	
p10	 p50	 p90	
	
Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	
Log	of	hourly wages	 2.33	 2.26	 3.19	 3.20	 3.90	 3.90	
Age	 37	 39	 41	 36	 40	 38	
Potential	Experience	 23	 25	 27	 20	 24	 19	
Years	of	Education	 9	 9	 9	 11	 11	 14	
No.	of	observations	 13	 32	 79	 45	 83	 80	
Private	Sector	
	
p10	 p50	 p90	
	
Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	 Male	 Female	
Log	of	hourly wages	 2.37	 2.30	 3.20	 3.21	 3.91	 3.91	
Age	 31	 36	 35	 38	 40	 37	
Potential	Experience	 18	 22	 20	 23	 24	 19	
Years	of	Education	 9	 10	 9	 10	 11	 14	
No.	of	observations	 89	 123	 134	 57	 58	 31	
	
4.5 Results	
4.5.1 Earnings	Functions	
	
Table	4.3	and	Table	4.4	present	the	estimates	 from	the	quantile	regressions	at	 the	
25th,	50th	and	75th	percentiles	run	on	separate	wage	functions	for	men	and	women.		
Table	 4.3	 presents	 the	 results	 from	 the	 human	 capital	 theory	 (Mincer-type	 wage	
equations),	 while	 the	 estimates	 in	 Table	 4.4	 include	 controls	 for	 sector	 of	
employment,	 occupation	 and	 industry.	 	 Figure	 4.5.1	 and	 Figure	 4.5.2	 provide	 a	
visualisation	of	the	results	from	the	human	capital	wage	specification.		In	the	graphs	
the	black	broken	horizontal	 line	 represents	 the	OLS	estimates	and	the	dotted	 lines	
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on	either	side	of	this	line	represent	the	corresponding	95%	confidence	interval.		The	
curves	in	the	graphs	and	the	shaded	area	are	the	quantile	regression	estimates	and	
their	corresponding	95%	confidence	intervals.		In	the	log	wage	quantile	regressions,	
the	coefficient	estimates,	𝛽(𝜃)	are	interpreted	as	the	estimated	returns	to	individual	
characteristics	at	the	θth	quantile	of	the	log	wage	distribution.				
	
In	 the	 human	 capital	 theory	 specification,	 a	 Wald	 test	 shows	 that	 the	
constant/intercept	terms	for	both	genders	are	significantly	different	from	each	other	
across	 the	 quantiles.	 	 The	 male	 intercept	 term	 is	 higher	 than	 that	 for	 females	
throughout	 the	 wage	 distribution,	 indicating	 that	 regardless	 of	 their	 productivity	
levels,	men	enter	the	labour	market	at	an	advantage	over	women.		This	may	be	due,	
in	part,	to	discriminatory	practices	by	employers	but	may	also	be	the	consequence	of	
men	 being	 more	 successful	 at	 negotiating	 higher	 pay	 packages	 than	 women.		
Discussion	 with	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer	 at	 a	 leading	 business	 performance	
improvement	consultancy	firm	based	in	Trinidad	indicated	that,	 in	her	opinion,	one	
of	the	main	reasons	for	the	existence	of	the	gender	wage	gap	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
is	 that	women	were	not	as	confident	as	men	when	negotiating	 their	pay	packages	
and	 they	 tend	 to	 undersell	 themselves	 in	 the	 workforce.	 	 In	 the	 psychology	
literature,	there	is	evidence	that	men	systematically	overestimate	their	own	abilities	
when	 predicting	 their	 future	 performances,	 while	 females	 tend	 to	 underestimate	
their	future	performance	(see	Maccoby	and	Jacklin,	(1974),	Frieze	et	al,	(1978),	and	
Kahneman	et	al	(1982)	for	discussion	of	this	evidence).			
	
As	 expected,	 the	 differential	 rate	 to	 schooling	 increases	 with	 the	 attainment	 of	
higher	qualifications	 for	both	men	and	women.	 	Degree	holders	have	 the	greatest	
advantage,	 as	 the	 coefficient	 on	 tertiary	 education	 is	 positively	 significant	 and	
greater	than	other	qualification	dummies.		However,	Wald	tests	show	that	for	every	
level	 of	 education	 obtained,	 the	 differential	 rate	 to	 education47	 do	 not	 differ	
significantly	 from	 each	 other	 across	 the	 quantiles	 in	 the	 case	 of	 both	 men	 and	
women.	 	 Women	 experience	 higher	 differentials	 than	 men,	 with	 rates	 ranging	
																																								 																				
47	 The	 differential	 rates	 to	 education	 were	 calculated	 at	 the	 exponential	 of	 the	 corresponding	
coefficient	minus	one.		
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between	239.4	per	cent	and	270.2	per	cent,	whilst	the	differential	rate	to	education	
for	men	ranges	between	229.0	per	cent	and	253.6	per	cent.		
	
The	 return	 to	 (potential)	 experience	 is	 statistically	 significant	 for	 both	 men	 and	
women	across	the	entire	distribution	of	wages,	except	for	men	at	the	lower	end	of	
the	distribution.	The	return	to	experience	remains	stable	as	you	move	up	the	wage	
distribution,	for	instance,	the	return	to	experience	for	women	is	1.5	per	cent	at	both	
the	25th	and	75th	percentiles,	and	for	men	the	return	to	experience	is	1.3	per	cent	at	
the	median	and	1.5	per	cent	at	the	75th	percentile.	
	
Married	 men	 appear	 to	 earn	 a	 wage	 premium	 compared	 to	 their	 unmarried	
counterparts	–	this	is	usual	in	the	literature	for	both	developed	(Schoeni,	1995)	and	
developing	 countries	 (Coppin	 and	 Olsen,	 1998;	 Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001;	 Olsen,	
2005).		However,	this	premium	decreases	as	you	go	up	the	wage	distribution.		At	the	
25th	 percentile,	 married	 men	 receive	 a	 wage	 premium	 of	 17.6	 per	 cent,	 but	 this	
decreases	to	9.4	per	cent	at	the	75th	percentile.	 	Marital	status	 is	not	a	statistically	
significant	 determinant	 of	wages	 for	women.	 	 Anecdotal	 evidence	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago	(based	on	discussion	with	the	CEO	of	a	consultancy	firm	operating	in	Trinidad	
–	referenced	above)	shows	that	employers	do	consider	marital	status	in	their	hiring	
decisions,	especially	in	this	new	age	of	uncertainty;	but	it	does	depend	on	the	role–	
some	 roles	 require	 travel	 so	 family	 life	 (including	 marital	 status)	 is	 always	 a	
consideration	when	hiring	 for	particular	 roles/positions.	 	 Some	employers	prefer	 a	
young	 single	 educated	 female	 instead	 of	 a	 young	 and	 newly	 married	 educated	
female	employee.	 	 In	addition,	 the	CEO	noted	 that	married	men	tend	 to	negotiate	
for	a	higher	salary	often	times	citing	he	has	a	family	as	his	reason	for	demanding	a	
higher	salary.	 	There	 is	also	greater	pressure	on	a	married	man	with	respect	 to	his	
relationship	 at	 home	 to	 earn	more	 and	 provide	 for	 his	 family;	 the	man’s	 ego	 also	
plays	a	role	in	ensuring	his	earning	status.	
	
Meanwhile,	 ethnicity	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant	 for	 men	 throughout	 the	 entire	
wage	distribution,	but	is	statistically	significant	for	women	of	East	Indian	descent	at	
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the	75th	percentile	–	 these	women	earn	11	per	 cent	 less	 than	women	of	mixed	or	
other	 ethnicities.	 	 Recall	 that	 the	 “mixed/other”	 category	 includes	 minority	
ethnicities	such	as	White,	Syrian/Lebanese	and	Chinese,	all	ethnic	groups	which	have	
historically	had	a	higher	social	 status	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	compared	 to	 the	 two	
major	ethnic	groups	–	Indian	and	African	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).	
	
In	the	full	model,	the	differentials	to	education	for	both	men	and	women	and	across	
all	the	quantiles	estimated	more	than	halved	compared	to	the	human	capital	theory	
specification.		In	other	words,	based	on	the	full	model,	about	half	of	the	differentials	
to	schooling	are	accounted	for	by	the	choice	of	sector	of	employment	–	private	or	
public,	occupation,	and	industry.	 	Again,	the	differentials	to	(all	 levels	of)	education	
for	men	and	women	are	not	statistically	different	from	each	other	across	the	various	
quantiles	estimated	with	the	exception	of	 tertiary	education	at	 the	75th	percentile.		
Noteworthy	 is	 that	 compared	 to	 the	 human	 capital	model	where	women	 enjoyed	
higher	differentials	to	education,	in	the	full	model	this	is	reversed.		In	the	full	model	
men	benefit	more	from	tertiary	education	across	the	entire	distribution	of	wages	–	
their	 wages	 increase	 between	 82.9	 per	 cent	 and	 95.2	 per	 cent,	 whereas	 women	
benefit	 from	 tertiary	 education	 range	between	49.5	per	 cent	 and	65.5	per	 cent	 in	
higher	wages.			
	
Throughout	the	wage	distribution	both	men	and	women	working	in	the	public	sector	
enjoy	 wage	 premiums	 over	 their	 counterparts	 employed	 in	 the	 private	 sector.		
Women,	however,	 receive	a	higher	wage	premium	for	working	 in	the	public	sector	
compared	to	their	male	counterpart.		Notably,	at	the	75th	percentile	women	receive	
significantly	 higher	wage	premiums	 compared	 to	men	 –	 30.1	 per	 cent	 versus	 18.6	
per	 cent.	 	 This	 substantiates	 the	 results	 from	 the	 previous	 chapter	 where	 it	 was	
found	that	there	is	a	significantly	higher	(pure)	wage	gap	in	the	private	sector	(23.0	
per	cent)	compared	to	 the	public	 sector	 (3.2	per	cent).48	 	Given	that	 female	public	
sector	 workers	 throughout	 the	 wage	 distribution	 receive	 at	 least	 a	 30.0	 per	 cent	
premium	 over	 female	 private	 sector	 employees	 may	 be	 evidence	 that	 the	
																																								 																				
48	The	(pure)	wage	gaps	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors	in	2012	are	lower	than	in	1993	when	
they	measured	6.3	per	cent	and	32	per	cent,	respectively	(Coppin	and	Olson,	2007).	
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government	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 is	 attempting	 to	 counteract	 discriminatory	
practices	with	respect	to	employment	and	pay	in	the	private	sector.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 occupations,	 being	 employed	 as	 a	 Clerk,	 Technician,	 Professional	 or	
Manager	 are	 the	only	occupations	 (compared	 to	Elementary	occupations)	 that	 are	
statistically	significant	in	determining	wages	for	both	genders	across	the	entire	wage	
distribution.	 	 At	 the	 25th	 percentile,	 female	 and	 male	 Technicians	 and	 Managers	
receive	statistically	similar	wage	premiums	whilst	Professional	women	receive	 (log)	
hourly	wages	almost	twice	as	much	as	Professional	men	(91.5	per	cent	versus	45.7	
per	cent).		At	the	75th	percentile,	female	Technicians	receive	higher	wage	premiums	
compared	 to	 men	 (63.0	 per	 cent	 versus	 41.8	 per	 cent),	 while	 male	 and	 female	
Professionals	and	Managers	receive	similar	wage	premiums.	
	
Pooled	Quantile	and	RIF-OLS	Regressions	with	Gender	Dummy	
	
As	a	prelude	to	the	more	extensive	quantile	decompositions	based	on	the	Machado	
and	Mata	 and	 Firpo	et	 al	RIF	procedures,	 pooled	quantile	 and	RIF-OLS	 regressions	
that	 included	 a	 gender	 dummy	were	 estimated.	 	 The	 results	 of	 these	 estimations	
showed	 a	 larger	 unexplained	 gender	 wage	 gap	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution	(see	Appendix	IV:	Measuring	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	using	Pooled	Quantile	and	
Pooled	RIF	Regressions).		
	
Based	on	the	pooled	quantile	regressions,	for	the	human	capital	model,	at	the	10th	
percentile,	women	earned	30.9	per	cent	less	than	men	and	22.5	per	cent	less	at	the	
90th	percentile	(Appendix	Table	IV.1).		Inter-quantile	tests	were	undertaken	based	on	
the	90th	–	10th	differences	to	assess	whether	differences	between	these	quantiles	are	
statistically	 significant.	 Results	 of	 the	 inter-quantile	 tests	 showed	 that	 the	
coefficients	 on	 the	 gender	 dummy	 at	 the	 10th	 and	 90th	 percentile	 are	 statistically	
different	from	each	other	at	the	10	per	cent	level	(Appendix	Table	IV.3).			
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The	 results	 from	 pooled	 RIF-OLS	 for	 the	 human	 capital	 model	 were	 qualitatively	
similar,	with	women	earning	32.2	per	cent	less	than	men	at	the	10th	percentile	and	
16.8	per	cent	 less	at	the	90th	percentile	(Appendix	Table	IV.4).	 	The	disparity	 in	the	
size	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 across	 the	 wage	 distribution	 is	 more	 evident	 when	
controls	 for	 sector	 of	 employment,	 occupation	 and	 industry	 are	 included.	 	 The	
pooled	RIF-OLS	(full	model)	estimated	the	gender	wage	gap	at	35.0	per	cent	at	the	
10th	 percentile	 compared	with	 9.2	 per	 cent	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile	 (Appendix	 Table	
IV.5).	 	A	Wald	 test	of	 the	equality	of	 the	gender	coefficients	between	the	90th	and	
10th	quantiles	show	that	they	are	statistically	different	from	each	other	at	the	1	per	
cent	level	(Appendix	Table	IV.6).		All	these	results	point	to	a	sticky	floor	for	Trinidad	
and	Tobago.			
	
Consequently,	 it	 was	 deemed	 that	 the	 more	 extensive	 quantile	 decompositions	
would	be	fruitful	in	examining	the	gender	wage	gap	across	the	distribution	of	wages	
and	 would	 provide	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	 sticky	 floor/glass	 ceiling	
phenomena	for	the	Trinidad	and	Tobago	labour	market.		
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Table	4.3:	Earnings	Functions	for	Men	and	Women	–	Quantile	Regressions	
(Human	Capital	Theory)	
	
VARIABLES	 QR_m25	 QR_f25	 QR_m50	 QR_f50	 QR_m75	 QR_f75	
Potential	Experience	 0.007	 0.015**	 0.013***	 0.019***	 0.015**	 0.015***	
	
(0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	
Potential	Experience2	 8.50E-05	 -1.23E-04	 -5.52E-05	 -1.72E-04	 -5.66E-05	 -1.14E-04	
	
(1.18E-04)	 (1.33E-04)	 (9.39E-05)	 (1.20E-04)	 (1.26E-04)	 (1.28E-04)	
Education	
	 	 	 	 	 	Lower	Secondary	 0.281***	 0.220***	 0.216***	 0.213***	 0.216***	 0.288***	
	
(0.050)	 (0.058)	 (0.046)	 (0.070)	 (0.036)	 (0.058)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.540***	 0.618***	 0.522***	 0.615***	 0.590***	 0.654***	
	
(0.048)	 (0.055)	 (0.057)	 (0.073)	 (0.041)	 (0.065)	
Tertiary	 1.233***	 1.303***	 1.191***	 1.309***	 1.263***	 1.222***	
	
(0.075)	 (0.075)	 (0.077)	 (0.071)	 (0.108)	 (0.061)	
Marital	Status	
	 	 	 	 	 	Married	 0.176***	 0.033	 0.154***	 -0.022	 0.094***	 0.030	
	
(0.041)	 (0.049)	 (0.033)	 (0.036)	 (0.034)	 (0.042)	
Ethnicity	
	 	 	 	 	 	Indian	 -4.24E-04	 -0.052	 -1.44E-16	 -0.052	 0.011	 -0.110*	
	
(0.060)	 (0.063)	 (0.041)	 (0.051)	 (0.038)	 (0.061)	
African	 0.043	 -0.056	 0.038	 -0.042	 0.021	 -0.032	
	
(0.064)	 (0.064)	 (0.048)	 (0.048)	 (0.042)	 (0.060)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Constant	 2.326***	 2.120***	 2.595***	 2.378***	 2.839***	 2.706***	
	
(0.092)	 (0.093)	 (0.071)	 (0.096)	 (0.078)	 (0.093)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 1,157	 849	 1,157	 849	 1,157	 849	
Note:	Bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	in	parentheses.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 log	 of	 hourly	wages.	 	 Base	 dummy	 variables	 are:	 Education	 -	 primary	 school;	Marital	 Status	 -	
unmarried;	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other.	 	
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Table	4.4:	Earnings	Functions	for	Men	and	Women	–	Quantile	Regressions		
(Full	Model)	
VARIABLES	 QR_m25	 QR_f25	 QR_m50	 QR_f50	 QR_m75	 QR_f75	
Potential	Experience	 0.007	 0.019***	 0.007	 0.016***	 0.005	 0.014***	
	
(0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
Potential	Experience2	 -1.54E-05	 -2.22E-04*	 -7.29E-07	 -1.66E-04*	 4.17E-05	 -1.88E-04**	
	
(9.85E-05)	 (1.16E-04)	 (8.52E-05)	 (9.48E-05)	 (1.04E-04)	 (9.44E-05)	
Education	
	 	 	 	 	 	Lower	Secondary	 0.118**	 0.109	 0.137***	 0.115**	 0.110**	 0.088	
	
(0.048)	 (0.069)	 (0.037)	 (0.053)	 (0.044)	 (0.065)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.281***	 0.236***	 0.312***	 0.266***	 0.305***	 0.246***	
	
(0.051)	 (0.076)	 (0.045)	 (0.055)	 (0.058)	 (0.072)	
Tertiary	 0.650***	 0.504***	 0.669***	 0.497***	 0.604***	 0.402***	
	
(0.109)	 (0.105)	 (0.069)	 (0.081)	 (0.121)	 (0.085)	
Sector	of	Employment	
	 	 	 	 	 	Public	Sector	 0.283***	 0.323***	 0.273***	 0.346***	 0.186***	 0.301***	
	
(0.046)	 (0.080)	 (0.033)	 (0.043)	 (0.036)	 (0.057)	
Occupation	
	 	 	 	 	 	Machine	Operator	 0.264***	 0.241	 0.248***	 0.221	 0.359***	 0.126	
	
(0.049)	 (0.422)	 (0.054)	 (0.183)	 (0.053)	 (0.359)	
Craft	Worker	 0.187***	 0.306	 0.203***	 0.380***	 0.239***	 0.406**	
	
(0.043)	 (0.211)	 (0.038)	 (0.120)	 (0.045)	 (0.203)	
Sales	Worker	 0.249***	 0.108	 0.263***	 0.158***	 0.384***	 0.135**	
	
(0.071)	 (0.075)	 (0.059)	 (0.059)	 (0.060)	 (0.062)	
Clerical	 0.216***	 0.361***	 0.169*	 0.333***	 0.225***	 0.241***	
	
(0.071)	 (0.083)	 (0.089)	 (0.047)	 (0.070)	 (0.058)	
Technician	 0.443***	 0.561***	 0.398***	 0.679***	 0.418***	 0.630***	
	
(0.064)	 (0.091)	 (0.049)	 (0.067)	 (0.070)	 (0.069)	
Professional	 0.457***	 0.915***	 0.609***	 0.906***	 0.745***	 0.825***	
	
(0.151)	 (0.103)	 (0.093)	 (0.080)	 (0.167)	 (0.086)	
Manager	 0.550***	 0.680***	 0.645***	 0.760***	 0.713***	 0.837***	
	
(0.137)	 (0.159)	 (0.112)	 (0.122)	 (0.130)	 (0.147)	
Industry	
	 	 	 	 	 	Agriculture/Fishing	 -0.151	 -0.273	 -0.087	 -0.063	 0.076	 0.092	
	
(0.158)	 (0.313)	 (0.134)	 (0.187)	 (0.153)	 (0.203)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.471***	 0.351	 0.404***	 0.189	 0.475***	 0.086	
	
(0.081)	 (0.286)	 (0.071)	 (0.154)	 (0.107)	 (0.136)	
Manufacturing	 0.186***	 0.144	 0.149***	 0.161**	 0.240***	 0.152	
	
(0.062)	 (0.106)	 (0.051)	 (0.072)	 (0.068)	 (0.108)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.251*	 0.332	 0.276***	 0.470**	 0.379***	 0.480***	
	
(0.152)	 (0.277)	 (0.080)	 (0.218)	 (0.096)	 (0.108)	
Wholesale/Retail	 0.062	 0.029	 0.034	 0.037	 0.005	 -0.044	
	
(0.059)	 (0.083)	 (0.051)	 (0.047)	 (0.052)	 (0.063)	
Transport/Communication	 0.167***	 0.034	 0.158**	 0.12	 0.262***	 0.134	
	
(0.060)	 (0.111)	 (0.076)	 (0.110)	 (0.075)	 (0.094)	
Finance/Insurance	 0.257**	 0.323***	 0.139**	 0.275***	 0.217**	 0.227***	
	
(0.107)	 (0.076)	 (0.066)	 (0.049)	 (0.108)	 (0.062)	
Construction	 0.171***	 -0.354**	 0.063*	 -0.152	 0.103**	 -0.041	
	
(0.044)	 (0.140)	 (0.034)	 (0.100)	 (0.044)	 (0.090)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Constant	 2.207***	 2.003***	 2.491***	 2.202***	 2.707***	 2.565***	
	
(0.082)	 (0.113)	 (0.078)	 (0.094)	 (0.081)	 (0.111)	
Note:	Bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Dependent	variable	 is	 the	 log	of	hourly	wages.	 	Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	Status	 -	
unmarried;	 Type	 of	 Worker	 –	 private	 sector;	 Occupation	 –	 Elementary	 Occupations;	 and	 Industry	 –	 Social/Personal	
Services.	
Marital	status	and	ethnicity	are	included,	but	not	reported;	estimated	coefficients,	size	and	sign	are	qualitatively	similar	to	
those	obtained	in	the	human	capital	specification.			
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Figure	4.5.1:	Quantile	Regression	of	Log	Wages	for	Women	–	HC	Model	
	
Figure	4.5.2:	Quantile	Regression	of	Log	Wages	for	Men	–	HC	Model	
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4.5.2 Decompositions	of	Log	Wage	Equations	
	
In	order	 to	decompose	 the	differences	 in	 the	wage	distribution	 into	differences	 in	
the	coefficients	and	differences	in	the	workers’	attributes	(characteristics),	we	apply	
the	Oaxaca-Blinder	decomposition	and	the	Machado	and	Mata	(2005)/Melly	(2006)	
procedure	described	 in	Section	4.3.1	with	the	number	of	bootstrap	replications	set	
to	200.	 	As	was	previously	stated,	 the	Machado	and	Mata	 (2005)	and	Melly	 (2006)	
decomposition	 techniques	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 detailed	 decompositions	 so	 that	 the	
effect	of	 individual	covariates	on	the	wage	gap	cannot	be	estimated.	 	Nonetheless,	
Table	4.5	contains	a	 summary	of	 the	decomposition	of	 the	wage	gap	delineating	a	
portion	attributable	to	differences	in	characteristics	(“explained”	component)	and	a	
portion	attributable	 to	differences	 in	coefficients	 (“unexplained”	component).	 	The	
counterfactual-based	 estimates	 of	 the	 wage	 differential	 are	 for	 five	 selected	
quantiles	ranging	between	the	10th	and	90th	percentiles	including	the	25th,	50th,	and	
75th.		The	figures	are	presented	in	exponential	form	for	ease	of	interpretation	(recall	
that	 the	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 log	of	hourly	wages);	 figures	greater	 than	unity	
indicate	a	widening	of	the	gap	whereas	figures	 less	than	unity	 indicate	a	closing	of	
the	gap.	
	
Based	 on	 the	 mean	 regression	 (OLS)	 decomposition	 used	 in	 the	 Oaxaca-Blinder	
methodology,	 the	 raw	 gender	 wage	 gap	 is	 11.4	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 full	 model.	 	 The	
results	of	the	MM	(2005)/Melly	(2006)	decomposition	technique,	based	on	quantile	
regressions,	 show	 that	 by	 focussing	 only	 on	 the	 mean	 gender	 wage	 gap	 (OLS),	
substantial	variations	in	the	gap	will	be	hidden.		For	instance,	the	extent	of	the	wage	
gap	at	 the	 lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution	 (25.1	per	cent)	 is	much	 larger	while	
there	 is	 little	 to	no	wage	gap	at	 the	higher	end	of	 the	distribution.	 	Given	that	 the	
differential	is	greatest	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution,	this	is	an	indication	
that	women	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	face	a	“sticky	floor”	rather	than	a	glass	ceiling.		
This	result	is	similar	to	only	a	few	countries	in	the	world	whose	labour	markets	have	
sticky	 floors	 instead	 of	 glass	 ceilings;	 some	 of	 these	 countries	 include	 Australia	
(Johnston	and	Less,	2012),	Pakistan	(Ahmed	and	Hyder,	2008),	Cyprus,	Luxembourg,	
Slovenia,	Spain	(Christofides	et	al,	2010),	and	Thailand	(Fang	and	Sakellariou,	2011).	
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According	to	Christofides	et	al	(2010),	the	phenomenon	of	sticky	floors	in	Cyprus	and	
Luxembourg	 is,	 in	 part,	 due	 to	 the	 high	 segregation	 of	 women	 in	 low-paying	
industries	 and	 occupations.	 	 In	 Pakistan,	 the	 authors	 attribute	 the	 country’s	 sticky	
floor	to	low	female	labour	force	participation	and	the	concentration	of	females	in	a	
few	particular	occupations	 (gender	occupational	 segregation)	 –	Ahmed	and	Hyder,	
2008.	 	 Notably,	 in	 Pakistan,	 education	 is	 the	main	 variable	 contributing	 to	 gender	
occupational	segregation.							
	
In	 terms	of	 the	 “explained”	 component,	 if	women	had	 the	 same	 characteristics	 as	
men,	 their	 wages	 are	 estimated	 to	 decrease	 along	 the	 entire	 wage	 distribution.		
Recall	that	throughout	the	wage	distribution,	women	have	at	least	one	more	year	of	
education	 than	 men	 (Table	 4.1).	 	 At	 the	 10th	 percentile,	 women’s	 wages	 are	
estimated	to	decrease	by	6.0	per	cent	if	they	had	equivalent	characteristics	as	men	
and	by	12.7	per	cent	at	the	90th	percentile;	the	corresponding	estimated	decrease	in	
female	wages	at	the	25th,	50th,	and	75th	percentiles	are	7.7	per	cent,	10.9	per	cent,	
and	11.8	per	 cent,	 respectively.	 	 This	 result	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 that	 at	 the	90th	
percentile	women	have	three	more	years	of	education	than	men	(Table	4.1).		Given	
these	results,	the	OLS	estimation	by	its	nature	being	a	mean	regression	analysis,	was	
unable	 to	 capture	 this	 disparity	 in	 the	 explained	 component	 across	 the	 wage	
distribution.	 	Based	on	the	OLS	estimate,	 if	women	had	the	same	characteristics	as	
men,	 their	 wages	 would	 decrease,	 on	 average,	 by	 11.6	 per	 cent.	 	 Looking	 at	 the	
human	capital	model	versus	 the	 full	model,	at	 the	90th	percentile,	women’s	wages	
are	 estimated	 to	 decrease	 by	 22.6	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 human	 capital	model	 (0.774	 in	
Table	4.5),	but	the	estimated	decrease	in	wages	is	much	smaller	in	the	full	model	at	
12.7	per	cent	(0.873	in	Table	4.5).		This	result	signals	than	women	may	have	better	
human	capital/productive	characteristics,	but	men	appear	to	have	more	favourable	
job	characteristics	(occupations	and	industries).			
	
The	estimated	 impact	of	the	“unexplained”	component	on	wages	decreases	as	you	
move	higher	up	along	the	wage	distribution.			This	may	be	an	indication	that	women	
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face	 greater	 discrimination	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	 spectrum	 compared	 to	
higher	paid	women.		For	instance,	at	the	10th	percentile	(low-paid	women),	for	their	
given	characteristics,	 if	women	were	to	be	paid	based	on	the	male	wage	structure,	
their	wages	would	increase	by	33.0	per	cent	whereas	their	wages	would	increase	by	
much	 less	 (11.8	 per	 cent)	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile	 (high-paid	 women).	 	 The	 Oaxaca	
decomposition	 is	 unable	 to	 highlight	 these	 differences	 in	 the	 returns	 to	
characteristics	across	the	distribution	of	wages.		At	the	higher	end	of	the	distribution	
of	wages	(75th	and	90th	percentiles),	women	appear	to	benefit	 less	from	working	in	
particular	 occupations	 and	 industries	 as	 their	 wages	 are	 estimated	 to	 increase	 by	
26.2	per	cent	in	the	human	capital	model,	but	only	by	11.8	per	cent	in	the	full	model,	
which	includes	controls	for	occupation	and	industry.		Women	receive	lower	returns	
to	 their	 productive	 characteristics,	 but	 this	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 them	 securing	 less	
favourable	job	characteristics.	
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Table	4.5:	Wage	Decompositions	
Oaxaca	Decomposition		
		
HC	
Model	
Std.	
Err.	 Full	Model	
Std.	
Err.	
			Raw	Difference	 1.113***	 0.029	 1.114***	 0.029	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.852***	 0.015	 0.884***	 0.020	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.307***	 0.026	 1.261***	 0.028	
Machado	and	Mata	(2005)	/	Melly	(2006)	Decomposition		
		
HC	
Model	
Std.	
Err.	 Full	Model	
Std.	
Err.	
Quantile	.10	 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 1.277***	 0.030	 1.251***	 0.028	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.923***	 0.021	 0.940**	 0.033	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.385***	 0.020	 1.330***	 0.022	
Quantile	.25	 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 1.202***	 0.026	 1.189***	 0.024	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.911***	 0.018	 0.923***	 0.028	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.319***	 0.016	 1.288***	 0.016	
Quantile	.50	 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 1.080**	 0.024	 1.095**	 0.026	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.870***	 0.022	 0.891***	 0.027	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.242***	 0.015	 1.229***	 0.016	
Quantile	.75	 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 0.976	 0.038	 0.998	 0.033	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.803***	 0.030	 0.882***	 0.032	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.216***	 0.022	 1.131***	 0.021	
Quantile	.90	 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 0.976	 0.024	 0.976	 0.030	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.774***	 0.049	 0.873***	 0.042	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.262***	 0.028	 1.118***	 0.029	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	for	quantile	decompositions.		
*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
	
4.5.3 Decompositions	of	Log	Wage	Equations	by	Public-Private	Sector	of	
Employment	
	
In	 the	previous	 chapter	based	on	 the	Oaxaca	decomposition	methodology	we	 saw	
that	there	was	a	much	larger	gender	wage	gap	in	the	private	sector	(22.9	per	cent)	
compared	to	the	public	sector	(3.2	per	cent).		Given	this	finding,	we	also	performed	
quantile	decompositions	based	on	sector	of	employment	to	analyse	the	differences	
in	 the	 returns	 to	 coefficients	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 returns	 to	workers’	 attributes	
along	 the	 wage	 spectrum.	 	 The	 same	 covariates	 from	 the	 earlier	 human	 capital	
model	and	full	model	were	used.		These	results	are	summarised	in	Table	4.6.		
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The	Oaxaca	decomposition	methodology	masks	the	great	variability	in	the	size	of	the	
gender	wage	gap	along	the	wage	distribution	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors.		
At	 the	mean	 (Oaxaca	methodology),	 the	gender	wage	gap	 in	 the	public	 sector	was	
3.2	 per	 cent	 in	 both	 the	 human	 capital	 and	 full	 models,	 but	 based	 on	 the	 MM	
(2005)/Melly	 (2006)	 quantile	 decomposition	 methodology,	 the	 wage	 gap	 is	 much	
larger	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution.		At	the	10th	percentile,	the	gender	
wage	gap	 is	estimated	 to	be	30.1	per	cent	and	22.8	per	cent	 in	 the	human	capital	
and	full	models,	respectively.		At	higher	wages	(90th	percentile),	women	earn	slightly	
higher	 wages	 (2.9	 per	 cent	 premium	 in	 the	 full	 model)	 compared	 to	 male	 public	
servants.	 	 At	 the	 median,	 there	 is	 no	 wage	 gap	 with	 men	 and	 women	 earning	
equivalent	wages.			
	
The	estimated	unexplained	public	 sector	wage	gap	varies	 strongly	with	θ	 (quantile	
under	consideration).		For	women,	their	wages	are	expected	to	increase	by	as	much	
as	32.3	per	cent	at	θ	=	0.10	if	they	were	to	be	paid	at	the	same	rate	as	men	for	their	
given	characteristics,	while	their	wages	are	estimated	to	decrease	marginally	by	1.4	
per	 cent	 at	 θ	 =	 0.90.	 	 The	 public	 sector	 has	 a	 relatively	 wide	 pay	 dispersion	 (see	
Figure	4.2)	and	therefore,	has	a	wide	pay	inequality	that	was	previously	hidden	when	
the	 Oaxaca	 decomposition	 method	 was	 used.	 	 The	 explained	 component	 of	 the	
public	 sector	pay	gap	 is	more	 stable	over	 the	wage	distribution	and	does	not	 vary	
very	 much	 with	 θ	 (in	 the	 full	 model).	 	 However,	 at	 the	 higher	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution,	 based	 on	 the	 human	 capital	 model,	 female	 wages	 are	 estimated	 to	
decrease	 by	 20.7	 per	 cent	 if	 they	 had	 the	 same	 characteristics	 as	men,	 and	 their	
wages	are	estimated	to	decrease	by	just	1.6	per	cent	in	the	full	model.	 	Also	at	the	
higher	end	of	 the	wage	distribution,	based	on	 the	human	capital	model,	 if	women	
were	 to	 receive	 the	 same	 rate	of	 return	 to	characteristics	as	men	do	 (unexplained	
component),	 their	 wages	 are	 expected	 to	 increase	 by	 24.6	 per	 cent,	 but	 this	
disappears	in	the	full	model	(which	includes	controls	for	occupation	and	industry).	
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In	the	private	sector,	the	gender	wage	gap	is	just	over	25.0	per	cent	at	the	lower	end	
of	the	wage	distribution	at	the	10th	and	25th	percentiles.		In	the	full	model,	at	the	75th	
and	 90th	 percentiles	 the	 wage	 gap	 falls	 to	 16.0	 per	 cent	 and	 12.0	 per	 cent,	
respectively.	 	 Given	 that	 the	 wage	 gap	 is	 largest	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution	 in	 both	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 we	 conclude	 that	 women	 in	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 face	 sticky	 floors	 irrespective	 of	 their	 sector	 of	 employment.		
Notwithstanding	this,	there	still	appears	to	have	sizeable	amounts	of	discrimination	
(unexplained	component)	in	the	private	sector	along	the	entire	spectrum	of	wages.		
Throughout	the	wage	distribution	in	the	private	sector,	if	women	were	to	be	paid	at	
the	same	rate	as	men	for	their	given	characteristics,	their	wages	would	increase	by	
approximately	22	per	cent.	
	
These	 results	 show	that	 the	public	 sector	pay	gap	 is	mostly	prevalent	at	 the	 lower	
end	of	the	wage	distribution	whereas	there	is	a	higher	private	sector	gap	throughout	
the	entire	wage	distribution.		Interestingly,	this	contradicts	with	standard	economic	
theory.		Becker	(1957)	has	suggested	that	profit-maximising	behaviour,	which	is	the	
norm	in	the	private	sector,	conflicts	with	the	practice	of	discrimination	on	the	part	of	
profit-maximising	 firms	 (“taste-based	 discrimination”).	 	 Nonetheless,	 one	 main	
reason	why	 the	male-female	wage	differential	 in	 the	public	 sector	may	be	 smaller	
than	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 pay	 system	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 is	
centralised.		The	Personnel	Department	of	the	Government	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	
established	 by	 the	 Civil	 Service	 Act	 1965	 (Chapter	 23:01),	 is	 responsible	 for	
determining	and	advising	on	the	pay	and	other	terms	and	conditions	of	service	for	
employees	 within	 the	 public	 sector	 (public	 service	 and	 statutory	 bodies).	 	 Also,	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 enacted	 the	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Act	 in	 2000,	which	 promotes	
equality	in	opportunity	between	persons	of	different	status,	including	sex.		It	is	likely	
that	enforcement	of	 this	Act	and	other	 labour	regulations	 is	more	prevalent	 in	 the	
public	sector	than	it	is	in	the	private	sector.		Furthermore,	most	of	the	private	sector	
in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 is	not	unionised	–	Mahabir	et	al	(2013)	noted	that	 in	2011,	
the	trade	union	intensity	ratio	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	was	16.4	per	cent.					
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Table	4.6:	Wage	Decompositions	by	Sector	of	Employment	
		 Public	Sector	 Private	Sector	
		 Oaxaca	Decomposition		
Mean	Analysis		 HC	Model	
Std.		
Err.		
Full	
Model	
Std.	
Err.		
HC	
Model	
Std.		
Err.		
Full	
Model	
Std.	
Err.		
			Raw	Difference	 1.032	 0.041	 1.032	 0.041	 1.226***	 0.038	 1.229***	 0.038	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.836***	 0.024	 0.904**	 0.031	 0.911***	 0.017	 0.969	 0.027	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.235***	 0.041	 1.144***	 0.035	 1.346***	 0.035	 1.268***	 0.036	
		 Machado	and	Mata	(2005)	/	Melly	(2006)	Decomposition		
		 HC	Model	
Std.		
Err.		
Full	
Model	
Std.	
Err.		
HC	
Model	
Std.		
Err.		
Full	
Model	
Std.	
Err.		
Quantile	.10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 1.301**	 0.086	 1.228**	 0.075	 1.251***	 0.029	 1.259***	 0.026	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.907**	 0.034	 0.929*	 0.052	 0.946**	 0.028	 1.020	 0.041	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.434***	 0.032	 1.323***	 0.040	 1.322***	 0.024	 1.235***	 0.025	
Quantile	.25	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 1.035	 0.036	 1.062	 0.038	 1.253***	 0.029	 1.253***	 0.026	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.886***	 0.036	 0.917***	 0.040	 0.931**	 0.022	 1.014	 0.038	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.169***	 0.022	 1.158***	 0.024	 1.345***	 0.024	 1.235***	 0.022	
Quantile	.50	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 0.970	 0.038	 1.000	 0.043	 1.217***	 0.024	 1.214***	 0.021	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.811***	 0.041	 0.896***	 0.040	 0.932**	 0.019	 0.985	 0.036	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.197***	 0.033	 1.117***	 0.032	 1.306***	 0.020	 1.233***	 0.021	
Quantile	.75	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 0.921**	 0.032	 0.913**	 0.033	 1.152***	 0.033	 1.160***	 0.034	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.832***	 0.048	 0.929**	 0.045	 0.896***	 0.036	 0.948*	 0.044	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.106**	 0.030	 0.983	 0.028	 1.285***	 0.024	 1.224***	 0.025	
Quantile	.90	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
			Raw	Difference	 0.988	 0.027	 0.971	 0.025	 1.109*	 0.052	 1.120*	 0.048	
			Explained	(characteristics)	 0.793***	 0.071	 0.984	 0.052	 0.840***	 0.059	 0.906*	 0.059	
			Unexplained	(coefficients)	 1.246***	 0.037	 0.986	 0.033	 1.320***	 0.042	 1.236***	 0.042	
Exponentiated	coefficients;	bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	for	quantile	decompositions.		
*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001.	
	
4.5.4 Decomposition	of	Log	Wage	Equations	using	RIF-OLS	regressions			
	
As	 discussed	 earlier,	 the	main	 advantage	 of	 the	 RIF-OLS	 decomposition	 technique	
developed	by	Firpo,	Fortin	and	Lemieux	(2009)	is	that	it	allows	for	the	computation	
of	 detailed	 decompositions	 across	 quantiles.	 	 More	 specifically,	 the	 technique	
facilitates	the	estimation	of	the	contribution	of	each	covariate	in	determining	gender	
wage	 differentials	 at	 different	 quantiles,	 either	 as	 part	 of	 the	 composition	 effect	
(that	 is,	the	effect	of	the	characteristics)	or	the	wage	structure	effect	(the	effect	of	
coefficients).			
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In	order	to	compare	the	results	of	the	RIF	decompositions	with	the	MM	(2005)/Melly	
(2006)	 decompositions,	 the	 same	 models	 and	 covariates	 were	 used	 –	 that	 is,	 a	
human	 capital	model;	 an	 extended	model	 (full	model)	which	 includes	 controls	 for	
sector	 of	 employment,	 occupation	 and	 industry;	 and	 separate	 decompositions	 for	
the	public	 and	private	 sectors.	 	 The	decompositions	were	 also	based	on	 the	 same	
five	quantiles	–	10%,	25%,	50%,	75%	and	90%.			
	
The	results	from	both	quantile	decomposition	techniques	are	broadly	similar	to	each	
other,	with	some	noticeable	differences	at	the	extremes	of	the	wage	distribution	–	
at	the	10th	and	90th	quantiles	(Figure	4.7).	 	Both	decompositions	point	to	a	higher	
wage	 gap	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution	 indicating	 that	 women	 in	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 face	 sticky	 floors	 rather	 than	 a	 glass	 ceiling.	 	 The	 median	
decompositions	 for	 both	 techniques	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 mean	 regression	
analysis.			
	
Figure	4.7:	Raw	Gender	Wage	Gap	
	
	
Table	 4.7	 to	 Table	 4.9	 present	 the	 detailed	 decompositions	 for	 the	 human	 capital	
and	 full	 models,	 respectively.	 	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 explained	 component,	 upper	
secondary	 and	 tertiary	 education	 in	 both	 models	 help	 to	 reduce	 gender	 wage	
differentials	across	the	entire	wage	distribution.		Given	that	these	coefficients	are	all	
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less	 than	 one	 within	 the	 explained	 component	 highlights	 the	 prominence	 of	
education	being	a	 source	of	better	 female	endowments.	 	At	 the	higher	end	of	 the	
wage	 distribution	 in	 both	 models,	 where	 women	 have	 more	 years	 of	 tertiary	
education	 than	men,	 the	 effect	 of	 reducing	 gender	 wage	 differentials	 is	 seen	 the	
most.				
	
In	the	full	model	(Table	4.8	and	Table	4.9),	 in	addition	to	education,	working	in	the	
public	 sector	 decreases	 the	 explained	 component	 of	 the	 wage	 gap	 across	 all	
quantiles.		Notably,	only	Machine	Operators	and	Craft	Workers	widen	the	explained	
component	 of	 the	 wage	 gap	 throughout	 the	 wage	 distribution.	 	 These	 two	
occupations	 are	 male-dominated	 employing	 13.5	 per	 cent	 and	 25.6	 per	 cent,	
respectively	of	all	men	 in	the	sample	compared	with	only	1.5	per	cent	and	2.2	per	
cent	of	all	female	workers.		The	wage	gaps	within	these	two	professions	are	wider	at	
the	lower	end	of	the	pay	scale.	
	
The	 total	 unexplained	 component	 (returns	 to	 characteristics)	 in	 both	 the	 human	
capital	and	the	full	model	is	sizeable	at	the	lower	end	of	the	pay	scale.		For	instance,	
if	female	workers	received	similar	rates	of	return	for	their	endowments,	at	the	10th	
percentile	 their	wages	are	 likely	 to	 increase	by	36.9	per	 cent	 in	 the	human	capital	
model,	and	29.0	per	cent	after	controlling	for	job	characteristics	(full	model).		There	
appears	to	be	less	discrimination	taking	place	among	higher	paying	jobs,	as	women’s	
wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	either	12.4	per	cent	(human	capital	model)	or	4.3	
per	 cent	 (full	model)	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile	 if	 they	were	 rewarded	 equivalently	 as	
men.			
	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 individual	 contributors	 to	 the	 coefficient	 component,	 the	
potential	experience	variable	exerts	a	sizeable	 impact	on	gender	wage	differentials	
throughout	the	wage	distribution	(see	Figure	).		Its	effect	widens	the	pay	gap,	and	is	
most	prominent	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution	(see	Figure	8).		This	shows	
that	men’s	(potential)	work	experience	is	rewarded	more	than	that	of	women,	and	
even	more	so	among	lower	paying	jobs.		The	returns	to	education	in	both	models,	in	
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particular	upper	secondary	and	tertiary	education,	are	also	positive	(i.e.,	coefficients	
are	greater	than	unity)	at	the	higher	end	of	the	wage	distribution.		This	means	that	
even	though	women	are	better	educated,	men	receive	greater	rewards	to	education	
at	higher	quantiles.			
	
Married	men	are	consistently	rewarded	a	premium	for	their	marital	status	across	all	
quantiles	except	at	 the	90th	percentile	 in	 the	 full	model.	 	 Lower	paid	married	men	
earn	the	greatest	premium,	receiving	about	10.7	per	cent	(human	capital	model)	and	
6.6	 per	 cent	 (full	 model)	 higher	 wages	 at	 the	 10th	 percentile	 compared	 to	 their	
married	female	counterpart.		As	was	previously	discussed,	this	may	be	due	in	part	to	
men	 being	 more	 successful	 at	 negotiating	 their	 salary	 packages	 and	 using	 their	
marital	 status	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 requesting	 higher	 wages.	 	 Further,	 women	 at	 the	
bottom	of	the	wage	distribution	are	more	 likely	to	have	 less	bargaining	power	and	
social	norms	and	family	commitments	may	lead	to	men’s	careers	taking	precedence	
(Arulampalam	et	al,	2007).	
	
Apart	 from	 these	 individual	 covariates	 contributing	 to	 the	 widening	 of	 the	 wage	
differential	 across	 the	 quantiles,	 the	 constant	 term	 exerts	 the	 biggest	 individual	
impact.		This	may	be	indicative	of	discriminatory	practices	on	the	part	of	employers	
as	men	simply	enter	the	labour	market	at	an	advantage	over	women.		The	extent	of	
discrimination	 is	highest	between	the	25th	and	75th	quantiles,	but	 its	 impact	on	the	
wage	differential	at	the	higher	end	of	wages	is	almost	mute.		Despite	the	full	model	
including	additional	controls	for	sector	of	employment,	occupation	and	industry,	the	
constant	 term	 still	 remains	 large	 (greater	 than	unity),	 reflecting	 the	 sizeable	male-
advantage	in	the	labour	market.	
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Table	4.7:	Wage	Decompositions	based	on	RIF-Regressions		
(Human	Capital	Model)	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Raw	Difference	 1.302***	 1.268***	 1.073**	 0.996	 0.924**	
		 (0.052)	 (0.043)	 (0.034)	 (0.048)	 (0.038)	
Explained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
			Potential	Experience	 1.007	 1.004	 1.011*	 1.027**	 1.036**	
		 (0.011)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.015)	 (0.019)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.006	 1.009	 1.005	 0.995	 0.979*	
		 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.010)	 (0.013)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.015**	 1.016***	 1.022***	 1.022***	 1.009**	
		 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.004)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.991	 0.989	 0.987	 0.983	 0.992	
		 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.016)	 (0.008)	
			Tertiary	 0.927***	 0.901***	 0.852***	 0.752***	 0.811***	
		 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.016)	 (0.025)	 (0.022)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.002	 1.002	 1.002	 1.000	 1.000	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 1.011**	 1.005	 1.003	 0.992	 0.991	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	
			African	 0.994	 0.995	 0.999	 1.003	 1.008	
		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
Total	 0.952***	 0.919***	 0.876***	 0.769***	 0.822***	
		 (0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.014)	 (0.022)	 (0.020)	
Unexplained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
			Potential	Experience	 0.848	 1.022	 0.881	 0.745	 0.513**	
		 (0.231)	 0.207		 (0.131)	 (0.169)	 (0.129)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.158	 0.998	 1.056	 1.224	 1.508***	
		 (0.194)	 (0.125)	 (0.105)	 (0.168)	 (0.192)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.111*	 0.953	 0.973	 0.993	 1.000	
		 (0.058)	 (0.039)	 (0.028)	 (0.032)	 (0.025)	
			Upper	Secondary	 1.008	 0.898***	 0.927***	 1.006	 1.052*	
		 (0.041)	 (0.030)	 (0.023)	 (0.035)	 (0.031)	
			Tertiary	 1.001	 0.942***	 0.928***	 0.967*	 1.074***	
		 (0.018)	 (0.014)	 (0.010)	 (0.017)	 (0.027)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.107***	 1.073***	 1.084	 1.089	 1.006	
		 (0.036)	 (0.029)	 (0.026)	 (0.039)	 (0.033)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.999	 1.018	 1.007	 1.009	 1.092**	
		 (0.044)	 (0.035)	 (0.029)	 (0.045)	 (0.045)	
			African	 1.016	 0.992	 1.009	 1.017	 1.116**	
		 (0.045)	 (0.034)	 (0.030)	 (0.048)	 (0.049)	
			Constant	term	 1.106	 1.546***	 1.428***	 1.317*	 1.050	
		 (0.233)	 (0.228)	 (0.166)	 (0.215)	 (0.157)	
Total	 1.369***	 1.379***	 1.225***	 1.296***	 1.124***	
		 (0.053)	 (0.044)	 (0.032)	 (0.047)	 (0.038)	
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Table	4.8:	Wage	Decompositions	based	on	RIF-Regressions	–	Explained	Component	
	(Full	Model)	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Raw	Difference	 1.328***	 1.269***	 1.073**	 0.998	 0.926*	
		 (0.052)	 (0.043)	 (0.034)	 (0.049)	 (0.038)	
			Potential	Experience	 1.004	 1.000	 1.006	 1.013	 1.030	
		 (0.010)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.010)	 (0.016)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.005	 1.008	 1.005	 1.001	 0.981	
		 (0.011)	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	 (0.009)	 (0.012)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.008	 1.011	 1.015	 1.013	 1.005	
		 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.995	 0.993	 0.993	 0.990	 0.995	
		 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.010)	 (0.005)	
			Tertiary	 0.968	 0.953	 0.919	 0.858	 0.879	
		 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.012)	 (0.020)	 (0.019)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.002	 1.002	 1.001	 1.000	 1.000	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 1.011	 1.004	 1.002	 0.993	 0.993	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	
			African	 0.994	 0.995	 0.999	 1.003	 1.007	
		 (0.005)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		 		 		 		
			Public	Sector	 0.981	 0.978	 0.981	 0.969	 0.984	
		 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.010)	 (0.006)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 1.048	 1.050	 1.052	 1.047	 1.007	
		 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.008)	
			Craft	Worker	 1.109	 1.088	 1.099	 1.083	 1.031	
		 (0.019)	 (0.014)	 (0.012)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.968	 0.994	 0.980	 0.968	 0.996	
		 (0.010)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	
			Clerical	 0.944	 0.948	 0.931	 1.010	 1.023	
		 (0.014)	 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.008)	
			Technician	 0.962	 0.963	 0.945	 0.927	 0.978	
		 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	 (0.014)	 (0.008)	
			Professional	 0.989	 0.989	 0.984	 0.966	 0.975	
		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	
			Manager	 0.996	 0.996	 0.995	 0.993	 0.995	
		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 0.998	 1.000	 1.001	 0.998	 0.999	
		 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 1.016	 1.014	 1.015	 1.026	 1.020	
		 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	
			Manufacturing	 1.010	 1.006	 1.003	 1.011	 1.007	
		 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 1.003	 1.002	 1.004	 1.014	 1.013	
		 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 0.994	 1.006	 1.013	 1.000	 0.986	
		 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	
			Transport/Communication	 1.006	 1.005	 1.004	 1.009	 1.009	
		 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
			Finance/Insurance	 0.984	 0.984	 0.993	 0.990	 0.986	
		 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
			Construction	 1.045	 1.030	 1.010	 1.009	 0.995	
		 (0.016)	 (0.012)	 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.008)	
Total	(explained	component)	 1.030	 1.010	 0.935**	 0.879***	 0.888***	
		 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.021)	 (0.033)	 (0.027)	
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Table	4.9:	Wage	Decompositions	based	on	RIF-Regressions	–	Unexplained	
Component	(Full	Model)	
	Unexplained	Component	 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
			Potential	Experience	 0.756	 0.897*	 0.837*	 0.810	 0.625**	
		 (0.151)	 (0.129)	 (0.090)	 (0.132)	 (0.113)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.185	 1.056	 1.069	 1.109	 1.331***	
		 (0.142)	 (0.093)	 (0.073)	 (0.105)	 (0.124)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.109***	 0.983	 0.991	 0.974	 0.99	
		 (0.039)	 (0.029)	 (0.019)	 (0.022)	 (0.018)	
			Upper	Secondary	 1.057*	 0.972	 0.99	 1.005	 1.036	
		 (0.032)	 (0.027)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.023)	
			Tertiary	 1.038**	 0.990**	 0.973**	 0.993	 1.084***	
		 (0.019)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.022)	 (0.029)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.066***	 1.050***	 1.050***	 1.041*	 0.995	
		 (0.025)	 (0.020)	 (0.017)	 (0.025)	 (0.023)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.981	 1.004	 0.995	 0.997	 1.055*	
		 (0.030)	 (0.023)	 (0.019)	 (0.030)	 (0.030)	
			African	 0.987	 0.982	 0.998	 1.001	 1.072**	
		 (0.033)	 (0.025)	 (0.021)	 (0.034)	 (0.034)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		 		 		 		
			Public	Sector	 0.991	 0.978**	 0.957**	 0.97	 0.973	
		 (0.028)	 (0.022)	 (0.018)	 (0.028)	 (0.025)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 1.005	 0.997	 1.005	 1.002	 0.997	
		 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.004)	
			Craft	Worker	 0.984**	 0.985**	 0.987**	 1.006	 1.006	
		 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	 (0.003)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.977	 1.018	 1.013	 1.054***	 0.995	
		 (0.025)	 (0.021)	 (0.014)	 (0.019)	 (0.016)	
			Clerical	 0.968**	 0.979	 0.99	 1.005	 1.000	
		 (0.014)	 (0.011)	 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	
			Technician	 0.965*	 0.968**	 0.968**	 0.952**	 0.985	
		 (0.020)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.020)	 (0.018)	
			Professional	 0.977***	 0.982***	 0.985***	 0.976**	 0.972*	
		 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.010)	 (0.015)	
			Manager	 0.991**	 0.993	 0.994	 0.993	 0.989	
		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.008)	 (0.009)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 1.007	 1.000	 0.999	 1.001	 1.001	
		 (0.008)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 1.002	 1.003	 1.001	 1.004	 1.007	
		 (0.001)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
			Manufacturing	 0.996	 1.003	 0.997	 1.001	 1.010	
		 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 1.003	 1.002	 0.999	 0.991**	 0.998	
		 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 0.994	 1.015	 1.01	 0.989	 1.012	
		 (0.022)	 (0.017)	 (0.012)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	
			Transport/Communication	 0.995	 0.996	 0.996	 1.012*	 1.015**	
		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	
			Finance/Insurance	 0.993	 0.995*	 0.985*	 0.985	 1.023	
		 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.012)	 (0.014)	
			Construction	 1.052***	 1.033***	 1.021***	 0.998	 1.016***	
		 (0.017)	 (0.011)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	 (0.006)	
			Constant	term	 1.269	 1.433***	 1.417***	 1.330**	 1.006	
		 (0.226)	 (0.179)	 (0.130)	 (0.170)	 (0.114)	
Total	 1.290***	 1.257***	 1.148***	 1.135***	 1.043	
		 (0.044)	 (0.032)	 (0.023)	 (0.034)	 (0.031)	
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Figure	4.8:	Wage-Experience	Curves	–	Human	Capital	Model	
	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
2.00	
2.20	
2.40	
2.60	
2.80	
3.00	
0	 5	 10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45	
Eﬀ
ec
t	o
n	
Lo
g	
W
ag
es
	
Experience	(years)	
Men_10	 Women_10	
2.00	
2.20	
2.40	
2.60	
2.80	
3.00	
3.20	
0	 5	 10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45	
Eﬀ
ec
t	o
n	
Lo
g	
W
ag
es
	
Experience	(years)	
Men_25	 Women_25	
2.20	
2.40	
2.60	
2.80	
3.00	
3.20	
3.40	
0	 5	 10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45	
Eﬀ
ec
t	o
n	
Lo
g	
W
ag
es
	
Experience	(years)	
Men_50	 Women_50	
2.40	
2.60	
2.80	
3.00	
3.20	
3.40	
3.60	
3.80	
0	 5	 10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45	
Eﬀ
ec
t	o
n	
Lo
g	
W
ag
es
	
Experience	(years)	
Men_75	 Women_75	
3.00	
3.20	
3.40	
3.60	
3.80	
4.00	
4.20	
0	 5	 10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45	
Eﬀ
ec
t	o
n	
Lo
g	
W
ag
es
	
Experience	(years)	
Men_90	 Women_90	
174	
	
4.5.5 Decomposition	of	Log	Wage	Equations	by	Public-Private	Sector	of	
Employment	(using	RIF-OLS	regressions)	
	
In	 Chapter	 3	 where	 we	 used	 the	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 methodology	 as	 the	 baseline	
analysis	 for	 this	 present	 research,	 there	was	 a	much	 larger	 pay	 gap	 in	 the	 private	
sector	(22.9	per	cent)	than	in	the	public	sector	(3.2	per	cent).		Here,	we	use	the	RIF-
OLS	 regressions	 to	 decompose	 wage	 differentials	 in	 both	 sectors	 of	 employment	
over	varying	quantiles	to	see	if	the	wage	gap	differs	along	the	distribution	of	wages.						
	
Public	Sector	
The	overall	pay	gap	in	the	public	sector	is	largest	at	the	10th	percentile,	amounting	
to	25.4	per	cent	in	the	full	model	(Table	4.11).		This	is	mostly	driven	by	differences	in	
the	 returns	 to	 characteristics	 (unexplained	 component).	 	 At	 the	 higher	 end	 of	 the	
wage	distribution,	women	are	 rewarded	more	 than	men	 for	 their	 (potential)	work	
experience,	but	 this	 trend	 reverses	at	 the	 lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution	with	
men	being	rewarded	at	much	higher	rates	for	their	experience	(Figure	4.9).		Marital	
status	 of	 men	 working	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 impact	 the	
unexplained	gender	wage	differential	throughout	the	entire	distribution	of	wages	as	
these	coefficients	are	close	to	unity	(Table	4.12).			
	
In	 the	 occupational	 groupings	 for	 Clerical	 workers,	 Technicians,	 and	 Professionals,	
women	 are	 rewarded	 slightly	 more	 than	 men	 (these	 coefficients	 are	 just	 under	
unity).		Notably,	these	three	categories	are	female-dominated	–	for	clerical	workers,	
28.9	per	cent	of	all	female	public	servants	are	clerks	compared	to	only	6.6	per	cent	
of	 all	 male	 public	 servants;	 27.7	 per	 cent	 of	 female	 public	 sector	 employees	 are	
technicians	 compared	 to	14.5	per	 cent	of	 all	men;	 and	12.0	per	 cent	of	 all	 female	
public	sector	workers	are	professional	staff	compared	with	5.9	per	cent	of	all	male	
public	 sector	 workers	 (see	 Table	 3.3:	 Sample	 Characteristics).	 	 Even	 though	 there	
exists	 some	 level	of	occupational	 segregation,	women	 in	 these	professions	are	not	
unduly	paid	as	sometimes	suggested	in	the	economics	literature.			
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In	terms	of	industries,	men	appear	to	be	rewarded	much	more	among	low	paid	jobs	
in	the	Construction	industry	(27.3	per	cent	higher	at	the	10th	percentile)	–	Table	4.12.		
Men	 also	 appear	 to	 simply	 enter	 the	 job	 market	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 pay	
spectrum	at	a	great	advantage	over	women	given	that	the	constant	term	is	large	and	
greater	 than	unity.	 	 This	male	 advantage	dissipates	 at	 the	higher	 end	of	 the	wage	
distribution.							
	
In	 the	 full	model	 for	 the	public	sector,	 just	as	 in	 the	sample	 for	 the	entire	working	
population,	 the	 fact	 that	women	are	better	 educated	 than	men	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	
negative	 impact	 (coefficients	 of	 less	 than	 unity)	 of	 tertiary	 education	 on	 the	
explained	differential	of	the	gap	throughout	the	entire	distribution	of	wages	(Table	
4.11).			
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Table	4.10:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Public	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	
Human	Capital	Model	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Raw	Difference	 1.254**	 1.060	 0.971	 0.879**	 0.932	
		 (0.108)	 (0.049)	 (0.056)	 (0.046)	 (0.055)	
Explained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
			Potential	Experience	 0.959	 1.038	 1.119***	 1.190***	 1.154***	
		 (0.068)	 (0.040)	 (0.049)	 (0.059)	 (0.062)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.083	 0.998	 0.956	 0.898***	 0.921*	
		 (0.079)	 (0.034)	 (0.034)	 (0.035)	 (0.041)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.039*	 1.025**	 1.044***	 1.012*	 1.013*	
		 (0.023)	 (0.012)	 (0.016)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	
			Upper	Secondary	 1.038	 1.029	 1.044	 1.023	 1.014	
		 (0.031)	 (0.022)	 (0.034)	 (0.018)	 (0.012)	
			Tertiary	 0.777***	 0.811***	 0.696***	 0.748***	 0.779***	
		 (0.041)	 (0.026)	 (0.033)	 (0.030)	 (0.031)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.005	 1.003	 1.001	 0.997	 1.001	
		 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 1.002	 1.003	 1.000	 1.004	 0.986	
		 (0.011)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.009)	
			African	 1.000	 0.999	 0.999	 1.001	 1.005	
		 (0.006)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.006)	
Total	 0.876***	 0.890***	 0.811***	 0.829***	 0.843***	
		 (0.029)	 (0.021)	 (0.029)	 (0.027)	 (0.027)	
Unexplained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
			Potential	Experience	 1.267	 0.779	 0.617*	 0.592	 0.786	
		 (0.720)	 (0.198)	 (0.182)	 (0.179)	 (0.295)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.772	 1.176	 1.321	 1.392*	 1.233	
		 (0.315)	 (0.220)	 (0.233)	 (0.223)	 (0.240)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.803*	 0.947	 0.942*	 1.000	 1.007	
		 (0.090)	 (0.041)	 (0.033)	 (0.022)	 (0.024)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.623***	 0.911*	 1.003	 1.05	 1.057	
		 (0.095)	 (0.050)	 (0.045)	 (0.041)	 (0.046)	
			Tertiary	 0.707***	 0.903***	 0.933***	 1.038	 1.165***	
		 (0.068)	 (0.031)	 (0.025)	 (0.031)	 (0.058)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.081	 1.068	 1.073*	 1.045	 0.985	
		 (0.074)	 (0.038)	 (0.044)	 (0.043)	 (0.049)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.995	 0.976	 1.047	 1.047	 1.063	
		 (0.072)	 (0.036)	 (0.048)	 (0.043)	 (0.056)	
			African	 0.951	 0.952	 0.972	 1.062	 1.117	
		 (0.093)	 (0.050)	 (0.060)	 (0.062)	 (0.083)	
			Constant	term	 4.047***	 1.684***	 1.524**	 1.014	 0.785	
		 (1.692)	 (0.329)	 (0.310)	 (0.181)	 (0.184)	
Total	 1.432***	 1.192***	 1.197***	 1.06	 1.105*	
		 (0.131)	 (0.049)	 (0.053)	 (0.042)	 (0.059)	
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Table	4.11:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Public	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	-	
(Explained	Component)		
Full	Model	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Raw	Difference	 1.254	 1.060	 0.971	 0.879**	 0.932	
		 (0.014)	 (0.050)	 (0.057)	 (0.047)	 (0.056)	
Explained	Component	 	 	 	 	 	
Potential	Experience	 0.982	 1.053*	 1.080**	 1.157***	 1.144***	
		 (0.062)	 (0.039)	 (0.040)	 (0.050)	 (0.058)	
Potential	Experience2	 1.049	 0.974	 0.967	 0.913**	 0.926*	
		 (0.070)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)	 (0.033)	 (0.041)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
Lower	Secondary	 1.010	 1.006	 1.024**	 1.004	 1.007	
		 (0.019)	 (0.009)	 (0.011)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	
Upper	Secondary	 1.012	 1.009	 1.019	 1.014	 1.010	
		 (0.015)	 (0.008)	 (0.016)	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	
Tertiary	 0.924	 0.922***	 0.834***	 0.849***	 0.852***	
		 (0.050)	 (0.024)	 (0.028)	 (0.026)	 (0.030)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
Married	 1.007	 1.003	 1.005	 1.000	 1.004	
		 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
Indian	 1.000	 1.003	 1.004	 1.008	 0.989	
		 (0.010)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.009)	
African	 0.999	 0.998	 0.996	 0.998	 1.001	
		 (0.006)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
Machine	Operator	 1.055***	 1.060***	 1.054***	 1.022**	 1.015	
		 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.016)	 (0.011)	 (0.014)	
Craft	Worker	 1.073***	 1.073***	 1.042***	 1.026**	 0.998	
		 (0.024)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.013)	
Sales	Worker	 1.011	 1.024**	 1.037**	 1.010	 1.000	
		 (0.013)	 (0.012)	 (0.018)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	
Clerical	 0.935*	 0.912***	 0.970	 1.013	 1.003	
		 (0.037)	 (0.020)	 (0.019)	 (0.011)	 (0.014)	
Technician	 0.943**	 0.934***	 0.910***	 0.945***	 0.985	
		 (0.024)	 (0.018)	 (0.022)	 (0.015)	 (0.012)	
Professional	 0.975*	 0.968***	 0.952***	 0.952***	 0.955**	
		 (0.014)	 (0.013)	 (0.018)	 (0.018)	 (0.019)	
Manager	 1.006	 1.006	 1.008	 1.006	 1.008	
		 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
Agriculture/Fishing	 0.997	 0.999	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	
		 (0.007)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.993	 0.999	 1.006	 1.003	 1.003	
		 (0.008)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
Manufacturing	 1.001	 1.003	 1.020***	 1.014**	 1.026**	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.008)	 (0.007)	 (0.014)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 1.003	 1.006*	 1.020***	 1.013	 1.012	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	
Wholesale/Retail	 1.001	 1.000	 1.001	 1.002	 1.002	
		 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	
Transport/Communication	 1.000	 1.006*	 1.025***	 1.016**	 1.012	
		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	
Finance/Insurance	 1.007	 1.005	 0.999	 0.998	 0.994	
		 (0.008)	 (0.005)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	
Construction	 0.917***	 0.971***	 0.975**	 0.991**	 0.997	
		 (0.027)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Total	(explained	component)	 0.889***	 0.920**	 0.923***	 0.925*	 0.922*	
		 (0.041)	 (0.029)	 (0.043)	 (0.039)	 (0.041)	
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Table	4.12:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Public	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	-	
(Unexplained	Component)	
Full	Model	
Unexplained	Component	 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
			Potential	Experience	 0.842	 0.696*	 0.765	 0.803	 1.011	
		 (0.370)	 (0.143)	 (0.177)	 (0.198)	 (0.305)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.039	 1.219*	 1.118	 1.149	 1.063	
		 (0.301)	 (0.167)	 (0.141)	 (0.136)	 (0.158)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.933	 0.993	 0.943**	 0.991	 1.006	
		 (0.078)	 (0.033)	 (0.025)	 (0.016)	 (0.019)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.938	 1.000	 0.986	 1.053	 1.062	
		 (0.111)	 (0.048)	 (0.040)	 (0.033)	 (0.039)	
			Tertiary	 0.949	 0.969	 0.955	 1.073*	 1.153***	
		 (0.082)	 (0.035)	 (0.033)	 (0.037)	 (0.059)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.015	 1.025	 1.006	 0.993	 0.965	
		 (0.055)	 (0.027)	 (0.027)	 (0.029)	 (0.034)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 1.002	 0.992	 1.029	 1.019	 1.010	
		 (0.051)	 (0.027)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)	 (0.041)	
			African	 1.015	 0.991	 1.012	 1.033	 1.062	
		 (0.074)	 (0.038)	 (0.043)	 (0.046)	 (0.059)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 0.997	 1.000	 1.000	 0.995*	 0.991*	
		 (0.003)	 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	
			Craft	Worker	 0.984	 1.002	 0.998	 1.003	 1.001	
		 (0.012)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.988	 1.007	 1.008	 0.986	 0.983	
		 (0.053)	 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.016)	
			Clerical	 0.931	 0.984	 1.005	 0.997	 1.006	
		 (0.041)	 (0.019)	 (0.018)	 (0.011)	 (0.015)	
			Technician	 0.876	 0.987	 0.932**	 0.925***	 0.952*	
		 (0.065)	 (0.031)	 (0.030)	 (0.025)	 (0.026)	
			Professional	 0.953	 0.988	 0.965**	 0.951***	 0.982	
		 (0.030)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.016)	 (0.027)	
			Manager	 0.987	 1.007	 0.997	 0.977**	 0.970**	
		 (0.012)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.009)	 (0.012)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 1.017	 1.005	 0.994	 0.994**	 0.997	
		 (0.025)	 (0.010)	 (0.007)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 1.013	 1.003	 1.002	 1.001	 1.003	
		 (0.014)	 (0.004)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	
			Manufacturing	 0.999	 0.996	 0.995	 0.998	 1.002	
		 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.999	 0.996	 0.989*	 0.993	 1.000	
		 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 1.001	 0.998	 0.998	 1.001	 1.000	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	
			Transport/Communication	 0.993	 0.988**	 1.001	 1.01	 1.011	
		 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	
			Finance/Insurance	 1.007	 0.996	 0.990	 0.999	 1.009	
		 (0.010)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.008)	
			Construction	 1.273***	 1.058**	 0.984	 0.978**	 0.997	
		 (0.082)	 (0.023)	 (0.014)	 (0.009)	 (0.008)	
			Constant	term	 1.929*	 1.384*	 1.530**	 1.069	 0.815	
		 (0.669)	 (0.242)	 (0.229)	 (0.146)	 (0.138)	
Total	 1.411***	 1.153***	 1.052	 0.950	 1.010	
		 (0.112)	 (0.038)	 (0.037)	 (0.031)	 (0.045)	
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Figure	4.9:	Wage-Experience	Curves	–	Public	Sector	(HC	Model)	
	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
Private	Sector	
The	most	noticeable	differences	in	the	results	for	the	decompositions	based	on	the	
RIF-OLS	technique	and	the	Machado	and	Mata/Melly	 technique	are	 for	 the	private	
sector.		RIF	regressions	show	that	in	the	full	model	the	raw	gender	pay	gap	peaks	at	
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the	25th	percentile,	is	lowest	at	the	median,	and	then	increases	as	you	move	higher	
up	along	the	wage	distribution.		On	the	other	hand,	the	MM/Melly	results	show	the	
private	 sector	pay	gap	 continually	decreasing	as	 you	move	 towards	 the	 top	of	 the	
wage	distribution	(Figure	4.5).	
	
Figure	4.5:	Raw	Wage	Gaps	Private	Sector	
(Full	Model)	
	
	
In	the	human	capital	model,	the	total	explained	component	shows	that	women	have	
more	 favourable	 productive	 characteristics	 (throughout	 the	 wage	 distribution,	 all	
coefficients	 are	 less	 than	 unity)	 –	 Table	 4.13.	 	 However,	 when	 controls	 for	
occupation	and	industry	are	included,	the	explained	component	of	the	gender	wage	
gap	 widens	 (coefficients	 are	 greater	 than	 unity)	 –	 Table	 4.14.	 	 Those	 occupations	
(such	 as	 Machine	 Operators	 and	 Craft	 Workers)	 and	 industries	 (like	 Mining	 and	
Quarrying,	and	Construction)	that	have	a	greater	male	intensity	account	for	some	of	
the	explained	component	of	the	wage	differential	(Table	4.14).			
	
Turning	 to	 the	 returns	 to	 characteristics	 (unexplained	 component),	 private	 sector	
employers	reward	men’s	work	experience	more	than	they	reward	women	for	their	
work	experience	–	both	at	the	 low	and	high	end	of	the	wage	distribution,	men	are	
rewarded	more	than	women	for	their	labour	market	experience	(Figure	4.5).			
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Unlike	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 in	 the	 full	 model,	 at	 the	 extreme	 ends	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution	men	do	not	appear	to	have	a	“male”	advantage	given	that	the	constant	
terms	 are	 less	 than	 one	 at	 the	 10th	 and	 90th	 percentile	 (Table	 4.15).	 	 This	 male	
advantage	favours	men	in	the	middle	of	the	wage	distribution	between	the	25th	and	
75th	 percentiles.	 	At	 the	 lower	end,	 at	 the	25th	 percentile,	men	 receive	 the	 largest	
premium	of	28.9	per	cent	over	women	when	they	enter	 the	 labour	market.	At	 the	
top	of	the	wage	distribution,	men	and	women	are	rewarded	similarly	regardless	of	
their	characteristics	and	productivity	levels.			
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Table	4.13:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Private	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	-	
Human	Capital	Model	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Difference	 1.238***	 1.340***	 1.174***	 1.241***	 1.252***	
		 		 		 		 		 		
Explained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
Potential	Experience	 1.002	 0.998	 0.997	 0.997	 0.995	
		 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.013)	
Potential	Experience2	 0.998	 0.999	 1.000	 0.999	 1.000	
		 (0.008)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.008)	
Lower	Secondary	 1.008	 1.009	 1.009	 1.010	 1.005	
		 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.985*	 0.978**	 0.975**	 0.972**	 0.975**	
		 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.013)	
Tertiary	 0.982**	 0.965***	 0.95***	 0.918***	 0.86***	
		 (0.007)	 (0.010)	 (0.013)	 (0.021)	 (0.035)	
Married	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	
		 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	
Indian	 1.014*	 1.005	 1.003	 0.997	 0.993	
		 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.010)	
African	 0.995	 0.998	 1.000	 1.004	 1.010	
		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.008)	
Total	 0.982*	 0.952***	 0.934***	 0.899***	 0.840***	
		 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.019)	 (0.033)	
Unexplained	Component	 		 		 		 		 		
Potential	Experience	 0.712	 0.729	 0.949	 1.090	 0.780	
		 (0.190)	 (0.171)	 (0.190)	 (0.208)	 (0.333)	
Potential	Experience2	 1.299*	 1.275*	 1.035	 0.996	 1.255	
		 (0.198)	 (0.183)	 (0.124)	 (0.124)	 (0.279)	
Lower	Secondary	 1.187***	 1.031	 0.977	 1.034	 1.004	
		 (0.063)	 (0.054)	 (0.042)	 (0.042)	 (0.064)	
Upper	Secondary	 1.090**	 0.984	 0.943**	 0.990	 1.022	
		 (0.036)	 (0.033)	 (0.027)	 (0.031)	 (0.058)	
Tertiary	 1.020*	 0.999	 0.986	 0.974**	 1.014	
		 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.011)	 (0.032)	
Married	 1.085**	 1.073**	 1.092***	 1.032	 0.971	
		 (0.037)	 (0.035)	 (0.033)	 (0.034)	 (0.054)	
Indian	 0.984	 1.044	 1.014	 1.034	 1.127	
		 (0.049)	 (0.045)	 (0.039)	 (0.045)	 (0.092)	
African	 0.985	 1.034	 0.991	 1.071*	 1.205***	
		 (0.044)	 (0.039)	 (0.034)	 (0.040)	 (0.087)	
Constant	term	 0.981	 1.236*	 1.284*	 1.115	 1.108	
		 (0.185)	 (0.240)	 (0.190)	 (0.169)	 (0.270)	
Total	 1.260***	 1.347***	 1.257***	 1.381***	 1.490***	
		 (0.046)	 (0.051)	 (0.041)	 (0.048)	 (0.087)	
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Table	4.14:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Private	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	
(Explained	Component)		
Full	Model	
		 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
Raw	Difference	 1.238***	 1.341***	 1.176***	 1.244***	 1.260***	
		 (0.048)	 (0.053)	 (0.043)	 	(0.048)	 (0.092)	
			Potential	Experience	 1.001	 0.998	 0.997	 0.998	 0.997	
		 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.999	 1.000	 1.000	 0.999	 1.000	
		 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.005	 1.006	 1.006	 1.007	 1.000	
		 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.990*	 0.986**	 0.986**	 0.983**	 0.989	
		 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	
			Tertiary	 0.988	 0.983**	 0.976***	 0.954***	 0.928***	
		 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	 (0.013)	 (0.023)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	 0.999	 1.000	
		 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 1.011	 1.001	 1.000	 0.993	 0.99	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.010)	
			African	 0.994	 0.996	 0.997	 1.002	 1.008	
		 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.008)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 1.032***	 1.047***	 1.043***	 1.039***	 1.025	
		 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.011)	 (0.015)	
			Craft	Worker	 1.064***	 1.091***	 1.082***	 1.066***	 1.042*	
		 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.016)	 (0.016)	 (0.022)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.977	 0.985	 0.986	 1.004	 1.028**	
		 (0.017)	 (0.015)	 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.014)	
			Clerical	 0.975**	 0.941***	 0.943***	 0.974***	 1.023	
		 (0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.013)	 (0.015)	
			Technician	 0.986**	 0.973***	 0.966***	 0.959***	 0.957***	
		 (0.006)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.014)	 (0.015)	
			Professional	 1.000	 0.998	 0.998	 0.997	 0.993	
		 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	 (0.015)	
			Manager	 0.996	 0.990*	 0.988**	 0.984***	 0.974*	
		 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.009)	 (0.014)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 0.993***	 1.001	 1.001	 0.999	 0.997	
		 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 1.021	 1.029***	 1.030***	 1.038***	 1.077***	
		 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.009)	 (0.020)	
			Manufacturing	 1.008	 1.012*	 1.008	 1.008	 1.012	
		 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 1.000	 1.001	 1.002	 1.002	 1.005	
		 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.006)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 0.961**	 0.962***	 0.978*	 0.999	 0.975	
		 (0.017)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	 (0.012)	 (0.016)	
			Transport/Communication	 1.005	 1.006	 1.005	 1.004	 1.004	
		 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
			Finance/Insurance	 0.973***	 0.963***	 0.967***	 0.974***	 0.948***	
		 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	
			Construction	 1.112***	 1.138***	 1.092***	 1.078***	 1.087***	
		 (0.025)	 (0.022)	 (0.017)	 (0.018)	 (0.026)	
Total	(explained	component)	 1.081***	 1.093***	 1.039	 1.054	 1.046	
		 (0.025)	 (0.028)	 (0.028)	 (0.034)	 (0.059)	
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Table	4.15:	Wage	Decompositions	in	the	Private	Sector	(using	RIF-regressions)	
(Unexplained	Component)	
Full	Model	
Unexplained	Component	 Q10	 Q25	 Q50	 Q75	 Q90	
			Potential	Experience	 0.788	 0.719**	 0.879	 1.024	 0.837	
		 (0.144)	 (0.111)	 (0.112)	 (0.122)	 (0.217)	
			Potential	Experience2	 1.185	 1.236**	 1.052	 1.001	 1.156	
		 (0.124)	 (0.113)	 (0.079)	 (0.091)	 (0.175)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 1.093**	 1.020	 0.980	 1.011	 0.984	
		 (0.038)	 (0.035)	 (0.028)	 (0.028)	 (0.041)	
			Upper	Secondary	 1.047*	 1.010	 0.975	 1.004	 1.031	
		 (0.025)	 (0.024)	 (0.021)	 (0.023)	 (0.036)	
			Tertiary	 1.027*	 1.013	 0.991	 0.971**	 0.99	
		 (0.015)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.015)	 (0.034)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 1.039*	 1.042*	 1.059***	 1.017	 0.973	
		 (0.023)	 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.023)	 (0.034)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.966	 1.006	 0.997	 1.005	 1.075	
		 (0.030)	 (0.027)	 (0.023)	 (0.027)	 (0.052)	
			African	 0.979	 1.002	 0.982	 1.045*	 1.141***	
		 (0.032)	 (0.027)	 (0.023)	 (0.028)	 (0.056)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 1.022*	 0.998	 0.994	 1.004	 0.994	
		 (0.012)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.015)	
			Craft	Worker	 1.008	 0.989	 0.99	 0.996	 1.01	
		 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.010)	 (0.014)	
			Sales	Worker	 1.039	 1.006	 1.012	 1.022	 1.03	
		 (0.028)	 (0.025)	 (0.020)	 (0.019)	 (0.026)	
			Clerical	 1.008	 0.984	 0.997	 1.004	 1.006	
		 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.017)	
			Technician	 1.025	 0.988	 0.994	 1.008	 0.97	
		 (0.018)	 (0.016)	 (0.014)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	
			Professional	 0.994	 0.990*	 0.995	 1.002	 1.007	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.016)	
			Manager	 0.999	 0.992*	 0.998	 1.002	 1.012	
		 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.017)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 0.998	 1.002	 1.001	 0.999	 0.999	
		 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 1.004*	 1.002	 1.001	 1.002	 1.001	
		 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.008)	
			Manufacturing	 1.033**	 0.997	 1.005	 1.011	 1.022	
		 (0.017)	 (0.013)	 (0.013)	 (0.015)	 (0.023)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 1.008*	 1.005*	 1.004*	 1.002	 1.004	
		 (0.004)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 1.086**	 1.016	 0.996	 1.014	 0.984	
		 (0.037)	 (0.028)	 (0.022)	 (0.023)	 (0.030)	
			Transport/Communication	 1.003	 0.999	 0.996	 1.003	 1.010	
		 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.007)	 (0.009)	
			Finance/Insurance	 1.036*	 1.001	 0.996	 0.987	 1.007	
		 (0.020)	 (0.015)	 (0.014)	 (0.016)	 (0.032)	
			Construction	 1.012*	 1.009	 0.996	 0.994	 0.991	
		 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.008)	 (0.013)	
Constant	term	 0.811	 1.289*	 1.278**	 1.041	 0.992	
		 (0.131)	 (0.175)	 (0.134)	 (0.147)	 (0.179)	
Total	 1.145***	 1.227***	 1.132***	 1.180***	 1.204***	
		 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.027)	 (0.031)	 (0.059)	
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Figure	4.5:	Wage-Experience	Curves	–	Private	Sector	(HC	model)	
	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
4.6 Conclusions	
	
This	study	builds	upon	previous	work	by	exploring	the	gender	wage	gap	not	only	at	
the	mean,	 but	 also	 throughout	 the	 entire	wage	 distribution.	 	 Previously,	 research	
focussed	on	the	mean	gender	wage	gap	(for	example,	Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001	and	
Coppin	and	Olsen,	2007),	but	substantial	variations	in	the	gap	will	be	hidden	in	such	
analyses.	 Two	 recent	 quantile	 decompositions	 techniques	 (Machado	 and	 Mata	
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(2005)/Melly	(2006),	and	Firpo,	Fortin	and	Lemieux	(2009))	were	used	to	analyse	the	
wage	 gaps	 for	 the	 overall	 working	 population	 but	 also	 between	 the	 public	 and	
private	sectors.		These	techniques,	just	like	with	the	Blinder-Oaxaca	decompositions,	
allow	 us	 to	 isolate	 the	 wage	 differential	 into	 a	 portion	 due	 to	 differences	 in	
endowments	and	a	portion	due	to	differences	in	the	returns	to	these	endowments,	
but	at	different	points	(other	than	the	mean)	along	the	wage	distribution.		
	
In	terms	of	the	two	quantile	decomposition	methodologies	used	for	our	analysis,	the	
one	 based	 on	 the	 unconditional	 quantile	 regressions	 (that	 is,	 Firpo	 et	 al,	 2009)	 is	
preferred.	 	 This	methodology	 focuses	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 quantiles	 of	 the	
marginal	 unconditional	 distribution	 of	 wages,	 whereas	 as	 the	Machado	 and	Mata	
(2005)	 approach	 provides	 a	 full	 characterization	 of	 the	 conditional	 distribution	 of	
wages	given	X;	 it	does	not	provide	 the	marginal	density	of	 the	wage	observations.		
This	 is	 because	 the	 marginal	 density	 depends	 on	 both	 the	 conditional	 quantile	
function	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 covariates.	 	 Firpo	 et	 al	 (2009)	 use	 of	 RIF-
regressions	 allows	 the	 calculation	 of	 unconditional	 quantiles	 and	 provides	 a	
straightforward	 way	 of	 estimating	 unconditional	 quantile	 treatment	 effects.	 	 This	
method	 is	preferred	given	that,	 in	general,	we	are	more	 interested	 in	 the	effect	of	
covariates	on	the	unconditional	(marginal)	distribution	of	wages	rather	than	on	the	
conditional	distribution.		Although	the	Machado-Mata	method	provides	an	estimate	
of	the	effect	of	covariates	on	the	marginal	wage	distribution,	it	 is	cumbersome	and	
typically	requires	numerical	integration.		The	Firpo	et	al	technique	gives	an	appealing	
alternative.		
	
Furthermore,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 regression	 coefficients	𝛽(𝜃),	 is	 easier	 and	
more	 straightforward	with	 the	 RIF-regressions	 (Firpo	 et	 al)	 than	with	 the	 quantile	
regression	 approach	 (Machado-Mata).	 	 For	 instance,	 if	 X	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 for	
tertiary	 education	 versus	 secondary	 schooling,	 the	 estimate	 of	 𝛽(50)	 following	 a	
quantile	regression	is	not	the	effect	of	tertiary	education	on	the	50th	percentile	wage	
earner;	rather,	it	is	the	effect	of	tertiary	education	on	the	50th	percentile	of	the	wage	
distribution.	 	 However,	 the	 use	 of	 linearization	 in	 the	 RIF-regression	 technique	
generates	a	simple	regression,	which	is	easy	to	interpret	–	the	regression	coefficients	
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𝛽(𝜃)	 provide	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 unit	 increase	 in	 X	 on	 the	 unconditional	 value	 of	W	
(wages).		
	
Lastly,	a	major	drawback	of	the	Machado-Mata	decomposition	approach	is	that	the								
individual	contribution	of	each	covariate	(individual	and	firm-level	characteristics)	on	
the	gender	wage	gap	cannot	be	disaggregated,	which	makes	it	less	useful	for	policy	
recommendations.	 	The	use	of	the	RIF-regressions	 in	the	Firpo	et	al	decomposition	
technique	 allows	 for	 such	 disaggregation.	 	 Also,	 the	 Machado-Mata	 methodology	
focuses	on	the	impact	of	differences	in	the	returns	to	characteristics	on	the	gender	
wage	 gap	 and	 may	 understate	 the	 effects	 of	 characteristics.	 	 The	 Firpo	 et	 al	
decomposition	technique	was	able	to	elucidate	the	importance	of	education	for	the	
“explained”	 component	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 and	 marital	 status	 and	 work	
experience	for	the	“unexplained”	component.		The	effect	of	these	covariates	across	
the	wage	distribution	is	discussed	in	more	detail	below.			
	
Previous	research	based	on	1993	data	for	Trinidad	and	Tobago	measured	the	gender	
wage	gap	at	19.2	per	cent	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001).		In	this	current	study,	for	2012,	
the	pure	wage	gap	decreased	 to	11.4	per	 cent.	 This	 reduction	 in	 the	gender	wage	
gap	may	be	due	 in	part	 to	 the	passing	of	 the	Equal	Opportunity	Act	 in	2000.	 	 The	
previous	 study	 by	 Olsen	 and	 Coppin	 (2001)	 used	 the	 standard	 Oaxaca-Blinder	
decomposition	 methodology,	 but	 this	 approach	 was	 unable	 to	 pick	 up	 the	 vast	
differences	in	the	wage	gap	for	low	and	high-income	earners.		For	instance,	for	the	
overall	 working	 population	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	wage	 distribution,	 the	 gender	
wage	gap	is	much	larger	(25.1	per	cent)	compared	to	the	higher	end	of	wages	where	
no	 gap	 exists.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 unexplained	 component	 of	 the	 gender	wage	 gap,	
which	can	(cautiously)	be	used	as	an	indication	of	the	extent	of	discrimination	in	the	
labour	market,	reveals	that	lower-waged	women	face	greater	discrimination.		At	the	
10th	 percentile,	 if	 women	 received	 the	 same	 rate	 of	 return	 as	 men	 for	 their	
characteristics,	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	33	per	cent	whereas	at	the	
90th	percentile	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	11.8	per	cent	(based	on	the	
MM/Melly	approach).	 	As	such,	women	 in	higher	paid	 jobs	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
seem	to	not	be	as	disadvantaged	as	lower	paid	women.	
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The	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 measured	 the	 average	 wage	 gap	 in	 the	 public	
sector	 at	 only	 3.2	 per	 cent.	 	 But,	 the	 quantile	 decomposition	 estimates	 that	 the	
public	 sector	 gender	 wage	 gap	 is	 much	 higher	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	
distribution	–	22.8	per	cent	at	the	10th	percentile	–	and	there	is	no	wage	gap	at	the	
upper	 end	 of	 wages	 (MM/Melly	 decomposition).	 	 Again,	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	
wage	 distribution	 women	 appear	 to	 face	 greater	 discrimination	 (unexplained	
component)	-	in	the	public	sector,	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	32.3	per	
cent	at	the	10th	percentile	while	they	enjoy	similar	rates	of	return	to	characteristics	
as	men	at	the	higher	end	of	the	wage	distribution.			
	
The	pure	wage	gap	is	much	larger	in	the	private	sector,	at	22.9	per	cent	at	the	mean	
(Blinder-Oaxaca	methodology),	but	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution	the	gap	
is	 more	 than	 twice	 that	 of	 the	 gap	 at	 the	 higher	 end	 of	 the	 distribution.	 	 In	 the	
private	sector,	at	the	10th	percentile	the	gender	wage	gap	is	25.9	per	cent	compared	
to	 12.0	 per	 cent	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile	 (MM/Melly	 decomposition).	 	 In	 the	 private	
sector	 it	 appears	 that	 female	workers,	 regardless	 of	 their	 position	 along	 the	wage	
distribution,	 face	 a	 similar	 degree	 of	 discrimination	 -	 the	 unexplained	 component	
reveals	 that	 throughout	 the	wage	distribution,	 if	women	were	to	receive	the	same	
rate	of	return	as	men	for	their	characteristics,	their	wages	would	increase	by	23	per	
cent	 (MM/Melly).	 	 However,	 based	 on	 the	 detailed	 decompositions	 using	 RIF-
regressions,	 the	 extent	of	 discrimination	 varies	 along	 the	distribution	of	wages.	 	 If	
women	 received	 the	 same	 rates	of	 return	 to	 their	 characteristics	 as	do	men,	 their	
wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	14.5	per	cent	at	the	10th	percentile,	22.7	per	cent	
at	 the	 25th	 percentile,	 13.2	 per	 cent	 at	 the	 median,	 18.0	 per	 cent	 at	 the	 75th	
percentile,	and	20.4	per	cent	at	the	90th	percentile.			
	
The	 detailed	 decomposition	 results	 (based	 on	 RIF-regressions)	 provide	 a	 more	
nuanced	 analysis	 for	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 both	 the	 explained	 and	 unexplained	
components	 of	 the	 wage	 differential	 at	 different	 points	 along	 the	 distribution.		
Overall,	 with	 the	 advancement	 of	 women’s	 education	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	
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recent	 history	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 free	 education	 by	 the	 government	 up	 to	 the	
tertiary	 level49,	women	now	have	better	characteristics	 (“endowments”)	than	men,	
especially	at	the	top	of	the	wage	distribution.			
	
In	 terms	of	 the	 “explained”	 component,	 if	women	had	 the	 same	 characteristics	 as	
men,	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	slightly	(by	3.0	per	cent	and	1.0	per	cent)	
at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution	(10th	and	25th	percentiles),	but	to	decrease	
along	the	higher	end	of	the	wage	distribution.	
	
Meanwhile,	the	unexplained	component,	which	can	be	 indicative	of	discrimination,	
shows	that:	1)	 lower	paid	men	enter	the	 labour	market	at	an	advantage	over	their	
female	counterparts	(this	premium	is	markedly	higher	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	
distribution	–	men	receive	a	premium	of	43.3	per	cent	at	the	25th	percentile,	33.0	per	
cent	at	the	75th	percentile,	and	0.6	per	cent	at	the	top	of	the	distribution);	2)	lower	
paid	men	are	rewarded	more	if	they	are	married	(they	receive	an	estimated	6.6	per	
cent	 premium	 at	 the	 10th	 percentile	 over	 married	 females,	 but	 higher-salaried	
married	men	do	not	appear	 to	receive	a	premium	because	of	 their	marital	status);	
and	3)	men’s	work	experience	is	valued	more	than	women’s	work	experience	from	
the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution	 up	 to	 the	 75th	 percentile;	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile,	employers	seem	to	reward	women	more	for	their	work	experience.		
	
In	conclusion,	although	female	workers	have	better	endowments	than	male	workers,	
and	 hence	 should	 be	 paid	 more	 than	 their	 male	 counterparts,	 men’s	 wages	 are	
higher,	 owing	 to	 a	 large,	 positive	 unexplained	 difference	 in	 the	 returns	 to	 these	
characteristics.	 	The	results	of	 the	quantile	decompositions	show	that	Trinidad	and	
Tobago’s	 labour	market	 does	 not	 have	 a	 glass	 ceiling,	 but	 female	 workers	 face	 a	
sticky	floor	instead	as	the	wage	gap	is	much	larger	for	low-paid	women	compared	to	
																																								 																				
49	 The	 government	 of	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 introduced	 the	 Dollar	 for	 Dollar	 Education	 Plan	 in	
September	2001	whereby	the	government	funded	50	per	cent	of	tuition	fees	that	applied	to	all	new	
enrolments	 at	 (public)	 institutions	of	 higher	 learning.	 	 In	 2004,	 the	Dollar	 for	Dollar	 Education	Plan	
was	 replaced	 by	 the	 GATE	 (Government	 Assistance	 for	 Tuition	 Expenses)	 programme.	 	 The	 GATE	
programme	is	a	funding	mechanism	that	provides	100	per	cent	financial	support	for	tuition	fees	for	
students	pursuing	higher	education	at	both	public	and	private	institutions.				
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their	 high-income	 counterparts.	 	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 glass	 ceiling	 in	 Trinidad	
and	Tobago	may	be	masked	by	the	fact	that	on	average	at	the	higher	end	of	the	pay	
scale	 women	 have	 more	 years	 of	 education	 than	 men	 –	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile,	
women	have	three	more	years	of	education	than	men.		It	is	likely	that	these	women	
feel	 compelled	 to	 educate	 themselves	 further	 to	 compete	 with	 their	 male	
counterparts	for	higher	paying	jobs.		
	
Apart	 from	 employer-based	 discrimination,	 the	 sticky	 floors	 phenomena	 facing	
working	 women	 in	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 may	 be	 due,	 in	 part,	 because	 of	 the	
challenges	these	 low-paid	women	face	 in	having	to	manage	family-life	and	bearing	
the	 major	 share	 of	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 home.	 	 Some	 of	 these	 women	 tend	 to	
prefer	 to	maintain	a	 low	paying	 job	as	 long	as	 the	 salary	 is	 stable.	 	Men	 in	 lower-
paying	jobs,	just	as	the	professional	male,	are	more	likely	to	ask	for	a	raise	or	leave	a	
job	seeking	a	higher	salary	than	would	women	given	the	fact	that	women	tend	to	be	
more	risk-averse.50			
	
	
																																								 																				
50	Based	on	the	interview	with	a	business	consultant	operating	in	Trinidad	(see	Appendix	III:	Interview	
with	Business	Consultant	Operating	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	for	full	details.)	
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Appendix	III:	Interview	with	Business	Consultant	Operating	in	Trinidad	
and	Tobago51	
	
Factors	in	the	private	sector	that	contribute	to	the	gender	wage	gap:	
1) Perception	 –	 male	 workforce	 is	 easier	 to	 handle	 in	 terms	 of	 less	 issues	
relating	to	the	balance	of	family-life.	
2) Businesses	 especially	 family-owned	 business	 still	 very	 male-dominated	
environment	at	the	board	and	executive/management	level.		
3) Both	men	 and	women	 prefer	 to	 report	 to	 a	male	 leader	 –	women	 leaders	
have	 a	 “chip”	 on	 their	 shoulders	 when	 they	 become	 managers	 (based	 on	
consistent	feedback	from	employees).	
4) Women	 themselves	 –	 not	 as	 confident	 as	men	when	 negotiating	 their	 pay	
packages;	 women	 tend	 to	 become	 disillusioned	 and	 de-motivated	 in	 the	
workforce	 when	 they	 believe	 they	 are	 not	 getting	 rewarded	 for	 their	
“worth”.	 Women	 undersell	 themselves	 in	 the	 workforce	 –	 projecting	
insecurity	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 employers	 will	 only	 pay	 them	 what	 they	
think	they	are	“worth”.	
5) Men	 find	 it	 easier	 to	 land	 a	 job	 that	 they	 are	 possibly	 not	 qualified	 for	
because	 they	 “market”	 themselves	 very	 well.	 	 Women	 will	 be	 more	
concerned	if	they	are	qualified	for	the	position.	
	
Women	tend	to	“job	hop”	less	(HR	recruitment	term);	male	professionals	take	more	
risk	with	changing	jobs:	
- Responsibilities:	 single	mothers,	 single	 professional	 women	 are	 usually	 not	
able	to	take	as	many	risks	and	jeopardise	their	families.		On	the	other	hand,	
men	 regardless	 if	 they	 have	 children	 or	 not,	 may	 not	 be	 living	 with	 the	
children	so	are	able	to	“jump”	jobs/roles	more	often	than	women.	
																																								 																				
51	Interview	entailed	several	open-ended	questions	and	was	conducted	in	person	in	July	2015.	
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- Enrolment	 in	 tertiary	 education	 institutions:	 more	 women	 pursue	 tertiary	
education,	 so	 they	 are	more	 educated	 than	men	 academically	 but	 lack	 the	
soft	skills	such	as	confidence	and	leadership	qualities.	
- Women	in	the	market	tend	to	have	more	dependents	than	men,	and	so	have	
less	tolerance	for	risk.	
- Glass	ceiling:	agrees	that	Trinidad	and	Tobago	does	not	have	a	glass	ceiling.		
Women	get	more	education	because	of	 lack	of	confidence;	 status	oriented.		
Sometimes	 being	 so	 educated	 is	 working	 against	 them	 because	 employers	
are	looking	for	good	talent	for	less	–	more	educated	women	may	be	viewed	
as	 too	 expensive	 to	 employers	 in	 addition	 to	 women	 not	 forcefully	
negotiating	for	their	pay	packages	or	raise/promotion.	
- Networking:	men	 use	 networking	 and	 relationships	 to	 advance	 themselves	
more	so	than	women;	women	tend	not	to	use	their	relationships	to	advance	
their	careers,	and	tend	to	be	more	institutionalised	in	their	approach	to	get	a	
promotion	and	follow	formal	channels	in	the	organisation,	whereas	men	may	
tend	to	have	more	of	a	“buddy”	relationship	with	senior	colleagues.	
- Professional	 men	 have	 less	 fear	 in	 going	 after	 the	 positions	 they	 want.		
Sometimes,	 the	 perception	 of	 a	 driven-woman	 being	 called	 a	 “bitch”	
prevents	some	women	from	striving	to	the	positions	they	really	want.			
- Sticky	floors:	primarily	because	of	the	challenges	of	having	to	manage	family-
life	 and	 the	 tendency	 of	 having	 to	 take	 on	 a	 lot	 of	 responsibilities	 in	 the	
home,	 these	women	tend	to	prefer	 to	maintain	a	 low	paying	 job	as	 long	as	
the	salary	is	stable;	also,	they	probably	would	not	get	more	education	and/or	
training.	 	Men	 in	 lower	paying	 jobs,	 just	as	the	professional	male,	will	more	
likely	ask	for	a	raise	or	leave	a	job	seeking	a	higher	salary	than	would	women	
since	women	will	tend	to	be	more	risk-averse.	 	Generally,	there	 is	a	greater	
number	 of	 older	 women	 working	 blue	 collar	 jobs	 and	 younger	 females	 as	
professionals.				
- Disparity	 in	wages,	why?	:	Because	of	discriminatory	practices	by	employers	
but	 also	 self-imposed	 by	 employees.	 	 Industrial	 Relations	 laws	 ensure	 that	
there	 is	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 now	 compared	 to	 the	 past,	 with	 more	
opportunities	available	to	both	men	and	women.	
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- Women	more	 likely	 to	complain	 to	 their	 family	and	 feel	 like	a	victim	 in	 the	
workplace;	 men	 just	 tend	 to	 negotiate	 more	 or	 leave	 the	 job	 and	 seek	
employment	elsewhere.	
- Men	are	less	loyal	to	employers	than	women	are.	
	
Solutions	
- Secondary	 education	 should	 prepare	 students	 with	 life	 skills	 and	 soft	 skills	
like	budgeting,	goal	planning,	leadership,	etc.	
	
Raising	a	family	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago:	
- Women	are	not	in	a	position	to	leave	the	workforce	to	raise	a	family;	a	high	
number	of	single	mothers	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	prevents	them	from	leaving	
employment.	
- Blue-collar	 couples:	 these	 women	 do	 not	 have	 the	 option	 to	 leave	 the	
workforce	because	they	tend	to	be	the	more	responsible	and	stable	parent.		
- Men	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	do	not	leave	employment	to	have	a	family.	
	
Leaving	employment,	why?	
- Men	 leave	 for	more	money;	women	 tend	 to	 stay	 in	 their	 jobs,	 as	 they	 are	
more	risk-averse.	
- Women	 will	 tend	 to	 leave	 their	 jobs	 if	 their	 family	 dynamics	 change,	 for	
instance,	 her	 husband	 opens	 his	 own	 business	 and	 she	 leaves	 to	 join	 the	
business	or	stay	at	home	with	the	children.	
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Does	age	play	a	role	in	hiring	a	man	versus	a	woman?	
- Depends	on	the	job,	field,	sector,	and	level	(employers	do	look	at	a	woman’s	
age	in	terms	of	being	married	and	wanting	children,	maternity	leave,	etc.).	
- Retired	males	 seem	 to	 negotiate	 for	 consultancy	 positions	 after	 they	 retire	
whereas	 retired	 females	 show	 a	 preference	 to	 remain	 at	 home	 and	 enjoy	
family-life	with	the	grandchildren.	
- Stereotypical	gender	roles	still	prevalent	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	
- Youth	in	the	workforce:		
o Less	 tolerant,	 loyal,	 committed	 to	 anything	 outside	 of	 themselves	
(jobs,	company,	etc.).			
o More	confident	and	willing	to	take	more	risks	than	their	elders.		More	
young	folks	driven	to	be	entrepreneurs	instead	of	an	employee.			
o Less	work	ethic	and	disciplined	than	older	generations.	
o Gender	dynamic:	young	females	are	more	arrogant,	less	tolerant,	less	
caring,	impatient,	and	passive	aggressive.		Young	female	professionals	
(well	 qualified)	 have	 an	 “entitlement”	 view	 in	 the	 workforce	 and	
when	 they	 get	 promoted	 or	 in	 higher	 levels	 of	 authority	 they	 are	
bossy	 instead	 of	 being	 a	 leader	 (this	 adds	 to	 the	 perception	 in	 the	
workplace	that	females,	especially	female	bosses	are	difficult	to	work	
with).	 	 Young	 professional	 females	 (compared	 to	 older	 female	
professionals)	 will	 quicker	 “jump”	 jobs	 instead	 of	 staying	 with	 the	
same	organisation	for	a	long	time.	
	
Marital	status	
- Employers	 do	 consider	 the	 marital	 status	 of	 prospective	 employees,	
especially	 in	 this	 new	 age	 of	 uncertainty,	 but	 it	 does	 depend	 on	 the	 role;	
employers	 prefer	 a	 young	 single	 educated	 female	 over	 a	 young	 and	 newly	
married	 educated	 female	 employee.	 	 Some	 roles	 need	 travel	 so	 family	 life	
(including	marital	status)	is	always	a	consideration	when	hiring	for	particular	
roles/positions.	
198	
	
Married	vs.	unmarried	male	wage	premium	
- Married	men	tend	to	negotiate	for	a	higher	salary	often	times	citing	he	has	a	
family	 to	 demand	 a	 higher	 salary.	 	More	pressure	on	 a	married	man	 in	 his	
relationship	 at	 home	 to	 earn	more	 and	 provide	 for	 his	 family;	 his	 ego	 also	
plays	a	role	in	his	earning	status.	
	
Education	vs.	work	experience	
- There	 is	 a	 perception	 of	 a	 greater	 reliance	 on	 education,	 but	 work	 ethic	
seems	to	very	important	as	well.	 	Persons	with	institutional	knowledge	with	
less	formal	education	might	end	up	staying	and	running	an	organisation	since	
the	 highly	 educated	 staff	 might	 have	 higher	 turnover.	 	 However,	 if	 the	
business	 were	 to	 downside,	 persons	 with	 institutional	 knowledge	 tend	 to	
have	more	of	an	entrepreneurial	spirit	compared	with	the	professional	staff.					
	
Collective	bargaining	
- Public	sector	and	manufacturing	rely	more	on	collective	bargaining.		Most	of	
the	private	sector	is	not	unionised.			
	
Performance-related	pay/promotion	
- Many	organisations	do	not	have	proper	performance	management	 systems	
in	place.			
	
Occupational	Segregation	
- Stereotypical	jobs	as	‘male’	and	‘female’	still	exists,	e.g.	female	housekeepers	
and	male	garbage	collectors.	 	Some	roles,	a	man’s	ego	will	simply	not	allow	
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him	to	take	the	job	and	would	rather	be	unemployed.		Discrimination	on	the	
part	of	employers	for	particular	traditional	gender	roles	still	exists.						
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Appendix	IV:	Measuring	the	Gender	Wage	Gap	using	Pooled	
Quantile	and	Pooled	RIF	Regressions	
	
Table	AIV.1	
Earnings	Functions	–	Pooled	Quantile	Regressions	
(Human	Capital	Model)	
		 q10	 q25	 q50	 q75	 q90	
			Potential	Experience	 0.0111*			 0.0125***	 0.0134***	 0.0153***	 0.009	
		 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.007)	
			Potential	Experience2	 -1.67E-05	 -1.32E-05	 -5.34E-05	 -6.93E-05	 6.97E-05	
		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.221***	 0.240***	 0.208***	 0.234***	 0.280***	
		 (0.045)	 (0.043)	 (0.046)	 (0.034)	 (0.050)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.534***	 0.563***	 0.553***	 0.605***	 0.736***	
		 (0.056)	 (0.043)	 (0.052)	 (0.034)	 (0.056)	
			Tertiary	 1.202***	 1.262***	 1.238***	 1.225***	 1.247***	
		 (0.073)	 (0.056)	 (0.054)	 (0.045)	 (0.067)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 0.143***	 0.102***	 0.0802***	 0.0695***	 0.0808**		
		 (0.043)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.027)	 (0.036)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.050	 -0.024	 -0.020	 -0.028	 -0.034	
		 (0.052)	 (0.044)	 (0.036)	 (0.035)	 (0.052)	
			African	 0.029	 0.001	 -0.015	 -0.012	 -0.033	
		 (0.058)	 (0.045)	 (0.035)	 (0.034)	 (0.052)	
Female	 -0.309***	 -0.276***	 -0.252***	 -0.233***	 -0.225***	
		 (0.039)	 (0.026)	 (0.026)	 (0.026)	 (0.033)	
Constant	 2.079***	 2.345***	 2.652***	 2.872***	 3.119***	
		 (0.087)	 (0.066)	 (0.061)	 (0.052)	 (0.083)	
Bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
Dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	hourly	wages.	Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	Status	–	
unmarried;	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other.	
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Table	AIII.2	
Earnings	Functions	–	Pooled	Quantile	Regressions	
(Full	Model)	
		 q10	 q25	 q50	 q75	 q90	
			Potential	Experience	 0.011*			 0.009***	 0.010***	 0.004	 0.007	
		 (0.006)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
			Potential	Experience2	 -3.66E-05	 -1.90E-05	 -4.78E-05	 4.05E-05	 -4.02E-06	
		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.133***	 0.144***	 0.126***	 0.114***	 0.133**		
		 (0.046)	 (0.040)	 (0.030)	 (0.036)	 (0.052)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.343***	 0.341***	 0.301***	 0.293***	 0.383***	
		 (0.050)	 (0.043)	 (0.034)	 (0.045)	 (0.059)	
			Tertiary	 0.689***	 0.697***	 0.637***	 0.524***	 0.612***	
		 (0.087)	 (0.058)	 (0.049)	 (0.053)	 (0.071)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 0.105***	 0.0764***	 0.0711***	 0.0887***	 0.053	
		 (0.032)	 (0.024)	 (0.022)	 (0.024)	 (0.034)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.0353	 0.00264	 -0.00791	 -0.0357	 -0.0424	
		 (0.051)	 (0.035)	 (0.035)	 (0.038)	 (0.050)	
			African	 0.0159	 0.00142	 0.00586	 0.0155	 0.0106	
		 (0.052)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.036)	 (0.046)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		 		 		 		
			Public	Sector	 -0.259***	 -0.240***	 -0.302***	 -0.251***	 -0.190***	
		 (0.044)	 (0.038)	 (0.031)	 (0.027)	 (0.047)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 0.221***	 0.274***	 0.275***	 0.349***	 0.333***	
		 (0.068)	 (0.048)	 (0.052)	 (0.050)	 (0.071)	
			Craft	Worker	 0.310***	 0.248***	 0.270***	 0.255***	 0.270***	
		 (0.052)	 (0.047)	 (0.038)	 (0.037)	 (0.067)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.107	 0.153***	 0.189***	 0.239***	 0.249***	
		 (0.072)	 (0.042)	 (0.037)	 (0.043)	 (0.045)	
			Clerical	 0.313***	 0.288***	 0.301***	 0.241***	 0.222***	
		 (0.079)	 (0.051)	 (0.042)	 (0.041)	 (0.051)	
			Technician	 0.478***	 0.492***	 0.500***	 0.557***	 0.498***	
		 (0.058)	 (0.046)	 (0.046)	 (0.046)	 (0.061)	
			Professional	 0.623***	 0.738***	 0.682***	 0.780***	 0.716***	
		 (0.101)	 (0.076)	 (0.058)	 (0.076)	 (0.081)	
			Manager	 0.523***	 0.595***	 0.670***	 0.735***	 0.806***	
		 (0.079)	 (0.089)	 (0.064)	 (0.089)	 (0.138)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 -0.445**		 -0.19	 -0.133	 -0.0827	 0.0188	
		 (0.188)	 (0.141)	 (0.118)	 (0.141)	 (0.105)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 0.394***	 0.318***	 0.313***	 0.332***	 0.534***	
		 (0.092)	 (0.070)	 (0.058)	 (0.105)	 (0.150)	
			Manufacturing	 0.125*			 0.0493	 0.0974**		 0.147***	 0.149**		
		 (0.065)	 (0.055)	 (0.039)	 (0.056)	 (0.072)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.0669	 0.146	 0.230***	 0.335***	 0.288***	
		 (0.138)	 (0.128)	 (0.071)	 (0.075)	 (0.108)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 0.0913	 -0.0613	 -0.0201	 -0.104***	 -0.133**		
		 (0.074)	 (0.052)	 (0.033)	 (0.040)	 (0.067)	
			Transport/Communication	 0.165*			 0.0627	 0.0988	 0.0969*			 0.0758	
		 (0.087)	 (0.065)	 (0.069)	 (0.051)	 (0.114)	
			Finance/Insurance	 0.281***	 0.178***	 0.160***	 0.102**		 0.0795	
		 (0.090)	 (0.059)	 (0.040)	 (0.048)	 (0.092)	
			Construction	 0.0464	 -0.0735*			 -0.0411	 -0.0651**		 -0.0936	
		 (0.053)	 (0.040)	 (0.031)	 (0.032)	 (0.069)	
Female	 -0.255***	 -0.211***	 -0.211***	 -0.182***	 -0.195***	
		 (0.041)	 (0.031)	 (0.025)	 (0.029)	 (0.044)	
Constant	 2.177***	 2.508***	 2.783***	 3.082***	 3.226***	
		 (0.095)	 (0.076)	 (0.071)	 (0.055)	 (0.083)	
Bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
Dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	hourly	wages.	Base	dummy	variables	are:	Education	-	primary	school;	Marital	
Status	–	unmarried;	Ethnicity	-	mixed/other;	Occupation	-	Elementary	Occupations;	Industry	-	Social/Personal	
Services.	
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Table	AIV.3	
Inter-Quantile	(90th	-10th)	Regression	based	on	Pooled	Earnings	Functions	
	(90th	–	10th	differences)	 HC	Model	 Full	Model	
			Potential	Experience	 -0.002	 -0.004	
		 (0.009)	 (0.008)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.000	 0.000	
		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.059	 0.000	
		 (0.059)	 (0.068)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.202***	 0.040	
		 (0.073)	 (0.077)	
			Tertiary	 0.045	 -0.077	
		 (0.085)	 (0.101)	
Marital	Status	 		 		
			Married	 -0.063	 -0.052	
		 (0.053)	 (0.051)	
Ethnicity	 		 		
			Indian	 -0.084	 -0.078	
		 (0.064)	 (0.073)	
			African	 -0.062	 -0.005	
		 (0.066)	 (0.066)	
Female	 0.0841*	 0.060	
		 (0.047)	 (0.050)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		
			Public	Sector	 		 0.069	
		 		 (0.063)	
Occupation	 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 		 0.112	
		 		 (0.087)	
			Craft	Worker	 		 -0.040	
		 		 (0.073)	
			Sales	Worker	 		 0.141*			
		 		 (0.082)	
			Clerical	 		 -0.091	
		 		 (0.086)	
			Technician	 		 0.019	
		 		 (0.085)	
			Professional	 		 0.093	
		 		 (0.136)	
			Manager	 		 0.283*			
		 		 (0.170)	
Industry	 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 		 0.464**		
		 		 (0.198)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 		 0.141	
		 		 (0.162)	
			Manufacturing	 		 0.024	
		 		 (0.092)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 		 0.221	
		 		 (0.152)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 		 -0.224**		
		 		 (0.100)	
			Transport/Communication	 		 -0.089	
		 		 (0.138)	
			Finance/Insurance	 		 -0.201	
		 		 (0.140)	
			Construction	 		 -0.140*			
		 		 (0.084)	
Constant	 1.040***	 1.048***	
		 (0.118)	 (0.138)	
Bootstrapped	standard	errors	using	200	replications	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
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Table	AIV.4	
Earnings	Functions	–	Pooled	RIF-Regressions	
(Human	Capital	Model)	
		 rif_10	 rif_25	 rif_50	 rif_75	 rif_90				
			Potential	Experience	 0.005	 0.004	 0.00852**	 0.0191***	 0.0286***	
		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 -3.44E***	
		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.239***	 0.239***	 0.284***	 0.296***	 0.120***	
		 (0.072)	 (0.052)	 (0.038)	 (0.051)	 (0.043)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.522***	 0.582***	 0.596***	 0.842***	 0.376***	
		 (0.070)	 (0.051)	 (0.038)	 (0.061)	 (0.058)	
			Tertiary	 0.710***	 0.898***	 1.070***	 2.006***	 1.514***	
		 (0.077)	 (0.053)	 (0.037)	 (0.071)	 (0.100)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 0.0779*	 0.116***	 0.121***	 0.041	 0.011	
		 (0.041)	 (0.032)	 (0.026)	 (0.042)	 (0.042)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.081	 0.060	 0.013	 -0.105*	 -0.103*			
		 (0.059)	 (0.044)	 (0.035)	 (0.058)	 (0.057)	
			African	 0.082	 0.100**	 0.009	 -0.055	 -0.115*			
		 (0.058)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.058)	 (0.059)	
Female	 -0.322***	 -0.305***	 -0.213***	 -0.277***	 -0.168***	
		 (0.045)	 (0.032)	 (0.025)	 (0.038)	 (0.037)	
Constant	 2.111***	 2.350***	 2.656***	 2.808***	 3.418***	
		 (0.104)	 (0.076)	 (0.057)	 (0.089)	 (0.088)	
No.	of	observations	 2006	 2006	 2006	 2006	 2006	
R-squared	 0.081	 0.166	 0.257	 0.320	 0.239	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
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Table	AIV.5	
Earnings	Functions	–	Pooled	RIF-Regressions	
(Full	Model)	
		 rif_10full	 rif_25full	 rif_50full	 rif_75full	 rif_90full				
			Potential	Experience	 0.006	 0.003	 0.00586*	 0.00969*	 0.0227***	
		 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	
			Potential	Experience2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 -2.8E-
04**			 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
Education	 		 		 		 		 		
			Lower	Secondary	 0.104	 0.142***	 0.179***	 0.158***	 0.057	
		 (0.072)	 (0.051)	 (0.036)	 (0.050)	 (0.044)	
			Upper	Secondary	 0.249***	 0.341***	 0.313***	 0.467***	 0.221***	
		 (0.073)	 (0.055)	 (0.041)	 (0.061)	 (0.058)	
			Tertiary	 0.325***	 0.455***	 0.544***	 1.062***	 0.887***	
		 (0.091)	 (0.066)	 (0.052)	 (0.101)	 (0.115)	
Marital	Status	 		 		 		 		 		
			Married	 0.056	 0.0986***	 0.106***	 0.035	 0.018	
		 (0.039)	 (0.030)	 (0.024)	 (0.039)	 (0.040)	
Ethnicity	 		 		 		 		 		
			Indian	 0.078	 0.049	 0.006	 -0.086	 -0.076	
		 (0.058)	 (0.041)	 (0.032)	 (0.054)	 (0.055)	
			African	 0.0948*	 0.0967**	 0.011	 -0.052	 -0.0975*			
		 (0.057)	 (0.041)	 (0.032)	 (0.055)	 (0.055)	
Sector	of	Employment	 		 		 		 		 		
			Public	Sector	 -0.218***	 -0.322***	 -0.246***	 -0.415***	 -0.208***	
		 (0.056)	 (0.039)	 (0.029)	 (0.049)	 (0.049)	
Occupation	 		 		 		 		 		
			Machine	Operator	 0.374***	 0.349***	 0.367***	 0.331***	 0.051	
		 (0.071)	 (0.060)	 (0.052)	 (0.084)	 (0.068)	
			Craft	Worker	 0.419***	 0.315***	 0.343***	 0.296***	 0.122**		
		 (0.070)	 (0.055)	 (0.043)	 (0.057)	 (0.048)	
			Sales	Worker	 0.303***	 0.0966*	 0.242***	 0.350***	 0.030	
		 (0.085)	 (0.058)	 (0.039)	 (0.056)	 (0.049)	
			Clerical	 0.558***	 0.441***	 0.437***	 0.053	 -0.127***	
		 (0.084)	 (0.063)	 (0.046)	 (0.062)	 (0.046)	
			Technician	 0.478***	 0.455***	 0.579***	 0.789***	 0.239***	
		 (0.077)	 (0.055)	 (0.043)	 (0.079)	 (0.074)	
			Professional	 0.401***	 0.400***	 0.553***	 1.164***	 0.985***	
		 (0.109)	 (0.069)	 (0.052)	 (0.108)	 (0.177)	
			Manager	 0.527***	 0.504***	 0.636***	 0.873***	 0.736***	
		 (0.077)	 (0.067)	 (0.061)	 (0.142)	 (0.166)	
Industry	 		 		 		 		 		
			Agriculture/Fishing	 -0.373	 0.054	 0.039	 -0.153	 -0.153***	
		 (0.235)	 (0.136)	 (0.104)	 (0.109)	 (0.059)	
			Mining/Quarrying	 0.204***	 0.296***	 0.372***	 0.648***	 0.440**		
		 (0.061)	 (0.064)	 (0.058)	 (0.135)	 (0.176)	
			Manufacturing	 0.183**	 0.158***	 0.064	 0.267***	 0.139**		
		 (0.072)	 (0.058)	 (0.047)	 (0.074)	 (0.066)	
			Electricity/Gas/Water	 -0.026	 0.062	 0.191***	 0.708***	 0.651***	
		 (0.070)	 (0.058)	 (0.059)	 (0.148)	 (0.225)	
			Wholesale/Retail	 0.047	 0.012	 -0.059	 0.031	 0.113**		
		 (0.081)	 (0.057)	 (0.039)	 (0.055)	 (0.049)	
			Transport/Communication	 0.073	 0.071	 0.0835*	 0.247**	 0.235**		
		 (0.068)	 (0.059)	 (0.050)	 (0.104)	 (0.111)	
			Finance/Insurance	 0.310***	 0.309***	 0.101**	 0.174**	 0.269***	
		 (0.069)	 (0.057)	 (0.045)	 (0.073)	 (0.085)	
			Construction	 0.053	 0.155***	 0.022	 0.001	 -0.031	
		 (0.079)	 (0.054)	 (0.039)	 (0.054)	 (0.038)	
Female	 -0.350***	 -0.274***	 -0.195***	 -0.192***	 -0.0918**		
		 (0.051)	 (0.035)	 (0.026)	 (0.042)	 (0.044)	
Constant	 2.076***	 2.430***	 2.725***	 3.037***	 3.532***	
		 (0.116)	 (0.083)	 (0.062)	 (0.096)	 (0.086)	
No.	of	observations	 2004	 2004	 2004	 2004	 2004	
R-squared	 0.142	 0.259	 0.377	 0.432	 0.309	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
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Table	AIV.6	
Wald	Tests	–	Gender	Dummy1	
(Pooled	RIF-Regressions)	
90th-10th:	Human	Capital	Model	
chi2(1)	=			14.58	
Prob	>	chi2	=				0.0001	
90th-10th:	Full	Model	
chi2(1)	=			34.36	
Prob	>	chi2	=				0.0000	
1	Test	of	the	equality	of	gender	coefficients	between	the	90th	and	10th	quantiles.	
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Appendix	V:	RIF-Regression	Results	
	
Table	AV.1	
RIF-Regressions	Human	Capital	Model	
VARIABLES	 male25	 female25	 male50	 female50	 male75	 female75	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Potential	Experience	 0.006	 0.004	 0.006	 0.012*	 0.015*	 0.029***	
		 (0.006)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.009)	
Potential	Experience2	 7.12E-05	 7.44E-05	 6.63E-05	 -2.68E-05	 2.63E-05	
-3.17E-
04*	
		 (1.13E-04)	 (1.87E-04)	 (9.12E-05)	 (1.39E-04)	 (1.52E-04)	 (1.79E-04)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.180***	 0.321***	 0.257***	 0.339***	 0.277***	 0.298***	
		 (0.053)	 (0.109)	 (0.043)	 (0.073)	 (0.065)	 (0.070)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.417***	 0.786***	 0.517***	 0.776***	 0.831***	 0.812***	
		 (0.052)	 (0.103)	 (0.044)	 (0.073)	 (0.077)	 (0.092)	
Tertiary	 0.583***	 1.058***	 0.822***	 1.423***	 1.855***	 2.124***	
		 (0.056)	 (0.099)	 (0.046)	 (0.065)	 (0.102)	 (0.097)	
Married	 0.191***	 0.023	 0.192***	 -0.001	 0.113**	 -0.09	
		 (0.037)	 (0.054)	 (0.033)	 (0.045)	 (0.055)	 (0.065)	
Indian	 0.035	 -0.012	 0.021	 0.003	 -0.09	 -0.112	
		 (0.051)	 (0.074)	 (0.043)	 (0.061)	 (0.075)	 (0.091)	
African	 0.068	 0.088	 0.02	 -0.002	 -0.028	 -0.07	
		 (0.051)	 (0.071)	 (0.044)	 (0.060)	 (0.078)	 (0.089)	
Constant	 2.456***	 1.992***	 2.696***	 2.317***	 2.817***	 2.523***	
		 (0.088)	 (0.132)	 (0.071)	 (0.100)	 (0.118)	 (0.132)	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations	 1,154	 842	 1,154	 842	 1,154	 842	
R-squared	 0.129	 0.179	 0.212	 0.337	 0.267	 0.399	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	 	 	 	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	AV.2	
RIF-Regressions	Full	Model	
VARIABLES	 male25	 female25	 male50	 female50	 male75	 female75	
Potential	Experience	 0.002	 0.009	 0.002	 0.014**	 0.006	 0.020**	
		 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.008)	
Potential	Experience2	 6.68E-05	 -5.71E-05	 6.10E-05	 -8.95E-05	 5.58E-05	 -1.78E-04	
		 (1.11E-04)	 (1.76E-04)	 (8.71E-05)	 (1.27E-04)	 (1.44E-04)	 (1.63E-04)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.096*	 0.167	 0.155***	 0.194***	 0.103	 0.214***	
		 (0.053)	 (0.111)	 (0.042)	 (0.067)	 (0.064)	 (0.068)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.241***	 0.376***	 0.277***	 0.326***	 0.447***	 0.425***	
		 (0.057)	 (0.116)	 (0.048)	 (0.079)	 (0.078)	 (0.088)	
Tertiary	 0.297***	 0.386***	 0.393***	 0.646***	 0.972***	 1.034***	
		 (0.076)	 (0.125)	 (0.064)	 (0.097)	 (0.148)	 (0.142)	
Married	 0.168***	 0.009	 0.166***	 0.008	 0.083	 -0.048	
		 (0.036)	 (0.052)	 (0.031)	 (0.042)	 (0.052)	 (0.057)	
Indian	 0.027	 0.013	 0.01	 0.027	 -0.09	 -0.079	
		 (0.048)	 (0.070)	 (0.040)	 (0.057)	 (0.074)	 (0.081)	
African	 0.051	 0.11	 0.015	 0.02	 -0.048	 -0.053	
		 (0.049)	 (0.069)	 (0.041)	 (0.056)	 (0.077)	 (0.080)	
Public	Sector	 0.273***	 0.353***	 0.202***	 0.359***	 0.350***	 0.458***	
		 (0.041)	 (0.071)	 (0.034)	 (0.060)	 (0.059)	 (0.088)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 0.031	 0.005	 0.045	 0.088	 -0.098	 -0.183**	
		 (0.141)	 (0.291)	 (0.113)	 (0.227)	 (0.135)	 (0.085)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.349***	 0.013	 0.368***	 0.288	 0.670***	 0.222	
		 (0.058)	 (0.262)	 (0.058)	 (0.209)	 (0.138)	 (0.322)	
Manufacturing	 0.169***	 0.132	 0.079	 0.124	 0.293***	 0.283**	
		 (0.061)	 (0.124)	 (0.053)	 (0.102)	 (0.090)	 (0.139)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.137**	 -0.029	 0.194***	 0.319**	 0.565***	 1.368***	
		 (0.056)	 (0.141)	 (0.063)	 (0.133)	 (0.164)	 (0.269)	
Wholesale/Retail	 0.059	 -0.044	 -0.014	 -0.087	 0.007	 0.082	
		 (0.071)	 (0.097)	 (0.053)	 (0.068)	 (0.077)	 (0.081)	
Transport/Communication	 0.077	 0.207*	 0.076	 0.231*	 0.350***	 -0.08	
		 (0.061)	 (0.110)	 (0.051)	 (0.134)	 (0.118)	 (0.208)	
Finance/Insurance	 0.238***	 0.307***	 0.025	 0.212***	 0.07	 0.254**	
		 (0.072)	 (0.091)	 (0.063)	 (0.076)	 (0.111)	 (0.104)	
Construction	 0.178***	 -0.260*	 0.071*	 -0.219**	 0.011	 0.036	
		 (0.055)	 (0.133)	 (0.042)	 (0.096)	 (0.061)	 (0.116)	
Machine	Operator	 0.264***	 0.376	 0.336***	 0.122	 0.300***	 0.201	
		 (0.058)	 (0.256)	 (0.052)	 (0.201)	 (0.086)	 (0.266)	
Craft	Worker	 0.198***	 0.681***	 0.278***	 0.698***	 0.290***	 0.096	
		 (0.055)	 (0.205)	 (0.043)	 (0.190)	 (0.057)	 (0.227)	
Sales	Worker	 0.209***	 0.101	 0.302***	 0.222***	 0.513***	 0.187***	
		 (0.066)	 (0.108)	 (0.053)	 (0.067)	 (0.091)	 (0.065)	
Clerical	 0.270***	 0.525***	 0.423***	 0.540***	 0.105	 0.043	
		 (0.088)	 (0.103)	 (0.072)	 (0.075)	 (0.114)	 (0.073)	
Technician	 0.328***	 0.570***	 0.505***	 0.746***	 0.629***	 0.994***	
		 (0.059)	 (0.105)	 (0.052)	 (0.083)	 (0.107)	 (0.113)	
Professional	 0.221**	 0.632***	 0.454***	 0.801***	 0.954***	 1.506***	
		 (0.089)	 (0.111)	 (0.070)	 (0.088)	 (0.148)	 (0.160)	
Manager	 0.387***	 0.642***	 0.579***	 0.812***	 0.789***	 1.029***	
		 (0.057)	 (0.141)	 (0.060)	 (0.136)	 (0.194)	 (0.215)	
Constant	 2.274***	 1.760***	 2.556***	 2.058***	 2.712***	 2.304***	
		 (0.098)	 (0.153)	 (0.071)	 (0.110)	 (0.118)	 (0.145)	
Observations	 1,154	 840	 1,154	 840	 1,154	 840	
R-squared	 0.201	 0.293	 0.326	 0.48	 0.372	 0.541	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.						
	 		
	 	
208	
	
Table	AV.3	
RIF-Regressions	Human	Capital	Model	–	Public	Sector	
VARIABLES	 pub_m25	 pub_f25	 pub_m50	 pub_f50	 pub_m75	 pub_f75	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Potential	Experience	 0.003	 0.015	 0.012	 0.035***	 0.023**	 0.049***	
		 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	
Potential	Experience2	 5.72E-05	 -2.11E-04	 -1.41E-05	
-4.73E-
04**	 -2.21E-04	 -0.001***	
		 (1.61E-04)	 (2.47E-04)	 (1.93E-04)	 (2.17E-04)	 (1.81E-04)	 (2.10E-04)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.163*	 0.410**	 0.330***	 0.600***	 0.112	 0.111	
		 (0.088)	 (0.171)	 (0.094)	 (0.126)	 (0.071)	 (0.072)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.525***	 0.814***	 0.956***	 0.946***	 0.563***	 0.412***	
		 (0.079)	 (0.150)	 (0.083)	 (0.112)	 (0.085)	 (0.086)	
Tertiary	 0.638***	 1.136***	 1.301***	 1.639***	 1.263***	 1.080***	
		 (0.083)	 (0.142)	 (0.086)	 (0.095)	 (0.116)	 (0.088)	
Married	 0.106**	 -0.048	 0.094	 -0.072	 0.004	 -0.1	
		 (0.053)	 (0.063)	 (0.067)	 (0.070)	 (0.065)	 (0.072)	
Indian	 -0.043	 0.036	 0.034	 -0.113	 0.1	 -0.047	
		 (0.069)	 (0.098)	 (0.099)	 (0.108)	 (0.090)	 (0.099)	
African	 -0.052	 0.057	 -0.009	 0.053	 0.05	 -0.084	
		 (0.068)	 (0.093)	 (0.097)	 (0.095)	 (0.090)	 (0.092)	
Constant	 2.728***	 2.145***	 2.552***	 2.080***	 2.965***	 2.949***	
		 (0.125)	 (0.180)	 (0.181)	 (0.146)	 (0.158)	 (0.139)	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations	 388	 345	 388	 345	 388	 345	
R-squared	 0.209	 0.26	 0.343	 0.389	 0.322	 0.314	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	 	 	 	 	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	AV.4	
RIF-Regressions	Full	Model	–	Public	Sector	
VARIABLES	 pub_m25	 pub_f25	 pub_m50	 pub_f50	 pub_m75	 pub_f75	
Potential	Experience	 0.003	 0.025**	 0.008	 0.024**	 0.022**	 0.036***	
		 (0.008)	 (0.011)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	
Potential	Experience2	 1.47E-05	 -4.03E-04*	 -3.41E-05	 -2.70E-04	 -2.40E-04	 -0.001***	
		 (1.61E-04)	 (2.38E-04)	 (1.83E-04)	 (2.08E-04)	 (1.83E-04)	 (1.99E-04)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.045	 0.086	 0.107	 0.454***	 -0.002	 0.05	
		 (0.085)	 (0.173)	 (0.080)	 (0.129)	 (0.071)	 (0.068)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.187**	 0.187	 0.393***	 0.450***	 0.374***	 0.157*	
		 (0.089)	 (0.181)	 (0.097)	 (0.137)	 (0.098)	 (0.090)	
Tertiary	 0.240**	 0.428**	 0.576***	 0.845***	 0.830***	 0.415***	
		 (0.099)	 (0.182)	 (0.131)	 (0.152)	 (0.166)	 (0.117)	
Married	 0.099**	 0.022	 0.101*	 0.083	 0.011	 0.033	
		 (0.050)	 (0.063)	 (0.058)	 (0.061)	 (0.062)	 (0.065)	
Indian	 -0.011	 0.021	 0.081	 -0.036	 0.139	 0.061	
		 (0.062)	 (0.089)	 (0.090)	 (0.085)	 (0.096)	 (0.084)	
African	 0.001	 0.026	 0.117	 0.082	 0.116	 0.023	
		 (0.063)	 (0.089)	 (0.089)	 (0.081)	 (0.095)	 (0.083)	
Machine	Operator	 0.485***	 0.575***	 0.427***	 0.496**	 0.143	 1.092***	
		 (0.088)	 (0.174)	 (0.137)	 (0.220)	 (0.107)	 (0.260)	
Craft	Worker	 0.417***	 0.171	 0.241***	 0.441	 0.181**	 -0.217	
		 (0.092)	 (0.231)	 (0.088)	 (0.267)	 (0.078)	 (0.145)	
Sales	Worker	 0.452***	 0.388**	 0.696***	 0.622***	 0.123	 0.255**	
		 (0.091)	 (0.185)	 (0.107)	 (0.165)	 (0.119)	 (0.106)	
Clerical	 0.350***	 0.515***	 0.270*	 0.214*	 0.014	 0.044	
		 (0.122)	 (0.151)	 (0.141)	 (0.119)	 (0.103)	 (0.056)	
Technician	 0.480***	 0.559***	 0.530***	 0.946***	 0.227**	 0.683***	
		 (0.092)	 (0.161)	 (0.128)	 (0.131)	 (0.112)	 (0.105)	
Professional	 0.454***	 0.628***	 0.576***	 1.110***	 0.441**	 1.189***	
		 (0.092)	 (0.162)	 (0.137)	 (0.141)	 (0.186)	 (0.132)	
Manager	 0.453***	 0.173	 0.467**	 0.593***	 0.115	 0.999***	
		 (0.111)	 (0.240)	 (0.199)	 (0.190)	 (0.194)	 (0.184)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 -0.006	 -0.187	 -0.077	 0.135	 -0.145**	 0.088*	
		 (0.198)	 (0.306)	 (0.185)	 (0.183)	 (0.069)	 (0.046)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.03	 -0.344	 0.365*	 0.133	 0.176	 0.030	
		 (0.107)	 (0.388)	 (0.191)	 (0.154)	 (0.241)	 (0.382)	
Manufacturing	 0.014	 0.360***	 0.436***	 0.961***	 0.357**	 0.592	
		 (0.093)	 (0.132)	 (0.128)	 (0.179)	 (0.142)	 (0.389)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.052	 0.231**	 0.294***	 0.749***	 0.192	 0.498*	
		 (0.069)	 (0.092)	 (0.112)	 (0.195)	 (0.150)	 (0.257)	
Wholesale/Retail	 -0.062	 0.286**	 0.071	 0.387	 0.527*	 0.343	
		 (0.194)	 (0.118)	 (0.299)	 (0.399)	 (0.304)	 (0.229)	
Transport/Communication	 -0.006	 0.338***	 0.388***	 0.364*	 0.332***	 0.036	
		 (0.051)	 (0.102)	 (0.074)	 (0.200)	 (0.117)	 (0.127)	
Finance/Insurance	 -0.489***	 -0.231	 -0.301	 0.301	 0.086	 0.134	
		 (0.159)	 (0.200)	 (0.183)	 (0.205)	 (0.191)	 (0.150)	
Construction	 -0.155*	 -0.652***	 -0.310***	 -0.167*	 -0.141***	 0.052	
		 (0.086)	 (0.157)	 (0.078)	 (0.090)	 (0.050)	 (0.059)	
Constant	 2.674***	 2.212***	 2.594***	 1.990***	 2.945***	 2.850***	
		 (0.136)	 (0.211)	 (0.165)	 (0.144)	 (0.157)	 (0.137)	
Observations	 388	 345	 388	 345	 388	 345	
R-squared	 0.368	 0.430	 0.523	 0.57	 0.402	 0.514	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	AV.5	
RIF-Regressions	Human	Capital	Model	–	Private	Sector	
VARIABLES	 pri_m25	 pri_f25	 pri_m50	 pri_f50	 pri_m75	 pri_f75	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Potential	Experience	 0.001	 0.017*	 0.006	 0.009	 0.011	 0.007	
		 (0.007)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	
Potential	Experience2	 2.05E-04	 -2.14E-04	 2.47E-05	 -3.46E-05	 7.93E-05	 8.60E-05	
		 (1.27E-04)	 (1.97E-04)	 (1.24E-04)	 (1.68E-04)	 (1.43E-04)	 (1.58E-04)	
Lower	Secondary	 0.254***	 0.181*	 0.205***	 0.260***	 0.292***	 0.211***	
		 (0.064)	 (0.103)	 (0.057)	 (0.086)	 (0.061)	 (0.075)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.430***	 0.490***	 0.406***	 0.624***	 0.553***	 0.589***	
		 (0.068)	 (0.098)	 (0.062)	 (0.085)	 (0.072)	 (0.089)	
Tertiary	 0.636***	 0.650***	 0.777***	 0.968***	 1.253***	 1.604***	
		 (0.080)	 (0.109)	 (0.074)	 (0.091)	 (0.107)	 (0.097)	
Married	 0.181***	 0.013	 0.239***	 0.03	 0.164***	 0.088	
		 (0.046)	 (0.059)	 (0.045)	 (0.055)	 (0.054)	 (0.057)	
Indian	 0.069	 -0.032	 0.021	 -0.011	 -0.016	 -0.093	
		 (0.062)	 (0.074)	 (0.057)	 (0.069)	 (0.066)	 (0.077)	
African	 0.071	 -0.021	 -0.006	 0.019	 0.026	 -0.160**	
		 (0.065)	 (0.075)	 (0.060)	 (0.071)	 (0.069)	 (0.075)	
Constant	 2.340***	 2.120***	 2.651***	 2.391***	 2.791***	 2.677***	
		 (0.105)	 (0.142)	 (0.093)	 (0.122)	 (0.102)	 (0.115)	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations	 766	 497	 766	 497	 766	 497	
R-squared	 0.114	 0.105	 0.149	 0.19	 0.182	 0.377	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
	 	 	 	 	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	   
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Table	AV.6	
RIF-Regressions	Full	Model	–	Private	Sector	
VARIABLES	 pri_m25	 pri_f25	 pri_m50	 pri_f50	 pri_m75	 pri_f75	
Potential	Experience	 -2.89E-04	 0.023**	 0.005	 0.014*	 0.008	 0.007	
		 (0.007)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	
Potential	Experience2	 1.90E-04	 -3.37E-
04*	
4.70E-06	 -1.21E-04	 5.60E-05	 5.37E-05	
		 (1.23E-04)	 (1.95E-
04)	
(1.16E-
04)	
(1.55E-
04)	
(1.30E-
04)	
(1.53E-
04)	Lower	Secondary	 0.155**	 .083	 .098*	 .172**	 .170***	 .131*	
		 (0.062)	 (0.107)	 (0.057)	 (0.087)	 (0.058)	 (0.074)	
Upper	Secondary	 0.268***	 0.216**	 0.207***	 0.344***	 0.314***	 0.291***	
		 (0.071)	 (0.108)	 (0.066)	 (0.097)	 (0.071)	 (0.087)	
Tertiary	 0.434***	 0.240*	 0.347***	 0.482***	 0.511***	 0.953***	
		 (0.122)	 (0.141)	 (0.113)	 (0.129)	 (0.179)	 (0.144)	
Married	 0.128***	 -0.018	 0.191***	 -0.01	 0.108**	 0.048	
		 (0.044)	 (0.060)	 (0.043)	 (0.054)	 (0.052)	 (0.054)	
Indian	 0.033	 0.009	 -0.005	 0.007	 -0.055	 -0.073	
		 (0.058)	 (0.078)	 (0.053)	 (0.067)	 (0.063)	 (0.073)	
African	 0.081	 0.072	 0.008	 0.074	 0.037	 -0.127*	
		 (0.061)	 (0.079)	 (0.054)	 (0.071)	 (0.065)	 (0.070)	
Machine	Operator	 0.277***	 0.328	 0.257***	 0.427**	 0.244***	 0.141	
		 (0.070)	 (0.210)	 (0.066)	 (0.205)	 (0.079)	 (0.204)	
Craft	Worker	 0.232***	 0.466***	 0.226***	 0.455***	 0.170***	 0.268	
		 (0.064)	 (0.166)	 (0.054)	 (0.170)	 (0.054)	 (0.195)	
Sales	Worker	 0.189**	 0.158	 0.163**	 0.095	 0.134*	 0.01	
		 (0.090)	 (0.110)	 (0.077)	 (0.083)	 (0.077)	 (0.056)	
Clerical	 0.359***	 0.582***	 0.412***	 0.454***	 0.289**	 0.239***	
		 (0.109)	 (0.106)	 (0.108)	 (0.096)	 (0.131)	 (0.082)	
Technician	 0.410***	 0.512***	 0.518***	 0.567***	 0.671***	 0.600***	
		 (0.072)	 (0.117)	 (0.073)	 (0.101)	 (0.100)	 (0.110)	
Professional	 0.173	 0.607***	 0.395***	 0.606***	 0.800***	 0.707***	
		 (0.158)	 (0.139)	 (0.131)	 (0.124)	 (0.174)	 (0.143)	
Manager	 0.335***	 0.645***	 0.554***	 0.632***	 0.866***	 0.801***	
		 (0.102)	 (0.117)	 (0.100)	 (0.131)	 (0.178)	 (0.166)	
Agriculture/Fishing	 0.074	 -0.635***	 0.022	 -0.151*	 -0.190*	 -0.011	
		 (0.231)	 (0.118)	 (0.158)	 (0.090)	 (0.112)	 (0.075)	
Mining/Quarrying	 0.474***	 0.299***	 0.534***	 0.422***	 0.699***	 0.48	
		 (0.079)	 (0.081)	 (0.076)	 (0.091)	 (0.108)	 (0.308)	
Manufacturing	 0.293***	 0.320***	 0.206***	 0.154	 0.217***	 0.106	
		 (0.081)	 (0.102)	 (0.073)	 (0.105)	 (0.083)	 (0.113)	
Electricity/Gas/Water	 0.212	 -1.086***	 0.364**	 -0.696***	 0.312	 -0.222	
		 (0.200)	 (0.227)	 (0.164)	 (0.221)	 (0.258)	 (0.223)	
Wholesale/Retail	 0.199**	 0.124	 0.084	 0.103	 0.023	 -0.042	
		 (0.084)	 (0.091)	 (0.068)	 (0.076)	 (0.069)	 (0.070)	
Transport/Communication	 0.195*	 0.252*	 0.133	 0.282*	 0.210*	 0.096	
		 (0.108)	 (0.147)	 (0.096)	 (0.159)	 (0.121)	 (0.189)	
Finance/Insurance	 0.373***	 0.366***	 0.312***	 0.344***	 0.181*	 0.292***	
		 (0.092)	 (0.086)	 (0.082)	 (0.083)	 (0.097)	 (0.092)	
Construction	 0.394***	 0.185	 0.232***	 0.328***	 0.194***	 0.334*	
		 (0.073)	 (0.134)	 (0.061)	 (0.107)	 (0.064)	 (0.174)	
Constant	 2.032***	 1.647***	 2.447***	 2.075***	 2.665***	 2.605***	
		 (0.113)	 (0.173)	 (0.093)	 (0.134)	 (0.105)	 (0.132)	
Observations	 766	 495	 766	 495	 766	 495	
R-squared	 0.21	 0.239	 0.261	 0.33	 0.306	 0.495	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	 		
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Chapter	5 Conclusion	
	
5.1		 Summary	of	Findings	
	
The	Caribbean	region	has	historically	been	an	understudied	region	in	the	economics	
literature	in	terms	of	gender	wage	gaps,	and	the	present	study	sought	to	fill	some	of	
that	 gap	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 Labour	markets	 can	provide	an	effective	mechanism	 to	
enhance	(or	hinder)	economic	growth	(Reilly	and	Bellony,	2009).		Given	the	fact	that	
the	last	set	of	substantial	research	done	on	Trinidad	and	Tobago’s	gender	wage	gap	
was	 based	 on	 1993	 data,	 this	 current	 research	 explored	 how	 the	 gap	 has	 evolved	
since	 then,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 the	 country’s	 economic	 boom	 years	 post-1993.		
Knowledge	of	the	labour	market	determining	process,	and	more	specifically,	details	
surrounding	the	nature	and	causes	of	gender	wage	differentials	 (and	by	extension,	
“discrimination”	in	the	labour	market),	is	invaluable	to	the	formulation,	design,	and	
implementation	of	public	policy.					
	
This	study	contributes	to	previous	work	exploring	gender	pay	differentials	in	Trinidad	
and	 Tobago	 (Olsen	 and	 Coppin,	 2001;	 Coppin	 and	 Olsen,	 2007)	 by	 exploring	 the	
gender	 wage	 gap	 not	 only	 at	 the	 mean,	 but	 also	 throughout	 the	 entire	 wage	
distribution.		The	main	objectives	of	the	thesis	included	measuring	the	magnitude	of	
the	 wage	 gap	 for	 the	 overall	 working	 population	 (and	 separately	 for	 sector	 of	
employment,	 namely,	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors);	 and	 to	 ascertain	 if	 working	
women	face	a	glass	ceiling	and/or	sticky	floor	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago.		
	
The	 gender	 wage	 gap	 narrowed	 over	 the	 past	 twenty	 years,	 moving	 from	 an	
estimated	gap	of	19.2	per	cent	in	1993	(Olsen	and	Coppin,	2001)	to	11.4	per	cent	in	
2012.	 	 The	 corresponding	 gender	wage	gaps	 in	 the	public	 and	private	 sectors	 also	
narrowed	over	the	time	period,	moving	from	6.3	per	cent	and	31.6	per	cent	in	1993	
(Coppin	and	Olsen,	2007),	respectively,	to	3.2	per	cent	and	23.0	per	cent	in	2012.			
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While	it	 is	still	unclear	what	were	the	main	drivers	that	led	to	the	narrowing	of	the	
gender	pay	gap,	the	passing	of	the	Equal	Opportunity	Act	in	2000	may	be	one	such	
factor	that	has	contributed	to	this	improvement.	The	Act	states	that	an	employer	or	
a	 prospective	 employer	 cannot	 discriminate	 against	 a	 person’s	 “status”	 (where	
status	 refers	 to	 his/her	 sex,	 race,	 ethnicity,	 geographical	 origin,	 religion,	 marital	
status,	or	any	disability)	in	terms	of	hiring,	and	in	the	terms	or	conditions	on	which	
employment	is	offered.	 	However,	the	law	in	its	current	form	does	not	address	the	
issue	of	equal	pay	for	work	of	equal	value.				
	
The	private	sector	gender	pay	gap	was	found	to	be	twice	as	large	as	the	gap	for	the	
overall	working	population,	and	almost	eight	times	more	than	the	gap	in	the	public	
sector.	 The	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 revealed	 that	 the	 largest	 contributor	 to	
the	 “unexplained”	 (differences	 in	 coefficients)	 component	 of	 the	 private	 sector	
gender	 pay	 gap	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 intercepts	 –	 if	 female	 private	 sector	
employees	 were	 rewarded	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	male	 private	 sector	 employees,	
women’s	wages	would	increase	by	over	50	per	cent.	This	means	that	men	employed	
in	the	private	sector	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	appear	to	have	a	clear	advantage	over	
women	when	they	enter	the	labour	market	regardless	of	their	level	of	productivity.		
The	wider	pay	differential	in	the	private	sector	compared	to	that	in	the	public	sector	
might	be	due	to	lack	of	labour	regulations	and/or	enforcement	in	the	private	sector	
compared	to	the	public	sector.				
	
The	 standard	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 methodology	 is	 unable	 to	 detect	 the	
vast	differences	in	the	wage	gap	for	low-	and	high-income	earners;	therefore	we	also	
employed	 quantile	 decompositions.	 	 For	 instance,	 we	 found	 that	 for	 the	 overall	
working	population	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	distribution,	the	gender	wage	gap	
is	much	 larger	 (25.1	per	cent)	compared	to	the	higher	end	of	wages	where	no	gap	
exists.	 	Additionally,	 the	“unexplained”	component	of	 the	gender	wage	gap,	which	
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can	(cautiously)	be	used	as	an	indicator	of	the	extent	of	discrimination	in	the	labour	
market,	reveals	that	lower-waged	women	face	greater	discrimination.		For	example,	
at	 the	10th	percentile,	 if	women	received	 the	same	rate	of	 return	as	men	 for	 their	
characteristics,	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	33	per	cent	whereas	at	the	
90th	percentile	their	wages	are	estimated	to	increase	by	11.8	per	cent	(based	on	the	
Machado	and	Mata/Melly	approach).		As	such,	women	in	higher	paid	jobs	in	Trinidad	
and	Tobago	seem	to	not	be	as	disadvantaged	as	lower	paid	women.	
	
The	 detailed	 decomposition	 results	 (based	 on	 RIF-regressions)	 provide	 a	 more	
nuanced	 analysis	 for	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 both	 the	 “explained”	 and	 “unexplained”	
components	 of	 the	 wage	 differential	 at	 different	 points	 along	 the	 distribution	 of	
wages.	 	 Overall,	 with	 the	 advancement	 of	 women’s	 education	 in	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago’s	recent	history	and	the	provision	of	free	education	by	the	government	up	to	
the	 tertiary	 level,	 women	 now	 have	 better	 characteristics	 (“endowments”)	 than	
men,	 especially	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	wage	 distribution.52	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 “explained”	
component,	 if	 women	 had	 the	 same	 characteristics	 as	 men,	 their	 wages	 are	
estimated	to	increase	only	slightly	(by	3.0	per	cent	and	1.0	per	cent)	at	the	lower	end	
of	the	wage	distribution	(10th	and	25th	percentiles),	but	to	decrease	along	the	higher	
end	of	the	wage	distribution.	
	
Meanwhile,	 the	 “unexplained”	 component,	 which	 can	 be	 indicative	 of	
discrimination,	 shows	 that:	 1)	 lower	 paid	 men	 enter	 the	 labour	 market	 at	 an	
advantage	over	their	female	counterparts53;	2)	lower	paid	men	are	rewarded	more	if	
they	 are	married	 compared	 to	 their	 married	 female	 counterparts54;	 and	 3)	men’s	
work	experience	is	valued	more	than	women’s	work	experience	at	the	lower	end	of	
																																								 																				
52	At	the	90th	percentile,	on	average,	women	have	three	more	years	of	education	than	men.	
53	 This	 premium	 is	 markedly	 higher	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution	 –	 men	 receive	 a	
premium	of	43.3	per	cent	at	 the	25th	percentile	compared	with	a	0.6	per	cent	premium	at	 the	90th	
percentile.	
54	 Married	 men	 receive	 an	 estimated	 6.6	 per	 cent	 premium	 at	 the	 10th	 percentile	 over	 married	
females.	
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the	 pay	 scale.55	 	 In	 short,	 although	 female	workers	 have	 better	 endowments	 than	
male	workers,	and	hence	should	be	paid	more	than	their	male	counterparts,	men’s	
wages	are	higher,	owing	 to	a	 large,	positive	unexplained	difference	 in	 the	 rates	of	
return	to	these	characteristics.		The	results	of	the	quantile	decompositions	show	that	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago’s	 labour	 market	 does	 not	 have	 a	 glass	 ceiling,	 but	 female	
workers	 face	 a	 sticky	 floor	 instead	 as	 the	 wage	 gap	 is	 much	 larger	 for	 low-paid	
women	compared	to	their	high-income	earning	counterparts.			
	
Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	glass	 ceiling	 in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	may	be	 “hidden”	by	
the	fact	that	on	average	at	the	higher	end	of	the	pay	scale	women	have	more	years	
of	 education	 than	men.	 	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 these	 women	 feel	 compelled	 to	 educate	
themselves	further	to	compete	with	their	male	counterparts	for	higher	paying	jobs.		
	
The	 foregoing	 analysis	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 possible	 presence	 of	 sample	
selection	bias	in	the	models’	estimates.		Heckman’s	two-step	procedure	was	used	to	
test	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 sample	 selection	 in	 the	 OLS	 regressions	 and	 it	 was	
(tentatively)	concluded	there	was	no	selection	 in	 the	OLS	models.	 	Although,	given	
the	weak	 identification	of	 the	Heckman	estimator	because	of	 the	 lack	of	exclusion	
restrictions	due	to	data	limitations,	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	estimates	are	more	robust	
and	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 the	more	 appropriate	models	 for	 analysis.	 Furthermore,	
some	 researchers	 (Stolzenberg	 and	 Relles,	 1997)	 have	 noted	 that	 only	 if	 selection	
bias	 is	very	severe	and	the	samples	are	 large,	does	Heckman’s	 two-step	correction	
method	improve	estimates	compared	to	the	“uncorrected”	OLS	estimates.			
	
Finally,	in	terms	of	the	labour	supply	decision	of	women,	the	results	from	the	probit	
model	were	broadly	in	line	with	a	priori	expectations.		In	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	fewer	
women	compared	to	men	are	in	wage	employment	–	in	2012,	the	percentage	of	men	
																																								 																				
55	 From	the	 lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution	up	 to	 the	75th	percentile,	men’s	work	experience	 is	
rewarded	 more;	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile,	 employers	 seem	 to	 reward	 women	 more	 for	 their	 work	
experience.	
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in	 wage	 employment	 was	 66.3	 per	 cent	 compared	 to	 53.5	 per	 cent	 for	 women.		
Furthermore,	the	predicted	probability	of	women	participating	in	the	labour	market	
increases	with	higher	levels	of	education.		Education	has	a	larger	(positive)	impact	on	
a	woman’s	decision	 to	engage	 in	wage	employment	 than	 it	 does	 for	men.	 	 Like	 in	
many	other	societies,	on	average,	having	a	partner	(married/common	law)	decreases	
a	woman’s	probability	of	participating	in	the	labour	market.		Meanwhile,	as	much	as	
ethnicity	is	not	a	significant	determining	factor	for	wages	for	both	men	and	women,	
it	does	play	a	role	in	women’s	labour	supply	decision.		Women	of	Indian	descent	in	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 are	 the	 least	 likely	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	market.	 	We	
hypothesise	that	this	may	be	due	to	historical	and	cultural	customs	and	norms	still	
practiced	within	that	sub-ethnic	grouping.				
	
5.2	 Policy	Implications	
	
From	a	policy	perspective,	the	results	of	this	study	show	that	public	policy	needs	to	
be	 flexible	enough	 to	deal	with	 the	 full	 range	of	women’s	experiences	both	at	 the	
top	and	at	 the	bottom	of	 the	wage	distribution.	 	 It	 is	 important	 to	understand	the	
nature	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 gender	 wage	 discrimination,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	 the	 sticky	 floor	 effect,	 in	 order	 to	 design	 adequate	 policy	
actions.	 	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	 sticky	 floors	are	 related	 to	 the	start	of	 “job	 ladder”	
climbing	and	may	be	seen	as	women	having	lower	probabilities	of	getting	promoted	
in	 several	 dimensions	 including	 occupational	 level,	 job	 authority,	 and	 wages	
(Deschacht	et	al,	2011).		
	
In	 addition,	 even	 though	 female	 labour	 force	 participation	 has	 increased	 steadily	
over	the	last	two	decades	from	just	over	40	per	cent	in	the	1980s	to	just	over	50	per	
cent	in	the	mid-2000s,	there	is	still	a	role	for	the	government	to	create	an	enabling	
environment	that	supports	even	greater	gender	equality	 in	the	labour	market.		The	
government	 has	 already	 been	 successful	 in	 implementing	 universal	 education	 at	
both	the	primary	and	secondary	school	levels.		However,	additional	policies,	such	as	
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ones	 that	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	 of	 discrimination	 on	 the	 part	 of	 employers,	 and	
measures	 to	 assist	 parents	 to	 reconcile	 work	 and	 family	 may	 lead	 to	 further	
increases	in	female	labour	force	participation.		Social	norms	surrounding	Indian	and	
Hindu	families	which	inhibit	females	from	seeking	employment	may	be	outside	the	
gambit	 of	 the	 government,	 and	 may	 instead	 need	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 mind-set	 of	 the	
overall	populace	of	the	country.		
	
5.3	 Limitations	
	
In	 any	 analysis	 of	 the	 gender	wage	 gap	 several	major	methodological	 issues	 arise.		
Firstly,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 male	 and	 female	 earnings	 equations	 are	 estimated	
consistently,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 methodological	 problems	 of	 self-
selection,	 heterogeneity,	 and	 endogeneity.	 	 Secondly,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	
decomposition	technique	of	the	wage	gap	is	critical	for	meaningful	interpretation	of	
its	components.	Not	all	of	these	issues	could	have	been	adequately	addressed	in	this	
research	due	to	data	limitations	in	the	data	set	used	for	analysis.		Nonetheless,	these	
issues	are	discussed	below.		
	
Sample	Selection	
Heckman	et	al	 (2003)	showed	that	the	underlying	assumptions	of	the	Mincer	wage	
equation	 may	 no	 longer	 hold	 and	 may	 in	 fact	 underestimate	 the	 returns	 to	
education.	The	sample	of	working	people	excludes	those	who	do	not	participate	 in	
the	 labour	market	 and	may	 not	 be	 a	 random	 selection	 of	 the	 overall	 population.	
Moreover,	if	the	labour	market	participation	decision	is	correlated	with	the	earnings	
function,	the	expected	value	of	the	error	term	in	the	earnings	function	may	not	be	
zero.		To	deal	with	this	selectivity	bias,	a	sample	selection	model	of	earnings	can	be	
applied	which	 takes	 the	 participation	 decision	 into	 account.	 	 However,	 the	 use	 of	
exclusion	restrictions	 in	the	selection	equation	 is	 imperative	for	 identification.	 	Due	
to	 data	 restraints,	 the	 selection	model	 was	 run	 without	 exclusion	 restrictions	 and	
was	shown	to	be	weakly	identified.				
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Heterogeneity	
Earnings	may	also	be	influenced	by	a	host	of	unobservable	factors	 like	 intelligence,	
innate	 ability,	 and	 motivation;	 however,	 these	 are	 difficult	 to	 measure.		
Heterogeneity	arises	if	unobserved	individual	characteristics,	which	affect	wages,	are	
correlated	 with	 the	 explanatory	 variables.	 In	 effect,	 the	 presence	 of	 unobserved	
individual	 heterogeneity	 may	 yield	 biased	 coefficient	 estimates	 of	 the	 observed	
variables	 that	 are	 generated	 from	OLS.	 	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 well	 established	 that	 if	
ability	is	correlated	with	both	the	level	of	education	and	earnings,	the	rate	of	return	
estimates	 based	 on	 OLS	 display	 an	 upward	 bias.	 	 Panel	 data	 techniques,	 such	 as	
instrumental	 variables,	 could	 be	 used	 to	 circumvent	 the	 issue	 of	 heterogeneity.		
However,	 even	 though	 there	 is	 consensus	 about	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 bias	 when	
heterogeneity	 is	 ignored,	 there	 is	 less	 agreement	 on	 its	 magnitude.	 	 Card	 (1999)	
presented	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 bias	 may	 be	 modest.		
Nevertheless,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 our	 dataset,	 like	 many	 other	 labour	 force	
surveys,	 contained	 little	 information	 that	 could	 have	 been	 sensibly	 used	 to	 proxy	
ability,	and	the	estimated	returns	to	education	are	thus	subject	to	this	caveat.				
	
Endogeneity	
The	underlying	wage	equations	can	also	be	mis-specified	due	to	the	endogeneity	of	
the	 explanatory	 variables.	 	 For	 example,	 work	 experience	 may	 be	 a	 function	 of	
previous	earnings	as	well	as	present	earnings;	or	even	the	returns	to	education	since	
the	wage	equations	do	not	 capture	 (unobserved)	ability.	 	 To	 remove	 this	bias,	 the	
endogenous	 variables	 should	 be	 instrumented	 (e.g.	 suggested	 instruments	 for	 the	
years	of	schooling	could	include	family	background	variables	like	parents’	education	
and	 income).	 	 The	 instrumented	 variable	 (IV)	 cannot	 be	 correlated	with	 the	 error	
term,	but	should	have	a	high	correlation	with	the	endogenous	variable.		The	labour	
force	survey	used	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	does	not	include	any	questions	relating	to	
family	 background	 variables	 such	 as	 parents’	 income,	 education,	 and	 the	 like.		
Therefore,	 the	OLS/IV	approach	 to	address	 the	endogeneity	of	work	experience	or	
education	could	not	have	been	employed.						
	
219	
	
Decomposition	Technique		
Decomposition	 can	 be	 sensitive	 to	 which	 wage	 structure	 is	 used	 as	 the	 non-
discriminatory	 wage	 structure.	 Under	 nepotism,	 women	 are	 paid	 the	 competitive	
wage,	 but	 men	 are	 overpaid.	 	 Here,	 the	 coefficients	 from	 the	 women’s	 earnings	
functions	 provide	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 non-discriminatory	 wage	 structure.	 	 Under	
discrimination,	employers	pay	men	competitive	wages	but	underpay	women.	In	this	
case,	 the	 male	 coefficients	 should	 be	 taken	 as	 the	 non-discriminatory	 wage	
structure.	In	reality,	employers	may	practice	both	nepotism	and	discrimination.		
	
A	possible	 solution	 to	 this	dilemma,	as	proposed	by	Neumark	 (1988)	was	used	 for	
our	analyses,	which	is	to	use	a	“pooled”	wage	structure,	which	is	a	weighted	average	
of	 the	 male	 and	 female	 wage	 structures.	 	 One	 should	 note	 however,	 that	 the	
Neumark	decomposition	technique	tends	to	overstate	the	explained	component	by	
inappropriately	transferring	some	of	the	unexplained	parts	to	the	explained	portion	
of	the	gap.			
	
Potential	Experience	
The	labour	force	survey	used	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	does	not	include	any	questions	
relating	 to	 job	experience	and/or	 tenure,	 and	as	 is	 customary	 in	 applied	work,	we	
used	potential	experience	as	a	proxy	for	actual	experience.		Potential	experience	was	
calculated	 as	 age	 minus	 years	 of	 education	 minus	 age	 at	 which	 formal	 schooling	
begins,	which	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	is	five	years	old.		Potential	experience	is	usually	
a	good	measure	of	actual	experience	 for	men	 (since	men	 tend	 to	have	continuous	
employment	 since	 leaving	 school),	 but	 less	 so	 for	 women	 (since	 women	 typically	
spend	 some	 time	out	of	 the	 labour	 force,	 for	example,	 to	 care	 for	 young	children,	
etc.).		Consequently,	the	potential	experience	measure	in	reference	to	women	tends	
to	 overestimate	 their	 actual	 years	 of	 experience	 and	 underestimate	 the	 impact	 of	
work	experience	on	earnings	 (Tzannatos	and	Sapsford,	1993).	Additionally,	 the	use	
of	potential	experience	in	lieu	of	actual	experience	in	the	wage	earnings	regressions	
for	 women	 may	 have	 overestimated	 the	 unexplained	 portion	 of	 the	 wage	 gap.		
Based	on	a	meta-analysis	of	gender	wage	gaps	in	several	countries,	Weichselbaumer	
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and	Winter-Ebmer	 (2005)	 found	 that	 using	 potential	 experience	 instead	 of	 actual	
experience	overestimates	the	unexplained	gender	wage	gap,	on	average,	by	1.8	log	
points.					
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